

FAR ABOVE RUBIES: The Association Between Bride Price And
Extramarital Liaisons In Uganda

by

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ABSTRACT {WORDCOUNT 383}

Objective: To examine the determinants of bride price and the impact of bride price on marital behavior in Uganda.

Methods: A survey on HIV related attitudes and behavior was conducted in 1215 households in Uganda in early 2001. Households were selected at random from Demographic and Health Survey household listings in 12 districts. Eligible respondents were men and women age 18-60. We asked all currently married women whether their husband gave her parents any items or monies by way of bride-price. Women were asked to state the value of the money or items and the date of completion of payoff. All bride prices were inflated to 2001 prices using an inflation rate of 6%. Logistic regression was used to determine the determinants of whether a women had any bride price, the size of the bride price. We also modeled the determinants of whether or not a woman reported having boyfriends or lovers other than her spouse.

Results: Of 839 married women interviewed, 592 agreed to complete the marital behavior module of the survey. Bride prices were paid for 406 and were not paid for 188 of the married women. The principal determinants of having any bride price were urban residence (O.R. 0.23 $p<0.01$) and current age (in decades) (O.R. 1.26 $p=.067$). Controlling for rural residence, woman's schooling did not predict the presence of a bride price. Among women who had a bride price, the bride price magnitudes were larger in households that owned more land. Finally controlling for rural residence, current age, current income, and highest grade completed, we found that having had a bride price lowered the wife's odds of sexual intercourse with a partner other than the spouse (O.R. 0.188

p=.024) and increased the husband's odds of non-spousal sexual intercourse (O.R. 2.137 p=0.053)

Discussion: The payment of bride prices has been a prevalent feature among rural Ugandan women, more so for older cohorts. Women who had participated in this custom were less likely to report extramarital relationships regardless of age. Their partners were more likely to report extramarital relationships. These findings are examined in light of a theory of marital payments that focuses on indivisibility of certain marital resources such as marital fidelity. Men may be substituting cash payments for their own fidelity in securing wives who provide marital fidelity.

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“Who can find a virtuous woman? For her price is far above rubies.”

--Proverbs 31:10

Introduction

Bride price, or the exchange of money and valuable items from the groom to the bride and/or her family, remains a prevalent custom in many societies, particularly in Africa. In contrast, dowry as practiced in South Asia is a monetary exchange from bride's family to groom and/or his family. Scientific contributions have been mostly to offer theoretical accounts for why societies engage in these customs. Empirical research on the determinants of bride price and how bride price affects later marital behavior has been more limited (Zhang and Chan 1999) .

With cursory attention, it is possible to consider monetary exchanges that accompany marriage as stigmatizing—casting the prospective spouse of either sex as a commodity (Wilson and Daly 1992). Indeed, some consider bride price to be a vestigial remnant of traditional patriarchal society destined to give way with the growth of opportunities for women other than marriage. Active policy discussion focuses on abolishing the refundability of bride-price which can enable men to control their wives by threatening to divorce them and request a refund of the bride-price (Okioma 2004; Rogers 2004; Wendo 2004).

If one cares at all about bride price, it must be because of presumed causal or non-causal links between bride price and the way the spouses treat each other during

the marriage¹. A successful theory must succeed not only in explaining why certain individuals in a community and not others have bride price, it should also help us understand why marital behavior may vary between couples on the basis of bride price.

The goal of this paper is to develop a theory of why there may be equilibria characterized by a non-negative bride price and why bride price might be related to sexual fidelity. We will use cross-sectional household data collected in Uganda in 2001 to explain: 1) Why the prevalence of bride price is variable both across regions and within regions; and 2) What mediates the association between bride price payment and later marital behavior by both the husband and the wife. The first question requires an explanation for bride price that predicts multiple regional equilibrium

Background

Bride price not only permits societies to adapt to the shortages of women that can occur with polygyny, it also helps grooms compete for the most desirable brides. Brides and their families faced with multiple suitors can weigh “cash on the barrel” against cheap talk of “love, devotion, and wedded bliss”.

¹ Since bride prices are terms of trade agreed upon by the interested parties, it is unlikely that the prices themselves will be the causal force—the prices must stem from the underlying properties of the market and the interested parties.

Polygyny and Shortages of Women

Bronfenbrenner was one of the first to link the practice of bride price to the practice of polygyny (Bronfenbrenner 1971). Viewing marriage as a long term contract for spousal labor, one sees bride price as the first of a succession of monetary and non-monetary transfers from husband to wife in exchange for services (Grossbard 1978). The roots of polygyny are imbedded in the technology of agricultural production. If men are heterogeneous e.g. owning various sized land parcels and women are homogenous (owning only their labor capacity) then there will be production gains to the more well endowed men from making long term (labor) contracts with multiple women. Even if the household is seen as primarily producing children and not agricultural products, polygyny emerges as an equilibrium where men are heterogeneous in asset ownership and are of limited use in child care (Becker 1991). No matter the genesis of polygyny, once polygyny is practiced by a sizable fraction of men, there will be a shortage of women. Men interested in marriage when there is a shortage of women will have to compete with other prospective grooms by offering incentives to whoever owns the right to grant a woman in marriage.

Anthropologists have questioned whether bride price can be seen as an attempt to compensate the father for his loss of the daughter's labor contribution (Kessel 1977). If the woman herself is empowered to grant her own assent to a marriage contract than she can reap the benefits of a competition for brides, not just in terms of a one time bride price, but through the division of resources and

responsibilities throughout the duration of the marriage. If, as occurs in many societies, the bride's parents have the power to contract marriage on behalf of their daughter, the daughter's gains from shortage conditions can be more variable. With perfectly selfish parents the bride price is extracted exclusively for the parents. With high levels of altruism the parents may not only share bride price directly with their daughter, but attempt to secure marital power arrangements that will benefit her. Ultimately it will be the daughter and not the parents who face the daily negotiations that secure and maintain her marital bargaining power. So ultimately, the daughter's ability to threaten either divorce or reduced contributions to the household (Lundberg and Pollak 1993), will determine her marital welfare. The question is whether the payment of bride price reveals information about the characteristics of bride and groom that portends their future welfare. Answering this question requires attention to the role of bride price in marital sorting of brides and grooms based on their characteristics.

We explore a model of gender asymmetry and paternal control where men are given the opportunity to pay a woman's father (or other close male relative) a premarital payment called bride price. It is common knowledge in this model that by paying a higher bride price men increase their chances of obtaining marital fidelity. This perception is reinforced by the custom of a 'money-back guarantee' offered by the relatives who are paid a bride price: they promise to return the bride price if the bride cheats and husband wants a divorce.

Women who place a positive value on marital fidelity don't have the option of paying a 'groom price' for it. Instead, women (and their relatives) can express the value they place on marital fidelity by accepting a lower bride price, or no bride price at all, in return for men's promise of marital fidelity. The connection between a lower bride price and husbands' fidelity is not as clear as that between higher bride price and wives' fidelity: if men don't fulfill their promises of fidelity, and the couple divorces, women don't benefit from a 'money-back guarantee'.

This section presents two models that conceive of fidelity in marriage as a private good of value to spouse A and produced by spouse B and of premarital payments as a means of acquiring this private good. The first model is a simple partial model that conveys some of the logic of our argument. Even though the second model is more complex, it uses some of the same simplifying assumptions used in the first model. In all our models we assume that both men and women may possibly value fidelity. We focus on fidelity while recognizing that marriage has other functions as well. Marriage typically also deals with the production of other goods that are either of private value to one spouse or that are a public good to the couple. Among such goods are the benefits that spouses derive from their shared children (see Grossbard-Shechtman 1993 and Mincy, Grossbard, and Huang 2005) or sexual intimacy.

We assume that fidelity enters individual utility functions as a private good. It is not farfetched to assume that a wife's fidelity is a private good to a husband, or vice-versa, a husband's fidelity is a private good to a wife: such fidelity generates feeling that rest in a person's heart, a private matter and a private good.

Our models are market models in the sense that we use Demand and Supply (D&S) analysis. It is assumed that there are many individual men and women who have a demand for marital fidelity and are interchangeable before they match into marriages. They therefore participate in the same markets for faithful spouses. These markets reach an equilibrium implying equilibrium ‘prices’ that are usually not observable but are connected to observable bride prices.

A partial model

We offer this simple one period model assuming males and females can make binding agreements for their conduct during a single post-marital period. Males will be indexed by “i” and females by “j”. Males must choose a number of extramarital partners, N_i^+ , and consumption, X_i to maximize:

$$[1a] \quad V_i(N_i^+, X_i, N_j^-) \text{ where } \frac{dV_i}{dN_i^+} > 0, \frac{dV_i}{dX_i} > 0, \frac{dV_i}{dN_j^-} > 0$$

Males can make payments C_j to females to contract a reduction in the number of extramarital partners, they can also receive payments C_i from females. These payments give the male budget constraint the following form:

$$[2a] \quad C_i N_i + I_i = C_j N_j + P_i X_i$$

We establish an arbitrary maximum number of lifetime extramarital sexual partners that is in part constrained by the amount of time available to the man to acquire an extramarital partner. We assume that all men and women are equally attractive and equally seducible so that there would be some universally constant number of hours required per extramarital partner². Our finitely lived agents would then have a finite cap on lifetime partners as follows:

$$[3a] N_i^- = \bar{N} - N_i^+$$

Where \bar{N} = Maximum number of extramarital partners in the period,
a constant.

N_i^+ =Actual number of i's extramarital partners

N_j^- = number of extramarital partners avoided by spouse j

X_i =Commodities consumed by i

C_i = Compensation offered by spouse j per extramarital partner
avoided by individual i

C_j = Compensation offered by i per extramarital partner avoided by
spouse j

I_i =Income of i.

P_i =Price of X.

² According to Leporello's records, Don Giovanni had 740 extramarital conquests in Italy, 231 in Germany, 100 in France, 92 in Turkey, but in Spain—1003. This would suggest that in operatic characters, unlike in our model, there is cultural heterogeneity in the seducibility of women, or in the effort supplied by the seducer.

We also posit a completely symmetric utility function and constraints for females indexed by “i”. All notation is analogous to the case of males.

$$[1b] V_i(N_i^+, X_i, N_i^-) \text{ where } \frac{dV_i}{dN_i^+} > 0, \frac{dV_i}{dX_i} > 0, \frac{dV_i}{dN_i^-} > 0$$

$$[2b] C_i N_i^- + I_i = C_i N_i^+ + P_i X_i$$

$$[3b] N_i^- = \bar{N} - N_i^+$$

From these two maximization problems we can derive optimal levels of avoided partners by i and by j.

We can derive men’s demand for women’s avoidance of extramarital partners, i.e. man i’s demand for N_j^- . We can also obtain the woman’s supply of N_j^- .

It is instructive to consider an intra-marital market for N_j^- , supplied by the woman and demanded by the man to derive a market equilibrium quantity of N_j^- .

Equilibrium costs C_j are obtained at this market equilibrium, where supply meets demand. There will be symmetrical markets for men’s supply of N_i^- and women’s demand for men’s N_i^- .

Bridewealth is a function of men's and women's 'earnings' from avoiding extramarital relations. Bride price represents payments received by women at the time of marriage. A bride price is positive when the woman (or her family) receives funds from the man at the time of marriage. Bride price is negative when the woman (or her family) pays money to the man (or his family). One can define net bride price as a monotonically increasing function, g , of net value of transfer payments.

$$[4] B = g(C_j N_j^- - C_i N_i^-)$$

The effect of an income increase to the man can be depicted as:

$$\frac{dB}{dI_i} = \frac{dB}{dI_i} (C_j N_j^- - C_i N_i^-) = g \left(\frac{dC_j}{dI_i} N_j^- - \frac{dC_i}{dI_i} N_i^- + C_j \frac{dN_j^-}{dI_i} - C_i \frac{dN_i^-}{dI_i} \right)$$

The sign of the income effect is ambiguous because it contains the sum of both positive and negative terms.

$$g ((+) - (+) + (+) - (-))$$

The second term is non-zero if the man's higher income makes him require a higher payment to induce faithfulness. The fourth term is non-zero if the man's higher income increases his taste for extramarital sex and requires the woman to rebate greater amounts of payment to induce faithfulness.

Analogously, there is an ambiguous effect of an income increase to “ y ”.

With this model one can make the following predictions.

Proposition 1) Bride price will depend on the number of extramarital partners avoided by the female. Thus as shown in relationship [4] there will be an association which we denote $B(N_f)$ and dB/dN_f is positive. The more avoided partners by the female the higher the bride price.

Proposition 2) Bride price will depend on the number of extramarital partners avoided by the female. The more avoided partners by the male the lower the bride price. A man can achieve discounts in the bride price he pays the woman by promising more faithfulness³.

Data

The data we will use come from a household survey we conducted in 12 districts of Uganda in 2001. The primary purpose of the survey was to measure the willingness to pay for an AIDS vaccine. Since the perception of HIV/AIDS risk is an important component of the demand for an AIDS vaccine, the survey included a

³ In Uganda, bride price is typically paid off over many years, and the payment schedule can be made favorable or unfavorable during the payment period by the father in law. Thus a philandering husband may face very strict

module to assess respondent's risk of HIV/AIDS. HIV is spread primarily through heterosexual transmission in Uganda so the risk assessment module asked about the respondents' sexual behavior—numbers of marital and extramarital sexual partners and use of condoms. In addition all currently married women were asked whether money or valuable items were transferred to her family by way of bride price. They were asked the date of completion of the payment and the total value of the payment.

For the WTP study a stratified random sample of households was drawn from Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2000 cluster lists. In the first stage we selected Kampala (the capital) and a sample of 11 additional outlying districts to achieve two goals: 1) Minimize the number of languages required⁴; 2) Obtain 25 to 30 clusters from regions of Central, Northern, Eastern, and Western Uganda (See map in Figure 2). The target districts were selected to offer wide variation in the rate of perceived risk (based on DHS 1995 responses) and in income levels.

At each household, a household respondent was identified who completed a household roster and identified the principal economic activity of the household head as well as the principal assets owned. From the household roster, a maximum of 3 adult respondents per household were selected for the in depth interview on behavior and willingness to pay.

terms, whereas a faithful son-in-law could merit leniency. Timed payments of the bride price help the bride's side of the contract enforce promises of male fidelity.

⁴ Uganda is a multi-ethnic, multi-language country. Practically each region has one or more languages.

A total of 1532 households were targeted and all locations visited. Of these, interviews were conducted in 1215 households. There were a total of 6,378 persons resident in the households enlisted. Of these, 2426 individuals were eligible for the questionnaire. To be interviewed, a respondent had to be: a usual resident of the household, aged 18-60, and not absent for more than 6 months in previous 12 months. A total of 1,758 individual interviews were conducted. There were 839 interviews with currently married women, and 430 interviews with the husbands of interviewed women. Unfortunately 247 women refused to answer whether or not bride price was paid to them—the Western region accounted for nearly half of the refusals. In the current analysis we eliminate these 247 women with missing bride price data from the analysis. The first columns of Tables 1 and 2 list the characteristics of these eliminated women. The final result of these sample size reductions is that there are 594 non-missing observations of whether bride price was paid, and 382 observations of whether bride price was paid in households where husbands were also interviewed.

Husbands were only interviewed by male interviewers, wives by female interviewers. All interviewers were experienced field staff from Makerere University who received extensive training in the protocol and were supervised with 1 field supervisor for every 4 interviewers.

Despite the skill of the interviewers, we noted regional differences in the responsiveness of our research participants. In the Western regions, women were reluctant to state whether or not they had had bride price, and they were even more

hesitant to reveal the monetary amount paid. In the Eastern regions, women almost never admitted to having extramarital partners, and it is impossible to assess whether this is because of an understandable unwillingness to trust strangers or due to an equally plausible high adherence to social norms of marital fidelity.

Methods

Bride Price Data

Respondents provided nominal estimates of their bride prices and the year payment was completed. When year of payment was not stated we dated the payment to the year of marriage. All bride prices were inflated to 2001 values using a constant annual rate of inflation of 6% which is the average rate of inflation reported in Kampala between 1995 to 2000 (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2000) .

Economic Status

Within the constraints of a thirty minute interview, we could only ask about ownership of a brief list of assets to assess economic status. We explored many ways to analyze the asset list including factor scores and (Ainsworth and Filmer 2002) raw counts of assets. The asset list we used overlaps exactly with the asset list used by the Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS) of 2000. So we also have imputed log income for our households using an out of sample technique. We take coefficients from a regression of log household expenditure against assets in UNHS-2000 data and apply the coefficients to our asset lists to impute log income.

Analysis

After tabulating the data by region and by whether or not bride was paid, we pursued two analytical questions: 1) What determines whether bride price is paid? 2) What determines whether spouses have non-marital sexual partners?

Determinants of Whether Bride Price is Paid

We used logistic regression with Huber-White correction at the cluster level to correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity. We produce odds ratios of the likelihood that a woman reported receiving bride price based on her characteristics and the characteristics of her husband. We then produce odds ratios of the likelihood that a woman would report sexual partners other than her husband in the last 12 months based on characteristics of herself, her husband, and whether she had a bride price. Finally we produce odds ratios of the likelihood that a man would report sexual partners other than his wife in the last 12 months, based on the same covariates.

Results

The prevalence of bride price declined with age from 91% women 50-60; 72% of women 30-49; and 63% of women age 18-29 reporting bride price. All subjects were asked for the year in which the bride price was paid off. In six respondents bride price was reportedly paid prior to a girl's birth, and in an additional 13 women bride price was paid prior to a girl's 10th birthday.

The first two rows of Table 1 give an initial indication that marital behavior may be correlated with whether bride price is paid. Chi-squared tests suggest that the

difference between the 2% of women with bride price who have extramarital liaisons and the 9% of women without bride price who do is significant ($P < 0.01$).

Based on the descriptive data alone, households where bride price has been paid appear to be more agricultural, to have less educated wives, to be more remote from doctors and pharmacies, to have slightly more children, and to own more land than households that state they did not exchange bride price. The households that refused to answer the bride price question are unlike the households that did not refuse in terms of their sexual behavior, they also own more land. However the refusing households are quite similar in many other respects.

Table 2 makes use of the little information we have on the value of the bride price for the subjects who exchanged it. These values were supplied by only 157 of the 406 households who had bride price. Consequently substantial sample selection bias impedes drawing inferences about the correlates of bride price magnitude. It is tempting to place the most confidence in patterns that have a regular upward or downward trend across the three bride price tertiles. For instance, condom use rises consistently across the three tertiles. Perhaps there are similar regularities in wife's perceived health, with high price brides perceiving greater health than low price brides. Number of children, notably, shows no trend across bride price tertiles.

Table 3 shows regional patterns in bride price response rates and responses. Western Uganda has the highest rate of non-response, followed by Eastern Uganda. Giving such a high rate of non-response, it is difficult to state there are strong regional differences in the prevalence of the bride price custom. The estimates of

polygyny are more reliable, because they rely only on the provision of a complete household roster. Households in which two women listed the same man as their spouse were coded as polygynous. We can confidently state that polygyny is much more rare in urban Kampala than in the rural areas we surveyed. The custom of bride price in Uganda appears least prevalent in Kampala. This would accord with Bronfenbrenner's conjecture that bride price is a phenomenon that attends polygyny (Bronfenbrenner 1971).

Table 4 shows multivariate estimates of the determinants of bride price payment. Column 1 confirms that all rural regions have a higher prevalence of bride price than Kampala, with the highest prevalence in the North. The subsequent columns show that individual level covariates do little to explain away the regional effects. Women who marry farmers have higher odds of entering a union with bride price. The economic status of the husband as reflected in both schooling and asset ownership also increases the odds of bride price. It is notable that wife's schooling does not increase the odds of bride price payment. There are theoretical reasons to predict that wife's schooling could increase the marital surplus (Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984) and empirical data from Kenya has shown a correlation of higher bride prices for women with more schooling (Mulder 1995).

Table 5 shows that a woman's odds of reporting an extramarital liaison vary widely by region, with North and West having higher odds of extramarital liaisons than urban Kampala. As noted previously, women from East Uganda almost never

reported extramarital sexual affairs. The logit model could not converge as long as the East Uganda dummy variable was included, and it was dropped.

Having a union in which bride price was paid lowers a woman's odds of reporting an extramarital sexual union with an odds ratio in the range of 0.20 that is statistically significant in all models tested. Husband's absence is positively associated with wife's extramarital sexual unions, but this could be endogenous with husbands choosing to spend more time away from a woman who does not confine her sexual interest to him.

Table 6 displays models of the probability that a man will report extramarital sexual liaisons. These models indicate that men who have paid bride price have roughly twice the odds of reporting extramarital sexual unions. The effects do not become statistically significant until the models include controls for women's age and schooling, and even then the p-value is only below 0.10. The models show no signs of regional patterns in male extramarital liaisons. Farmers are about half as likely to have extramarital unions as non-farmers ($p < 0.10$). Spending time away from the home (but being present on the day of the survey) was not related to the odds of extramarital unions. This is possibly related to sampling bias. Men who were absent in the past but present on the day of interview are not representative of all absent men.

Discussion

The principal limitation in our study stems from non-response to the question about whether bride price was paid, with 29% of women declining to answer this question. The rate of non-response differed strongly across regions, making it difficult to interpret the meaning of differences in bride price prevalence by region. The non-responders to this question did not differ markedly by age and education. The non-responders had female extramarital contact frequencies that were intermediate between those with and without bride price. Non-responders had higher rates of male extramarital contact. The limitations from non-response become even more severe in interpreting the data on the magnitude of bride price for women who had bride price.

Conclusion

This paper put forward a theory of bride price highlighting its role in equilibrating marriage markets. The key insight was that partners in a marriage derive utility from behaviors that are traded. These behaviors vary in the costs they impose and on the degree to which they are appreciated. Suitors in the marriage market with a high appreciation for a spousal behavior may not be similarly endowed with a comparative advantage in supplying the like behavior in return. Bride price offers individuals with such a double standard a means to buy the behaviors they cherish from their partner with cash to partially supplement any deficiencies they may have in supplying reciprocal behaviors for their partner.

In testing our theory with data from Uganda we hypothesized that sexual fidelity was a behavior that both husbands and wives valued. Based on biological and anthropological considerations we expected that men might value sexual fidelity more than women. We found evidence that women who report having received bride price were less likely to report having non marital sexual partnerships. Men who offered bride price before marriage were more likely to report having non marital sexual partnerships.

The data do not support the inference that bride price payments cause these marital behaviors. It may simply be that bride price is a mechanism for sorting husbands and wives based on underlying propensities. Policies to eliminate bride price payments would not necessarily make men more faithful nor women less so.

Both policymakers and marriage market participants may find it useful to be aware of the sorting properties associated with bride price payments. Given the health risk from HIV/AIDS that attends extramarital relationships in Uganda, policy makers may target HIV counseling and testing programs towards men who paid and women who were not paid bride price. Those who entertain suitors in marriage markets should perhaps pause and consider the import of premarital gifts and lavishments. Are these gifts honest tokens of esteem or are they inducements to overlook hidden flaws?

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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVES BY WHEHER BRIDE PRICE HAS BEEN PAID

Variable	Households with UnknownBride Price Status (245)		Households With Bride Price (N=406)		Households Without Bride Price (N=188)	
	Number	% or Mean	Number	% or Mean	Number	% or Mean
Wife had sex with someone other than spouse*	223	4%	380	2%	179	9%
Husband had sex with someone other than spouse*	160	23%	247	20%	99	16%
Wife ever used condom with any partner	243	19%	399	18%	182	33%
Husband is farmer	186	69%	274	69%	108	42%
Wife's Perceived Health: Better than Others	245	29%	403	32%	187	32%
Wife's Perceived Health: Same as Others	245	27%	403	24%	187	22%
Wife's Perceived Health:Worse than Others	245	22%	403	20%	187	18%
Wife's Perceived Health: Don't Know	245	23%	403	24%	187	27%
Number of Months Husband was Away in Last 12 Mos.	247	0.425	404	0.426	188	0.718
		(1.501)		(1.470)		(1.935)
Husband's Current Age	245	39.061	403	39.293	186	35.527
		(12.465)		(12.489)		(10.727)
Wife's Current Age	245	32.245	403	32.258	187	29.027
		(9.917)		(9.959)		(8.412)
Wife's Highest Grade Completed	241	4.577	398	4.590	183	5.454
		(3.556)		(3.707)		(3.932)
Husband's Highest Grade Completed	186	5.973	274	6.106	106	5.896
		(3.310)		(3.298)		(3.752)
Distance to Private Doctor (Miles)	143	2.180	248	2.154	103	1.781
		(2.141)		(2.428)		(2.232)
Distance to Pharmacy (Miles)	138	2.030	232	2.179	103	1.283
		(2.200)		(3.142)		(1.631)
Real Bride Price (Year 2000 Shillings)	0	--	159	872,601	0	--
		--		(1,516,503)		--
Log Real Bride Price	0	--	153	12.277	0	--
		--		(2.357)		--
Number of Children	247	5.186	406	4.921	188	4.372
		(2.467)		(2.372)		(2.657)
Household Size (persons)	247	6.798	406	6.436	188	5.723
		(2.977)		(2.798)		(3.006)
Log Imputed Household Income	116	14.217	246	14.249	109	14.177
		(1.193)		(1.130)		(0.941)
Land Owned (Acres)	118	6.233	251	5.461	113	2.929
		(9.270)		(9.503)		(4.933)
Household Owns 3 or more items	247	30%	406	31%	188	33%

Table 2: Descriptives By Bride Price Tertiles

Variable	Missing		Lowest Tertile		Middle Tertile		Highest Tertile	
Wife had sex with someone other than spouse*	223	4%	52	0%	49	0%	54	2%
Husband had sex with someone other than spouse*	160	23%	31	10%	27	26%	27	11%
Wife ever used condom with any partner	243	19%	52	8%	50	14%	52	19%
Husband is farmer	186	69%	32	75%	27	70%	27	59%
Wife's Perceived Health: Better than Others	245	29%	52	27%	51	41%	53	43%
Wife's Perceived Health: Same as Others	245	27%	52	15%	51	18%	53	25%
Wife's Perceived Health: Worse than Others	245	22%	52	25%	51	12%	53	17%
Wife's Perceived Health: Don't Know	245	23%	52	33%	51	29%	53	15%
Number of Months Husband was Away in Last 12 Mos.	247	0.425	52	0.346	49	0.286	54	0.648
		(1.501)		(1.118)		(1.061)		(1.915)
Husband's Current Age	245	39.061	51	46.235	51	35.176	54	38.130
		(12.465)		(13.227)		(11.226)		(10.684)
Wife's Current Age	245	32.245	52	38.942	50	26.84	54	31.315
		(9.917)		(10.648)		(7.144)		(8.188)
Wife's Highest Grade Completed	241	4.577	51	3.333	50	3.96	54	6.296
		(3.556)		(3.357)		(3.698)		(4.082)
Husband's Highest Grade Completed	186	5.973	32	6.188	27	5.778	27	6.926
		(3.310)		(3.487)		(2.547)		(3.842)
Distance to Private Doctor (Miles)	143	2.180	37	2.905	35	2.043	30	1.25
		(2.141)		(3.551)		(2.414)		(1.790)
Distance to Pharmacy (Miles)	138	2.030	35	2.486	30	2.583	27	2.222
		(2.200)		(2.309)		(5.713)		(4.264)
Real Bride Price (Year 2000 Shillings)	0	0	52	26,797	51	355,807	54	2,179,045
		(0)		(34,623)		(160,546)		(2,033,515)
Log Real Bride Price	0	0	45	9.314	51	12.680	54	14.332
		(0.000)		(1.997)		(0.464)		(0.661)
Number of Children	247	5.186	52	4.923	51	4.490	54	4.148
		(2.467)		(2.596)		(1.880)		(1.907)
Household Size (persons)	247	6.798	52	6.346	51	5.824	54	5.5
		(2.977)		(2.983)		(2.017)		(2.044)
Log Imputed Household Income	116	14.217	39	13.883	48	14.154	41	14.758
		(1.193)		(0.630)		(0.862)		(1.434)
Land Owned (Acres)	118	6.233	40	4.15	49	3.321	42	7.167
		(9.270)		(3.641)		(3.013)		(16.424)
Household Owns 3 or more items	247	30%	52	23%	51	31%	54	43%



TABLE 3: BRIDE PRICES BY REGION

	Percent Who Don't Respond Whether Bride Price Paid	Percent of Responders Who Had Bride Price	Percent of Households that are Polygynous	Median Real Bride Price in 2001 Shillings*
North (N=118)	20%	89%	17%	330,381
East (N=151)	35%	64%	2%	530,000
West (N=302)	38%	72%	21%	NA
Central (N=136)	18%	75%	17%	262,299
Kampala (N=131)	23%	40%	0%	831,713

*Exchange rate in 2001 approximately 1000 shillings per US dollar.

TABLE 4: MULTIVARIATE DETERMINANTS OF WHETHER BRIDE PRICE IS PAID

Table shows odds ratios from logistic regression on whether bride price was paid

Number of Observations	592	320	320
Kampala, Urban Region (Reference Category)	--	--	--
North, Rural Region	12.657 (5.83) ***	24.08 (4.10) ***	29.651 (4.41) ***
West, Rural Region	3.884 (5.26) ***	6.568 (3.62) ***	8.309 (3.83) ***
Central, Rural Region	4.575 (4.95) ***	9.363 (3.82) ***	11.142 (3.85) ***
East, Rural Region	2.745 (3.11) ***	5.117 (3.14) ***	6.551 (3.50) ***
Wife's Age		1.023 (0.85)	1.021 (0.79)
Wife's Schooling		1.025 (0.58)	0.998 (-0.04)
Wife Perceives HIV Not Possible		2.038 (1.87) *	2.147 (1.96) *
Husband is a Farmer		2.655 (3.02) ***	2.736 (3.09) ***
Husband's Age		0.993 (-0.28)	0.99 (-0.41)
Husband's Highest Grade Completed		1.124 (2.51) **	1.103 (2.01) **
Household Owns 3 or More Items			2.206 (1.93) *

Huber-White t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

TABLE 5: MULTIVARIATE DETERMINANTS OF EXTRAMARITAL LIAISONS.

Table shows odds ratios from logistic regression on whether **WIFE** has had sex with someone other than spouse in the last 12 months.

Number of Observations	545	461	284	284	284
Wife Had Bride Price	0.165 (-3.84) ***	0.188 (-3.05) ***	0.248 (-1.62) *	0.179 (-2.47) **	0.188 (-2.25) **
Kampala, Urban Region (Reference Category)	--	--	--	--	--
East, Rural Region (Dropped)	--	--	--	--	--
North, Rural Region	2.374 (1.20)	3.519 (1.35)	18.688 (2.01) **	57.491 (2.16) **	47.054 (2.07) **
West, Rural Region	3.179 (2.16) **	3.392 (2.24) **	15.206 (2.36) **	43.917 (2.27) **	44.659 (2.06) **
Central, Rural Region	2.886 (1.87) *	2.251 (1.32)	6.23 (1.39)	18.967 (1.63)	18.396 (1.55)
Polygynous Household	1.036 (0.05)	1.224 (0.26)	0.585 (-0.37)	1.021 (0.01)	1.032 (0.02)
Wife's Age		0.979 (-0.82)	1.051 (0.60)	1.036 (0.39)	1.053 (0.50)
Wife's Schooling		1.083 (1.59)	1.017 (0.17)	0.972 (-0.29)	1.018 (0.21)
Wife Perceives HIV Not Possible		0.472 (-1.07)	0.408 (-1.01)	0.297 (-1.72) *	0.331 (-1.51)
Husband is a Farmer			0.49 (-0.91)	0.401 (-1.31)	0.368 (-1.29)
Husband's Age			0.891 (-1.40)	0.894 (-1.23)	0.869 (-1.07)
Husband's Highest Grade Completed			1.011 (-0.07)	1.121 (-0.77)	1.218 (-1.21)
Number of months husband was away in last 12 Mos.				1.941 (2.89) ***	1.91 (2.83) ***
Household Owns 3 or More Items					0.126 (-1.24)

TABLE 6: MULTIVARIATE DETERMINANTS OF EXTRAMARITAL LIAISON.

Table shows odds ratios from logistic regression on whether **HUSBAND** has had sex with someone other than spouse in the last 12 months.

Number of Observations	344	288	285	285	285
Wife Had Bride Price	1.3 (-0.82)	1.822 (1.62) *	2.051 (1.86) *	2.065 (1.87) *	2.137 (1.94) *
Kampala, Urban Region (Reference Category)	--	--	--	--	--
North, Rural	0.686 (-0.52)	0.877 (-0.13)	1.015 (-0.01)	1.04 (-0.04)	0.983 (-0.02)
West, Rural	1.844 (0.96)	2.434 (1.14)	2.578 (1.24)	2.594 (1.23)	2.429 (1.13)
Central, Rural	2.133 (1.21)	3.013 (1.40)	3.038 (1.44)	3.162 (1.46)	3.01 (1.39)
East, Rural	0.609 (-0.77)	0.868 (-0.17)	0.801 (-0.28)	0.739 (-0.38)	0.688 (-0.45)
Wife's Age		0.964 (-1.41)	0.989 (-0.29)	0.989 (-0.29)	0.991 (-0.26)
Wife's Schooling		1.07 (-1.46)	1.056 (1.03)	1.054 (0.98)	1.067 (1.18)
Wife Perceives HIV Not Possible		0.666 (-0.96)	0.635 (-1.03)	0.637 (-1.01)	0.618 (-1.08)
Husband is a Farmer			0.536 (-1.75) *	0.537 (-1.75) *	0.527 (-1.79) *
Husband's Age			0.973 (-1.05)	0.973 (-1.06)	0.973 (-1.06)
Husband's Highest Grade Completed			0.945 (-1.00)	0.951 (-0.87)	0.957 (-0.75)
Number of months husband was away in last 12 Mos.				1.147 (0.86)	1.136 (0.77)
Household Owns 3 or More Items					0.743 (-0.66)

Huber-White t statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

[illegible]