

Power Structures and Agency in Rural Ethiopia

Development Lessons from Four Community Case Studies

**Paper Prepared for the Empowerment Team in the World Bank Poverty
Reduction Group**

Philippa Bevan and Alula Pankhurst

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The Executive Summary, the main paper, and each of the Appendices can be downloaded separately from the WeD Ethiopia website. A Policy Brief associated with the paper is also available on the website.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.

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Executive summary

1. This paper is linked to a five-year academic programme of multi-country and multi-disciplinary research into well-being in developing countries.
2. There are potentially three rather different audiences for the paper: development policymakers, especially those concerned with Ethiopia, policy thinkers especially those associated with the World Bank empowerment agenda, and development researchers. Accordingly we have structured the paper to provide a number of ways of reading, which are described in the Introduction, and we are providing three conclusion sections in the Executive Summary.
3. The first explains why the main research findings matter for policy; the second summarises the implications of the findings for donor empowerment strategies; and the third explains how the research framework might be taken forward to add a potentially useful perspective on development.
4. To set the scene for the three sets of conclusions we describe the purpose of the paper and report the main research findings.

The purpose of the research paper

5. The purpose of the paper is to show how iterative interactions through time between power structures and personal agents in rural communities in Ethiopia have had consequences for (1) the personal power¹ of community members of different social status, (2) the overall efficacy of the communities, and (3) the trajectories of the communities in terms of reproduction and change. The findings are used to draw some conclusions for development policy and practice.
6. The paper asks three research questions, which are answered using a theoretical framework (Section 2), applied to data made in case studies of four ‘exemplar’ rural communities in the Oromo and Amhara regions of Ethiopia between 1995 and 2005, to produce the evidence base (Appendix 2) which underpins the conclusions of the paper².
7. The four case communities were selected to enable comparisons, between Amhara and Oromo communities, food-surplus and food-deficit communities, communities more and less integrated into markets and government services, ethnically/religiously homogenous and mixed communities, and Muslim and Orthodox Christian communities.
8. The first question posed is: ‘In these communities how do local power structures affect the embodied personal agency and degrees of power of rural people of different genders, ages, household wealth, ethnicity, and religion?’
9. Local power structures exist in four ‘domains of power’, or ‘fields of action’: livelihoods, human production and reproduction, community management, and the re/production and dissemination of ideas. Current personal agency profiles are the historical outcomes of past interactions between agency and structures.
10. People of different genders, ages, wealths and social origins face different opportunities and constraints in each of the fields of action, and bring to them different embodied personal agency profiles developed through their life experiences thus far. These profiles are a mix of internalised cultural values and norms, types and levels of in/competence, and psychological resources/liabilities.
11. The extent to which people exercise personal power in any situation depends on an interaction between personal agency and structures of opportunity and constraint, which are constituted by *institutions* (rules and norms), social *relationships* with other social actors in *material contexts*, and *ideas*. Such relationships involve five types of individual and collective power: *power to*, *power with*, *power over*, *power on behalf of* and *power against*.
12. *Symbolic* power is implicit in (1) the roles and institutions which prescribe different kinds of behaviour for people of different social statuses, and (2) ideas about what differences matter and why.
13. The second question is about community reproduction and potential change. How does the operation of each of these fields, separately and interactively, contribute to the achievements of the community systems as whole? What collective facilitative power and liabilities are associated with them?
14. The third question asks ‘In what ways have the power structures in these community systems changed in the longer run, and to what extent have these changes promoted reproduction or change in the community

¹ The ability to achieve chosen goals.

² The evidence in Appendix 2 also provides some access to the life-worlds of the people who live in the research communities, and gives the people themselves some voice in the development discourse.

systems as a whole?' Are the communities trapped in 'low-level' equilibria? Are there internal or external 'drivers of change' which have led, or may lead, to changes of direction in the future? Are there different answers to these questions for different types of community?

15. These power structures and personal agency profiles are important for development policy and practice for three reasons. *First*, they act as 'filters' to all community interventions, since people with strong personal agency occupying powerful roles are able to make decisions and take actions which allow, promote, deflect, inhibit, or rule out the goals of the intervention, while people with weak personal agency and low social status may not be able to take advantage of the new opportunities which interventions create.
16. *Second*, power structures and personal agency may be targets of 'empowerment' interventions aimed at reducing inequalities in power relationships, changing norms, rules and ideas, strengthening personal agency or empowering sections, groups, categories or collectivities, including communities.
17. *Third*, development interventions with goals which are not related to empowerment may have the unintended consequence of over-empowering or disempowering particular people or groups requiring developing strategies for compensatory action.

Power structures and patterns of personal agency in rural communities

Research Question 1: In these communities how do local power structures affect the embodied personal agency and degrees of power of rural people of different genders, ages, household wealth, ethnicity and religion?

18. Rural communities in Ethiopia are organised through hierarchies based on gender, age, household wealth, and locally salient status related to 'primordial' social origin, education and personal abilities. These hierarchies are associated with different personal agency profiles and structured opportunities and constraints in the four fields of action for people of differing social statuses.
19. *Structures in the livelihood field of action:* The vast majority of livelihoods in the integrated and remote sites are based on own account household farming; a very few households and individuals make livings out of agricultural labour, own-account off-farm work, and off-farm employment. A minority of households mix farming and off-farm activities, the latter usually as secondary activities. Opportunities for off-farm activity are small but greater for males than females, and greater for males in the integrated sites. There are more opportunities for women in the Amhara sites where dungcake-selling and spinning are established coping strategies.
20. Off-farm own-account activity falls into two categories: coping strategies for the poor and business strategies for the better-off with the former being more common. Off-farm employment is rare in the remote sites.
21. The farming division of labour is governed by gendered norms which are related to the gendered norms governing work in the human re/production field of action and associated with ideas about what males and females and children and adults are like.
22. There are marked internal inequalities in access to material productive resources with small proportions of households categorised (in terms defined by the communities) as very rich and rich in productive assets (together between 15-20% across the sites) a middle category of households doing fairly well or 'getting by' (40-47%), and a category of 'the poor' including poor, very poor and destitute, amounting to 33-40%.
23. Richer peasants relate to poor peasants in the livelihood field in a number of ways: they employ them as servants or daily labourers; they sharecrop their land; they develop personal patron-client relations in which they may help out with food or money at times in return for undefined services; they lend them money on the basis of different contracts, for example before the harvest to be repaid in grain with interest, or by taking their land and using it until the loan is repaid. The treatment a servant or borrower receives depends on the personal probity of the rich peasant.
24. Productive wealthholding is associated with, though not determined by, gender of household head, age of male household head and social origin. Females heading households in Amhara communities tend to be divorcees and considerably poorer in productive resources. Females heading households in the Arssi Oromo sites are mostly widows or wives whose husbands have taken a new wife.
25. *Structures in the human re/production field of action:* Women and girls are the main actors in the field of human production and reproduction although in male-headed households their activities are overseen by the male head. A little over 20% of households in each site are female-headed.
26. Many of the institutions and practices surrounding pregnancy, birth and the post-partum period produce risks for both mother and baby; mother and baby health services are not prioritised.
27. Raising and feeding a family requires a house, furniture, cooking utensils and other domestic assets, the provision of clothes, health services and education if it is valued, and the daily provision of (processed and

cooked) food, local drinks, water, fuel for cooking, and time for child socialisation, informal education, and caring for sick, disabled and old relatives.

28. There are marked inequalities in access to material reproductive resources between sites and among household within sites. In the integrated sites there is access to electricity and piped water for richer households while markets and services are near for all, although poor people often cannot afford to use them. In the remote sites and among the poor in the integrated sites time is spent collecting fuel and water. Travelling to markets and services from the remote sites is also time-consuming. Within sites the quality of reproductive assets varies widely with at one extreme a few rich households with satellite TVs and at the other destitute households whose members live from hand to mouth.
29. Within households senior women have power over younger females and young boys and both gender and age hierarchies operate among children. A little over half of inhabitants in each of the four sites are under 20. As a rule starting from around the age of six children are expected to work for the household in gendered roles; from adolescence boys increasingly work for themselves and this is also now the case for some girls. Children from poor households may be sent to other households to work as servants. Most children who attend school also perform household work.
30. *Intra-household relationships and household facilitative power*: Male heads are engaged in unequal relationships of 'power over' females and younger males in their households, which may involve elements of exploitation, exclusion, domination and violation. However, they also use 'power on behalf of' different members of their household, and, from another perspective, these relationships underpin a household division of labour which creates the collective 'power with' which households use to make a living and produce and re/produce its members. Levels of collective facilitative power are lower in households where heads do not have authority over the labour power and where time and energy are devoted to intra-household struggles and conflicts involving 'power against'.
31. *Structures in the community governance field of action*: The goals of community governance include: the maintenance of social order through the control of deviant behaviour, resolution of disputes and handling of dissent and conflict; economic development; social protection; implementation of gender and family 'policies'; the management of collective resources; and community survival and solidarity.
32. This field of action contains two interactive governance structures, one with its roots in the community and the other brought into the community by the government. These systems have different priorities and ways of going about things. They sometimes work independently, sometimes in collaboration, and sometimes confront each other. They are both organised along hierarchical lines and neither is immediately compatible with the individualistic and egalitarian principles implicit in donor and international NGO discourses.
33. Men who are powerful in the community governance structures are likely to belong to the dominant status group. Criteria for elite status include wealth, occupation of key community roles such as dispute settlement, leadership in local organisations, education, and religious office. Powerful men can mobilise collective 'power with' in kin, neighbour, friendship, and clan and/or ethnic networks. Mobilised status groups may use 'power against' other status groups in processes of exclusion which may lead to conflict.
34. Women, younger uneducated men, and poor men have little say in community affairs, although female relatives of powerful men may have informal influence and there are official positions for women in *kebele* structures and women who occupy these positions and take a lead in organising women for collective women's activities.
35. *Structures in the ideas field of action*: There is a considerable variety of opinion in these communities and in contexts where they feel safe people are willing to express themselves and argue about ideas. Within this field of action it is possible to identify structures and agents involved in the re/production and dissemination of five cultural repertoires of ideas: local traditional, local modern, new religious ideologies, government ideologies, and donor/NGO ideologies. There are also other current influences on local ideas which are more diffuse including 'imagined communities', networks of relations and interactions beyond the communities; opposition political parties; diasporas; and the national and international media.
36. In one homogenous site religious ideas about livelihoods and religious ceremonies preached by Orthodox priests conform with local traditional ideas and are in direct conflict with government policies and directives which are accepted in local modern repertoires and resonate with donor and NGO repertoires. In the other homogenous site religious Islamic ideas about livelihoods and religious ceremonies are modern in that they contradict local traditional repertoires. However, some of the ideas run counter to government repertoires and donor/NGO repertoires, for different reasons. In both sites religious repertoires are currently the most symbolically powerful.
37. In the heterogeneous sites people live with models of other ways of thinking, particularly in religious terms. There are contradictions at a number of levels in the ideas and narratives of the different religions: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, various versions of Protestantism, and Catholicism. The increasing influence

of religious fundamentalists in all religions is making these logical contradictions more visible leading to a decline in religious tolerance. Religious differences are associated with ethnic differences and consequently affect and are affected by inter-ethnic competition for scarce material resources and local political influence.

38. People in the integrated sites have more frequent interactions with urban dwellers and greater access to the media which contributes a consumer dimension to local modern repertoires.
39. *Personal agency*: Personal agency profiles are laid down in childhood; as babies grow towards adulthood they develop physically and mentally and learn locally appropriate skills more or less well, they incorporate family values, norms, beliefs, and 'ways of doing things', and they develop psychological resources or liabilities. Adult competence, 'habitus', and autonomy, or ability to make and pursue choices, is profoundly influenced by childhood experiences.
40. There are key problems and challenges related to different moments in child development as babies become knee children, roaming children, working/learning children, adolescents, very young adults, and then adults. Sensitivity to these moments on the part of policy makers could lead to improved empowerment interventions.
41. *Personal power and degrees of empowerment*: The social category with the least personal power in the communities is 'the poor' who are a mix of males and females and people of different ages. Structures provide more constraints than opportunities for most poor people and many approach them with problematic personal agency profiles produced through lifetime experiences which may include incompetence related to illness, disability or old age, a habitus developed in a childhood of poverty, and/or psychological liabilities which for example may be that the person has 'become defeated'. Poor people with good personal agency profiles can make choices, but may not have the opportunity to pursue them, or even if they have may not achieve the final goal.
42. While females and young men on average have less personal power than males and older men, those who are not poor have more personal power than poor people. Empowerment strategies which would benefit females and young men may not reach those who are poor without special design for them. The category of 'the poor' is not homogenous; different kinds of poor people need different empowerment strategies.

Research Question 2: How does the operation of each of the four fields of action, separately and interactively, contribute to the achievements of the community systems as whole? What collective facilitative power and liabilities are associated with them?

43. The hierarchies described above are key mechanisms in the production and reproduction of community '*facilitative power*', which depends on the material contexts, social relationships, institutions and ideas involved in the four fields of action, and the ways in which the fields interact. Households and kin networks form the core of the livelihood, human re/production, and social protection fields which provide most of the security people achieve, apart from the donor/NGO/government food aid provision in drought-prone sites. The majority of Ethiopians are involved in such 'informal security regimes'.
44. The main causes of insecurity in these regimes are scarce collective resources, life processes, local competition for scarce resources and structured inequality. The main solutions are kin-based social exchanges and 'opportunity-hoarding' on the basis of claims to superior social identity, and patchy government services, although the 'welfare mix' involves a potentially larger set of players and institutions some of which are international.
45. Such regimes can be found across the rural and small-town areas of the four 'established' regions: Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and SNNP, in parts of the four 'emergent' regions of Afar, Somali, Gambella and Beneshangul Gumuz, and in the informal sectors of larger towns. They vary in ethnic and religious composition and the extent to which they are connected to government.
46. Farming is the key activity in all sites and there are no local signs of the 'industrialisation' which the agricultural-development strategy was designed to underpin. No outside opportunities have been provided and dominant local habituses in which farming is the only desirable and respectable occupation apart from government employment mean that those with the entrepreneurial 'animal spirits' that exist everywhere do not have the inclination or the competence to invest in small-enterprise production rather than services.
47. In recent years government penetration of these communities has increased and there are signs of development achievements. However, communities resist changes that seem to threaten the local community governance structures which are vital to the survival and reproduction of the informal security regimes, without which the inhabitants would not survive.
48. The communities host at least five types of competing cultural repertoire each with a logically compatible set of values, goals and beliefs (ideas). 'Traditional' community repertoires adhered to mainly by older

people are being challenged by 'modern' community repertoires introduced by rich merchants, educated adults and youth, and the infiltration of global cultures.

49. Three ideological repertoires are being actively promulgated within the communities, each with the intent of changing the preferences of inhabitants. Increasingly fundamentalist religious repertoires strive to change or reinforce religious values and related practices. The government repertoire is used to try to get inhabitants to conform to practices based on hierarchical socialism, while donor and NGO repertoires have introduced some liberal and egalitarian ideas. People draw on these repertoires in ways that are unsystematic and seemingly contradictory.
50. There are differences in the collective facilitative power of different types of community. Community facilitative power is greater in communities which produce a crop surplus and are more integrated into markets and services. Communities with a mix of ethnic groups and religions can observe different ways of doing things but they also waste energy and time competing in a variety of ways. In the homogenous communities everyone can potentially be mobilised to work together for the whole community. However, it is more difficult to be a nonconformist especially at a time when religious leaders are powerful. In the two homogenous sites Orthodox Christian and Muslim leaders are not using their power in ways which are particularly conducive to development goals.

Research Question 3: In what ways have the power structures in these community systems changed since the 1960s, and to what extent have these changes promoted reproduction or change in the community systems as a whole?

51. While the 1975 land reform abolished the Amhara/Tigrayan landlord class wealth and occupational distinctions with their status connotations have persisted to some extent. There is also a legacy of memories of exploitation, exclusion, domination and violation.
52. Farming technologies have moved on to the extent that the modern inputs of improved seeds, fertilisers and pesticides are increasingly used, while the use of small motorised irrigation pumps is spreading in appropriate places. However, soil is prepared using an oxplough technology that goes back centuries and there are few other signs of modernity in the rural fields. Few off-farm own-account activities are new or use new technologies exceptions being the electric grain mill and the Usuzu trucks used by grain traders.
53. Creeping land reform has increased the security of tenure of landholders and relaxation in the law with regard to land-leasing has commodified the share-cropping 'market' to an extent. The PASDEP³ goal of commercialisation of agriculture could produce revolutionary change in the livelihoods of the farmers of Korodegaga should the site be included in a large commercial irrigation scheme using the Awash. PASDEP also proposes the promotion of much more rapid non-farm private sector growth, though it is not clear that this will focus on the small/medium enterprises and local economic development that could raise the general living standards of people in these communities.
54. A recent change in the field of human production is the growing acceptance of contraception to reduce family sizes, although there were reports of opposition from Muslim religious leaders in Turufe Kecheme. There has been little change in the lack of respect in local cultures for the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth and the post-partum period and this is matched by relative neglect in government provision of maternal and infant health services.
55. Parents still train their children into gendered habituses emphasising the need for males to learn aggression and females submission. However, there is increasing acceptance of education for girls and the severity of the violence involved in disciplining children has diminished. Young children are still often cared for by slightly older children.
56. While religious education is losing popularity among Orthodox Christians it is becoming increasingly popular for Muslims. It has been brought into the communities by teachers reportedly trained in Nazreth using resources contributed by Saudi Arabian Muslims, who also contributed funds for the building of three mosques in Korodegaga. There is growing enthusiasm for formal education in all sites, although there are also opponents, particularly in Dinki.
57. There has been little change in the domestic work burden. Women and girls work very long hours.
58. The statement that 'trust and interest in formal market and state institutions remains low' (Kurey, 2005) is misleading. People are not committed to customary ways of doing things because they are 'informal' but because they work. People engage with 'formal' market institutions when access to them is of benefit and would probably prefer that they were more formal in the sense of being policed to prevent cheating and that there were more of them. The 2005 elections were a source of huge interest in all sites although subsequent

³ Ethiopia's second PRSP

events did reduce trust in state institutions. Also people are increasingly organising internally to develop new (civil society) institutions and organisations to reduce insecurity with constitutions and rules. While these are not 'formal' in the way the word is usually used in development discourses, they do have elements of formality about them.

59. In terms of gendered 'power over' there is an ongoing process of change which began during the Derg era and has continued since 1991. The power of patriarchal men over women and younger men and within the community more generally has been reducing, although there are still institutionalised elements of exclusion, exploitation, domination and violation to be found in these relationships. Parents are able to exert considerable power over working/learning children (roughly 6 to adolescence), particularly girls.
60. In the 1960s there were wealthy landlords who no longer exist and tenants of different wealths. During the Derg *kebele* leaders and those who joined the Producer Co-operatives had opportunities for greater wealth in the community. Today there are big differences in productive and reproductive wealth in all communities with signs of increasing inequality and 'class formation' as the numbers of landless people increase. Richer households who employ servants are in a powerful position in relation to their employees as if they refuse to honour the contracts the servants often have no redress. Richer households who sharecrop land in are also powerful compared with the poor landholders who are often elderly or women heading households.
61. The ethnic hierarchy of imperial times has been challenged ideologically and through the ethnic federal structure. However, historic experiences of exploitation, exclusion, domination and violation are part of individual and collective memories, while it is always difficult for a group that was once superior to view others as equals and to give up aspirations for a return to the old status quo. Pressure on land and the paucity of other economic opportunities apart from those associated with office in the *kebele* has contributed to the local politicisation of ethnicity in Dinki and Turufe Kecheme.
62. While there is a correlation between ethnicity and religion it is not a perfect one. In many rural Ethiopian communities Orthodox Christians and Muslims have lived together tolerantly for many years. However, just as there is a potential for feelings of injustice related to historic relations between ethnic groups the same is true for historic relations between different religious groups. During Imperial times the status of Muslims was low compared with that of the Orthodox Christians.
63. There are a number of continuities in the stories of these four communities, chief of which is that there have been no changes in the structures of the local economies since their reconstruction after the fall of the Derg which look likely to set them off on new trajectories. This economic reproduction parallels the reproduction of the informal security regimes described above. From one perspective it is possible to argue that in much of rural Ethiopia the configuration of community fields is currently geared to reproduce communities with low levels of facilitative power and that community systems are trapped in low-level equilibria.
64. However, it is possible to identify a number of 'drivers of change':
 - Existing land shortages combined with the large youth population will push many of them off the land
 - An increasingly educated population with access to global cultures will not respond well to overly-authoritarian governance structures
 - If homegrown organisations such as *iddir* are allowed to develop independently a local civil society might emerge to assist in promotion of the development agenda
 - Government activities supported by donors are promoting human development and providing social protection in the drought-prone sites; the longer-term consequences of this are unclear
 - There are great dangers in the current politicisation of ethnicity (see Somalia) and religion (see the Sudan) which cannot be ignored by external development actors.

Summary for policy makers

65. Government policy makers and donor policy advisers working with different governance models should discuss this openly. They should both recognise the value of local community governance models to rural residents and find out more about how they work with a view to encouraging bottom-up changes.
66. Development policy makers should be aware of the potential for politics at country, regional and local levels to undermine or support development activities.
67. Local community power structures act as filters to all planned interventions which should be designed with this in mind. Interventions inject new resources, ideas, institutions and relationships with the potential to empower some and disempower others. It is very difficult to reach 'the poor' who are not a group but a category of power-weak but diverse kinds of people.
68. While empowerment interventions are usually aimed at improving personal agency profiles, sometimes through supporting collective action, there is scope for considering interventions to empower communities

by assisting them to break out of 'low-level equilibria traps' . There are potential lessons from other countries experimenting with Local Economic Development (LED).

69. Empowerment interventions to increase the personal power of disadvantaged categories may be designed to change structures of opportunity and constraint, to change ideas, or to improve personal agency profiles.
70. *Changing structures of opportunity and constraint*: ways of introducing new livelihood opportunities to people based in rural communities, especially the young and landless, need to be explored at local, regional and national levels.
71. The MDG goal of reduction of maternal mortality needs to be treated with the same seriousness as the primary education goal. Improved utilities and infrastructure empower women, as does micro-credit linked with new breeds and training for cash-producing farming activities which fit well with other time demands.
72. Local community and government governance structures could work more efficiently together, based on mutual trust and respect.
73. *Changing ideas*: there is a battle of ideas going on in rural communities which needs to be understood and monitored, since it has serious implications for development interventions.
74. *Changing personal agency profiles*: childhood is a time of great importance; this is the time when personal agency profiles including the in/competences, habituses and autonomy which underpin choices and achievements in adult life are developed. Interventions to invest in children are important both for a view of development as a long-term process and a view of development as wellbeing improvement.
75. Competence: few children get nutritionally-balanced diets, while those in drought situations and in poor households often starve for shorter or longer periods. Most start farm or domestic work at around the age of six, as they are taught the skills important for farming and domesticity while making increasingly important contributions to the household economy. Children from poor families may be hired out as servants from very young ages. An increasing proportion of children go to school with most mixing work and schooling.
76. Habitus: children in rural areas grow up in households organised on the basis of gendered hierarchies in which domination and violence by 'superiors' to 'inferiors' is common, although less severe than it was in the past. Boys are encouraged to be aggressive, which is linked with the idea of family protection against enemies, while girls are taught to be quiet and submissive, linked with the idea of them becoming homemakers. During education children learn new ways of thinking, although gendered hierarchies and violence are also found in schools.
77. A choice of four livelihood goals was mentioned by richer young men approaching adulthood in the integrated sites: farming, larger-scale trading, government employment and international migration, with America the favoured destination. By comparison manual work is of low status, with the historic stigma attached to 'craftworkers' such as blacksmiths, potters, tanners, and to a lesser extent weavers, carried into the field of 'industry'. Many poor boys start life as agricultural servants/herders. There is a need to raise the status of industrial work.
78. The main livelihood goals for richer young women were marriage requiring domestic skills, government employment requiring education, and international migration for domestic work. Low status activities for which poor girls are prepared include dungcake and firewood selling and the making and selling of local alcoholic drinks.
79. Autonomy: there is considerable evidence of personal autonomy, or the ability to make and pursue choices, among both males and females, particularly evident in the way in which many adolescents and young adults of both genders in three of the sites are now working for cash to enable them to go to school, many starting Grade 1 at relatively late ages.
80. Government investment in the education of these adult 'personal agents' of the future has expanded in all sites in the last few years, and been met with enthusiasm by many parents and young people. Barriers to the attendance of poor children include costs and the household need for their labour. Attempts to abolish the shift system caused problems for children who had to travel far, and for those whose work was vital to the household. Absenteeism was related to clashes between school calendars and seasonal or market day work demands. Poor children would benefit from 'informal education' initiatives while calendars to suit local conditions and provide more flexibility during peak agricultural periods would reduce absenteeism and dropout rates.
81. Policy action to improve personal agency profiles requires a *Child Policy* covering nutrition and health, child work including child 'trafficking' , the timing, structure, content and quality of education, child protection from violence and abuse, and attention to gendered child-rearing practices. Poor children need special assistance which could be provided were the NGO sector to expand.
82. Land shortages have led to the rise of a class of young men who are either landless or have very small plots from their parents, and, while increasing numbers are becoming educated, there are few local off-farm opportunities and little urban migration.

83. To improve local livelihood opportunity structures for young men and women a *Youth Enterprise /Employment Policy* should be included in *wereda* and regional 'Local Economic Development' plans for small towns.
84. A number of adult respondents said they would appreciate a literacy programme.
85. The current government has been committed to empowering women since its inception and policies for women have made some impact on women's rights to land, and provided a space for discussions of 'harmful traditional practices' which are the first step in their reduction. Women in the integrated sites increasingly practice family planning and young people in the remote sites expressed support for it. Government policies in this area are gradually bearing fruit but the pressure must be maintained.
86. Until recently there has been little development activity aimed at women in the sites; an NGO savings and credit scheme associated with access to hybrid hens in Korodegaga provided a small group of women with income from eggs and hens and improved diets for their families. In two sites towards the end of the research women's groups were beginning to access Government credit. Schemes should be designed which fit in with the other demands on women's time.
87. There was little evidence in the sites of government or NGO activities in pursuit of the MDG to reduce maternal mortality. Government and donor action in the area of women's reproductive health in these sites was limited to contraception. Women's needs during the pregnancy-birth-infancy cycle are largely ignored inside local communities, by government, and by donors. Maternal ill/health affects the personal agency of the next generation as well as reducing the mother's personal agency. Women's policies should be three-pronged: to support mothers, to improve gender relations, to support economic development.
88. Customarily old people were respected and feared as a result of their ability to bless and curse. Their cultural and political power began to decline during the Derg and currently only wealthy or elite old men have retained respect. Some young people insult the old for their out-of-date ideas.
89. In the remote communities the institutions and relationships in kin-based informal security regimes theoretically provide support for old people no longer able to work and for those without relatives material resources and care should be provided by neighbours other community members. We do not have information on how well these mechanisms work in practice.
90. These mechanisms are also found in the more integrated communities, but they do not cover everyone. Old people with no relatives and immigrant old people are at risk of sliding into destitution and relying on begging to stay alive.
91. The disempowerment of old people should be recognised and a *Policy for the Aged* advocated; this is another area where expansion of the NGO sector could contribute.
92. The most extreme form of disempowerment is death but not much is known about its incidence in rural communities except that it is frequent. In mid-2004 in 12% of households across the communities someone had died in the previous year; five people from one household died. Consideration should be given to the introduction of local registers of births and deaths.

Summary for policy thinkers

93. No development intervention is a-political and this is particularly true of empowerment interventions. Power is not an individual attribute but a quality of relationships; improving the 'power to' of individuals or categories of person impinges on the 'power to' of others. For example, the move to increase education for girls in Ethiopia in order to empower them had consequences for other members of local communities including forced demands for contributions from rich and poor of labour and cash to build extra classrooms and pay extra teachers, and increased workloads for mothers due to the loss of daughters' labour time.
94. There are other theoretical issues which need to be taken into account. Empowerment in the context of controlling power relations (exploitation, exclusion, domination, violation) requires the disempowerment of dominant parties which is politically complex and sensitive. The empowering of collectivities (power with) can enable them to use it in competition or conflict with other collectivities (power against).
95. The empowering of communities through improving techniques of production and discipline requires institutional designs which can connect efficiently with existing institutions, rather than trying to impose external and alien priorities. In this connection the discourse distinctions between 'formal' and 'informal' and 'modern' and 'traditional' or 'customary', both associated with the idea that development can only occur through the 'formal' and the 'modern', are not helpful in contexts where formal markets are 'missing' (although real markets are not), where the state is still in the process of being 'built' and local grass-root organisations are often not considered to be part of 'civil society'.
96. It is not easy to change structures of opportunity and constraint since norms and ideas are embodied in social actors; the changing of rules or techno-material contexts will not be effective without matching changes in norms and ideas contradictory to the proposed change. For example, the prime obligations that people owe to others are to kin and involve social exchanges over long periods of time. When new

resources are introduced to a community the moral obligation to reciprocate past assistance or to care for weaker kin members may over-ride rules forbidding 'corruption'

97. Despite these caveats the empowerment agenda is potentially very important for disadvantaged power-weak people in informal security regimes⁴ in rural areas in poor countries such as Ethiopia, particularly children, poor other people, and other females. However, it needs to be employed with sensitivity and recognition of potential pitfalls in the way it is justified. The empowerment discourse suggests people may be empowered by improvements to embodied competence and access to resources (agency), by changes in institutions (rules and norms), or by changes in the way the two interact. The goal is ostensibly to ensure that choices are achieved. However, if institutions are changed through interventions but people's preferences or habituses have not changed, then the goal is not to ensure that choices are achieved but to change the choices. This should be acknowledged.
98. For example, female circumcision is widely supported by males and females throughout rural Ethiopia; uncircumcised girls/women (depending on cultural context) bring shame on their families, cannot get married, and cannot be buried in churchyards. The government has banned the practice but people are making the choice, exercising their personal power, to take the risk of behaving illegally. In this situation neither government nor donors like the choice.
99. In considering interventions to empower through improving personal agency profiles there is a need to address together the three constituents: habitus or preferences; in/competences; and autonomy/heteronomy as a psychological resource/liability. For example, if young people are formally educated (competent) and potentially autonomous but lack an entrepreneurial habitus in the context of few job opportunities their personal power in the livelihood field will not be increased.

Summary for development researchers

100. In the academic field development-related research takes place largely within development economics, 'development studies', 'area studies', geography, social anthropology, and in small pockets in the disciplines of political science, sociology and increasingly psychology. Most empirical research that informs policy, particularly country policies, is produced by economists and dependent on survey data gathered from household heads, enterprise owners, and service providers. Participatory research used as a form of 'market research' has also been used to inform policy.
101. The development economics 'paradigm', now institutionalised as best practice for data collection in poor countries, produces very valuable information for the description and analysis of livelihoods and human resources, markets and economic growth, household poverty and larger macroeconomic issues. However, it does not meet the growing demand for information, analyses, explanations and policies relating to issues which are increasingly seen as relevant to development such as intra-country conflict, state-building and national governance, community-level governance, social protection and, at the individual level, personal wellbeing including personal security, empowerment and subjective quality of life.
102. Its methods are also ill-adapted to addressing important sensitive issues, such as sexuality, HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, illegal or banned activities, which require developing trust and more time with respondents. Also the survey approach has difficulties in assessing activities or mobile or migrating populations, and the poorest who may not live in households or have residences that can be sampled may fall through the net. The question of people strategies, and decision making can usually only be inferred by the outcomes.
103. Development researchers in disciplines and fields other than economics have research perspectives and skills with much to contribute to improved understandings of issues which have recently made it on to the development agenda. For example, if, as Stern *et al* (2005) argue, development for poor countries by definition involves endogenous and/or engineered changes in preferences, there is a need for research into the diverse local cultures which constitute the 'nation'. And if, as they also argue, changes in the investment climate and empowerment are 'inherently political' so that extreme political and economic differences can generate violent conflict, there is a need for country-level research into the dynamics of power at national and lower levels, and the linkages and networks between levels.
104. Research into culture and power requires knowledge about 'qualities' as well as 'quantities' and is best conducted using theoretically-sophisticated conceptual frameworks in conjunction with mixed methods; a Q-Integrated rather than a Q-Squared approach. Advances in computer technology mean that 'qualitative data' about community, household and individual 'cases' can be easily entered, stored and organised to

⁴ In this paper we have not addressed the problems of trying to empower people in the insecurity regimes to be found in the pastoral peripheries of Ethiopia.

allow for rapid comparative qualitative and quantitative analyses of small-N and large-N cases, where the connection between the statistics and the cases is not lost as it is in variable-based research.

105. The 'poverty traps' which are of growing interest to economists are constructed and reconstructed in community-level social systems by people who pursue goals according to their culturally-learned values and beliefs and follow established practices which contribute to the survival but often also the entrenchment of the systems. Integrated multi-method research focused on competing cultural repertoires and power dynamics would raise levels of understanding about the ways in which differential 'informal' practices impact on attempts by states and civil society organisations to introduce formal markets and new technologies which would lead to more appropriately designed interventions.
106. A similar research approach in government bureaucracies would lead to a greater understanding of the informal dynamics which often undermine civil service reforms, public financial management, and service delivery and could assist policy makers to design interventions which realistically start from current ways of doing things and provide a clearer understanding of obstacles to change.
107. The WeD Ethiopia research was undertaken in exploratory mode and has produced a considerable multi-level database of quantitative and qualitative data made in four rural communities and two urban spaces. The model could be adapted for the efficient generation of panel Q-integrated data about communities purposively selected as exemplars of different livelihood systems, local cultures and cultural mixes. Data generated through such an approach could be used by local governments, as well as national government and donors concerned to map what is happening in different parts of the country. In particular it could illuminate contrasts between different types of community, for example integrated and remote villages, surplus producing and deficit food aid dependent sites, and improve understandings of differential impacts of regional policies

1. Introduction: the purpose and structure of the paper

1.1. Empowerment and power

Empowerment has been a World Bank policy goal since the 2000/1 World Development Report, inspiring new approaches to economic development (Stern, Dethier and Halsey-Rogers, 2005), World Bank project and policy goals and associated measurement (Alsop, Bertelsen and Holland, 2006; Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005) and country Poverty Assessments (e.g. Kurey, 2005). The brief discussion of these three examples in the next section leads into an equally brief description of the ‘power’ framework we make use of in the paper.

This framework bears some resemblance to the World Bank’s ‘empowerment framework’ (Alsop *et al*, 2006). However, the focus is not the goals, processes and outcomes of development interventions, but the ways in which iterative interactions between power structures, culture and agency in four ‘exemplar’ rural communities have reproduced and/or changed the structures, the culture, the agents and the relationships between them. We bring the framework to data made as part of an academic study of inequality and quality of life in four rural communities in Ethiopia over a period one month in 1995 and eighteen months between 2003-4. The exemplar communities reflect differences among agriculture-based livelihood systems related to ecology and location, differences in integration/remoteness of sites with regard to market and state influences, differences among cultures related to ethnicity and religion, and contrasts between homogenous and heterogeneous communities. The main purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the value of such a research approach to policy and project designers, makers and implementers in Ethiopia and more generally.

Given policy shifts in aid delivery towards ‘General Budget Support’, and changes in developing country governance structures towards decentralisation, development actors would benefit from deeper understandings of how power mechanisms and ‘culture’ operate through time at local levels to generate stagnation or change and allow, promote, deflect or inhibit different kinds of development intervention. We believe that, exploiting recent developments in computer technology, such understandings could be established through a new, institutionalised and cumulative, multi-disciplinary and multi-method country-based development research agenda, with purposively selected ‘exemplar’ panel ‘communities’ as the initial unit of focus⁵. In order to develop an understanding of how different types of community are reproducing themselves and/or changing, data must be collected at community level and the ‘sub-system’ levels of ‘households’, social networks, and community organisations. In order to develop an understanding of differences in the exercise of personal power within the communities information about individual people occupying different social roles and statuses and their relationships is also necessary. The paper makes use of such data collected for other purposes.

1.2. Empowerment as a World Bank policy goal

An approach from economics

In a book published in 2005 World Bank economists Stern *et al* argued that development must be understood ‘as a dynamic process of continuous change in which entrepreneurship, innovation, flexibility, and mobility are crucial’; the strategy that follows from this understanding has ‘two pillars’: ‘building an investment climate that fosters entrepreneurship, innovation, productivity and jobs, and empowering and investing in people, particularly poor people, so that they can participate in the economy and society’ (xxiv). Empowerment is regarded both as a goal and driver of development, the central issue being people’s ability to participate effectively in the economy (xxx). The focus is on obstacles to participation implicit in local institutions, and access to services, with evidence related to these produced through household, firm and service unit surveys. Two features of this approach are relevant to this paper and we return to them in the conclusion. First, the claim that development involves changes in people’s ‘preferences’ and, second, recognition of the fact that ‘changes in the investment climate and empowerment are inherently political’ and at ‘their extreme, political and economic differences can generate violent conflict that is profoundly damaging to development.’ (Stern *et al*, 2005: xxxii)

An approach from sociology

The work of the World Bank empowerment team in the Poverty Reduction unit is based on theoretical approaches developed within the discipline of sociology (Alsop *et al*, 2006: 9) which underpin a framework which can be used ‘for understanding, measuring, monitoring, and operationalising empowerment policy and

⁵ This chimes with a suggestion in Alsop *et al* (2006: 76) of ‘using panel communities for just-in-time mixed methods M&E data generation’.

practice' (*op cit*: 1). Empowerment is defined as 'the process of enhancing an individual's or group's capacity to make purposive choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes' (*ibid*). The two pillars here are 'asset-based agency' and 'institution-based opportunity structure' and the framework 'suggests that investments and interventions can empower people by focusing on the dynamic and iterative relationships between agency and structure' (*ibid*).

In the framework three domains of power are identified. The state, in which a person is a civic actor; the market, in which a person is an economic actor; and society, in which a person is a social actor. People experience domains and sub-domains at different levels: macro, intermediary, and local which includes household, wider kin networks, and community. Domains are linked; for example, status (power, authority and prestige embedded in a role) which is defined in the 'society' domain, affects participation in the state and market domains. The measurement or tracking of empowerment involves information about asset-based agency and institutions and direct measures to establish (1) whether a choice exists (2) whether a person exercises that choice and (3) whether the choice is achieved. Development interventions have varying impacts on structure and agency in different domains and at different levels. For example policy changes affect institutions by altering incentives, sanctions, and/or entitlements, while programme and project interventions may also introduce new assets.

An application of the framework for the World Bank Ethiopia Poverty Assessment

A study of empowerment in Ethiopia using the framework was used to inform the 2004 Poverty Assessment (Kurey, 2005). The core generic findings of the review, which we return to in the concluding section, were:

- The vast majority of Ethiopians suffer from low asset bases and limited opportunities to act on their own choices in their interactions within society and the market and with the state. This is particularly true for women and pastoralists.
- Citizen trust and interest in formal market and state institutions remains low, both overall and in comparison to traditional and nonstate institutions.
- Informal institutions – including the norms, traditions, and cultural values of Ethiopia – inhibit citizens' overall empowerment by perpetuating social divisions and discouraging participation in the market and government decision-making processes.

1.3. The WeD-Ethiopia power framework

The conceptual framework and methodology summarised here is described in more detail in Section 2 of the paper. A sufficient summary is provided here so that Section 2 may be ignored by those with no interest in theorising. There are three important extensions to the empowerment framework. First, the passage of time matters: social actors have ages, histories and habituses, communities have long histories and potential futures. Second, a fourth domain of 'culture', which includes 'preferences', is identified. Third, the domains, or 'fields of action', of state, market and society are redefined to cover both 'modern' and customary' community features and their 'inter-penetration' is acknowledged. The local community polity includes customary political structures as well as the state. Local economies involve social as well as market exchanges. Polities and economies are 'embedded' (Polyani, 1944) in societies whose most important constituents are kin and lineage relations and cultures in which religion plays a central role.

The conceptual framework models Ethiopia's rural communities as unequally structured complex, dynamic and adaptive open social systems energised by the inter-actions of social actors and reproduced and/or changed through a historical process of iterative interactions between agents and structures. In these rural community systems four important inter-penetrating fields of action, each with its own structures of opportunity /constraint, can be identified: (1) livelihood production; (2) human, household and kin reproduction; (3) community governance; and (4) cultural manipulation or the reproduction and change of local cultural repertoires. Changes in one field of action are likely to impact on other fields leading to complex interactions which may reverse or divert the original change. Such processes contribute to the reproduction of community systems.

Household 'sub-systems' are the key organisations for livelihood production and human reproduction, while other community organisations also have sub-systemic properties. The relationship of individual social actors to the community is mediated through participation in sub-systems, particularly household membership. Each social actor has a gender, an age, a wealth status, and a social origin status, which, *taken together*, underpin the particular opportunities/constraints governing the ability to act in the four fields of action. The power a 'genderaged', 'wealthed' and 'social-originated' person exerts in a particular episode of action depends on an interaction between her embodied personal agency and the structures of opportunity/constraint she faces,

which she will experience as (1) *resources* she can use, (2) *rules* she should follow, and *relationships* or the actions of other people which support, divert or oppose what she is trying to do. The relation between agency and structure is one of historical alternation between the conditioning of agents by structure and the elaboration of structure by interacting agents. There are unintended individual and collective consequences of the interactions among agents differently located in the structures which can affect collective trajectories as well as personal fates.

Power permeates the structures of community systems. *Power to* is embodied in individuals (including *power within*), while *collective power to* is emergent from the social structures of organisations and other collectivities. *Power to* is exercised in relationships with other individuals or collectivities who also have 'power to'. In some relationships this results in each party exercising *power against* the other. Other relationships involve *power over*, *power with*, and *power on behalf of*. The *facilitative power* of community and household structures depends on material, relational, symbolic and political 'capitals' which have accumulated over time. The degree of facilitative power emergent from local structures has consequences for all community members.

In the paper we focus our study of power in communities on the four analytically identifiable but empirically inter-penetrating 'fields of action' identified above: (1) livelihoods; (2) human, household and kin reproduction; (3) community governance; and (4) cultural manipulation, reproduction and emergence. Unequal structures of opportunity/constraint and unequal embodiments of personal agency in these fields of action involve four types of status difference: (1) biologically-based - gender and age; (2) locally salient social origins - potentially: clan/lineage, residence status, ethnicity, religion, occupational 'caste' and race; (3) household wealth-poverty; (4) government – people.

Livelihoods and human reproduction are heavily centred on patriarchal households and their surrounding kin networks. They depend on a gendered division of labour within and across households. Households vary by (1) wealth, (2) membership structure and (3) stage in the development cycle. In the field of community governance community and government structures and agents meet and interact. Community leadership is involved in mediating and moderating external interventions. Cultural manipulation involves 'cultural entrepreneurs' with missions to promote particular ideologies. External opinion leaders, including government, religious leaders, donors, NGOs, and media disseminate knowledge and ideologies in attempts to change or reinforce local preferences/habitus and institutions related to livelihoods and human reproduction, while internal opinion leaders are active as interpreters and proselytisers of customary or new cultural repertoires. Cultural reproduction depends on intergenerational transfers of local knowledge and practices.

1.4. Research questions, evidence base and rhetorical style

The paper is guided by three research questions:

1. What patterns of opportunity and constraint do social and cultural structures in each of the four fields of action provide for people of different social statuses?
2. How have these structures been changing, if at all?
3. What are the implications of the findings for development strategies?

The database used in the paper consists of qualitative 'protocol' data made in 1995 and 2003 (WIDE) and between July 2004 and October 2005 (DEEP), a random sample Resources and Needs Survey (RANS), plus a psychological instrument for measuring quality of life (WeD-QoL) in each site. The DEEP protocol research was conducted by male and female researchers resident in each site for 3 weeks in each month who provided gendered perspectives on all topics in the form of respondents' narratives, reported observations and commentaries. The normative and cognitive structures and the relational and material structures constitutive of community complex open social systems cannot be directly observed; they have to be inferred from a mix of measures, narratives and observation. The survey and psychological measures and the narratives and reported observations in our database are 'traces' (Byrne 2002) of the operation of the community systems at the time they were recorded, whose import we have to interpret using our framework.

One of the aims of our larger research programme is to contribute to the development of a rigorous case-based and multi-method approach to development research. We believe that rigour demands the provision of an evidence base for conclusions drawn from qualitative data. The evidence base for the conclusions of the paper is contained in Sections 3-7 which are structured using the framework and present the relevant system 'traces' in the form of tables using RANS data and boxes containing extracts of field research reports. The boxes are not

used in the conventional way as occasional supplements to the main text but should be seen as pieces of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) which provide clues to the operation of the community systems at the same time giving the reader some access to the life-worlds of the people who live in the communities, and the people themselves some voice in development discourses.

1.5. The structure of the paper and ways in which it can be read

We are aware that there are different audiences for parts or all of the paper and have designed it to be read in different ways. The main text of the paper is organised as follows:

1. Introduction
2. Conceptual framework, database, analytic approach and rhetorical style
3. The community structures in the macro context
4. Power structures and agency in the communities 2003 – 2005
5. History, path dependence and future trajectories – a longer view
6. Lessons for development policy and practice

There is a short Appendix 1 describing the WeD Ethiopia database and a longer set of Appendices (2-5) which provide the evidence base for the conclusions of the paper:

Appendix 2: Structures and agency in the livelihood field of action 2003-2005

Appendix 3: Structures and agency in the fields of human re/production 2003-2005

Appendix 4: Structures and agency in the field of community governance 2003-2005

Appendix 5: Structures and agency in the cultural field of action 2003-2005

Section 2 can be ignored by all but those interested in theory and methods and read only by those who are not interested in anything else. The Appendices can be ignored by those interested only in the conclusions. Each of the Appendix reports on the fields of action can be read separately. So, for example, those with an interest in governance at local levels could just read Appendix 4. Those who are interested in the lifeworlds and voices of men, women and children in rural Ethiopia might read all Appendices 2-5. Those who only have time to read a few pages should read the Executive Summary.

We conclude the introduction with a summary of what the Appendices in the evidence base cover.

The purpose of these Appendices is to describe and analyse status-related opportunities and constraints in the four sites between 2003 and 2005 which resulted from differences in personal and social power associated with each of the four fields of action. The statuses which determine personal agency and opportunities and constraints are genderage, relevant local categories of (embodied) social origin, and household wealth.

Appendix 2: In all sites own-account farming is the dominant occupation although there are opportunities for off-farm own-account activity and employment, these being greater in the more market-integrated sites. This Appendix describes the material contexts and the institutions, relationships and ideas which determine livelihood opportunities and constraints for males and females of different ages, household wealths, and social origins. Sections 2 and 3 describe opportunities and constraints related to farm production and off-farm work. Section 4 describes credit and insurance mechanisms while Section 5 details the problems and crises faced in the communities. The Appendix concludes with a discussion of community facilitative power, noting the difference between the food-surplus and food-deficit sites, and explores how household access to material resources is affected by the cultural resources of the household.

Appendix 3: The second major field of action in which all members of the community are involved is human production and reproduction. The production of human beings depends on marriage and includes pregnancy, birth, and investments in children in terms of socialisation and education for future human resources. Human reproduction involves the use of material resources to maintain people on a daily basis including food, housing, household assets, clothes, and care and treatment during illness. Women and girls are the main household actors in the field of human production and reproduction, although young boys may also contribute reproductive labour and adult males build and maintain the houses, contribute material resources for reproduction, and participate in the raising of children. Appendix 3 describes the gendered division of labour and the material

contexts, institutions, relationships and ideas which determine opportunities and constraints related to human production and reproduction.

Appendix 4: The third major field of action is community governance. The goals of community governance are the maintenance of social order by controlling deviant behaviour, resolving disputes and handling dissent and conflict, economic development activities, social protection, gender and family 'policy', the management of collective resources, community survival and solidarity. Governance structures consist of the roles, rules, values and beliefs involved in decision-making on behalf of the community. In rural Ethiopia there are two inter-penetrating sets of governance structures, one with its roots in the community and the other brought into the community by the government. In this Appendix we consider these two sets of structures separately and provide some examples of issues which have arisen in the communities across the government-community interface. The section concludes with a discussion of local and ideological repertoires of ideas associated with community governance.

Appendix 5: The fourth field of action is the one in which 'cultural capital' is made and contested. In line with our definition of culture as 'ideas' in this Appendix we identify recent deliberate attempts at cultural manipulation to change the 'preferences' of local inhabitants and describe other more diffuse influences which depend on what is going on in the wider cultural contexts of the communities and various kinds of networking. We identify five cultural repertoires which are being disseminated in the communities: local traditional; local modern; new religious ideologies; government ideologies; and donor/NGO ideologies.

2. Conceptual framework, database, analytic approach and rhetorical style

The purpose of this section is to explain how we conceive of power structures and agency and the relation between them, and how our theoretical framework underpins the empirical analysis and policy discussion. We explain how and why we have extended the opportunity structures / agency framework developed by the World Bank empowerment group. We then link the framework to the data used in the paper.

2.1. Conceptual framework

The Alsop/Holland framework was developed with measurement for evaluation of development projects in all parts of the world in mind. The WeD-Ethiopia framework was developed with a view to improving understanding of how the operation of power structures in local Ethiopian communities affects (1) community survival and development (2) patterns of household wealth and (3) patterns of personal life quality including personal power. In particular we take a more complex view of people and structures and the relationship between them, and locate our interpretations and analyses in ongoing historical processes.

‘Empowerment’

The World Bank empowerment framework was developed for the measurement and monitoring of empowerment processes and outcomes in the context of development interventions. The framework has two definitions of empowerment. One definition is 'a person's capacity to make effective choices; that is, as the capacity to transform choices into desired actions and outcomes' (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005: 4). This has two aspects: 'agency' or 'an actor's ability to make meaningful choices; that is the actor is able to envisage options and make a choice' (op cit: 6) and 'opportunity structure' defined as 'the formal and informal contexts within which actors operate' (*ibid*) and 'institutional context' (Holland and Brook, 2004: 94). A second definition of empowerment is 'increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those into desired actions and outcomes' (*ibid*).

We have experienced the two definitions of ‘empowerment’ as confusing and use it only in the second sense. In the WeD-Ethiopia power framework we use the terms ‘personal power’ and ‘collective power’ to refer to ‘empowerment’ in the first sense. Also, as our framework uses the structure-culture⁶-agency theory developed by Margaret Archer (1995, 1996 and 200), we stick with her conception of agency⁷ and use the term ‘autonomy’ to refer to ‘an actor’s ability to make meaningful choices’, which also enables us to make links with discourses in political theory and psychology which use the term in this way. For example, Doyal and Gough, distinguish between ‘autonomy’⁸ and ‘critical autonomy’ with the latter referring to the ability to question and participate in agreeing or changing the rules of a society (1991:67).

Structures, ideas and agency

In the empowerment framework personal and collective power has three aspects: one related to autonomy, the second to structures of opportunity, and the third to the relation between structure and agency. We also identify these three aspects as important.

Structures of opportunity and constraint

The first thing we would add is that unequal structures constrain as well as provide opportunities. Opportunities and constraints are unequally allocated and there is frequently a relationship between the opportunities of one person or social category and the constraints of another person or social category, for example landowners and tenants, husbands and wives, ethnic majorities and minorities. Following Archer we also claim that, from an analytic perspective, the structural and cultural or symbolic domains are substantively different and relatively autonomous (1996: xiii). The structural domain has two aspects⁹: social system variables, including roles and

⁶ Where culture is defined as ‘ideas’.

⁷ Which includes all social action.


⁸ Doyal and Gough’s definition of autonomy is similar to that of empowerment, in that it depends on a combination of personal and social variables. ‘Three key variables affect levels of individual autonomy: the level of *understanding* a person has about herself, her culture and what is expected of her as an individual within it; the *psychological capacity* she has to formulate options herself; and the objective *opportunities* enabling her to act accordingly’ (Doyal and Gough, 1991:60); emphasis in the original.

⁹ This harks back to Lockwood’s seminal article on ‘system integration’ and ‘social integration’ and the way that the relationship between the two affects the stability of the social system in question (1964).

institutions or rules/norms, and structured social relationships in material contexts.

It is helpful to use the grid-group theory of Douglas (1978) and Wildavsky *et al* (1990) to consider the different kinds of relationship that may exist between relationships and institutions.

FIGURE 2.1



The typology reveals the variability in ways in which an individual's involvement in social life is organised. 'Grid' refers to the degree to which an individual's life is circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions which may be formal rules or informal norms. 'The more binding and extensive the scope of the prescriptions, the less of life that is open to individual negotiations' (Thompson *et al*, 1990: 5). Group refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units. The greater the incorporation the more individual choice is subject to group determination. Individualists are weak on both axes being motivated by self-interest and a sense of themselves as 'sovereign authors of their own fate' (Fitzpatrick, 2005: 191). Hierarchists are strong on both, identifying with a particular group while viewing social groups as ordered in 'vertical levels of authority and subservience, superiority and inferiority' (*ibid*). Fatalists are strong on grid but weak on group and 'a sense of constraint combines with low affiliation minimising the desire for collective identification and action' (*op cit*. 192). Egalitarians are weak on grid but strong on group 'in that they resent external constraint and believe it can be resisted through solidarity with others' (*ibid*). People in rural communities in developing countries operate in regulated environments and, depending on the extent to which they are incorporated into social groups experience hierarchy or fatalism. The government approach to communities in Ethiopia is hierarchical and regulatory. In contrast donor ideologies are rooted in liberalism placing value on individualism and/or egalitarianism.

The structural and cultural domains are substantively different and relatively autonomous. The cultural domain is about the relations pertaining between ideas, and the ideational influences operating between people (Archer, : xiii). This domain also has 'system' and 'social' aspects; there are logical relations between ideas which may be consistent or inconsistent, and there are relations between cultural agents involving inter-personal influence including 'the manipulative assault and battery of ideas used ideologically' (*op cit*.: xix). The question here is why, when and how people struggle over ideas. Inconsistency in ideas may lead to system instability or change, as may ideological conflicts between socio-cultural agents. The symbolic aspects of opportunity and constraint structures includes knowledge as well the 'various ideas and values that provide [people] with general principles for action, rules of behaviour, and legitimating beliefs' (López and Scott, 2000: 21). The structuring of *symbolic resources* or capital, including knowledge and information, political ideologies, religious beliefs and rules, customary values and beliefs, government laws, rules, and roles, and customary norms associated with roles,

involves *symbolic power*¹⁰. Depending on their social makeup, levels of political and/or religious domination, historic internal conflicts and relations with the outside world, there is variation among communities in the extent to which there is cultural consensus; it is important to look for competing 'cultural repertoires' and struggles over cultural ideas. Also there may be areas of social life and activity not influenced by formal rules or customary norms.

Agency

The empowerment framework, with its measurement focus, does not say much about social actors; agency is measured by an actor's 'asset endowments'. 'These assets can be psychological, informational, organisational, material, social, financial, or human' (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005: 9). This confuses the Archer distinction between agency and structure since some of these assets are embodied (psychological, human) while others are part of the social structure (organisational, material, social, financial) or the cultural system (informational). Structures involve formal and informal relationships between people with social identities and roles in those structures (networks, hierarchies, markets, organisations, teams, dyads...) and between people and material resources or assets; these relationships are guided by institutions (formal rules and informal norms).

The embodied aspects of people that are important in the empowerment framework are psychological assets, human assets and incorporated informational assets. Psychological assets include 'the capacity to envision' (Alsop *et al* 2006: 11) levels of self-confidence (Alsop and Heinsohn, 2005: 43) while what might be called psychological liabilities include acceptance of one's own disempowerment and second class status (12). Human assets include skills and literacy (11), education levels. Embodied informational assets include awareness, for example of reproductive health issues (47).

We define 'personal agency' as including everything a person is capable of doing including habitual actions, autonomous actions, and critical actions. Our conception of a 'person' is of a gendered being. Everyone has a gender and a (changing) age; in all societies, taking both together, embodied 'genderage' affects not only the roles which actors play in the society, economy, polity, and culture, but also the particular instantiations of abstract universal human needs¹¹, and the forms of the resources required to meet those needs. We believe it is difficult to conceive of power relations in any society without recognising the importance of genderage.

On the basis of psychological theories of human development we have distinguished a number of key life stages adapted to fit rural Ethiopian lifestyles. These relate to: infants; kneechildren; roaming children; learning/working children; adolescents; very young adults, mature adults; and declining adults. Erikson (1959) identified the following challenges posed during these life stages: babies - learning to trust in a relation of dependency; knee children - becoming autonomous and able to make choices and decisions; roaming children - developing initiative in physical and mental activity; children - becoming industrious through learning and practising skills; adolescents - establishing an identity; young adults - developing intimacy in close physical and emotional relations; mature adults - establishing and guiding the next generation; declining adults - integrating and accepting what has happened in life. We see the first five categories, covering roughly from birth to about 15, as being particularly relevant for the development of embodied capacities for, attitudes towards, and the likely goals of 'meaningful choice'.

Each individual is born as a gendered biologically-structured baby into a family occupying a more or less elevated position in the local social and cultural structures. The status of family of origin has considerable implications for future experiences and development. Child development is based on interactions between bodily maturation and the natural, other material, social, and cultural environments, leading to three types of embodied *resource or liability*¹². The first set relating to health, strength, locally-relevant skills and practical and pedagogic knowledge are often described as 'human resources', though we prefer to call them *competence*

¹⁰ Sometimes identified as *dispositional power*. In relation to the power to make public decisions this aspect of power is identified by Lukes as the 'third dimension', the first being public decision-making processes, and the second control of what appears on the decision-making agenda. In the third dimensions powerful people are able to define what constitutes a grievance by shaping perceptions and preferences and controlling information in such a way that those which an external observer would regard as having real grievances consent to their domination (2005: 150).

¹¹ Conceived as including internally-oriented needs for competence and autonomy, and externally-oriented needs for relation and meaning. These needs may compete.

¹² It is important to recognise that what is embodied may be an asset or a liability. For example, the bodies and brains of children who are regularly malnourished are damaged, while the psychological resources of many child soldiers would be better described as liabilities.

resources/liabilities. The second set, which we are calling 'personal identity', relates to personality, and a history of experiments, experiences and learning in natural and material contexts, and key personal relationships. The emotions play an important role. The development of personal identity depends on a continuous sense of self which everyone acquires early in life. By the time we reach maturity we have acquired a personal identity which defines the kind of person we are (for example confident, immoral, easygoing, fanatical, lazy, defeated, reflective, critical...). Personal identity includes 'psychological resources' (and liabilities) one component of which are *autonomy resources/liabilities*. Adult experiences may lead to changes in personal identity.

A third contribution to personal agency is made by the 'embodied structures' described by the term 'habitus' (López and Scott, 2000: 101). A child spends the first 15 to 20 years of his or her life learning how to become an adult in the style of his or her parents and other significant adults. 'A habitus develops as children imitate actions and infer patterns that are incorporated as structures that generate their own future actions' (López and Scott, 2000: 103). In other words they develop tendencies to act in one way or another in particular situations. These are 'coded into the brain and other organs in such a way that individuals are able to act in routine ways without having to think consciously about what they ought to be doing ... Values, norms, and ideas, then, come to be fixed in the body as postures, gestures, ways of standing, walking, thinking, and speaking'. A habitus provides a person with internalised unconscious information as to *how*, given the kind of person they are, they ought to think, behave, want, and choose and *what* they ought to think, do, want and choose. Morality is a key element of habitus. Habitus vary by gender and local culture and potentially by class and other unequal local statuses.

Through the development of a habitus young people are prepared for particular social roles. With maturity they assume and personify roles, achieving a social identity. Over time as they pass through life people modify their habituses as a result of new experiences related to the ageing process, and to external changes in their social context and social roles. For example, early habitus acquired in the family is transformed by schooling, while people migrating to new cultural contexts find that their routine ways of acting are inappropriate.

Embodied resources/liabilities of relevance to personal agency can be analytically divided into (1) those that underpin physical and cognitive in/competence, (2) those aspects of personal identity related to heteronomy/autonomy and (3) those aspects of habitus which restrict or enable the ability to choose and suggest what should be chosen.

The relation between structure and agency

In the empowerment framework there is reference to an iterative process between structure and agency which is a key element in Archer's theoretical approach. Archer stresses the importance of time. At 'Time 1' social actors are faced with a social system of structured roles, rules and materials and a cultural system of ideas. There is a process or episode of 'social agency' (2000: 283) involving interactions among primary and collective agents who occupy different roles and have different personal and collective agency profiles. At Time 2, as a result of the process, social structures, cultural systems and 'agency', or what is embodied in individual social actors, will either have been reproduced or changed in some way.

Domains of power and fields of action

In the empowerment framework three domains of power are identified. The state, in which a person is a civic actor; the market, in which a person is an economic actor; and society, in which a person is a social actor. The three domains are divided into sub-domains:

- State: justice, politics and service delivery
- Market: credit, labour and goods
- Society: family, community (as a whole and possibly sub-groups such as ethnic groups or kin networks)

This is a useful starting point but, for our purposes, we need to add a fourth domain of 'symbolic culture', defined as the production, dissemination and reproduction of ideas¹³, and redefine the three domains to fit the realities of the communities we are studying. The local community polity includes customary political structures as well as the state and we are proposing a domain of 'community governance' which includes the state and the

¹³ Some definitions of culture include material practices as well as mental products and see institutions (rules and norms) as cultural. Our domain of culture is one where people's material practices re/produce mental products, rather than livelihoods, people, or collective action. The ideas produced and disseminated relate to all four of the fields of action.

'community' part of 'society'. Local economies involve social as well as market exchanges. The domain of 'society' refers to all social relations while 'family' becomes a separate domain of power involving human production and reproduction. The power domain of symbolic culture includes local cultural repertoires, which are sets of logically-related ideas available within the community which are the result of historical processes, and 'ideological repertoires', which are sets of logically-related ideas currently being brought to the community by 'cultural entrepreneurs' who wish to influence the values, norms and beliefs of residents. In non-modern contexts politics and economies are 'embedded' (Polyani 1944) in societies whose most important constituents are kin and lineage relations and symbolic cultures in which religion plays a central role.

We are redefining the domains as 'fields of action' which overlap and inter-penetrate through the multi-roles played by individual actors and the logical relations between the different institutions and ideas important in each of the fields. 'A society – as a social space – consists of a multiplicity of fields in complex articulations with one another' (López and Scott 2000: 85). Bourdieu (1984, 1994) developed the notion of fields recognising that in a social space each field has to accommodate to the 'pressures and strains of coexisting with other fields' and that fields are involved in complex interchanges. There are relationships of autonomy and interdependence among fields and in particular social formations it is possible to identify hierarchies of fields. Each field has its own developmental dynamics. Within the space of autonomous and interpenetrating fields social structures are formed.

Each community is structured by a division of labour whose pattern underlies a set of more or less overlapping and inter-penetrating fields of action. The most important fields for the power, survival and development of the community are the fields of (1) material production or livelihoods, (2) human production and reproduction, (3) community governance, and (4) the cultural production, reproduction and dissemination of ideas.

Communities as complex and dynamic open social systems

System levels

In the empowerment framework people experience domains and sub-domains at different levels – macro, intermediary, and local which is defined for ease of analysis as an administrative boundary (Alsop *at al*, 2006: 21). For our study of communities we argue that people experience the four fields of action at levels within the 'local', particularly the household level. In the empowerment framework account is taken of the passage of time through measurement before and after a development intervention. In our framework we take account of both levels, and social reproduction and change by adopting a 'complex and dynamic open social systems' approach (Byrne, 1998). Open social systems have fuzzy boundaries which to a degree differentiate them from their environment. Within them it is possible to identify open 'sub-systems' and they are also likely to be open sub-systems of larger open social systems. Our main focus is the 'local': we are interested in how the community system works as a whole, and also in how sub-system households work. We are also interested in the local impacts of actions initiated at macro and intermediary levels.

Community reproduction and change: path dependence

These community open social systems evolved to their current structural states through the actions and interactions of generations of social actors responding to contextual ecological and social pressures and outside interventions from within and beyond the country; and their future pathway depends on such processes in the future. System structures, including structures of opportunity and constraint, are historical outcomes of social processes which condition but do not determine future action. Parker describes the important approach to structure/agency analysis developed by Archer (1995) in the following way. 'Analytically speaking, the relation between agency and structure is one of historical alternation between the conditioning of agents by structure and the elaboration of structure by interacting agents'. (2000: 74). Historical development is not necessarily a smooth flow as evidence by stop-go histories of change. The process of social development 'is not continuous, linear and progressive, but is organised around significant discontinuities and ruptures' (López and Scott, 2000: 83)

Households are small systems with development cycles related to the age of the leading adults. As a result of the stresses of rural life households regularly deviate from the locally ideal household development trajectory (for shorter or longer periods) with consequences for the collectivity as well as individual members. Deviator households are likely to be connected to stronger households. Households are key organisations in the fields of material production, kin-based reproduction, and cultural re/production and people have roles and obligations in community governance structures as a result of their household memberships. Households are differentially

located within unequal community structures in terms of access to material resources (wealth/poverty), social resources (roles and positions in social networks), cultural resources (evaluations of the members' social origin) and political resources (relationships with community leaders and government)

Power and empowerment

In the empowerment framework measures of assets and institutions in the different domains provide *intermediary* indicators of empowerment or personal or collective power. *Direct* measures of degrees of empowerment can be made by assessing (1) the existence of choice (2) the use of choice and (3) the achievement of choice (op cit: 10). The focus here is on the *power to* of individuals or groups, taking account of both internal autonomy and location in structures of opportunity/constraint. We would add that *collective power to* or *facilitative power* is emergent from the social structure and cultural system of the organisation or group concerned. For example the *facilitative power* of community and household structures depends on material, symbolic, relational, and political 'capitals' which have accumulated over time as a result of action in the four fields. There is also a relational and interactional aspect to structures of opportunity and constraint which involve *social resources* resulting from networking, organisation and role hierarchies in the four fields. Relational mechanisms connecting social roles and individual people vary to include: *control* by some people and groups over others (*power over*); *competition and conflict* between people and groups (*power against*); *co-operation* among people and groups (*power with*); and *care* of some people and groups by others (*power on behalf of*).

In the WeD Ethiopia framework the personal power of an individual has four components: what is embodied as a result of past history; personal location in household and community structures of opportunity/constraint; the person's household's facilitative power; and the person's community's facilitative power. Empowerment or disempowerment of any individual can result from positive or negative changes to what is embodied (e.g. from illness or education), in personal location in community or household structures, or in collective household or community facilitative power. Since all individuals live in relationships the dis/empowerment of one will have knock-on effects for those with whom they regularly inter-act.

Outside interventions to increase the power of a particular category of person, household or other organisation, or the community insert new material and symbolic resources into the community, come with rules which may be contradicted by local rules, and change people's actions with potential knock-on effects for other people. For example, the building of a school in a community requires land, which may come from grazing land reducing the number of livestock that can be sustained, and community contributions of cash and labour diverting resources from household productive activities. Teachers come with a curriculum of new ideas which may lead young students to grow contemptuous of older uneducated people, and rules about attendance which disrupt the organisation of household labour and increase the workloads of adults who may already be over-burdened. While the students may be empowered through education this is likely to be at the expense of the power of others.

2.2. The Ethiopia WeD multi-method database and its use in this paper

The Ethiopia WeD database has been made over a period of 10 years (1995-2005). It covers four rural and two urban sites, though here we only make use of the rural data. It includes protocol data collected at community, household and individual levels, survey data collected at household level, and quality of life scores for 371 individuals. In the main fieldwork period between July 2004 and October 2005 a team of two researchers, one male and one female, were resident in each of the sites for three weeks in each month making data guided by a series of protocols, ensuring comparability across the sites. There is more information about the database and how it can be accessed in Appendix 1. The Ethiopia database also has linkages with the panel Ethiopian Rural Household Survey data (six rounds between 1994 and 2004) which covered households included in an IFPRI survey of six food-deficit communities

There are three sources for the data used in the paper:

WIDE1¹⁴ protocol research in the fifteen rural sites of the Ethiopian Rural Household Survey in 1995

WIDE2 protocol research in the same sites plus five more between July and September 2003

DEEP¹⁵ survey, protocol and psychological measurement research in four sites selected from the WIDE sample between June 2004 and November 2005:

¹⁴ Wellbeing and Illbeing Dynamics in Ethiopia

¹⁵ in-Depth Exploration of Ethiopian Poverty

The multi-methods for gathering the information some of which is used in relation to the research questions include

- a household resources and member needs questionnaire (RANS) administered to 250 households in each of the sites (apart from Dinki where all 169 households were included) in June/July 2004
- a series of protocol-guided semi-structured interviews and focus groups with key informants of different statuses completed in 1995, between July and September 2003 and between July 2004 and November 2005, exploring community structures, cultures, and histories, and current activities and events including disputes and various forms of collective action.
- in each of the sites twelve monthly community diaries and individual/household monthly diaries for twelve households in each site covering the activities and experiences of all members of the household.
- in each site for males and females fourteen adult life histories, ten interviews with old people, sixteen interviews with children/young people of different ages and their main carer, and six interviews with both members of an 'inter-generational' couple – father-son; mother-daughter.
- in each site responses to a psychological instrument measuring aspects of quality of life from 31 males and 31 females of different ages and wealths.

2.3. Bringing the framework to the data

In this section we describe our analytic approach which is 'case' rather than 'variable' based and set out the research questions which we have brought to the database in more detail. The aim of our study is to produce understanding and explanations of ways in which rural communities and households in Ethiopia have been working recently, and how they have changed and are changing. Being interested in patterns and patterning rather than relationships between variables we have chosen to take an historical (nested) case-based approach to our communities, households and people (Byrne and Ragin, 2008; Bevan, 2008).

The normative and cognitive structures and the relational and material structures constitutive of community complex open social systems cannot be directly observed; they have to be inferred from a mix of measures, narratives and observation. We regard the survey and psychological measures and the narratives and reported observations in our database as 'traces' (Byrne 2002) of the operation of the open social system at the time they were recorded, whose import we have to interpret using our framework.

What can case-based approaches tell us?

In line with our characterisation of the communities as complex open social systems we have adopted a multi-level 'case-based' approach (see for example Ragin, 2000; Ragin and Becker, 1992; Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000). Our four case communities are constituted by nested case-households themselves constituted by nested case-individuals. In the social sciences beyond the development field there is a growing interest in 'case-oriented' approaches, which 'by their nature, are sensitive to complexity and historical specificity' and able to 'maintain a meaningful connection to social and political issues because they are more concerned with actual events, with human agency and process.' (Ragin, 1989: ix). The recent huge increase in computer storage, power and speed has potentially revolutionised case-based research (Byrne: 2002)

Capturing a case in its uniqueness

Community members can be given voice. In addition a case study offers a substitute for firsthand experience. Each reader comes with a store of experiential and tacit knowledge and can use a single case study as the basis for 'naturalistic generalisation'. Thirdly, description and explanation leads to understanding of the case as a whole, and this understanding can inform evaluation and prescription tailored to the particular case.

In relation to the goals of this paper *one* case study can contribute to understanding of:

- the longer-term fate of external planned interventions
- the extent to which academic and policy conceptual frameworks reflect and reveal local realities on the ground and how they might be improved
- how a particular case works as a whole with a view to imagining scenarios related to potential development or empowerment interventions
- the extent to which general conclusions drawn from large sample surveys apply in this case; might a more nuanced approach be more effective?
- how the case is affected by its wider context

Comparison of cases

Comparative analysis of findings from *two or more* case studies purposively selected in relation to key differentiating variables can assist in identification and understanding both of common patterns or common mechanisms and of differences in the way they play out. In different contexts universal causal mechanisms combine over time in diverse causal processes. Key insights here are that variables operate in concert (Ragin, 1987) and impact at different points in time as events unfold (Becker, 2000). Outcomes can always be reached by multiple pathways and narrative accounts of events in particular cases can be used identify patterns of pathways.

For larger numbers of cases potential strategies include the case survey method (Yin and Heald, 1975), Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 1987 and 2000), and meta-ethnography (Noblit and Hare, 1988), none of which have been widely used in the development studies field.

Multi-level analysis

Rural communities are constituted by households and by people both of which can in turn be analysed as cases using multi-level and multi-methods potentially analysable using both qualitative and quantitative procedures. Here we would endorse

Integrating qualitative and quantitative analysis

All the data was made out of conversations with respondents with some questions being more open-ended than others. Many of the same responses have been used to construct quantities and to describe qualities. Our analysis has a number of 'quantitative' elements:

- We reduce some responses to numbers or rankings (how many? how much? how satisfied?) which we use to inform us about particular individuals and households as well as patterns at community level
- We have constructed household productive wealth and demographic structure typologies and use descriptive statistics to establish how the communities are structured in terms of household use of the material means of production.
- We use other descriptive statistics from the RANS as traces of the operation of the community systems in June/July 2004.
- A principal components analysis of the psychological measurement data on happiness goal satisfaction revealed six domains of importance: basic needs, economic production, infrastructure and government services, the household in the community, customary relations, and modern orientation. Individual and aggregated scores on these domains provide information about the goals of particular individuals, genderage and wealth categories, and the four communities.

These quantitative traces have to be interpreted (Byrne 2002) a task which is supported by use of the qualitative data. We also linked the quantitative and qualitative data by purposively selecting in-depth cases using survey results. For example having 'boxed' the households into wealth categories and household types on the basis of data from the Exploratory QoL module, and explored and interpreted the quantitative aspects, we then used selected examples from the types for in-depth exploration of actions, relations and norms.

Research questions, evidence base and rhetorical style

The paper is guided by three research questions:

1. In these communities how do local power structures affect the personal agency and degrees of power of rural people of different genders, ages, household wealth/poverty, ethnicity, religion, occupational caste, and residential status?
2. How has the recent operation of each of these fields, separately and interactively, contributed to the achievements of the community systems as whole? What collective facilitative power and liabilities are associated with them?
3. In what ways have the power structures in these community systems reproduced themselves or changed in the longer-run, and to what extent have these changes promoted reproduction or change in the community systems as a whole?. Are the communities trapped in 'low-level' equilibria? Are there internal or external 'drivers of change' which have led, or may lead, to changes of direction in the future? Are there different answers to these questions for different types of community?

To answer Research Questions 1 and 2 in the evidence base we accumulate traces of the operation of social

structures and cultural systems in the four fields of action between 2003 and 2005. In the Appendix we describe and analyse structures of opportunity and constraint, cultural systems, and agency to develop narratives about the personal and collective power of people of different social statuses in each of the four fields of action separately. The social statuses of interest are genderage, household wealth, and social origin. For each field of action we present narrative and quantitative 'trace' evidence of the ways in which field structures offer different opportunities and constraints to males and females, olders and youngers, dominant and minority cultural groups, and richer and poorer. In Section 4 of the main paper we use this evidence base and the conceptual framework to produce an analysis of power structures and personal agency in the communities between 2003 and 2005 structured as follows:

1. Recent structures of opportunity and constraint in each of the fields for gendered adults and children of different wealth and social origin status
 - a. Material resources
 - b. Institutions and roles
 - c. Relations between people of different social statuses occupying different roles
 - d. Local and ideological repertoires of ideas
2. Embodied agency of gendered children, adults and old people of different social statuses
 - a. Habitus
 - b. Competence
 - c. Autonomy

This is followed by a consideration of overall community facilitative power which is constituted by

- a. Collective material resources – including the natural environment
- b. Collective human resources
- c. Efficacy of governance structures
- d. Efficacy of cultural ideas
- e. How the four fields work together

In Section 5 we respond to the following questions:

1. What changes in structures, agency and patterns of inequality can be identified:
 - a. In livelihoods?
 - b. In human re/production?
 - c. In community governance?
 - d. In cultural repertoires of ideas?
2. How has collective facilitative power changed?
3. What factors are significant for future trajectories?

Finally in section 6 we draw some conclusions of relevance to development policy makers, policy thinker and researchers.

One of the aims of our larger research programme is to contribute to the development of a rigorous case-based and multi-method approach to development research. We believe that rigour demands the provision of an evidence base for conclusions drawn from qualitative data. The evidence base for the conclusions of the paper is contained in Sections 3-7 which are structured using the framework and present the relevant system 'traces' in the form of tables using RANS data and boxes containing extracts of field research reports. The boxes are not used in the conventional way as occasional supplements to the main text but should be seen as pieces of 'thick description' (Geertz, 1973) which provide clues to the operation of the community systems at the same time giving the reader some access to the life-worlds of the people who live in the communities, and the people themselves some voice in development discourses. We are not convinced that this is the best way to present the evidence base, since while some people seem to like it, others find it confusing. We agree with Alsop *et al* that 'additional work on presentation of nonquantified information could increase the effectiveness of communicating with users of the analysis' (2005: 38).

3. The Community Structures in Country Context: 2003-2005

In this section we give a brief macro history of Ethiopia and provide a regional and country context for the four research communities. We introduce key features of the communities, describe ideal local household structures and development cycles, and provide some evidence about actual local household structures. We then map, for each of the communities, the social status structures which condition personal and collective power: genderage, wealth, and local identities associated with social origin.

3.1. A brief macro history

Ethiopian society is characterised by extreme poverty and extreme forms of hierarchy. In Western terms most Ethiopian residents are both asset- and income- poor and many are extremely poor; and, while there is a growing urban middle class and political elite their numbers are relatively tiny. Most power relations between social groups or categories have historically involved well-established hierarchies of status supported by norms and rules favouring superiors which are often violently enforced. Historic status discriminators include age, gender and class and various manifestations of ethnicity, clan, religion, occupation and race. Ethiopian history has left a number of legacies whose impacts on our research communities are traced in Section 9. Of particular importance are relations between ethnic groups complicated by religious differences which have very long histories and the ideology and actions of the military socialist regime known as the Derg which was in power between 1974 and 1991.

From the 4th to 16th centuries power in the Ethiopian highlands was held by a succession of Amhara or Tigrayan warlords and Orthodox Christian theologians. During the 16th century the territory was subject to a wave of Muslim invasions followed by a vast expansion of Oromo in the south and a deep infiltration in the north. During the latter half of the 19th century the foundations of the modern state were laid including the conquest of Oromo and other non-Amhara people to the south of the Abyssinian highlands. From the later 1920s to 1974 Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie in an Amhara-dominated regime where there were few limits to his authority.

The Emperor was ousted from power in 1974. The goal of the Derg was a military socialist republic based on the model of the USSR entailing the establishment of a vanguard single party, a range of campaigns and mobilisations in the countryside, and the introduction of mechanisms for surplus appropriation and political control. Marxist-Leninist modernisation brought education and literacy programmes, forced villagisation, producer co-operatives, and resettlement which was often forced. In addition a number of accepted status distinctions came under ideological attack, including those related to class¹⁶, gender, age and occupation¹⁷, while religious activity was controlled in various ways and many customary practices were suppressed. Those who grew up in this context, the oldest of whom are now in their thirties, have a different habitus (Elias: 1994, Bourdieu: 1977) from that of older generations.

The EPRDF regime, which came to power in 1991 as a result of winning a civil war, is dominated by one ethnic group (from Tigray). It was precisely their ethnically based mobilisation that led them to assume, in the face of the collapse of the communist ideology and soviet power, that other groups could and should mobilise on that basis. They promoted 'docile' 'clone' ethnically based parties while very few other groups in opposition mobilised effectively on the basis of ethnicity save, arguably, the OLF. Therefore in the early phase the EPRDF was quite supportive of revitalisation of ethnic/cultural consciousness, and has been involved in affirmative action for minorities in education, linguistic policy, and parliamentary representation, though cynics would say this was also motivated by a divide and rule policy. While its approach to the economy and religious and customary activities has been more liberal than that of the Derg, there has been little real economic privatisation and the government has retained a socialist approach to community politics and mobilisation.

The most important power resource in Ethiopia has always been the State, and competition to control it has involved inhabitants in recurrent, ethnically-complex conflicts, which occasionally break out into open war. These conflicts have undermined and sidelined economic development, diverting precious resources, increasing indebtedness and leading to loss of life, disabilities, war traumas and an enormous diaspora. Control of the state has brought with it control of political decision-making, including the electoral process, control of the military, control of the main agricultural means of production (land), access to donor funding, control of government budgets and food aid distribution, government-related employment and related incentives (housing, vehicles, travel etc), control of the 'private sector' through monopolies or EPRDF-sponsored 'private' enterprise and, until

¹⁶ Land ownership and control of labour and tribute from tenants were important during the imperial period from the late 19th century. Land was nationalised in 1975.

¹⁷ Freeman and Pankhurst (2003) showed that the Derg tried to impose equality for the artisan/hunter occupational groups

the recent introduction of modern communication technologies, domination of ideas and information¹⁸.

Two major goals of both Derg and EPRDF regimes have been (1) economic, social and cultural modernisation conceived in socialist terms and (2) the control of political opposition; a major means towards both has been what Clapham (2002) describes as 'the project of *encadrement*'. This involves incorporation into structures of control based on a single party system directed from above, to be achieved through control of land and state resource allocation, the organisation of farmers into peasant associations and a hierarchy of lower-level structures, and peasant mobilisation through campaigns, meetings, direct orders and collective labour. As recent events surrounding the May 2005 election have shown there are 'system contradictions' (Lockwood, 1964) between the EPRDF party-based *encadrement* project and the constitutionally-based ethnic federation established in 1995 which is theoretically based on a parliamentary democratic political structure.

With regard to social protection, Ethiopia has a long history of 'famines that kill' and neither the Imperial regime in 1974/5 nor the Derg in 1984/5 considered it part of the government's responsibility to provide safety nets. Working with donors and NGOs the EPRDF has continued to improve a food aid system which saved many, though not all, lives at risk during the 2002/3 drought. Currently there is a two-tiered food aid programme. One tier is the Productive Safety Net programme on which around 6 million depend annually, which has two components: labour-intensive public works and direct support for labour-poor households. Another 10 million are vulnerable and likely to become food insecure in a short-term emergency situation which will be dealt with as and when it arises.

3.2. Ethiopia's in/security regimes

As in other poor areas of the world where states are 'fragile' it is possible to identify and locate three types of 'in/security regime' in the current Ethiopian context which we are identifying as 'welfare regimes', 'informal security regimes', and 'insecurity regimes'. What differentiates these regimes are the mechanisms which generate insecurity and the structures responsible for dealing with that insecurity. Poor country welfare regimes are for a very small category of private sector and government employees and businessmen and others who are relatively wealthy. The main sources of insecurity for them are ill-health, old age (life processes) and potential unemployment related to lack of education for the next generation. Solutions are provided via government and private sector fringe benefits such as sick pay and pensions, and the market in the form of private clinics, hospitals, schools, and universities which may be overseas, and investments in international markets. Participants in Ethiopia's welfare regimes are mostly based in the capital and larger towns.

The majority of Ethiopians are involved in informal security regimes with more or less government contribution. The main causes of insecurity in these regimes are scarce collective resources, life processes, local competition for scarce resources and structured inequality. The main solutions are kin-based social exchanges and 'opportunity-hoarding' on the basis of claims to superior social identity, and patchy government services, although the 'welfare mix' involves a potentially larger set of players and institutions some of which are international (see Section 6). Such regimes can be found across the rural and small-town areas of the four 'established' regions: Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and SNNP, in parts of the four 'emergent' regions of Afar, Somali, Gambella and Beneshangul Gumuz, and in the informal sectors of larger towns. They vary in ethnic and religious composition and the extent to which they are connected to government.

Insecurity in insecurity regimes results from political contention where violent conflict produces and reproduces insecurity, suffering and death, as political and military leaders mobilise followers to fight for control of land, natural resources including oil, diamonds and other mineral resources and/or the state, often on the basis of socially-constructed 'primordial' identities of ethnicity, clan and/or religion. In such contexts many ordinary people do not survive; those that do seek security by participating in the fighting, seeking patrons among the warring factions, or by migrating, sometimes to refugee camps supported by international humanitarian aid. Insecurity regimes can be found in parts of the pastoral peripheries of the four relatively-sparsely populated emergent regions.


The projects of *encadrement* and local development are playing out to varying degrees and in different ways dependent on the particular Ethiopian context (James *et al.*, 2002) and the activities of other external agents. In this paper we take two community cases of informal security regimes from the largest regions, Oromia and Amhara. At this meso level, key power resources are access to the means of production, particularly agricultural

¹⁸ Although following the election crisis in May 2005 the Government removed the local licenses from Voice of America and Deutsche Welle whose broadcasts were reported as the major source of election-related information in our rural sites, imprisoned or charged a number of journalists from the private press, and stopped the use of SMS messages which were reportedly used by the opposition.

and grazing land, livestock, labour, and in some sites capital to buy irrigation pumps, status discriminators of various kinds, occupation of culturally-valued local positions, access to government resources including official positions, and human resources such as farming or house management skills, ability to speak well and argue in public, and literacy, numeracy and education.

3.3. Locating the communities in the macro structures

The majority of the Ethiopian population lives in informal security regimes in the highlands. 'Within an African context, Ethiopia is a relatively densely populated country¹⁹; yet the population has been and remains concentrated in the highlands... With gradually increasing land shortage peasants from the highlands have tended to migrate along the escarpments into lower areas.' (Pankhurst and Piguët, 2004: pp 2 & 5) previously used mainly by pastoralists. Rainfall in these lower areas is scanty and unreliable leading to food-deficit livelihood systems. Where rainfall is good and the ecology is favourable food surpluses can be generated.



Four Major WeD Research Sites in Ethiopia

Our four case study sites are Yetmen and Dinki in Amhara Region and Turufe Kecheme and Korodegaga in Oromia Region. Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme are surplus-producing sites, close to major roads and relatively²⁰ well connected to markets and government services. Yetmen is situated in the highlands of Gojjam and contains a very small town, while Turufe Kecheme is on the southern edge of the Rift Valley close to the town of Shashemene. Yetmen is the wealthier site. The other two are situated mostly in the lowlands, are relatively recently settled, are difficult to reach except on foot, are drought-prone often facing food production shortfalls, and are less well-connected to markets and government services.

One of the sites in each region exemplify cash-crop surplus-producing partially market-integrated livelihood systems which are targets of the ADLI strategy; the Amhara site is almost completely ethnically and religiously (Orthodox Christian) homogenous while the Oromia site contains a mix of eight ethnic groups and a four religions. The other sites in each region are more poorer and more remote and peripheral; both are close to pastoralist communities. They exemplify drought-prone, deficit-producing, food-aid dependent livelihood systems with irrigation potential which has been patchily utilised over the years since the 1960s. The Oromia

¹⁹ The current density of 64 persons per sq kilometre is higher than most areas in sub-Saharan Africa, except for Burundi and Rwanda, (Population Reference Bureau [2003] Washington)

²⁰ Compared with many developing countries our 'integrated' communities are quite remote; on the other hand our remote communities are relatively integrated compared with many Ethiopian communities.

site is almost completely ethnically and religiously (Muslim) homogenous, while the Amhara site contains two ethnic groups: Amhara who are mostly Orthodox Christians and Argobba who are all Muslims.

Table 3.1: The Case Study Sites

	Amhara Region	Oromia Region
Food-surplus and relatively integrated	Yetmen <i>homogenous</i>	Turufe Kecheme <i>ethnic mix</i>
Remote drought-prone and food-deficit	Dinki <i>ethnic mix</i>	Korodegaga <i>homogenous</i>

Remote, drought-prone, food-aid dependent sites

Korodegaga, Oromia Region - relatively homogenous

Korodegaga is a large remote, drought-prone and food aid dependent site, inhabited by Muslim Oromos who were once pastoralists and who settled in nine separate villages originally for defensive purposes. There is a history of conflict with local pastoralist groups.

The principal crops are maize, *tef*, sorghum and beans but rainfed agriculture is precarious due to frequent rain failures. The village is more or less surrounded by the rivers Awash and Kelete, which, without an all-weather road or bridge ensures remoteness, but offer prospects of irrigation for subsistence crops. Currently an NGO-provided pump irrigates 40 hectares of land which allows around 130 farmers to grow vegetables for sale on small plots. Some of these farmers employ local and migrant daily labour, particularly for weeding. Land, which has not been redistributed since the first allocation in the 1975 land reform is firmly in the hands of older men, creating a class of young men known as *jirata* or dependents. The various forms of economic sharing institutions found elsewhere are also common here providing share-cropping and land renting opportunities for young men with access to oxen. There is also an irrigation farmers' associations, irrigation pump groups, small ROSCAs, and a women's savings and credit association.

Water is obtained from the rivers, which in the case of the Awash is often polluted by waste from a local sugar factory. Malaria and typhoid are common diseases. There is a small school in one village which provides education between Grade 1 and Grade 4; beyond that learners must go out of the site. Young people seem very keen for education and often finance it themselves from funds acquired through daily labour. Polygyny is said to be relatively common in the site and widow inheritance and automatic marriage with a dead wife's sister have been practised. People attend three major mosques and a number of smaller ones.

Since the fall of the Derg in 1991 inhabitants have practised their Islamic religion more freely; and the Saudi Arabia Wehabi sect has provided funds to build a number of mosques in the site offering an alternative to the local Sufi islam. Food aid in the form of food-for-work is regularly provided by government-donor programmes.

Dinki, Amhara Region - ethnically mixed

Dinki is situated in the lowlands of North Shewa, near Ankober. It is remote, hilly, drought-prone and occasionally food aid dependent, occupied by a mix of Muslim Argobas (around 60%) and Amharas who are mostly Orthodox Christians.

The main crops which farmers (try to) grow are sorghum and *tef*. They also grow maize, soya beans, chickpeas, sunflower, sesame, cotton and *nug* for home consumption. Vegetables and fruit are also grown, mostly for sale, some using irrigation from the river Dinki. Crop pests and livestock diseases cause problems. The land is such that it requires a lot of ploughing. Cattle are kept mainly to ensure the replacement of oxen. Land is short and around a quarter of households were reported as landless in 1995. There is a tradition of weaving among the Argoba many of whom resort to it as a coping strategy at times in their lives; women spin the cotton to be woven. Cloth is woven for home consumption and for sale. Various forms of economic sharing arrangements are institutionalised, including work groups, reciprocal work exchange arrangements, share-cropping, ox-

sharing and the share-rearing of animals.

Traditional Islamic education is provided in small mosques known as *kelewa*. There is no church in Dinki and no biblical education. The nearest primary school is at Chibite about 6km and 2 hours walk distant. Water comes from springs and rivers. Malaria has affected most inhabitants.

Other social capital includes credit associations (*iqub*), funeral associations (*iddir*), neighbours' gatherings on the first of the month (*adbar*), and groups of Christians celebrating their favourite saints' day in each others houses every month (*mehaber*). In the May elections it was reported that the EPRDF did not win; the majority of Argobba voted for one opposition party and of Amhara for another.

Easy major road access, good rain, surplus-producing sites

Turufe Kecheme Oromia Region - ethnically mixed

Turufe Kecheme consists of two villages situated in a rural area well on the way to becoming a suburb of the fast-growing town of Shashemene, which is located on the road between Addis Ababa and Kenya as it rises from the Rift Valley. Around 57% of the inhabitants are Oromos, 99% Muslims; the others are a mix of Tigraway and Amharas (18%), who are mostly Orthodox Christians, and Wolayitas, with a few Kembatas and others from SNNP Region (around a quarter), many of whom are Protestants from a number of sects. There are also some Catholics.

The village occupies part of a plain area with fertile soil which is suitable for agriculture; the rain is such that farmers can produce two harvests. The main crops produced for are potatoes, maize, wheat, barley and *tef*. Potatoes and maize are sold to merchants for sale in Addis Ababa. In the past these Arssi Oromo were pastoralists and they are adept cattle keepers. They also keep goats, sheep, chickens, bees and donkeys, horses and mules for transport. As with the previous two sites various forms of economic sharing institutions can be found, although richer farmers also use migrant daily labour at busy times. There are casual labour opportunities outside the site.

Water comes from rivers and streams and some is piped to the village. During villagisation in 1985 the government forced people to dig latrines near their new houses, but none of these is being used at present. School attendance is relatively high although children who attend school are also expected to perform household tasks appropriate to their sex. Unemployment of school leavers is described as a problem. In *Turufe* social capital includes seven cattle herding organisations, five funeral associations (*iddir*), two oxen insurance associations (*iddir*); ROSCAs (*iqub*), groups putting money aside to celebrate the *meskel* holiday; and a traditional dispute resolution institution (*shenecha*). In the May elections an Oromo opposition party (OPCO) reportedly gained the most votes.

Yetmen Amhara Region - homogenous:

Yetmen town is small and situated on the territory of the larger rural Yetmen *kebele* in Enemay *wereda* in Gojjam. The town was founded in 1968 around a Swedish-built elementary school. The road from Bichena to Dejen and on to Addis Ababa runs through the town which is about 250 kilometres north-west of Addis. The inhabitants are all Amharas and Orthodox Christians.

Yetmen is a food-surplus site; much of the *tef* and wheat grown on the site is sold in Addis Ababa. Agriculture is rain-fed and based on ox-plough technology. Farmers use fertiliser and crop rotation. No serious crop disasters have been reported. Land is scarce. Livestock are important for ploughing, as pack animals, for dung, which is the major source of fuel, dairy products, meat, and hides and skins. Closely linked to agricultural activity livestock, petty cash grain trading and collecting and selling dung for fuel are important activities in the area. The main activity in the town is grain trading.

There is traditional wage labour paid in grain for ploughing, harvesting, building, working as a labourer, babysitting, herding, well-digging and wood chopping. There is also labour-sharing across households in larger workgroups or through a pair of farmers working equally on each others' land. Other forms of sharing/exchange include share-cropping, oxen-sharing, labour exchanged for oxen and traditional credit arrangements known as *arata*. In addition to housework women are known for their basket weaving and women who can spin well are respected. Rural women make *areqe* and sell it in the market or to women who sell it in the town along with other local drinks. Women are involved in petty cash trading and in collecting and selling dungcakes. Other local occupations include those of builders, weavers, potters, tanners, a diesel generator operator, flour mill operator, agricultural extension agent, teachers; women's occupations are limited to pottery and teaching.

The town has a junior high school, electricity and piped water. Water comes from wells and the local river apart from in the town where water is now piped. In 1995 it was estimated that there were about 15 latrines in the site used by 'enlightened people'. Today it is said that no-one uses latrines. The school is now a junior high school and there are a few young men and women being educated beyond 12th grade. However, unemployment is a problem for school leavers and their families. Malaria arrived in Yetmen for the first time in 2004.

Yetmen has a service cooperative which provides fertiliser, credit associations (*iqub*), funeral associations (*iddir*), groups of Christians celebrating their favourite saints' day in each others houses every month (*mehaber*) or at the church (*senbete*). Disputes are resolved by the social court (*fird shengo* and informal elders' groupings (*shimgilina*). In the May elections it was locally reported that the opposition CUD party received the most votes.

3.4. Comparing the communities: unequal status structures and household systems

Patterns of personal and collective agency and structures of opportunity/constraint depend on three types of social status related to (1) gender and age (2) household structures and (3) household status arising out of wealth/poverty status and social origin. In this section we describe the personal agents in these communities and map the unequal status structures which they occupy across the four sites. While we consider the different status attributes in turn from an analytic perspective, it is important to remember that 'really' each person's identity involves a combination of genderage, wealth status and social origin status..

The personal agents: differences in genderage

Table 3.7 shows the demographic structures of the four sites in relation to age and genderage. In these rural sites many people do not know exactly how old they or their children are, and also may respond inaccurately to improve their status, for example, men may claim to be much older than they are once they have decided they are old while older women may claim to be younger.

		Koro			Dinki			Turufe Kecheme			Yetmen		
Birth era	Age	M	F	All	M	F	All	M	F	All	M	F	All
2003/4	< 1	2.0	1.4	3.4	1.9	1.0	2.9	0.5	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.3	1.0
2002/3	1-2	2.5	3.4	5.9	3.8	2.2	6.0	2.6	2.7	5.3	1.7	1.8	3.5
1999/2001	3-5	4.6	4.6	9.2	4.1	6.0	10.1	4.9	4.7	9.6	4.0	3.7	7.7
Under 6		9.1	9.4	18.5	9.8	9.2	19.0	8.0	8.1	16.1	6.4	5.8	12.2
1992-1998	6-12	10.6	9.2	19.8	9.0	11.0	20.0	10.4	11.5	21.9	10.5	11.8	22.3
1988-1991	13-16	5.6	4.1	9.7	5.4	3.8	9.2	4.6	5.5	10.1	5.7	6.3	11.9
1985-1987	17-19	4.1	3.7	7.8	2.2	1.2	3.3	4.7	3.0	7.7	3.4	2.9	6.3
Working Youth		20.3	17.0	37.3	16.5	16.0	32.5	19.7	20.0	39.7	19.6	21.0	40.6
Under 20s		29.4	26.4	55.8	26.3	25.2	51.5	27.7	28.1	55.8	26.0	26.8	52.8
1975-1984	20-29	9.8	8.2	18.0	6.2	9.0	15.2	10.3	9.5	19.8	7.9	8.5	16.4
1965-1974	30-39	4.6	5.1	9.7	7.1	5.7	12.8	5.0	4.6	9.6	5.3	5.0	10.3
1955-1964	40-49	2.8	4.8	7.6	2.9	2.6	5.5	2.6	2.8	5.4	3.0	3.9	6.9
1945-1954	50-59	2.7	1.5	4.2	2.2	3.3	5.5	1.9	2.5	4.4	2.9	3.6	6.5
Adults		19.9	19.6	39.5	18.4	20.6	39.0	19.8	19.4	39.2	19.1	21.0	40.1
1935-1944	60s	1.6	1.1	2.7	3.0	3.2	6.2	1.3	1.6	2.8	2.7	1.8	4.5
1900s-1934	70s	1.3	0.7	2.0	2.3	1.0	3.3	1.1	1.1	2.2	1.1	1.5	2.6
Ageing		2.9	1.8	4.7	5.3	4.2	9.5	2.4	2.7	5.0	3.8	3.3	7.1
		M	F		M	F		M	F		M	F	
Total		52.2	47.8	100%	50.1	49.9	100%	49.8	50.2	100%	48.8	51.2	100%

In all sites somewhat over half the population was under 20. In the remote sites 19% of the population were under the age of 6, often reported as the age when children start doing useful household work. In Turufe Kecheme the proportion was 16% and in Yetmen 12% which may be associated with increasing use of contraception (see Section 5). In all sites but Yetmen (46%) the proportion of 'developing young' (0-16) was 48% and of adults (20-60) 39% or 40%. Dinki had the highest proportion of 'ageing' (10%) and Korodegaga the lowest (5%). Differences between genders in different age categories were insignificant although overall there were slightly more males in Korodegaga (52%-48%) and females in Yetmen (49%-51%). In the other two sites proportions were equal. These individuals are organised as members of different households, whose structures and divisions of labour are described in the next section.

The households

The 'household' is the basic unit of material production and human reproduction in rural Ethiopia but the form that it takes is culturally variable. In the next section we describe the local household systems, the division of household labour among productive, reproductive and community-related work and the lines of connection between households and the action fields of community governance and cultural re/production.

Household structures

Households are organised along patriarchal principles with hierarchies based on gender and age. The male head manages the household and can take all major decisions or agree to share some of the decision-making with his wife. Sisters are expected to serve their brothers, while within genders authority is dispersed through age hierarchies.

Table 3.8 shows that on average households in the Oromia sites are larger than those in the Amhara sites; strikingly so in Turufe Kecheme, which may be associated with polygyny among the Oromo. Households with only 1 member are more common in the Amhara sites; such 'households' are usually included as dependent households in larger 'livelihood clusters'.

	Remote		Integrated	
	Korodegaga	Dinki	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Mean	4.8	4.1	6.6	4.8
	Percent of households			
1	2.7	13.0	1.6	4.8
2	11.0	13.6	2.8	10.0
3	15.3	19.5	6.8	18.0
4	24.3	14.8	12.0	18.0
5	16.1	14.2	15.1	12.8
6	9.0	10.1	12.4	12.4
7	7.1	6.5	14.7	10.8
8	7.8	4.7	11.6	5.2
9	2.7	1.8	7.2	4.8
10	1.6	1.2	7.6	2.8
11	1.2		4.4	0.4
12		1	2.4	
13			0.8	
14			0.4	
15			0.4	
Total no hhs	255	169		250

Among the Amhara in Yetmen, Dinki and Turufe Kecheme the *ideal household development cycle* begins with the establishment of a new household by a young couple (new household), has a period where the first children are born and dependent (young nuclear family), moves into a period where children provide household labour (mature nuclear family), followed by period when the older children set up their own households with more or less assistance from the parents (emptying nest), ending with a period of dependency by the old parents and the handing over of the remainder of the property (dependent old household).

BOX 3.7: HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES IN THE AMHARA SITES

From Yetmen:

The basic unit of Amhara social life is the household (*beteseb*). The term *beteseb* also stands for family. A family consists of parents, children, and others such as adopted children who reside in the house and ex-members who are no longer resident. To be a member of a household through adoption is very rare. The Amhara household has two distinguishing characteristics: members are expected to carry out specific tasks allocated according to sex and other criteria, and they are all under the authority of a single senior male. Men are assigned such tasks as ploughing, sowing, harvesting, threshing, cattle and grain trading, slaughtering, herding, driving pack animals, building houses, and cutting wood. Women are responsible for cooking, making butter, carding and spinning, cutting, and carrying water and wood. Major decisions are mostly made by husbands / men. Sometimes wives / women discuss things with men and they argue raising points but ultimate decisions are mostly made by men. A main household task is the allocation of resources.

In 2005 it was reported that there are people living alone, especially in the urban site. Women who are

living alone work in local drink houses of their own or of other people. But men who live like this get their subsistence from daily work. Most households in Yetmen are male-headed, and a woman who has lost her husband would want to marry soon otherwise she will be labelled *galemota* with a connotation that no one is willing to marry her. Children who grow up in female-headed households are also considered to be arrogant as they lack control of fathers. However, there are a few female-headed households who support their children by renting their land or by giving it to a share-cropper.

People who are hired for a given period of time in a household and are not relatives of the members of the household are regarded as members of the household until they finish their contract. No distinction is made regarding dwelling, food and the like. But clothing might not be bought for him, unless he agrees that it will be deducted from what he will get at the end of the contract.

Young and old households are considered to be lacking self-sufficiency, because the younger households are recently formed and older households are declining. So both households need support from middle-aged households. And thus middle-aged household are considered as fully-fledged households.

Among the Muslim Oromo of Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme and, to a lesser extent the Argobba of Dinki, polygyny is practised; the *ideal household development cycle* is initially similar to the Amhara model but, usually when the household is in the mature nuclear phase the head either brings a second (and sometimes third) wife into the household, or sets up a separate household for the second wife, keeping more or less connection with the first wife. Customarily a widow was expected to marry a brother of her dead husband, while if a wife died the family was expected to replace her with a sister.

BOX 3.8; HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES AMONG THE ARSSI OROMO

From Turufe Kecheme:

A household is a group of people living under one roof, eating and working together, sharing income and governed under the authority of a head. In Turufe Kecheme, as in *kebele* all over Ethiopia, control over the operation of agricultural holdings and major decisions regarding the use of resources, is predominantly the right of the household head, usually the husband. Women participate in weeding, harvesting, *enset* scraping, cooking and going to the market to buy food items and cloth. Men are responsible for the remainder of the agricultural productive activities and buy cattle, donkeys and clothes. Men sell grain and cattle and women food items. Children help the father (if males) or mother (if females) in the field and around the homestead or herding cattle in the pasture areas.

The husband is responsible for providing food for the household, building the house, school fees, clothing, investment in goods, such as farm equipment, health expenditure, furniture, fuel etc and he also controls the income from the household. Fetching water, collecting wood and buying necessary food materials to be cooked for the household is the woman's responsibility.

When we consider *real households* at any point in time we would expect to see a mix of household types with some in process of transition between the stages. We also find a number of households which have fallen off the ideal track for a number of reasons including death of spouse, separation and divorce, couple infertility, or early death of both parents. Table 3.9 shows that in Korodegaga in 2004 only half of the RANS households were on the path of the ideal development cycle.

TABLE 3.9: REAL HOUSEHOLDS IN KORODEGAGA: 2004

Household type	Frequency	Percent
Young couple first marriage	5	2.0
Nuclear first marriage	93	36.5
Polygynous male-headed	29	11.4
Couple not first marriage	8	3.1
Nuclear not first marriage	42	16.5
Men without wives	17	6.7
Wife head with husband resident	6	2.4
Polygynous wives alone	6	2.4
Widows	38	14.9
Divorced/separated women	4	1.6
Females alone	4	1.6
Males alone	3	1.2
Total	255	100%

The proportion of female-headed households is very similar in the four sites being between 23% and 24%.

(Table 3.10)

	Remote		Integrated	
	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Male	77.5%	76.1%	76.1%	76.8%
Female	22.5%	23.9%	23.9%	23.2%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The division of labour within households

Apart from those who are 'too young to work', 'too old to work' or chronically ill or disabled, household members are active in one or more of the four fields of action: production, human reproduction, community governance, and cultural manipulation. In normal circumstances adult males will not be involved in domestic activities, although in the absence of females boys may fetch wood and water and look after younger siblings. Heads of tax-paying and land-holding households are expected to 'participate' in community governance by attending meetings and providing household labour for community work. Some men and a few women are active in local community governance. Both men and women may participate in local organisations such as burial associations, in the richer sites ROSCAs, and among the Amhara monthly religious feasting groups. Men and women will also invest time, energy and resources in maintaining social networks based on kinship, neighbourhood and/or friendship. Some men and women in particular cultural roles devote time to practising and disseminating cultural repertoires in which they believe. These may be rooted in conservative or radical approaches to the Christian or Islamic religions, customary spiritual practices, political ideologies of various kinds, or modern ideas about science and education.

BOX 3.9: ACTIVITIES IN DINKI

From Dinki:

Farming is the common economic occupation, although there is a Muslim sub-group which is involved in weaving to support household income. Most of the Argoba practice weaving at one time or another as a supportive means of subsistence. Some Amhara informants also reported that they practiced weaving during the 1985 famine period although they have since abandoned it. There is no distinct group of craft workers. There is only one blacksmith farmer in the *gott*. Within the community there is one traditional midwife who helps the women of Dinki when they give birth. People from both ethnic groups are also involved in *kebele* and party political activities. Educated Muslims are involved in teaching the Quran, healing spirit related illness, and performing funeral rituals. Elders from both groups participate in dispute resolution, either informally or as members of the semi-formal *kebele* elders' council.

On a daily or less frequent basis both men and women may spend time on a range of activities across the fields of action; however for most people the main foci of time and energy are making a living and human, household and kin reproduction. These were the activities picked up in the RANS when household heads were asked to describe the main activities of each of its member in the month prior to the survey which was administered in June/July 2004. The broad categories of main activity which emerged from this survey were: farming including own-account farming and employment, off-farm own account; off-farm employment; community work; household work; domestic work; and being unable to work; and education. Although both community work (discussed further in Section 6) and household work are important activities they appeared rarely as main activities in mid-2004. The same applies to a number of other 'part-time' activities of both men and women.

BOX 3.10: FULL- AND PART-TIME ACTIVITIES

From Turufe Kecheme:

In addition to farming, men are occupied in house construction, trade, weaving, thatching and carpentry. Women can be occupied in beer-brewing, preparing local liquor (*areke*), spinning, first aid during childbirth, hair styling (*shuruba*), and making home utensils from straw in addition to preparation of food and looking after children.

From Yetmen:

Almost all peasants of the village construct houses and make fences. Some are engaged in selling crops in the village and supply major towns like Addis Ababa occasionally. Some women in Yetmen town sell local drinks like *areke* (distilled liquor), *tella* (local beer), *birz* (honey drink) and *tej* (mead). Women in the rural part of Yetmen make *areke* and sell it either in the market or to the women who sell it in the town. Women are also engaged in petty cash trading and in collecting and selling dung-cakes. Poor households play an active role in these activities.

Household heads were asked to classify the main and secondary activities of each household member in the month prior to the survey and, if there were different main and secondary activities at other times in the year to classify these.

Table 3.11 shows that roughly 18% of males and 19% of females were considered too young to work or attend school. Averaging across the sites 27% of males were in education only or combining education with some work, compared with 22% of females. However, a higher proportion of females in the integrated sites were in education than males in the remote sites.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe K	Yetmen	All
MALE					
Too young to work	20%	17%	16%	20%	18%
Education only	3%	3%	3%	12%	5%
Education and work	13%	19%	34%	14%	22%
Work only	64%	60%	47%	54%	55%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
FEMALE					
Too young to work	19%	21%	17%	19%	19%
Education only	1%	2%	3%	9%	4%
Education and work	5%	12%	31%	15%	18%
Work only	74%	66%	49%	56%	59%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Tables 3.12 and 3.13 categorise the activities of males and females considered old enough to work.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe K	Yetmen
FARMING				
Main activity May/June 2004	73.5%	70.1%	40.8%	48.3%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	20.4%	29.1%	40.6%	19.4%
Main activity at other times in the year	2.3%	1.4%	0.8%	16.5%
Secondary activity at other times in the year		0.4%	0.1%	2.3%
OFF-FARM OWN ACCOUNT				
Main activity May/June 2004	2.7%	0.8%	4.2%	10.4%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	4.7%	2.3%	2.7%	4.2%
Main activity at other times in the year	2.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
OFF-FARM EMPLOYED				
Main activity May/June 2004	1.2%	1.0%	5.4%	8.0%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	2.9%	0.8%	2.7%	5.8%
Main activity at other times in the year	0.8%		0.2%	0.3%
Secondary activity at other times in the year	0.4%			0.6%
DOMESTIC WORK				
Main activity May/June 2004	2.3%	2.4%	2.6%	4.1%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	11.6%	7.7%	14.5%	8.3%
Main activity at other times in the year			0.4%	
Secondary activity at other times in the year		0.2%	0.1%	
UNABLE TO WORK				
Main activity May/June 2004	4.5%	2.6%	4.5%	5.4%

Secondary activity May/June 2004		0.8%	1.1%	
Main activity at other times in the year				
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
EDUCATION				
Main activity May/June 2004	15.9%	23.1%	41.1%	20.3%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	0.4%	0.8%	0.3%	0.2%
Main activity at other times in the year		0.6%	0.9%	
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
THOSE WITH 2 ND ACTIVITY IN MONTH	42.4%	43.1%	65.6%	45.9%
THOSE WITH DIFFERENT ACTIVITY IN YEAR	5.7%	2.2%	2.8%	17.0%
THOSE WITH SECOND ACTIVITY IN YEAR	0.4%	0.6%	0.4%	2.8%

In the remote sites the main activity of around 70% of active males was farming compared with 41% in Turufe Kecheme and 48% in Yetmen. This may have been affected by the differing ecologies and seasonal effects; for example irrigated farming can be carried out at most times of year. Off-farm opportunities were considerably greater in the integrated sites; the two main monthly activities of 10% of males in Turufe Kecheme and 18% in Yetmen were off-farm. There were higher proportions of males for whom education was the main activity in Turufe Kecheme (41%) compared with the other three sites. In all sites but Turufe Kecheme, where the figure was 66%, just over 40% of males had a second important activity in the previous month. At other times of the year 17% of males in Yetmen followed a different activity compared with 2-6% in the other three sites. It is clear from these figures that off-farm opportunities are considerably greater in the integrated sites.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe K	Yetmen
FARMING				
Main activity May/June 2004	13.7%	9.6%	5.8%	2.8%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	5.9%	31.8%	15.1%	2.3%
Main activity at other times in the year		3.7%	0.3%	6.6%
Secondary activity at other times in the year			0.8%	0.7%
OFF-FARM OWN ACCOUNT				
Main activity May/June 2004	7.7%	0.4%	5.0%	12.5%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	14.0%	7.4%	2.4%	3.9%
Main activity at other times in the year	1.5%	0.2%	0.7%	
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
OFF-FARM EMPLOYED				
Main activity May/June 2004	0.4%		0.7%	1.1%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	0.8%		0.1%	0.7%
Main activity at other times in the year	0.4%			
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
DOMESTIC WORK				
Main activity May/June 2004	67.8%	72.7%	45.2%	58.3%
Secondary activity May/June 2004	56.4%	38.7%	61.7%	68.9%
Main activity at other times in the year			2.4%	0.7%
Secondary activity at other times in the year	0.4%		0.7%	0.2%
UNABLE TO WORK				
Main activity May/June 2004	4.1%	2.2%	4.5%	3.8%
Secondary activity May/June 2004		0.2%	0.8%	
Main activity at other times in the year			0.1%	
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
EDUCATION				
Main activity May/June 2004	6.6%	15.0%	37.6%	21.4%
Secondary activity May/June 2004			0.3%	
Main activity at other times in the year			1.0%	
Secondary activity at other times in the year				
THOSE WITH 2 ND ACTIVITY IN MONTH	76.9%	78.2%	80.7%	75.9%
THOSE WITH DIFFERENT ACTIVITY IN YEAR	0.4%		1.4%	0.8%

Women in the Amhara sites did more off-farm work than those in the Oromia sites. 23% of females in Dinki, the majority being Argobba, did spinning as a main or secondary activity in the pre-RANS month while 18% of females in Yetmen and 8% in Turufe Kecheme were engaged in a range of activities. In times of drought in Korodegaga the selling of fuelwood, which is predominantly a female activity, is reported as being vital for the

survival of many households; at other times it is a coping strategy for poor female-headed households or undertaken occasionally when there is a need for cash.

The main activity of all females in the pre-RANS month was domestic work although the proportions varied between remote sites (68%-73%) and integrated sites (45%-58%). Factors of importance were proportions attending school and the less time-consuming domestic infrastructure (water, fuel, grinding mills, markets) in the integrated sites.

The institutions and relationships underpinning these activities are considered in the next two sections.

Inequalities among households

In the following section we map inequalities among households in productive wealthholdings and status connected to the gender of the household head and locally salient social origins. In each sites 22-23% of the households are headed by women. In Turufe Kecheme and Dinki ethnicity correlated with religion distinguishes community members in important ways. In Turufe Kecheme and Korodegaga clan membership is relevant. In Yetmen residence status is recognised as a distinguishing criterion. In all sites there is some correlation between the gender and social origin of the household head and the wealth status of the household.

Inequalities in household wealth

While from an 'objective' internationally comparative perspective most residents of the four research communities would be considered as 'poor', there is considerable internal inequality in access to material productive and reproductive assets and services. The style of life of the wealthy may be relatively comfortable.

BOX 3.3: WEALTHY PEOPLE

From Yetmen:

The wealthiest people in the community are the merchants who buy agricultural products from the farmers for a lower price and sell it for a higher price in major towns. They have cars to transport the grain to towns and bring consumer goods to supply their own or other's big shops. Rich people in the rural part may have two or more oxen and the same number of cows and sheep, and may rent additional plots of land to increase their income. Those people who have additional skills like weavers and blacksmiths are also better off.

From Dinki:

Middle-wealth households may have some livestock - at least one cow and an ox or two, land and better access to labour. However, the richer households may have a good house, more than ten camels, at least one donkey, more than two pairs of cows and oxen with other livestock such as goats, sheep, enough labour, and at least one male and female servant.

On the other hand poor and destitute people often live miserable lives. In addition to the structural poverty found in all sites a major cause of transitory poverty in the remote sites is regular harvest failure which in very bad years affects everyone.

BOX 3.4: POOR PEOPLE

From Yetmen:

Poor people include those work for a daily wage, farm labourers, those who are landless, those with no ox who sharecrop or rent their land out, those descended from a poor family, handicraft men who own no land, widows, prostitutes, those who collect and sell firewood and dung-cakes, those who make and sell *tella*, *areke*, *kolo*, bread, and those who are disabled and unable to work, especially old people with no one to look after them. The poorest of the poor are those people who are disabled and who have no supporter, but who make their livelihood by begging.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Poor households may have land but no tools or oxen preventing them from getting a good yield. Destitute work as domestic servants or as daily labour. Ex-soldiers, unemployed youths who have completed school, and peasants without land are underprivileged groups on the one hand, and farm wage labourers and traders on the other are evidence of incipient class formation in the kebele. However, the importance of these people, except traders is low. Traders are a good example for other farmers to get involved in off-farm activities to earn additional income. Many of the destitute are leprosy victims who have no child or

relatives to help them. Some of them have little or no farmland.

From Korodegaga:

There has not been a good harvest in the past ten years. Drought results in crop failure and inability to feed the household members, leading to dependence on food aid and daily labour and firewood selling. This results in intensification of poverty in all aspects of people's life. Lack of farm oxen is another handicap for the poor and destitute farmers. Due to lack of farm oxen, they are forced to rent or share-crop their farms or to share their labour in exchange for oxen with 'richer' farmers.

There are a growing number of destitute people, particularly in the integrated sites.

BOX 3.5: DESTITUTE PEOPLE

From Dinki:

The community organizations do not have religious/cultural reasons to exclude the poor but their membership obligations systematically bar the poor. The poor have been increasingly excluded from *iddir* and *mehaber* since the famine period mainly due to economic factors. The destitute borrow or receive grain/food from others. Some people need the destitute to work for them. Others feel pity for them. Non-participation in *Idir* and *Mehaber* has been a typical form of social exclusion of destitutes.

From Korodegaga:

The poor are undermined by other people in their clan or the community. Poor and helpless people like me are excluded because we cannot contribute financially to social organisations. Old men who have wealth have a great role in decisionmaking and dispute resolution in the community. poor people have no voice in the community. Destitutes have no livestock or money; sometimes physically weak, no knowledge/skill to perform work properly, little or no food, may not be able to help family, leave organisations like *iddir*. Some depend on help from relatives, neighbours, govt. Others do daily labour or sell firewood. Two types – very poor who could change and those who don't know how to work and live with others.

From Turufe Kecheme:

What makes them destitute is poverty. They are not called to feasts, nobody asks them when ill. There are homeless and landless. The courses of destitute are that they live with the support of people. They don't have proper meals; they sometimes sleep without eating. Destitute take part in any kind of work. They view themselves as socially outcast... Destitutes are involved in clientage. ... Types of destitute: landless destitute, homeless destitute, sick but landowning and support less destitute.

From Yetmen:

Some destitutes do not have houses and even if they have it, it is poorly constructed. Destitutes do not have oxen and land. They wear torn clothes and bad clothes, and most of the time they live a life that is hand to mouth. Some of them are without *iddir*, *mehaber* and other institution. These people cannot contribute in terms of money or food, and they cannot organize a festival and feed others. ... They have the habit of presenting themselves to a festival, and eat and drink even when they are not invited. They do not care/worry with respect about people's judgment. Some live by sheltering themselves around the houses of the rich because they do not have their house. If there is any some work on daily labour, and live. And yet others serve the riches by taking contract they chop woods collectively or in groups. By pooling themselves together, they harvest and work on the agricultural activities of the riches; they arrange marriage among themselves. Some live by begging.

We used the RANS data to 'box' households according to the pattern of productive assets they had access to in June/July 2004.

TABLE 3.4: PATTERNS OF RELATIVE PRODUCTIVE WEALTH AND POVERTY 2004

	Dinki		Korodegaga		Turufe Kecheme		Yetmen	
	%	Cum %	%	Cum %	%	Cum %	%	Cum %
Very rich	7.1	100	2.4	100	8.8	100	2.8	100
Rich	12.4	92.9	12.9	97.6	9.2	91.2	12.0	97.2
Upper Middle	26.0	80.5	9.8	84.7	19.2	82.0	18.8	85.2
Lower Middle	20.7	54.5	31.0	74.9	21.6	62.8	24.8	66.4
Poor	11.8	33.8	30.6	43.9	24.0	41.2	18.4	41.6
Very poor	14.8	22.0	3.9	13.3	10.8	17.2	18.4	23.2
Destitute	7.1	7.1	9.4	9.4	6.4	6.4	4.8	4.8

Key productive assets for each site were identified from the responses to relevant Protocol and Exploratory QoL

questions. Each household was ‘boxed’ into one of seven wealth categories according to the combination of productive assets of which they made use:

Very rich	doing very well
Rich	doing well
Upper Middle	doing fairly well
Lower Middle	getting by
Poor	not quite managing
Very poor	struggling
Destitute	living from hand to mouth

Box 3.6 describes how the process worked for Dinki.

BOX 3.6: WEALTH-BOXING THE DINKI HOUSEHOLDS

From Dinki:

The very rich had large rainfed landholdings (range 1.38 to 4 hectares; mean 2.34), more than half had some irrigated land, 2 or more oxen, and a good number of livestock (range 4-10.30 Tropical Livestock Units; mean 7.14). They included two weavers, and one man with a job in a seedling nursery.

The rich category had a lot of land (range 1.25-3.25; mean 1.88) more than a third had irrigated land, 1 ox or more, good livestock (range 2.85-8.80 TLU; mean 4.52). They included a weaver.

The middle category has a number of sub-categories according to whether they had irrigated land or not, oxen, numbers of TLUS.

The upper middle had a mean of 1.33 ha (range 0.25-3.00), 11 of them had 2 oxen, 23 had one and only 10 had none, and they had a mean TLU of 2.66 (range 1.00-4.66). There was one trader, one teacher and one smith among them.

The lower middle had a mean of 1.16 ha (range 0.63-2.75), none had two oxen and the majority had none, they had a mean TLU of 1.38 (range 0-2.65). Three of the households heads were too old to work, and two were weavers

Households in the poor category generally had one hectare or less (mean 0.48); only three of them had irrigated land, no oxen, very little livestock between (range 0-1.33 TLU, mean 0.28). They included three household heads who were too old to work, and one who was disabled, and one weaver.

Households were classified as destitute if they were landless, virtually no livestock (only three of them had any livestock at all between 0.5-0.35 TLUs). They included four household heads who were too old to work.

Table 3.5 compares a measure of all household productive and reproductive assets across the sites using mean quintile scores on a rural asset index constructed by Marleen Dekker from responses to an exhaustive RANS question about assets. People in Yetmen are on average considerably asset-richer (4.59 compared with a mean of 3) than those in Korodegaga (1.61) with Turufe Kecheme and Dinki in between.

	Amhara	Oromia
Integrated	Yetmen 4.59	Turufe Kecheme 3.11
Remote	Dinki 2.57	Korodegaga 1.61

In line with this evidence self-reported average vulnerability was lowest in Yetmen (2.16) followed by Turufe Kecheme (2.56), Dinki (2.60) and Korodegaga (2.86). The proportions reporting that they were ‘struggling’ or ‘dependent’ were less than 25% in Yetmen compared with 75% in Korodegaga. The highest percent reporting that they were ‘doing well’ is found in Dinki reflecting recent opportunities to sell products grown by irrigation.

	Remote		Integrated		Total
	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kech.	Yetmen	
Doing well 1	14.9	0.8	6.4	12.4	8.0
Doing just OK 2	25.6	29.0	38.8	63.1	40.2
Struggling 3	44.0	53.3	46.8	20.9	41.2
Dependent 4	15.5	16.9	8.0	3.6	10.6
Count	168	255	250	249	923
% within Site	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Inequalities in social origin

In this section we describe and map across the four sites (1) ethnic and religious identities; (2) clan identities; (3) residence status; and (4) occupational 'caste'/race

Ethnicity and religion: Our sites are in two regions: Amhara and Oromia. Two of the sites are relatively homogenous in ethnic terms and 'representative' of their respective regions: Yetmen is overwhelmingly Amhara and Korodegaga overwhelmingly Oromo. The two other sites are more diverse: Dinki has both Argobba (60 percent) and Amhara (40 percent), and Turufe has a majority of Oromo (57 percent), and migrant minorities from the South (Wolayta 10%, Kambata 6%, Hadiya 4%, Gurage 5%) representing about a quarter of the population and northern migrants (Amhara-Tigraway) about 17 percent.

	Remote		Integrated				All sites			
	Korodegaga		Dinki		Turufe Kecheme		Yetmen			
	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No		
Oromo	99.6%	244			57.1%	140	0.4%	1	43.3%	385
Amara	0.4%	1	36.4%	60	7.8%	19	99.6%	233	35.2%	313
Argobba			63.6%	105					11.8%	105
Gurage					5.7%	14			1.6%	14
Hadiya					2.9%	7			0.8%	7
Kembata					5.3%	13			1.5%	13
Sidama					0.4%	1			0.1%	1
Silte					0.4%	1			0.1%	1
Tigrayan					9.8%	24			2.7%	24
Wolayta					10.2%	25			2.8%	25
Sodo					0.4%	1			0.1%	1
	100%	245	100%	165	100%	245	100%	234	100%	889
	Homogenous		Ethnic mix		Ethnic mix		Homogenous			

In terms of power relations ethnicity has been important mainly in the two heterogeneous sites. In Dinki the Amhara landlords who came from the highlands in the imperial times obtained land and the Argobba tended to be looked down on. During the Derg period the Argobba as well as Amhara tenants gained access to land. During the EPRDF period the Argobba were accorded more political prominence as an ethnic group with its own political party and representation in the parliament. However, still today in terms of land and livestock holdings and other indicators of wealth the Argobba have slightly lower averages than the Amhara.

In Turufe Kecheme the migrant groups particularly those from the North and especially those from Tigray gained economic power in the imperial period through exploiting larger land-holdings and involvement in trade. The migrants' superiority continued during the Derg period with the Kembata, who had a strong political position, becoming particularly active in the Derg regime. In 1991 at the time of the change of government the Oromo gained the ascendancy and most of the Kembata were expelled and their land taken over. A few Eritreans were also expelled at the time of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and very few have remained. Several of the few traders are Tigrayan or Amhara. However, positions in the *Kebele* Administration are fully

controlled by the Oromo. Some migrant labourers have faced discrimination or employers not honouring payments, and there were attempts to restrict or ban migrant labourers. The migrant groups have been uneasy about their status, and the northerners in particular feared expulsions if the EPRDF lost power in the 2005 elections. Although expulsions have not taken place they express feelings of insecurity, and some have adopted a strategy of sending their offspring to live, study and work in local towns and in Addis Ababa.

In Korodegaga in 1994 the only ethnic group living in the site were Oromo. In 2005 there were about 30 migrant labourers, mostly young men, who worked in groups of four or more on the land rented and irrigated by the investors. Most of them were Amharas from Wello (Northern Ethiopia) and some from Eastern Shewa, and there were also some Wolayta. They came into the community alone without any family members and lived in temporary tent-like houses which they built around the irrigated farms of the investors who rented the land from the locals. Some of these labourers also rented land from local farmers and produced vegetable cash crops. There were also a few share-cropper migrant labourers. The investors said they preferred to employ migrant labourers because they believe that the temporary settlers are hard-workers and well-experienced in irrigation work. There was no strong social interaction between the migrants and locals, but there were some conflicts. Local people accused them of raping their daughters and introducing bad habits like drinking. Many people of Korodegaga say that they are Arssi and, at the same time, Oromo because they are Muslims. They consider the non-Muslim population of the Oromo as 'Amhara' which to them means Christianised Oromo. As one female informant puts it, 'the Amhara [to mean the Christian Oromo of Eastern Shewa] like their stomach; on market days both men and women enter hotels to eat food and to drink beers and Katikala; women are not afraid to enjoy the company of men. However, the Arssi do not give much attention to their stomach; they prefer to sell their farm outputs and livestock to the Amhara to consume at home; and women are culturally forbidden to enjoy themselves with men in hotels.' Thus, we can understand from the above description that people call themselves Arssi in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Oromo population. During the *Derg* regime the local governments said that, 'all Arssi Muslims and Shewa Oromo must be called by the name of 'Oromo'. Arssi is the name of the region.' So some Muslims have accepted this concept but others still believe 'we are Arssi'.

Historic conflicts with neighbouring ethnic groups were reported from Korodegaga and Dinki, although the regular Korodegaga conflicts with Jille pastoralists are said to be a thing of the past. In Dinki both Amhara and Argobba consider the Afar to be traditional enemies involving regular armed conflicts in market places such as Dulecha, Zuti and Senbete and some theft of cattle and camels.

There is a correlation between ethnicity and religion but it is not perfect. 19% of Amhara are not Orthodox Christians and 24% of Oromo are not Muslims. The Argobba are all Muslims while all four religious are covered by the ethnic groups from SNNP in Turufe Kecheme.

	Remote		Integrated		All sites
	Korodegaga	Dinki	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen	
	%	%	%	%	%
Islam	98.9	65.8	44.2		52.5
Orthodox Christian	1.1	34.2	34.4	99.5	41.5
Protestant sect			18.5	0.5	5.3
Catholic			2.9		0.8
	Homogenous	Ethnic mix	Ethnic mix	Homogenous	

Clans: Clanship is very important for the Oromo Arssi in Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme, with certain clans claiming superior status, respect or precedence, numerical predominance, prior land rights or precedence in the *gada* age grading institution in the area.

BOX 3.2: ARSSI OROMO CLANS

From Turufe Kecheme:

The Oromo groups in Turufe Kecheme are members of the *Weyrera*, *Se'emana*, and *Gomora* clans which are patrilineal. The land [is said to] belong to the *Weyrera* group. Members of the *Se'emana* and *Gomora* groups live in the *kebele* mixed with the *Weyrera* without having [prior] territorial claims...In order to wield power in the PA one has to be liked and respected within the clan lineage. Being a member of a respected lineage, for example *Amannu* which is the dominant lineage within the *Weyrera* clan is an important factor for gaining power in the PA. With the support of a strong lineage one can accomplish any objective in the PA. During elections people tend to elect their clan members and people from their lineage; the clan or lineage whose members are a majority have the possibility of dominating the PA.

From Korodegaga: There are thirteen clans (*gosa*) in the community... The Sebros are the largest in terms of population and dominant in terms of economic power and social and kin networks. ... Ogodu is the most discriminated clan because people say that members of this clan are extravagant and harsh in time of conflict. They call them *laffee gogogdu* ('dried bones') which shows the extent of the people's hatred towards them. Gulele is also not liked by many people. Members of this clan migrated to the area from Eastern Shewa in the past few decades. Thus, they do not belong to the Arssi Oromo. Moreover they are Christian in religion while all the rest are Arssi and Muslim.

The significance of clanship has declined but it is still important in murder cases, with group responsibility for blood compensation payments, and also to some extent for bridewealth payments.

Though belonging to descent groups is no longer the relevant social distinction it used to be in imperial times in Amhara societies, in Yetmen individuals can sometimes gain access to land through close maternal as well as paternal relatives and disputes, particularly murder cases, can involve family feuds.

Occupational 'caste':

"Throughout Ethiopia there are minority groups of craftworkers and hunters that are excluded from mainstream society. The marginalisation of these groups is not a new or localised phenomenon. It occurs in the north and the south, in towns and in the countryside, in the past and in the present. ..it is so widespread that it has been described as a 'pan-Ethiopian cultural trait' (Levine 1974: 56). (Pankhurst, A. 2001: 1)

In all sites there are also small minorities involved in non-farming occupations including smiths, potters, in some cases tanners and weavers. Apart from the last category they tend to be despised,²¹ and interaction with them is constrained and intermarriage unheard of. In Dinki all five full-time weavers and ten out of 11 part-time weavers are Argobba and this is considered a respectable occupation. The only part-time leatherworker is also Argobba, but the two part-time smiths are Amhara. In Turufe the only full-time leatherworker is from the Wolayta minority. However, insofar as craftworkers are able to farm as well as obtain income from craftwork they may become relatively wealthy as in Yetmen, and their status can improve. Other skilled occupations such as those of carpenters, masons, and tailors in all sites may be means to becoming relatively wealthy involving occasional or seasonal work in urban areas.

Former slaves: In Yetmen former slaves descended from Southerners brought to the Amhara Region to work during the Imperial regime have been despised and looked down upon by the *chewa* of "noble birth" and even by the craftworkers. Former tenants and herdsmen may also be considered somewhat inferior.

Natives and immigrants: Distinctions are drawn for some purposes between natives (*balager*) and immigrants (*mete*). In response to a RANS question about how the head of household identified him/herself socially 167 out of 925 responded. The status has some importance in Yetmen.

TABLE 3.3: NATIVES AND IMMIGRANTS – SELF-IDENTIFICATION

²¹ See Freeman and Pankhurst 2003.

	Remote		Integrated	
	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Native	2	47	13	139
Immigrant	0	6	14	28
Total	2	53	27	167
Total hhs	169	255	251	250
% of hhs	1.2%	20.8%	10.8%	66.8%

4. Power and Personal Agency in the Communities: 2003-2005

4.1. Introduction

This section draws on the data in Appendices 2-5 to construct an analysis of power structures, personal agency and community facilitative power in the four communities in the period roughly between 2003 and 2005. The key research questions guiding the organisation of the data in these appendices and the analysis in this section were:

How do local power structures in each of the fields of action affect the embodied personal agency and degrees of power of rural people of different genders, ages, household wealth, ethnicity, religion, occupational caste, and residential status?

How does the operation of each of the four fields of action, separately and interactively, contribute to the achievements of the community systems as whole? What collective facilitative power and liabilities are associated with them?

We begin with a brief description of the structures at work in the four fields of action. In Sections 4.3 to 4.6 we consider current structures of opportunity and constraint for people of different statuses in each of the fields by analysing:

- Roles and institutions
- Relations between people of different social statuses occupying different roles
- Access to material resources
- Local and ideological repertoires of ideas

We then draw some general conclusions about opportunities and constraints in the fields of action for people of different social statuses and also suggest ways in which differences in community structuring affect these opportunities and constraints..

In Section 4.7 we focus on personal agency profiles constituted by the habituses, in/competences, and psychological resources/liabilities embodied in gendered children, adults and old people of different social statuses. We then speculate about the degrees of personal power achievable by people of different social statuses.

Finally we present conclusions from a comparative analysis of the key contributors to levels of facilitative power in the communities: accumulated community capitals in each of the fields and interactions among the fields. These interactions operate in three ways. First through degrees of integration/contradiction among the institutions in the different fields. Second, through degrees of social integration/conflict among actors operating in the different fields of actions. Third, through degrees of logical in/consistency among ideas about the different fields held by people participating in them. We conclude by considering the relations between the fields allowing us to assess the extent to which each of the communities has been 'trapped' in a low-level poverty equilibrium (Bowles *et al.*: 2006).

4.2. The four fields of action and the structuring of power

Rural communities in Ethiopia are organised through role hierarchies based on gender, age, household wealth, and locally salient status related to 'primordial' social origin, education and personal abilities. These hierarchies determine who does what in each of the four major fields of community action: making a living, producing and reproducing people, community governance, and the re/production and dissemination of the ideas which give meaning to people's lives. The hierarchies are associated with different personal agency profiles and structured opportunities and constraints in the four fields of action for people of differing social status.

Households are key in both livelihood and human re/productive fields of action. They are organised to produce *power with* along patriarchal principles with hierarchies based on gender and age. In the ideal mature household the male head manages the household and can take all major decisions, though he may agree to share decision-making with his wife. Sisters are expected to serve their brothers, while, within genders, authority is dispersed through age hierarchies. The males exert *power over* females and older over younger using material and psychological incentives, and the sanctions of disapproval, violence, and at the extreme exclusion from the household.

The ideal Amhara household cycle (Yetmen, a large minority in Dinki and a small one in Turufe Kecheme) starts with a young newly-married couple who become a young then mature nuclear family eventually becoming a dependent couple in old age when the children have set up their own households. Among the Oromo Arssi (99% of Korodegaga and a small majority in Turufe Kecheme) and Argobba (a small majority in Dinki) the ideal cycle includes polygyny. Young and old farming households are likely to be dependent to some extent on mature households. Around half of households in Korodegaga were on the ideal track; others had diverted due to death and divorce. A little less than a quarter of the households in each site were female-headed. The length of time a household spends being headed by a woman varies depending on whether the woman re-marries, whether there is a son in the house and if there is how old he is.

The goals of community governance include the maintenance of social order through the control of deviant behaviour, resolution of disputes and handling of dissent and conflict, economic development, social protection, implementation of gender and family 'policies', the management of collective resources, and community survival and solidarity. This field of action contains two interactive governance structures, one with its roots in the community and the other brought into the community by the government. These systems have different priorities and ways of going about things. They sometimes work independently, sometimes in collaboration, and sometimes confront each other. They are both organised along hierarchical lines and neither is immediately compatible with the individualistic and egalitarian principles implicit in donor and international NGO discourses.

In the field of community governance the key players are *wereda* officials and just some of the male household heads: those who are active in local community politics and management. There are opportunities for both elders and the younger educated to act as *kebele* officials for longer and shorter periods of time. There are also local governance roles, such as dispute settlement. Men who are powerful in the community governance structures are likely to belong to the dominant status group. Criteria for elite status include wealth, occupation of key community roles, leadership in local organisations, education, and religious office. Powerful men can mobilise collective '*power with*' in kin, neighbour, friendship, and clan and/or ethnic networks. Mobilised status groups may use '*power against*' other status groups in processes of exclusion which may lead to conflict.

Women, younger uneducated men, and poor men have little say in community affairs, although female relatives of powerful men may have informal influence and there are official positions for women in *kebele* structures and women who occupy these positions and take a lead in organising women for collective women's activities. In the field of ideas there are external and internal players. Internally there is a mix of conservatives who value the customary ways of thinking and behaving and are usually older, and modernisers of various kinds who are more likely to be younger and educated and to act as conduits into the community for ideas from outside. However, many aspects of 'Imperial' customary cultural repertoires were challenged by the socialist Derg regime which was against religion, 'harmful traditional practices', and wealth inequalities, and preached the equality of women, youth and occupational castes. The current government has continued to disseminate these ideas although they have allowed freedom to practise religion. Ideas and concepts from donor and NGO discourses penetrate these communities very rapidly, while access to radios and in urban areas which people visit regularly TVs and videos provide different views on the world. Migrants, some who have been overseas, return with stories while formal and religious education changes habituses as well as competence. There is thus a considerable a range of ideas for people to draw on, some of which are contradictory..

Who is conservative and who modernising in the current array of socio-cultural actors varies across the sites. In Yetmen Orthodox Christian priests are conservative and powerful while in Dinki, where 'traditional beliefs' are still relatively strong, there is no Orthodox church and priests are regarded as providing few of the usual religious services while imposing too much religious 'taxation'. In Korodegaga the old Sufi-style Islam has been rapidly replaced since the early 1990s with a stricter *wehabi* style Islam exported from Saudi Arabia and brought into the community by young religiously-educated men. There are signs of increasing fundamentalism among the Muslim Argobba in Dinki, while in Turufe Kecheme there is less evidence of acceptance of fundamentalist ideas.

4.3. The livelihood field of action

The vast majority of livelihoods are based on own account household-based farming; a very small minority of households and individuals make livings out of agricultural labour, own-account off-farm work, and off-farm employment.

Farming

Farming requires land, seasonally appropriate labour, two oxen, other livestock, farm implements and inputs, and markets for outputs. In the drought-prone sites irrigable land is a key resource. Livestock play important roles in the economic activity of these communities. A cattle herd generates oxen for ploughing, cows producing milk and butter, dung for manure or fuel, meat, skins and hides, and cash. Goats and sheep can be eaten or sold. Pack animals provide transport and camels can also be eaten. Bees produce honey which can be used to make the local mead *tej*. Hybrid chickens which produce quantities of eggs for sale have been recently introduced to women in Korodegaga. Farming activities are affected by Government development services and mobilisations for collective work to support and improve the farming environment.

Farmers who can afford them combine modern technologies including fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds, irrigation pumps, and livestock vaccination with local knowledge. In each community successful farmers are recognised as being extremely skilful and knowledgeable.

Land: institutions, relations, distribution, beliefs

Since 1975 land has been state-owned and allocated to households. In the past this has provided local government officials with an important power resource for controlling dissidents and benefiting kin networks. *Wereda* or *kebele* officials can confiscate and redistribute land, for example if tax is not paid. Other reasons for loss of land in the sites included allocation of land by *wereda* officials for 'inward investment' and political revenge evidenced in the 1997 redistribution of land in Yetmen when most of the land of former Derg 'bureaucrats' was distributed to young landless households. There has been no official redistribution in any of the sites since 1997 (Yetmen). There was an unofficial redistribution in Turufe Kecheme in 1991 when the Derg regime fell and most Kembata were violently expelled. In Dinki the last official redistribution was in 1987 and in Korodegaga there has been no official redistribution since the original allocation in 1975. Over the years since 1975 informal use-rights have been solidifying and in 2004/5 land measurement took place in all the sites. This was associated with changes in land taxation to introduce a graduated system; farmers were also promised land certificates.

In the early period after the 1975 land reform after the death of both parents *kebele* officials could redistribute land. Now it seems that families are developing rights in land with parents able to allocate parcels of their land to children before their deaths. Widows and divorcees have formal legal rights to the ex-husband's land and these are being exercised to an extent. Customary practices in terms of which children inherit what vary across the sites and are more or less affected by the growing importance of *sharia* law in Korodegaga, Dinki and Turufe Kecheme, and government legislation everywhere. In the past the Amharic inheritance norm, which was not always practised, was equal shares between brothers, in contrast to Oromo Arssi norms which favoured primogeniture. There is no official land market but a local institutions have evolved to match supply and demand including sharecropping and renting and leasing land. In 2004 in the Amhara sites 42% of households had sharecropped some land in. There is occasional illegal land-selling involving the bribing of *kebele* leaders.

In the relation between landowner and sharecropper or renter the powerful partner in terms of the division of the crop is the latter who brings the scarce resource of oxen and often provides seeds, fertiliser and pesticides as well. This often works against the interest of women-headed households. However in recent conflicts related to land registration over who owned the land, the original holder or the farmer who had been sharecropping or renting it for some years, social courts ruled in favour of the landholder.

There is the potential for growing vegetables for sale on irrigable land in all the sites. Procedures for accessing land irrigable on a large scale, as in Korodegaga, are not well-established. Here there are four potentially competing institutional bases for organising irrigation: an NGO-initiated co-operative; a subsidised government scheme; local individual and group initiatives proposed by government; 'foreign' investment by entrepreneurs from outside the community. In Dinki and Yetmen those with land adjacent to the rivers are able to irrigate it; in Dinki the technology involves channels originally built to power watermills, while in Yetmen and Korodegaga water pumps of different sizes are involved.

Land is a scarce commodity over which there are frequent conflicts including between landowners and sharecroppers/renters, between neighbours over boundaries, and relatives over the inheritance of the land of a household head who has died. In Korodegaga there are also conflicts over communal land which has been occupied by individuals. At a community level in Yetmen there was a conflict between a group of younger farmers who wanted to use the river for irrigation and a group of older farmers with livestock who were worried about access to grazing land and water for their herds, which was won by the older farmers. There was also a conflict in Dinki between the seedling station, water-mill owners and cash-crop producing farmers over use of

scarce water. It was resolved by a discussion and the establishment of a new institution for taking turns to draw off water

Land in all sites is unequally distributed; this unequal distribution makes an important contribution to the household productive wealth differences described in the previous section. 14% of households in Turufe Kecheme were reported as landless, compared with 9% in Dinki and 2% in both Yetmen and Korodegaga. However, the RANS sample did not include the landless young men who have been unable to set up their own households. In the integrated communities a very few households had landholdings of less than ¼ hectare. There were few households in Turufe Kecheme with large landholdings: 4.8% with 2 or more hectares compared with 17.8% in Dinki, 58.4% in Korodegaga and 31.2% in Yetmen. However, large rainfed landholdings in Korodegaga often produce little or nothing. Access to irrigated land varied across the sites: 50.8% in Korodegaga, 26.1% in Dinki, 2.2% in Yetmen and none in Turufe Kecheme. Inequalities to access to irrigation in the drought-prone sites of Korodegaga and Dinki has led to increasing inequalities in household wealth.

The gender of the household head affects access to land although inequalities vary across sites. In the Amhara region sites differences in the average size of landholdings by male and female heads are notable: 1.3: 0.6 in Dinki and 1.8: 1.0 in Yetmen. The differences are no so great in the Oromia sites: 2.4: 2.2 in Korodegaga and 0.9: 0.7 in Turufe Kecheme. This is associated with differences in the status of the women heading households: in the Oromia sites they are mostly widows likely to have inherited all their husband's land while in the Amhara sites there is a higher proportion of divorcees who would only have received a portion of land. Female-headed households were considerably less likely to use irrigated land than males in Dinki 10% compared with 30%, while there was a small difference in Korodegaga 46% compared with 52%.

The age of male heads also affects access to land to some degree, particularly in Korodegaga, where the few males of 70 and over have the highest average landholding which is over twice that of males in their 20s and Turufe Kecheme where males over 50 have higher average holdings than those under 50. In Dinki men in their 40s on average have the most land, while in Yetmen this is true for men in their 50s. The distribution of irrigated land by age of male head was more unequal and related to age hierarchies in Korodegaga than in Dinki where males in their 30s had the lowest access.

There are small differences in access to land by ethnic group in the mixed sites. In Dinki while there is little difference between the mean landholding of the Amhara (1.21) hectares and that of the Argobba (1.16 hectares) 13.5% of Argobba households are landless compared with 1.7% of Amhara households. 34% of Amhara households used irrigated land compared with 20% of Argobba. In Turufe Kecheme the 'immigrant' Tigrayans have the largest mean landholding while Oromo and Amhara means are almost the same. Immigrants from the Southern Region on average have access to notably less land.

In Korodegaga the households whose male heads belong to the dominant and largest clan, the Sebiro, have an average land size a little larger than that of households in other clans: 2.4 hectares compared with 2.1. Only 0.8% of Sebiro households are landless compared with 3.5% from other clans while 8.4% of Sebiro have landholdings of 5 or more hectares compared with none from other clans. There is little difference between the clans in access to irrigated land.

Labour: institutions, relations, distribution, beliefs

The farming division of labour is gendered. Adult males plough, plant, weed, keep wild animals away from the farm if necessary, harvest and thresh. They also burn farm waste and prepare farm implements. Women in most places have tasks related to soil preparation, weeding, harvesting and threshing, although Argobba women ideally should not work on the farm. They may also keep chickens, milk cows and make butter. Children generally start work from the age of about six, although it may be earlier or later depending on household composition. Boys work at herding and on the farm with their contribution increasing as they grow older. Girls may work at herding and the female farming tasks although they also have domestic work responsibilities. There are consequential beliefs about what males and females should do in terms of farming. For example women should not plough and Argobba women should not work on the farm at all. This is related to the belief that they should confine themselves to the homestead. Since ploughing is reserved for men in no site can a woman farm without a man: a husband, father, brother, son, relative/ neighbour, or servant. Women heading households without men rent or share-crop out their land.

Running a farming household in rural Ethiopia is like running a small business. The work that has to be done is determined by the farming calendar and every day tasks related to agriculture and livestock appropriate to the

season have to be allocated and performed. There are periods of intense activity and slacker periods when males and females can work off-farm. This may involve unpaid household work, such as repairing fences, or painting the house, own-account activities, or seasonal employment perhaps involving migration. The structure of decision-making as to what should be done and who should do what is hierarchical, it being the responsibility of the male head to make decisions such as when to plant, how to deal with a pest or livestock disease, and when to take crops to market. In a mature household ideally wives and husbands, sons and daughters work co-operatively together in a process involving *power with*..

However, hierarchies also involve *power over* which is particularly relevant for the boys and girls of the household who are expected to be obedient and perform the tasks allocated to them by their fathers and mothers. Discipline is maintained through incentives and sanctions, including violence. As boys and less so girls reach adolescence conflicts may develop with parents over farming work tasks (*power against*) as they begin to work for themselves, perhaps to finance their education or in the anticipation of setting up their own households, as well as contributing to the family farm. The adult-father son relation is affected by the growing shortage of land, which is a major power resource, there often being not enough to support viable farms for father and son(s).

In addition to household labour there are a number of institutionalised and informal practices for labour-sharing across households including the employment of agricultural servants and herders for a season or longer, the employment of daily labour, especially for weeding, informal contract-based labour exchanges, working groups for harvesting, sharecropping and land renting. Work sharing involves *power with*. In the case of *debo* a man invites friends and relatives to help with ploughing, sowing, weeding, harvesting or house-building. After the work is complete the group shares food and drinks prepared by the females in the family. *Wenfel* is an equal reciprocal exchange of labour between two males working alternately on each others' land.

There are considerable status differences between peasant farmers and employed agricultural labourers and herders. Daily labour is also a low status activity, although it is relatively acceptable in Korodegaga as a part-time activity among young people and women in search of cash. There were frequent complaints from agricultural labourers and employed herders of bad treatment by employers. Daily labour is usually performed by community members who are landless and/or destitute or are peasants with small landholdings, although in Korodegaga young people do daily labour to raise cash. In Turufe Kecheme ploughing at piece rates is acceptable while ploughing at a daily rate would make 'them inferior to others'.

Access to other inputs

There are a number of customary institutions for accessing oxen which bring two farmers together through a contract. For example, share-croppers exchange land for the work of oxen, while a farmer with one ox will establish a sharing relationship with another farmer with one ox. Share-rearing is practised in the remote sites; richer farmers give goats and sheep to be cared for by poorer farmers and the offspring are shared. There are also customary rules for accessing tools and seeds through exchanges. The different arrangements have names signifying the exchange 'price'.

Markets for outputs

Between producer and consumer in Yetmen (*tef*) and Turufe Kecheme (potatoes) are *brokers*, who buy and accumulate relatively small amounts of produce at harvest time which they then sell on to the *traders* who transport it and sell it in Addis Ababa. : Farmers suspect collusion among traders on prices.

Government activities in the farming livelihood field

Government agricultural services were frequently appreciated, although government was criticised in the remote sites for failing to provide the livestock services which would have saved many lives. Government officials frequently mobilised people for collective work designed to improve the agricultural environment. This was appreciated when it was felt to be effective and useful, for example road maintenance or widening, but criticised when it was felt to be a waste of time (water-harvesting in Dinki and Korodegaga and sometimes terracing). The timing of summons for work and for meetings was not always designed to fit in with the demands of the agricultural calendar.

Government taxes land and sales at the market. *Kebele* officials in Turufe Kecheme might be bribable to allow illegal land sales. In Korodegaga deals were made between *wereda* officials and 'foreign investors' and *kebele* officials and an Ethiopian NGO to give them access to irrigable land.

Off-farm activities

Off-farm own-account livelihoods

The opportunities for off-farm own-account livelihoods in or near the sites included:

- ‘Utilities’ - collecting firewood and making dungcakes and taking to town to sell (usually done by females)
- ‘Industrial production’ – blacksmithing and weaving (males) and spinning and alcoholic drinks (females)
- Services –petty trading from home (females), shop-keeping and petty trade in town (males and females), selling alcoholic drinks in town often associated with prostitution, cash-crop trading to Addis Ababa and other large towns (males) and brokering between farmers and larger traders (males in Turufe Kecheme, males and females in Yetmen).
- ‘Investing in anything thought to be profitable’ (a few males in Turufe Kecheme)
- Begging (particularly in Yetmen)

These activities can be divided into three types: coping strategies for males and females in poorer households; activities to raise cash for particular purposes such as buying new clothes or paying school fees; and business activities involving trade and shop-keeping for richer households led by males. Most off-farm own account activities are coping strategies or cash-raisers conducted in the ‘informal sector’. For most households they are supplementary to farming livelihoods although for some households, mostly female-headed, they are their main means of livelihood. In Korodegaga during droughts the collection and selling firewood is widespread.

In all sites farming is the ‘respectable’ occupation. The less respectable own-account activities include collecting and selling firewood and dungcakes, and the ‘industrial production’ of blacksmiths, tanners, potters and less so weavers and spinners. Craftworkers who undertake most of what ‘industrial production’ exists are traditionally ‘despised’ and farmers would not mix socially with them. A few such workers in Yetmen have become relatively rich through their work and also acquired farmland leading to a situation of ‘status inconsistency’ between social acceptability and wealth. There have been some intermarriages between farming families and richer craftworker families, although those concerned have faced problems of social acceptance.

Off-farm employment

The incidence of this is so low in the sites that we do not have much information. Males in the integrated sites, particularly Turufe Kecheme, which is within commuting distance of a relatively large town, have opportunities for manual work, either unskilled (e.g. loading, taxi attenders) or skilled (e.g. carpenters, plumbers, mechanics). A few had jobs in the service industry or were employed by government or NGOs. *Kebele* leaders are now paid part-time.

There are presumably rules governing access to jobs in the formal sector but with so few involved we have no information about them nor how people get access to skilled jobs. Much recruitment for work in Shashemene is done by *delala* (brokers). Networks of relatives and friends are also likely to be important. Where no institutions have developed to govern how work is allocated there may be conflicts involving *power against*. For example, in Korodegaga there are fights between young men from different villages over should load the lorries with vegetables from the irrigation farms.

Formal employment with government is a high-status activity and one of the main goals of education for males and females. Manual skills are respected but do not raise the local status of those who have them..

Local and ideological repertoires related to the livelihood field of action

‘Traditional’ local repertoires

Men should farm producing traditional crops and livestock using the labour of wife/wives, children and others in customary arrangements. Sons should become farmers and daughters farmers’ wives. Sons should live near to parents. Own-account farming is the basis of the livelihood system with the main products being grain/potatoes and livestock, which are highly valued. Economic relationships are based on social exchanges and contracts. Labour should be provided by the household according to genderage, work groups or exchanges, or the employment of servants, and contracts should govern land/oxen/input/labour exchanges. Credit should be sought from kin and rich men. There is not a moral obligation to repay credit from government. Apart from government employment off-farm work is undesirable: a coping strategy for poor households or undertaken by excluded occupational ‘castes’. *Kebele* leaders should help their families and kin to improve their livelihoods.

Modern local repertoires

Farmers should use modern inputs since fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds and credit increase local grain and potato yields and are worth the investment in the cash-crop sites. Irrigation using motor pumps to pump

water from rivers, channels in hilly areas channels, or tap water, should be used to grow vegetables and fruit for sale, and grain for home consumption in drought-prone sites. Daily labour should be used for weeding and harvesting. Women should be involved in cash-producing activities, for example through rearing chickens. Credit should be sought from NGOs, government, and collective savings groups.

Farm work and life is hard; viable off-farm activities in urban settings are desirable. For children education should take priority over farm and domestic work. Young women can put education and work before marriage. Young men and women can migrate to urban areas or even internationally for work and should not be expected to live near their parents, although they should support them with remittances. Young men and women can earn money acting as brokers between farmers and larger-scale traders. Off-farm activities provide opportunities. One way to become rich is to become a large-scale trader. The goal of education is government employment or international migration. Daughters sent to the Middle East as domestic servants should send remittances home to the family.

Religious repertoires

Both Orthodox Christian and Muslim religions have rules prohibiting people from working at certain times which are related to fasting/feasting rules. Farm outputs are in the hands of God. Religious leaders have an important role in praying for rain. Obligations related to funerals and other death ceremonies also affect work.

Government modernisation repertoire

Farmers in cashcrop sites using modern inputs are contributing to the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation Agenda. Those in food-deficit sites need new technologies, especially irrigation. *Wereda* level agricultural services and *kebele* level Development Assistants should introduce new technologies motivated by targets to be met. Women should be encouraged and assisted to develop their own farming activities. Government should assist people in drought-prone sites by introducing water technologies by any means possible. For example officials have promoted irrigation in Korodegaga in four ways: through a co-operative organised by an NGO which provided a pump and credit; by urging farmers to form groups to buy shared motor-pumps; by selling non-motorised pumps related to a water harvesting project which failed due to the soil; and by providing two large pumps to irrigate a government scheme.

Left to themselves people will not pursue the activities that are necessary for development. Government must take the lead and force changes through persuasion, instruction and sanctions. People should be mobilised for community work to improve infrastructure and rehabilitate the environment through 'campaigns'; these take priority over the other activities of community members. Labour markets are not necessarily to be encouraged since they are not under government control. A full land market is not currently an option. Land certification is seen as a compromise that can promote tenure security and investment. Output markets provide an opportunity for taxation but do not need government regulation.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

The only site with current evidence of donor and NGO livelihood repertoires is Korodegaga. The NGO stayed in the site for five years (2001-2006) organised an irrigation co-operative, provided a pump, received a contribution from each of the 130 farmers and provided credit for inputs. Those who did not repay were not allowed to use the land and then taken to the Social Court; a number had their land taken away.

The NGO also set up a savings and credit scheme for women and provided hybrid hens and training in keeping them. Donor involvement in Food Aid led to the introduction of the Safety Net scheme in Korodegaga towards the end of 2006. This scheme is intended to provide long-term security to farmers in drought-prone areas so that they do not have to sell assets to survive.

Recent donor policy and practice in Ethiopia has been focused at macro level with little attention to meso-level livelihoods. However there are current moves to promote decentralisation to the *wereda* level though it is unclear if and how this will affect the community level. In the discourse there is an assumption that development is being held back by the absence of markets and the informality of activities. People will respond to the incentives offered by (competitive) markets and a programme of privatisation is supported although there is disagreement as to whether a full land market should be established.

Opportunities and constraints in the livelihood field for people of different social statuses

Social origin affects opportunities for households through its (weak) correlation with wealth: ethnicity in Dinki and Turufe Kecheme and clan in Korodegaga. In Turufe Kecheme people from the Southern Region were less likely to be farmers and more likely to be engaged in off-farm work. Muslim Argobba women are meant to

confine their activities to domestic work on the homestead although this is not possible in poorer households. There has been no suggestion in the Muslim cultures of Korodegaga or Turufe Kecheme that women should not work outside the home on the farm or in off-farm activities. In the Yetmen Orthodox Christian culture customarily women should stay at home as much as possible, although this is changing under the influence of increasing education opportunities.

Household opportunities in farming are related to the community environment and the productive wealth of the household. Households in Dinki and Korodegaga without access to irrigable land, and households in Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme with small plots cannot produce enough to cover the household's annual needs. Households in this situation are likely to depend on daily labour, firewood or dungcake selling, or alcoholic drink production, and they may send their children to be servants in richer households and/or sharecrop out their land.

Individual opportunities in farming are related to gender, age and also to wealth. Adult men can do all farming activities if they have the material resources. They are usually able to control the labour of their wives, sons, and daughters. Women cannot plough and are unlikely to do the other heavier farming activities; women heading households without male labour must sharecrop or rent their land out in a relationship where they are the weaker partner. However, women heading households may have sons and richer women may be able to hire male labour. They may also pursue female farming activities; for example women in Korodegaga with access to an NGO credit scheme were able to generate income from hybrid hens and their eggs. Women in richer households have opportunities to invest in female farming activities.

Between the ages of 6 and around 14 the agricultural labour of sons and to a lesser extent of daughters is controlled and they usually have little choice of work activity, although they may combine it with school attendance, unless they reside in rich houses where labourers may be employed. Once they reach 14 or 15 young people may start working on their own account, many of them now using the income they earn to pay for school attendance, the opportunity for which has grown considerably in the last few years due to expanded government programmes. Young men unable to access land may benefit from sharecropping land in if they can acquire oxen.

Choice of off-farm activities for both males and females is greater in the integrated sites, although in Dinki the tradition of reliance on weaving/spinning to cover the months after the harvest has been consumed means that a considerable number of households are involved in off-farm work. Even in the integrated sites choices are mostly limited to activities which supplement agricultural incomes and there are few opportunities to establish the small and medium enterprises regarded as so important for development by Stern *et al* (2005: 233-239).

The choice of off-farm employment is almost non-existent in the remote sites requiring urban migration. Yetmen has a very small town where there are some opportunities, while Turufe Kecheme is within commuting distance the larger town of Shashemene. There are more employment opportunities for males than for females.

4.4. The action field of human production and reproduction

Activities in this field can be considered under three headings: human production, human reproduction and social investment. Women and girls are the main actors in the fields of human production and reproduction although in male-headed households their activities may be overseen by the head. Males are also responsible for house-building and maintenance and for provision of food and cash for human reproduction. Women give birth to children and are responsible for their early care. Daughters begin to help mothers with both domestic work and childcare at the age of 5 or 6, and by the time they are 12 they may be doing the bulk of the household's domestic work, although they may also have younger sisters who contribute and over whom they have some authority as a result of the age hierarchy. Young boys may assist with fetching wood and water and be involved in other domestic work if there is insufficient female labour in the household. Households with insufficient child labour may bring in relatives on a temporary basis, adopt relatives or non-relatives (depending on the culture), or if richer pay maidservants from poor households. The wife is responsible for the management of the domestic labour of the household and for providing hospitality during ceremonies, feasts and for work groups. At the same time most women give birth regularly, sometimes producing as many as fifteen children in their lifetimes, and on average around six.

Husbands, wives and children also invest time in building and maintaining their 'social resources': interacting with relatives, friends and neighbours and participating in organisations such as burial societies, and religious ceremonies, for mutual support in times of difficulty and for enjoyment and self-fulfilment. Household members also respond to demands from the government for community work and attendance at meetings in order to

maintain or increase their 'political resources'. These activities contribute to local community governance which is discussed in the next section.

Human production

In order to begin the process of producing children a couple must get married. In Amhara marriage is regarded as a contract between a man and a woman who pool resources to live together. Divorce is easy; the couple take the resources they brought with them and share those they produced together. Until recently it was easier for the husband to keep all or most of the land but government legislation that land should be shared on divorce has had some effect in Yetmen. In the Oromo system marriage is an institution that connects two clans and involves bridewealth; divorce is difficult since theoretically bridewealth should be returned. When a husband dies the wife is often inherited by a brother or other male relative, and when a wife dies the husband can claim one of her sisters to honour the obligation resulting from the bridewealth payment. Polygyny is practised by the Muslim Oromo in Turufe Kecheme and Korodegaga and by the Muslim Argobba.

Customarily a couple had little or no choice of marriage partner, particularly the female. This still applies in many cases although there is a process of change under way with an increasing number of young couples involved in 'voluntary abduction' or consulted by parents. Child marriage is still practised in Yetmen although it was reported that often the couple divorced once they reached the age when they should live together and then chose their own partner. Just under a quarter of households in each of the sites is female-headed. There are more divorcees in the Amhara sites, while some of the households in Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme are headed by first or second wives who have been more or less abandoned by their polygynous husbands. Some widows and divorcees do not remarry due to the low power and status of children in the household of a stepfather.

Failure to become pregnant is usually blamed on the wife; an Amhara man is likely to divorce her while an Oromo man is likely to marry a second wife. Illegitimate children and their mothers are not accepted in any of the sites. Abortion is admitted to in all sites but Korodegaga; in Turufe Kecheme women 'drink bleach' or take large quantities of malaria pills. Contraception is not generally acceptable in Dinki or Korodegaga and most women have not been using it. However, in the more integrated sites contraceptive use now seems to be relatively widespread. Customary ideas are important in affecting choices in this area. For example in Yetmen infertile women are despised because they are considered to be cursed while in Dinki it is believed that God is the one who gives children. In Korodegaga older people believe that having more children is an asset and households with more children get more respect because children are important for protecting households from outside enemies. However, modern ideas are penetrating particularly in the integrated sites and among young people. For example in Korodegaga young males and females thought that the poverty of many households could be attributed to the fact that there were too many children.

Most pregnant women work until they give birth and do not receive any special care or food. In Turufe Kecheme wealthy women may get a better diet. Most births take place at home although if there is a serious problem women may be taken to the health centre or hospital, which is easier in the more integrated sites. There is a high maternal mortality rate. The publicly expressed preference particularly in the Oromo sites is for male babies, sometimes associated with their ability to defend the family from enemies and with the fact that women marry into other clans, although women interviewed by women often express a preference for female babies, since these will soon assist them with domestic work. Some women admitted to providing better food and care to male babies. In all sites there are not so many females as there 'should' be according to international male/female ratios and this discrimination may help to explain this.

The main problems reported in raising infants relate to feeding them and dealing with their illnesses. Childrearing is better among the wealthier than the poor. The wellbeing of children was reported as threatened by lack of parental care including mother's death, lack of adequate food, illnesses, lack of medical care, being beaten, being abused, lack of time to play with friends, lack of resources to enable a girl to dress like her friends or a boy to have any clothes, bad relations with friends, and for girls circumcision (Turufe Kecheme), early marriage (Yetmen), abduction, inability to find a marriage partner (more likely for poor girls), heavy work and lack of education.

Informal education is provided by parents, other relatives, neighbours and peer groups. In all sites parents and other informal educators were concerned to inculcate gendered habituses in young people designed to produce aggressive attitudes and behaviour in males and subservient attitudes and behaviour in females. For example, while infants of both sexes were reported by a male respondent from Yetmen as having much the same problems, with no difference in parental expectations and goals or parental interactions with them, once children are mobile differences in approach develop. Boys are taught to be aggressive while girls are encouraged to be

'cool, tolerant, non-aggressive and non-confrontational'. These gendered habituses are confirmed as children move to adolescence and beyond. However, this does not seem to affect attitudes to formal education in the integrated sites, where equal access for males and females seems to be accepted. There are moves in this direction in Korodegaga. In Dinki there is less school attendance overall, although this may be related to the distance of schools in the past. Currently the Argobba are more interested in religious education than formal education and are concerned to protect and control women by confining them to the homestead, although there are signs of dissent among some women

Religious schools are found in all sites. There has been a flourishing of Islamic education in Korodegaga related to the recent building of three mosques with finance from Saudi Arabia. In Dinki there is a woman who teaches the Koran to children and a few young men who are being educated in *madrasas* in Saudi Arabia. In Yetmen attendance at the local priest school had declined. The government's expansion of educational opportunities has had an effect in all sites. Given that many people of non-official school age are keen for an education the ages of those attending schools are widely dispersed. The average ages of the RANS sample of males in Grade 4 in mid-2004 were 17 in Dinki, 16 in Turufe Kecheme, and 15 in Korodegaga and Yetmen. This may partly be attributable to increased opportunities enabling older children to catch up, but may also relate to the need for child labour to support household livelihoods. In Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme there seemed to be no gender bias in early primary school attendance: in Yetmen school in 2005 there were more girls than boys in Grades 1-3 and no difference in numbers completing Grade 8. One explanation was that at least one son is required all day for herding while daughters can help before and after school.

Human reproduction

Raising and feeding a family requires a house, furniture, cooking utensils and other domestic assets and the daily provision of (processed and cooked) food, local drinks, water, fuel for cooking, and the longer-term provision of clothing, health services, and time for child socialisation and informal education, and access to schools for formal education if that is valued and for caring for the sick and disabled and old dependents who may not live in the household. The quality of houses and household assets varies across the sites, the most comfortable houses are found in Yetmen, followed by Turufe Kecheme and Dinki, with Korodegaga some way behind. In all sites but Dinki all livestock, or young livestock, are kept in the house at night due to theft in the integrated sites and hyenas in Korodegaga, with consequences for the health of inhabitants. Rich households in Korodegaga and Dinki have bought houses in nearby towns in which children attending schools can live. Young people have a problem getting access to land for housing, frequently building in the compound of their parents.

The household reproductive assets in Yetmen and Turufe are considerably better than those in Dinki, and particularly Korodegaga. The difference in quality of housing and reproductive assets between rich and poor households in all sites is striking. The staple food in all sites is grain, made into *injera* or porridge, with a stew made of vegetable protein. However diet varies with wealth and rich households may eat meat, eggs, vegetables and dairy products fairly regularly while poor households may regularly replace the *wot* with *berbere* made from local spices.

The integrated sites are nearer to maternal and general health services and primary and secondary schools, while some inhabitants have access to piped water and electricity and all do not have to travel long distances to collect water and wood, and go to the market. Argobba women do not go to market normally being confined to the homestead. Since the Derg era residents in all sites have been encouraged to dig and use pit latrines but in all communities but the villagised section of Turufe Kecheme these are regarded as more problematic than the use of the 'outdoors'.

Illnesses attack the human resources of a household, and there are many problematic diseases in all or some of the sites, including malaria, meningitis, elephantiasis, leprosy, typhoid, hepatitis, yellow fever, cholera, TB, respiratory problems, measles, rubella, mumps, eye problems, rabies, sunstroke, haemorrhoids, STDs and HIV/AIDS, skin diseases, gynaecological problems, and for children persistent itching, sore throats, coughing and diarrhoea and vomiting. Illnesses preventing normal activity in the population in the last year were highest in Dinki (10%) and lowest in Yetmen (3%) with Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme both at 7%. This may be related to a more problematic health environment or to the proportions seeking treatment or to some interaction between the two. Treatment-seeking for illnesses in a two week period varied considerably with over half of illnesses reported as taken for treatment in all sites but Dinki, where the percentage was 14%. This may partly be because the treatment sought was traditional and respondents don't like to admit to this to educated interviewers (who may give them a lecture) but is also related to the proximity and quality of health care sites. A relatively substantial proportion of households reported deaths in the year preceding the survey: 5% in Turufe

Kecheme, 6% in Dinki, 7% in Yetmen and 9% in Korodegaga. Five of the Korodegaga households suffered multiple deaths which in one household totalled 5.

Intra-household relationships

As elsewhere in the world in some households relations between husband and wife are warm and co-operative in a context where a wife is expected to respect her husband's wishes. In other households conflict is a regular feature. Customarily men can claim sex with their wives when they desire it and have been opposed to contraception. However, this is changing particularly in the integrated sites and among younger people. Fathers are involved in the socialisation and work training of children, particularly the boys.

The mother-baby couple is involved in a pregnancy-infancy cycle which lasts almost two years. Babies may be harmed as a result of poor health and care of the mother during pregnancy and illness, death or overwork of the mother after birth. While most parents have emotional and loving relationships with most of their children, they also regard them as potential household workers and carers in old age. Relations between parents and sons before adolescence are sometimes problematic as a result of their training to be aggressive, which is seen as necessary for household survival in an environment where there are enemies. There were reports of insults and acts of violence by sons against their mothers if their needs are not met particularly when they are hungry, of fathers getting angry with sons who refuse the food or clothes they are given, and reports that boys growing up in female-headed households may get 'out of hand'. Few relational problems were reported with girls of this age who are trained to be obedient and submissive. As in other parts of the world parents face problems of disobedience and demands from adolescents, although the contribution that they can make to the work of the household is appreciated. While adolescent boys assert their independence by acting aggressively the equivalent reported for girls is 'murmuring' when asked to do something.

Fathers may have co-operative or conflictual relationships with married sons which often depend on wider family relationships and histories. For example, an elderly rich and polygynously married man in Korodegaga works co-operatively with two older married sons, one of whom has a minor *kebele* post, but argues constantly with another married son, who was in the army, while one of the elder's wives lives with and cares for one of the soldier son's small daughters. While sons have the main responsibility for the care of parents in old age there may be close personal relationships between mothers and daughters. It was reported that fathers living with daughters may not be looked after properly.

Male children expect their sisters to serve them while older siblings of each gender have some authority over younger ones although in childhood its exercise, particularly among males, may involve physical violence.

Local and ideological repertoires related to the human re/production field

Traditional' local repertoires

Customary forms of marriage are good (though there are variations in what is considered important): child marriage, arranged marriages, abduction, polygyny, marriage with a dead wife's sister; marriage to a dead husband's brother. Divorce is acceptable among the Amhara but not among the Arssi Oromo. The gendered division of labour in the household is good. Men should lead the household and control the behaviour of members using persuasion, incentives and sanctions including violence. Wives should obey husbands; sisters should serve brothers; youngers of both sexes should obey elders. A couple should have as many children as possible to provide household labour and because it is God's will. Boys should be raised to be aggressive and girls to be submissive; each should be taught gendered role activities. Girls should not be sent to school. They should be circumcised as children (Amhara) or just before marriage (Arssi Oromo). Domestic activities must be done by females, and boys help with firewood and water collection only if there are not girls/women to do so..

Modern local repertoires

Child marriage should be abolished. Couples should have some choice in who they marry. Too many children lead to household poverty. Couple should limit the number (a suggestion of 4) by using contraception. Both boys and girls should be sent to school. Domestic activities must be done by females.

Religious repertoires

Church marriages forbidding divorce are desirable, though rare. A Muslim may have up to four wives, though few have more than one. Women should be modest and restrict their public activities. The number of children a woman has is in the hands of God. In some religious repertoires contraception is forbidden. Islamic education is important for both boys and girls.

Government modernisation repertoire

Customary forms of marriage are not good. Government rules ban marriage under 18, abduction and forced marriages. No-one should marry below the age of 18. Couples should choose their marriage partners. Couples should limit the number of children they have through contraception. Female circumcision should not take place. No interest in who does domestic activities. All children should be sent to primary school.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

They have little interest in marriage rules. Wife-beating should be abolished. Couples should limit the number of children they have through contraception. No interest in who does domestic activities. All children should be sent to primary school.

Opportunities and constraints in the field of human re/production for people of different social statuses

Customarily male household heads, usually supported by their wives, have made the first important choice leading to human production: that of their daughter's marriage partner. The new husband has then usually controlled the number and spacing of children. Arssi Oromo women have had little choice in ending a marriage, though it may be ended or transformed by the husband marrying another wife. If the husband dies there will be pressure for her to marry one of his male relatives. Amhara women can initiate divorce but they have been expected to remarry quickly. However, with support from government policies, these customary institutions, practices and beliefs are being challenged by older women in the integrated sites and by some of the youth in all sites.

The process of becoming pregnant, giving birth, and caring for the infant in the early months is highly affected by the lack of importance attached to it in male-dominated governance structures. Customary and local government structures allocate few resources to provide opportunities for unstressed pregnancies and safe births²². These are more likely to be achieved by women living in richer households in the integrated sites. While there are customary rules about post-partum activities women in poor households are unlikely to be able to follow them.

In some cases discrimination against female babies may reduce their comparative survival opportunities compared with those of males. As children grow their developing competence may be threatened, particularly by inadequate consumption and other resources, lack of proper care by parents, illness, lack of healthcare when ill, overwork and lack of education. Parents and other adults in the community inculcate gendered habituses in young people designed to produce aggressive attitudes and behaviour in males and subservient attitudes and obedience in females. However, this does not seem to affect attitudes to formal education in the integrated sites, where equal access for males and females seems to be accepted. The only real opposition to education in general and female education in particular is found among the Argobba Muslims of Dinki.

Human reproduction opportunities are greater for those who are rich; people in poor households have inadequate material resources in terms of housing, household reproductive assets, food, fuel, clothing, and access to health services. Poor women are also likely to have less time for child socialisation and informal education. Human reproduction opportunities are also greater for the not-poor in the integrated sites than the not-poor in the remote sites who do not have access to modern utilities and have to travel some distance for services and markets.

The burden of work on women and girls is partly dependent on household demographics; if there are no daughters the wife will be hugely over-worked; the more daughters a woman has the less work she will have to do unless the daughters are sent to school. There were reports that the main domestic work burden falls on girls from about the age of 10. Male children expect their sisters to serve them while older siblings of each gender have some authority over younger ones although in childhood its exercise, particularly among males, may involve physical violence

4.5. The community governance field of action

The goals of community governance are the maintenance of social order by controlling deviant behaviour, resolving disputes and handling dissent and conflict, economic development activities, social protection, gender and family 'policy', the management of collective resources, community survival and solidarity. Governance structures consist of the roles, rules, values and beliefs involved in decision-making and implementation on

²² This neglect of the important nurturing role women play in the development of personal agency profiles is also a feature of donor approaches to women, where the main foci are contributions to economic growth and relations with men.

behalf of the community. In rural Ethiopia there are two inter-penetrating sets of governance structures, one with its roots in the community which we are calling 'local community governance' and the other brought into the community by the government which we are calling 'local government governance'. In Kurey's terms the former involve 'informal institutions' while the latter are 'formal state institutions'. Here we consider the local community and government structures of opportunity and constraint separately, and then discuss how they interact across the interface focusing on institutional contradictions and alignments, and conflicts and co-operation.

Local community governance

Local power in community structures is associated with being one of the elite. Eliteness involves one or more of the following: greater wealth, influence through local informal organisational positions, and/or influence through formal organisational positions including government and religious roles. Literacy and education can be useful. Greater wealth can enable elites not just to purchase productive assets, such as pumps and vehicles in the richer sites, but also to mobilize more labour through festive work groups, to employ wage labourers, to invest in more livestock in the poorer sites including prestige animals such as camels, horses and mules, to improve their housing, notably with tin roofs becoming a symbol of eliteness in the poorer sites, to build urban houses and to purchase some luxury items, including better household goods such as metal beds and mattresses, radios and TVs, bicycles and even trucks in Yetmen. Elites are also be able to access better services in towns, and may send their children for education to live with town relatives. In Dinki and Korodegaga control and use of irrigation are the most important access to elite status based on wealth. In Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen such status derives from larger landholding and involvement in trade.

Customary elites are influential in local decision-making and implementation, particularly in dispute resolution. In all sites local dispute settlement is carried out by *Elders* who are concerned to bring the parties together to discuss the issues and to restore harmony among people who live close to each other. *Gada* is an Oromo political institution based on age-grades whose influence declined during the Derg but which now plays a role in conflict resolution and problems related to murder. '*Bewitching*' or spirit possession is an institution which is used in the Amhara sites for solving certain conflicts. Wealthy merchants in Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen have contributed and mobilised the people bringing electricity, telecommunication service and the like while inward investors in irrigation and a man who set up a shop and beef fattening project contributed to rafts to cross the Awash. Religious leaders have a strong following in all the communities, and play key roles at times of crisis. There have recently been increasing divergences within and between religions resulting from growing fundamentalist influences among Muslim, Orthodox and Protestant groups. Within groups the fundamentalist tendencies have tended to be promoted by younger educated men often with external contacts preaching against lax religious practice and customs that were seen as traditional and not part of the main religion. In Yetmen people listen to what priests say 'which is not the case with government officials'.

Local politics are important in the selection of *kebele* leaders who are elected by the people. Factional politics are involved but difficult to discern as they are based on informal networks and may change rapidly. Sometimes they seem to be follow ethnic or clan lines and may be important in the election or replacing of *kebele* representatives. However, these elections are also subject to influences from the *wereda* authorities, and occasions when directives instruct leadership changes offer opportunities for changing unpopular leaders and can alter the power balance and lead to shifting alliances and allegiances

Community organisation includes households, informal social networks which are often kin-based and some locally formal organisations with rules which are often written down. These include burial societies found in all sites, rotating savings clubs in the two richer sites, and monthly feasting groups among the richer Amhara. A key aspect of community governance structures are those which provide social protection. In these rural communities the locally-based 'welfare mix' is dominated by self-help, households, families and wider kin, neighbours, friendship and patron-client networks. Local community organisations, particularly *iddir*, make some contribution, as do some community level institutions, networks with other communities particularly through marriage links, religion-based programmes, religious charity, NGOs, and international links through kin and diaspora organisations. The share-cropping out of land operates as a form of social protection for elderly and sick people. A few rich families send children to private schools and use private cosmopolitan health services. Government cosmopolitan services and traditional health services, including herbalists, bonesetters, and 'magicians', and visiting religious sites of 'holy water' are also widely used, often simultaneously. Most gender and family 'policies' have been described in the previous section. One that clashes with government policy which has not been mentioned is female circumcision. Girls are circumcised for cultural reasons. It is regarded as shameful not to have been circumcised and girls who are not cannot be buried in churchyards while

among the Oromo they cannot be married. It is claimed that circumcision brings freedom: from being mocked and insulted.

Collective action (*power with* and *power to*) at 'club' and 'community' levels plays a big role in these communities. People come together to organise ceremonies related to death, marriage and birth and locally important dates in religious and customary calendars, in work groups to build houses and do farm work, and to pursue particular projects or goals. Community celebrations have been a customary way to build solidarity and a community spirit. These are important in Yetmen and very important in Dinki, although there are some tensions arising from Muslim and Orthodox Christian differences. In Korodegaga the penetration of stricter approaches to Islam have led to the almost total abandonment of customary community rituals, while in Turufe Kecheme the ethnic mix means that people tend to conduct celebrations within their own group. Elites mobilise people for action using *power over* and generating *power with*.

Political competition involving *power against* is a feature in all sites but particularly in the ethnically mixed communities. There are tensions in the relations between ethnic groups who follow different religions in both Turufe Kecheme and Dinki, being stronger in the former. The increasing fundamentalism of religious beliefs causes particular problems in mixed-religion communities. For example both Orthodox Christians and Muslims have (different) rules about the preparation of food which make it difficult for them to celebrate festivals together, and has led to the disintegration of longstanding multi-religious burial associations since each religious group now believes that the use of communal food equipment by the other groups will contaminate it. At times of crisis or potential crisis peaceful coexistence may break down as it did in Turufe Kecheme at the downfall of the Derg when most of the Kambata were expelled. The 2005 elections were a period of tensions and in Turufe the minorities expressed fears of expulsion should the EPRDF be defeated. All the *kebele* officials are Oromo (57% of the population) and are seen by the other inhabitants as giving priority to natives. There is conflict and competition among clans in Korodegaga; for example fights between organised gangs of youngsters from Buko and Sefera villages occurred regularly between 2002 and 2005 associated with opportunities for manual work loading lorries with vegetables.

Conflicts involving violence also occur with neighbouring communities, other families and kingroups, and within households. The Dinki and Korodegaga communities have historic conflicts with pastoralist neighbours which occasionally flare up. Dinki residents were also reported as considering the Oromo as historical enemies for committing genocide against their people during the Italian occupation (1937-42). In the environs of Yetmen there are local bandits living outside the law. Blood feuds between families and kin networks are a potential feature in the northern sites. Customarily violence has been a widespread sanction used by superiors to punish and control inferiors, particularly in gendered hierarchies. Much has been made of the finding in a recent Ethiopian Demographic Household Survey that 85% of women accept that a man can beat his wife for one of six of reasons, including burning food (65%), neglecting the children (65%), arguing with him (61%), going out without telling him (56%), or refusing sexual relations (51%) (Kurey, 2005). However, not all women accept regular beating, a standard response being to return to the parents' house. Reconciliation often depends on the provision of compensation gifts, such as a new dress, by the husband.

Local government governance

Wereda officials are appointed and they are encouraged to join the EPRDF, as are the paid *kebele* officials who may receive party-organised training. Trained development assistants with responsibilities for particular communities are a recent new resource; the DA in Korodegaga in 2004/5 was female. *Wereda* officials have access to government resources to pursue government policies in the *kebeles* for which they are responsible; currently they are upwardly accountable with many of their activities governed by targets which they are expected to meet.

Peasant Associations, now known as *kebele* were established in the mid-1970s. Recently reorganisation has involved the merging of old *kebele* to create larger units roughly around three times the size of the older ones. These are now referred to as *Kebele Administrations*, since they are the lowest tier of government with paid officials, accountable to and reporting to *wereda* levels. There are government-formed women's associations and roles for women in the *kebele*, although they are not generally powerful in the community. In Dinki in 2003 the *kebele* had the following committees: service cooperative, committee of associations; community participation; committee of artifacts; security of justice sector; family planning programme; health committee; local militia; land tax; resettlement programme; food for work; education committee; water committee; women's participation; road construction committee; voluntary service; AIDS committee. In Yetmen the administration is headed by the chairperson with 6 cabinet members chosen from 100 people who themselves were chosen by the people in the three *got* which make up the *kebele*. They also choose a chairperson for each *got*. Under the *got*

chairperson is a secretary and the local militia. In Korodegaga it is claimed that the *kebele* administration is accountable to the *wereda* administration. In Korodegaga the Development Assistant is a member of the cabinet. Communities also have *kebele* social courts. The court in Korodegaga has five members, one of whom is a woman. It meets twice a week and is responsible for major disputes such as conflicts over land, cattle entering farmland, group fighting, minor theft, serious conflicts between husband and wife and serious quarrelling between individuals. It has a right to decide a penalty up to 500 *birr* but no right to decide on imprisonment. More serious crimes are reported to the police, and the cases are seen by the *wereda* court. In recent years new structures for mobilising and controlling local people at a lower level have been introduced. This had happened earlier in Tigray and then Amhara Region, where they are known as *Mengistawi budin* which are units of about 50 households and within these *hiwas* or *cells* with 10 households or less. In the Oromia sites they are known as *gere*, *got* and *cell*. Community labour and contributions are organised through these structures; lack of 'participation' may be punished through fines.

Kebele officials are intermediaries between the government and the community: they disseminate and implement government directives, policies and information and are responsible for taxation, mobilising community members for group work such as terracing and afforestation, and security. *Kebele* leaders are influential, particularly when they control resources such as food aid, or can affect outcomes in disputes, land measurement and distribution including to themselves and their relatives, participation in collective labour or conscription. However, their power may be limited to their period of office, and they may be disfavoured once no longer in power. The power resources of *Kebele* officials include the threat of removing land entitlements, approval of illegal land sales, taxation, the ability to fine and imprison, the power to mobilise people for community work, the signing of permits for people to leave the site, get medical treatment etc, and the registration of organisations such as *iddir*. One way in which *kebele* and *wereda* officials relate to local people is through meetings. Top-down social order is maintained through instructions coming from the Region and *wereda* to the *Kebele* Administration, often explained at meetings at which directives, campaigns and quotas are laid out. If conflicts cannot be resolved by neighbourhood elders or are serious they are brought to the *Kebele* social court, and if the verdict is imprisonment the offender may be taken to the *wereda*.

People in the four sites received a wide range of services from government between mid-2003 and mid-2004. A big contrast between the remote and integrated sites is the provision of food aid to the former and modern utilities and hospitals to the latter. Korodegaga received considerably more services than Dinki reflecting differences at *wereda* level. Security was important in the Oromo sites but not the Amhara sites and more use was made of the courts. The most frequently taken-up services were agricultural advisory and inputs, education, and health services of various kinds. Expressed levels of satisfaction with the government services received by households between mid-2003 and mid-2004 was high with only 15% in Dinki, 13% in Korodegaga, 12% in Turufe Kecheme, and 11% in Yetmen not being 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied'. Satisfaction with NGO services in the three sites where they are active was even higher with the equivalent figures being 2%, 9% and 9%. The qualitative data shows that the veterinary service (or its absence) was a major cause of dissatisfaction for farmers in the remote sites in 2004/5.

A significant proportion (between 20% and 56% across the sites) of males of 7 and over have no experience of education. 72% of females in the remote sites have had no experience of education. However, a female in Turufe Kecheme is more likely to have experienced education than a male in any of the other three sites, while in Yetmen a very slightly higher proportion of females than males are currently attending primary school. In the last few years the government has adopted a policy of the rapid expansion of education and abolition of the shift system. Parents have been mobilised to send their children to school, sometimes under threat of fines if children do not attend. In Dinki some parents compromised by sending one child while some children pretended they were going to school but played together instead. Implementation of the policy and the related increased demand led to problems in all sites at the beginning of the school year in 2004 due to lack of classroom space and insufficient numbers of teachers. As a result contributions of cash and/or labour were demanded in all sites but Dinki to upgrade buildings and in Turufe Kecheme to pay a teacher's salary.

Government provision of preventive services such as vaccination has been increasing and take-up in all sites but Dinki is quite high; more than two-thirds of the residents have been vaccinated. There is lack of interest in Dinki (37%) while in Turufe Kecheme some men prevented their wives from having a meningitis injection because they believed it contained a contraceptive. There are anti-AIDS clubs and activities in all sites but Dinki and in later 2005 reports of government activity against malaria including the provision of free bednets and prophylactics, and DDT spraying. It was frequently reported from the sites that poor people usually do not seek cosmopolitan health treatment due to the expense.

The main form of social protection provided by government is food aid which has been regularly, if not always sufficiently, provided, mostly as food for work in Korodegaga and Dinki. There has been no food aid or food for work in Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme, which are generally surplus producing. The changes in the food aid system associated with the introduction of the Productive Safety Net Programme caused some problems in Korodegaga in the first part of the research year (September 2004 – October 2005) which were sorted out in May 2005. Taking a longer view the importance of food aid is clear. In both the drought-prone sites food aid is appreciated when it saves lives and helps poor and vulnerable people. But it is seen as making people lazy and it is not always timely. In 2003 there were complaints about unfairness. Benefits mentioned were that people could work locally rather than having to migrate, that some of the work is useful (soil conservation, ponds, forest development) and encourages a work spirit, and that people participate in their own development. The major constraints were conflict with labour needs and people's own priorities at peak times, low payment rates, and late arrival of the food. Other points mentioned were that not everyone is involved, and that the work is often compulsory and results in disincentives for individual and community initiative.

The government policy on marriage is based on the voluntary consent of the couple. Abduction is illegal. From 2005 divorced women had rights to share land with her husband. Civil law supports inheritance to all children; so now a married daughter who has inherited nothing can in theory take the case to the social court. The government has banned female circumcision. Family planning has been part of government health policy for a long time.

The government's style of mobilisation may be assumed to enhance efficiency of communication and implementation of government policies and service delivery. However, it may also be perceived as intrusive, competing with existing informal institutions and undermining community autonomy. Attempts to make use of community institutions to promote overtly political agendas may also be perceived as running counter to community interests. One potential problem is the use of the new *encadrement* structures to replace customary practices and in some cases the labour market. For example in Turufe Kecheme the authorities sought to use the official structure rather than traditional work parties to collect harvests and banned migrant workers resulting in increases in the rate peasants had to pay to employ wage labourers. Roadblocks were set up and migrant labourers were not allowed to pass them. Directives to use the new formal structure to collect crops instead of traditional labour groups were resisted by local people who argued that people would work harder using the traditional groups as result of the reciprocal obligations they established.

Another problem is the length of meetings. A main government instrument aimed at promoting change is the [long] meeting during which officials lecture local people. There was a sense expressed in all sites that people were fed up with the frequency of the meetings which they often considered a waste of valuable time. In some cases people only attended out the fear of fines or of being considered uncooperative. There was also a dislike of the way in which government instructed local grassroots organisations such as burial societies to contribute cash and organise the labour of members for development initiatives. There are memories in Turufe Kecheme of the Derg regime using burial associations as a source for recruiting soldiers.

A fourth problem relates to the standardised campaign approach with quotas in which the officials of each *wereda* seek to impress the regional authorities by achieving or going beyond targets or quotas. This has negative implications including doing things in too great haste, mobilising energies on single tracks detracting from applying human, material and other resources to ongoing activities, a tendency to go for increasing numbers and quotas set from above to the detriment of quality, experimentation, and adoption of what works, assuming that the same solution is valid everywhere without taking due consideration of regional, altitudinal, climatic, and socio-cultural variations. This is a particular problem for 'Development Agents'; young educated and trained people whose position as 'go-betweens' between the *wereda* and the community can be very difficult.

Government taxation and special contributions are collected diligently. In 2005 people went to all the sites to measure the land with a rope. Household heads were given or promised certificates and tax schedules related to size of landholding were developed. In Dinki government taxes and other imposed contributions are collected by the *kebele* leadership using the social courts and militia to force people who do not co-operate. In Turufe Kecheme people were not allowed to pay their land tax (maintaining their rights to their land) unless it was accompanied by a contribution towards the building of a primary school in a neighbouring area which none of their children would attend. The maximum land tax in Dinki in 2005 was 70 *birr* (around \$9) and the minimum 20 *birr* and in Korodegaga the maximum was 100 *birr* and the minimum 30 *birr*. Contributions in cash, labour or wood have been expected for the construction of schools in all four sites in 2005. Contributions of labour

and/or cash for the building of health posts were required in Dinki and Yetmen.

The community-government interface: some examples of interactions

In this section we describe two types of interactions between local government and communities. The first type is at the level of institutions or systems where we consider interactions between state and customary justice systems. The second is at the level of social relationships where the focus is on examples of community resistance to government policies.

System integration/contradictions

There is prevalent assumption of a disconnect between formal and informal institutions²³. The State is seen as increasingly penetrating, and within communities people are portrayed as dependent on informal institutions and lacking confidence in formal institutions. There is certainly some truth to these stereotypes. State structures have become more pervasive with ever lower levels of control²⁴, a narrative that is common regarding dispute resolutions. Some elders spoke of their mandate being reduced compared to the past, with *Kebele* social courts monopolising serious and sensitive issues such as murder and land disputes, relegating elders to cope with minor family and inter-household matters²⁵. Moreover, local people trust and rely on informal institutions. Informal dispute resolution based on cultural logics differs from universal values of the formal legal system: it relies on compromise, is restorative, seeking reconciliation among people who live together, it is accessible, localised, in a familiar language, less costly, timely, does not involve imprisonment; relying on the moral authority of social ostracism or cursing and achieving reconciliation through blessing and commensality; it is thus considered legitimate and predictable based on widely held beliefs and norms.

However, when we look closely at how disputes are handled and resolution processes a more complex and dynamic picture emerges, and there is much greater interaction and interdependence of the two systems than might at first appear. In practice the formal justice relies heavily on informal institutions throughout the process. First, when litigants bring a case, they are sent back to elders to mediate and seek a compromise and only if this fails are they allowed to return to the *Kebele* courts. In Yetmen the social court assigns elders with a written request to investigate not just in family and marital affairs but also for land and money matters. Elders are expected to communicate their decisions in writing to the courts. Second, courts often seek the advice of mediating elders as witnesses. Third, once a verdict is reached elders are often expected to ensure that the parties implement and respect decisions. Courts may also be involved in enforcing verdicts suggested by the elders.²⁶

There has also been a tendency for the formal system to involve or co-opt the elders into semi-formal roles. For instance in Dinki the *Kebele* formed a marriage and divorce committee,²⁷ composed of elders. This is related to State interests in defending women's rights and monitoring male-dominated customary institutions but also due to the high prevalence of marital disputes and the view that elders are needed. Moreover, local level *Kebele* officials are from the communities and understand and often share the cultural premises of the elders, and seek to translate external values in local terms and minimise external impositions. There has also been a process of informal institutions becoming more formalised, notably in the use of written contractual agreements of decisions, with chairmen being designating and keeping copies of agreements. To conclude the picture that emerges is less of separation and more of negotiation and collaboration, with compromise as well as resistance.

Major crimes like serious theft, murder, rape, abduction, ethnic or clan-based disputes are passed to the *wereda* court. The *kebele* social court's accountability is not to the *kebele* administration but to the *wereda* court. It seems that the presence of this court helps the people to get solutions to their security problems. People go to the court even for minor cases. Some informants said that the court is giving fair justice to the people. The social court works in coordination with the *kebele* administration (*kore bulchisa*) and the *kebele* security (*Abba nagga*). Sometimes, it also coordinates with community elders. Elders complain that the increasing role of the social court in dispute resolution greatly contributes to the decline of the role of traditional conflict resettlement institution.

²³ See for instance: "The formal and informal opportunity structures under which Ethiopians live their lives are not complementary" Empowerment in Ethiopia: A status review. *WB Draft Working Paper*, p.33

²⁴ See the earlier discussion on levels of local government.

²⁵ However, customary institutions are said to have a greater role than under the Derg.

²⁶ For instance in Dinki the owner of a donkey that ate crops in a field was made to pay compensation.

²⁷ Such a committee was already described in a resettlement setting in the late 1980s (Pankhurst 2002:242-62).

Social integration/conflicts

During our research period there were cases of resistance to government policies some of which involved confrontation while in others the resistance was more passive. In most cases if the community was determined the policy failed. The examples here relate to resettlement, conscription, land measurement, water harvesting, the digging of household latrines, new education policies, abduction, female circumcision, commemorative ceremonies for the dead, the abolition of blood feuds, and the 2005 elections.

Local resettlement: in Dinki the community was opposed plans to move households off hillsides which government experts wanted to have reforested moving people into settlements nearer the river. Community members said they were relieved that government energies in mid-2005 were concentrated on the elections so that this plan was shelved.

Conscription: during the Derg wars against Eritrea several rounds of forced conscription were carried out in all the sites, and there were cases of men who tried to resist. In Dinki one man considers that he and his relatives were discriminated against for having successfully resisted conscriptions by hiding. In 2005 there was conscription in Dinki and even reports of some cases of conscripts being taken from marketplaces and rumours of them trying to escape.

Land measurement : the government has firmly continued the policy of land remaining state property. However, at a local level in many of the sites there were 'illegal' land sales. In 2005 a new policy of land measurement was carried out in all the sites with a view to providing ownership certificates, with the intention of promoting tenure security and investment. However, this resulted in some conflict notably in Turufe between land owners and those who had rented land and in Dinki due to fears that this would be a measure to increase taxation, and in particular by the Muslim Argobba men who did not want their wives to be registered as co-owners.

Water harvesting: This nationwide water harvesting campaign was carried out in 2003-04 in the two drought-prone sites, Korodegaga where it failed as it was inappropriate given the soil type, and around Dinki where the plan was rejected due to fears it would spread malaria but where people from Dinki were required to provide labour for surrounding areas.

Household latrines: In Yetmen and Dinki people were instructed to dig latrines and threatened with fines; a number dug holes but just for show.

Government education policies: The abolition of the shift system was successfully resisted in Korodegaga on the ground that children travelling a long distance missed the mid-day meal and did not have time to complete their household work. There were concerns expressed in Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen about the effects on children's work but the policy was not implemented during the research period, partly because there were too many children for the schools to cope with even with a shift system. The attempt by the government to extend the school calendar to July failed in Dinki as this is the month when the rainy season starts; many children had to stop school because they could not cross the rivers which were too full.

From Dinki came a request to the Ministry of Education to design the school calendar to fit in with local environments and agricultural working calendars and the timing of markets, since school attenders may have to stay at home to look after younger siblings while their parents go to market.

Abduction: a reason frequently proffered explaining why parents are not keen to send their daughters to school is the fear of rape or abduction. However, while abduction is now a criminal offence it is difficult to prosecute, partly because the parents of the victim are not keen once the case has been resolved by elders.

Female circumcision: Since circumcision is now illegal unless the interviewer is well-trusted respondents are likely to claim that it is not practised. However, a trusted research officer established that an Amhara nurse who opposes circumcision because of the health problems it caused had had her infant daughter circumcised as otherwise her parents and relatives 'would not give her peace' if she had not. Attempts to raise awareness about the disadvantages of circumcision are continuing.

Commemorative ceremonies for the dead: Amhara ceremonies for the dead are expensive and repeated a number of times. In Yetmen *kebele* officials tried to ban them but people protested openly and the officials abandoned the attempt after one of their number was exposed for secretly fixing a *teskar* for one of his relatives in another *kebele*.

The abolition of blood feuds: Blood feuds may still occur in both Oromo and Amhara regions. Government attempts to abolish such conflicts in the Dinki area by setting up a 'Blood Drying Committee' organised from *wereda* down to *kebele* level met with failure.

The 2005 elections: In all four sites the government party lost the 2005 elections. Up to the run up of the elections the EPRDF was confident of winning massive support in rural areas, a view which was reinforced at meetings and by *kebele* officials. Frequent meetings and radio programmes meant that people in the communities were very much aware of the upcoming elections and there was considerable discussion within communities. However, campaigning was limited and opposition presence within the sites was almost non-existent. In all sites local people told *wereda* officials at meetings that they would be voting for the EPRDF, partly out of fear of reprisals. After the elections there were meetings in Yetmen and Dinki to discuss the elections where EPRDF cadres were said to have admitted mistakes and promised to redress them. In Yetmen respondents suggested they should have done this before the election. Fairly soon after the elections some 200 people from Dinki were sent for a couple of weeks to discuss how government could improve its policies.

Local and ideological ideas related to the governance field of action

People in the communities have access to five cultural repertoires stipulating how the community should be governed.

'Traditional' local repertoires

Wise and experienced elders should guide the community as to the values they should follow, the knowledge that they need, and the beliefs which are correct in each of the fields of action. Elites (male elders, influential wealthy, educated, religious leaders) should make the important community decisions. Social order should be maintained with reference to traditional and religious values. Communities must protect themselves against neighbouring enemies. Disputes should be resolved by elders and other traditional institutions such as *gada* and spirit possession wherever possible. The aim is the restoration of harmony among people who have to live in regular face-to-face interactions. Community relations should be organised through social networks and local 'formal'²⁸ organisations such as burial associations and savings clubs and regular community and neighbourhood festivals. Customary ceremonies are important, especially those related to burial of the dead. All members should contribute work for ceremonies and other co-operative community work. People or groups should assist poor and destitute old, sick and young people with resources and care.

Household and personal security should be sought and provided through self-help, intra-household sharing, family obligations, particularly of children to parents, long-term social exchanges with families and wider kin, neighbours and friends, and seeking patrons. Land should not be marketable as it provides security for those who can no longer work. People should seek health treatment appropriate to their illness; which may involve self-treatment, traditional health practitioners, visiting holy water sites, going to pharmacies, or using government or private for-profit health services. The customary gender and family policies described in Section 2, including female circumcision, should remain in place. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with corporal punishment; it is necessary to maintain discipline within the household.

It is not surprising that *kebele* officials are prone to favour their relatives and kin networks since, as members of kin networks, they have long-term moral obligations. The government's governance style is problematic since it interferes with farming calendars, collective land use, and often takes little account of local preferences.

Modern local repertoires

Those who are successful in business and people with education, and model farmers who apply modern inputs are the ones who should be listened to. People should be open to new ideas from outside the community and even outside the country. Local groups of men and women should organise to pursue development assistance from government and NGOs. People should use modern institutions for saving and borrowing. Household and personal security can be sought through local formal organisations such as *iddir*, NGOs and through government food aid, although long-term development aid would be preferable. People should use cosmopolitan health services. Government should not exploit grass-root organisations. Government gender policies should be implemented. People should not sell their oxen and go into debt to finance customary celebrations such as child marriages and expensive and repeated burial ceremonies.

Religious repertoires

The values, knowledge, advice and instructions of religious leaders whose role is validated nationally and/or

²⁸ In that they have rules.

internationally should be strictly followed since they know what God's will is. Failure to conform is or will be punished. Orthodox Christians should observe religious holidays called by priests. The official representatives within all religions are against the practice of traditional festivals. Religious followers should practice the rules of charity endorsed by the religion they follow. Poor people can seek personal security via religious charity.

Government modernisation repertoire

Government has regarded the free movement of ideas as a threat to its political control and used various means to prevent it. *Kebele* officials should disseminate and implement government directives, policies and other information. They should gather taxes and mobilise community members for group development work. The best way to mobilise peasants is through long meetings where they are lectured and local government *encadrement* structures with cells of 10 households or less for which one household head has responsibility. Lack of participation should be punished with fines. Officials are theoretically held accountable through the system of *gimgema*; meetings during which community members can raise criticisms and request removal of the official although in practice it is more likely to be used to get rid of officials not towing the line. Social order should be maintained through instructions coming from the Region and *wereda* to the *kebele* administration; local security is maintained by local *kebele* militia who are armed.

Government should provide economic and human development services, and food aid to drought-affected communities, although this should be used as payment for community development work. Local communities should contribute cash and labour on demand to improve local services, such as education, health services sanitation, piped water, roads, and should pay a small fee for the use of these services. Customary gender and family policies should be replaced with modern policies. Local grass-root organisations should be at the service of government. In elections local people should support the government party which is mobilising them for development.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

Donors think that 'information' has the potential to increase market and political efficiency. Local government officials should be accountable to community members through participatory state structures rather than to higher government levels, to ensure a voice for 'the poor' in development activities and to reduce corruption. Local officials should be regularly elected in secret ballots. Opposition parties should be allowed to freely contest regional and national elections. Customary institutions should be increasingly replaced by formal ones.

Opportunities and constraints in the governance field of action for people of different social status

Both local community and local government governance structures are dominated by adult and richer men with little voice for women, or uneducated younger men. Older men have more power in community governance structures than they do in local government structures, as a result of the government's favouring of the appointment to *kebele* office of younger educated men who are often in their 30s. There are a few opportunities for women to participate in *kebele* structures although they have little power; they are likely to be widows, divorcees or wives abandoned or neglected when husbands have taken a new wife. We do not have any information about who is active and powerful in the community assemblies which did not seem to be active during our research period.

4.6. The 'ideas' field of action

In relation to the ideas which people in the community have access to we have identified two types of local cultural repertoire and three types of imported ideological repertoire and compared their content in the previous three sections in relation to livelihoods, human re/production and governance. Most people are likely to mix ideas from the repertoires in ways which are more or less consistent. However, there are also structures and agents whose purpose it is to create or reproduce and disseminate ideas within each of the five repertoires. There are also more diffuse ways in which new ideas are introduced into the communities and old ideas reinforced.

Customary structures and agents transmitting traditional ideas

Older and middle-aged people are the main promoters of traditional ideas, particularly important being the influential elders with important roles in local community governance structures, including notable women with influence over how women think. Some younger people in Korodegaga regret the disappearance of 'beautiful' traditional festivals. Informal interactions and gossip play an important role in the reproduction of the local traditional ideas about how livelihoods, human re/production and community governance should be organised which have been described above.

Local structures and agents transmitting modern ideas

Rich merchants in the integrated sites promote modern utilities, material and organisational technologies and business-based ideas, including market research. Groups of young people in all sites have 'modern' goals involving education and escaping from peasant farming. Young people generally are critical of the old generation with its old-fashioned approach to life. Some women talking in safe contexts are supportive of government gender policies in relation, for example, to land ownership, contraception and abduction, and a few are critical of widely-supported customary practices such as female circumcision. Teachers and community members with higher levels of education, which include males and females in all sites, draw on and disseminate modern repertoires.

Structures and agents producing and disseminating new religious ideologies

All our communities have been affected by religious mobilisations of one kind or another, all with the aim of trying to control or change the behaviour and beliefs of local people. Orthodox Christianity depends on local 'taxes'; Islamic, protestant and catholic mobilisations tend to be externally financed. The increasing influence of religious fundamentalists, notably Islamic, but also Protestant and to some extent Orthodox has led to a greater concern for stricter observance of religious beliefs, and tensions with the predominant more lax and tolerant tendencies. This has had effects both within religious groups and between them. Two of our sites are characterised by differing religious homogeneity: Islam in Korodegaga and Orthodox Christianity in Yetmen. The other two sites are religiously heterogeneous, with Islam and Orthodox Christianity competing in Dinki and Islam, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic Christianities in Turufe. In the religiously homogenous sites there is competition between more lax practice accommodative of traditional beliefs and stricter and fundamentalist dispositions often spread by external influences. Thus in Korodegaga wahabi influences backed by funding from the Gulf promoted stricter Islamic practices and militated against traditional beliefs. In Yetmen priests sought to encourage stricter observance of holy days and they were reported as being more powerful in influencing community behaviour than government officials.

In the two heterogeneous sites there were also competing repertoires between stricter and more accommodative tendencies within religious but the main tensions and competitions were between religions and their representatives. Increasing hostility between Amhara Orthodox Christians and Muslim Argobba is reportedly linked to political competition. There has been resistance to Muslim fundamentalists in Turufe Kecheme, where there is an association between poverty and Protestantism.

The production and dissemination of government ideologies

Government was particularly active in the communities in the lead-up to the May election. They organised community work and called many meetings. There were attempts to change working practices through education and the issuing of directives, which were successfully resisted in Turufe Kecheme. Many meetings were devoted to telling the community to vote for the EPRDF. Women in Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme were more supportive of the EPRDF than the men, citing their championing of women's economic rights.

The production and dissemination of donor/NGO ideologies

Donor and NGO repertoires have focused on promoting pro-poor policies and governance, recently being more active with central government in Addis Ababa than in local communities, though there are plans for this to change. Consequently such donor and NGO ideologies which have reached the communities have mostly done so through intermediaries. For example, ideas of what democracy entails owe a debt to donor formulations.

Donors have been promoting the poverty reduction policy process, and linkages to MDG issues, putting pressure for achieving quotas which sometimes seem unrealistic, and can reinforce the campaign approach in sectoral initiatives in health, education, water and sanitation, environmental rehabilitation. Governance issues have related to questions of transparency, accountability and empowerment. Though a concern about civil society is expressed donors have tended to view support to government as the legitimate and only practical approach to development and NGO ideologies have moved away from the project approach and are concerned with scaling up, replication and integration with regional government structures. NGO presence in even the drought prone sites seems to have been reduced, with less involvement in Dinki and only limited and dwindling support to a small irrigation cooperative in Korodegaga.

Other current influences on local ideas

While Government, donors, NGOs and religious leaders act intentionally to affect the preferences of community inhabitants people also have access to a more diffuse set of influences, including membership in wider 'imagined communities', networks of relations and interactions beyond the community in other rural areas and

towns, local political parties, diasporas and the media, particularly radio.

Local and ideological ideas related to the ideas field of action

'Traditional' local repertoires

Wise and experienced elders should guide the community as to the values they should follow, the knowledge that they need, and the beliefs which are correct in each of the fields of action.

Modern local repertoires

Those who are successful in business and people with education, and model farmers who apply modern inputs are the ones who should be listened to. People should be open to new ideas from outside the community and even outside the country.

Religious repertoires

The values, knowledge, advice and instructions of religious leaders whose role is validated nationally and/or internationally should be strictly followed since they know what God's will is. Failure to conform is or will be punished.

Government modernisation repertoire

Government has regarded the free movement of ideas as a threat to its political control and used various means to prevent it.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

Donors think that 'information' has the potential to increase market and political efficiency.

4.7. Embodied agency and degrees of power

In this section we discuss the sources of differences in embodied personal agency and degrees of power. This is a preliminary discussion to set out the ideas, as we have not yet had time to make use of the relevant data made at personal level.

Embodied agency

Choice and its exercise are related to embodied personal agency as well as to structures of opportunity and constraint. Current embodied agency, composed of habitus, in/competence, and psychological resources, is a result of past interactions between personal agents and opportunity and constraint structures. The roles and statuses a person has occupied in the past strongly influence current personal agency profiles. Gender and age are important variables. The habituses of older men and women were laid down through interactions which took place in Imperial times, while people aged between about 35 and 20 have been influenced by local instantiations of Derg ways of doing things. Those under 20, over half the population in each of the sites, have grown up in the EPRDF regime.

Gendered differences in personal agency profiles

Personal agency profiles are laid down in childhood; as babies grow towards adulthood they develop physically and mentally and learn appropriate skills more or less well, they incorporate family values, norms, beliefs and 'ways of doing things', and they develop psychological resources and liabilities. Adult competence, habitus and psychological resources, including the ability to make and pursue choices, is profoundly influenced by childhood experiences. These are particularly affected by gender, household wealth, and the social origin status to which the household belongs.

There are key problems and challenges related to different moments in the progress from baby to adult. Infants, knee children and roaming children are in process of developing the foundations of their future in/competence, psychological resources and cultural habitus. Nutrition, health and the learning of practical skills are important for in/competence. Psychological resources and liabilities are developed in different development stages. Infancy is a period of learning to trust - or not. Knee children or toddlers are learning to be autonomous and able to make choices and decisions - or not. Roaming children are developing initiatives in physical and mental activity - or not. These children are also learning local ways of doing things and incorporating values and beliefs.

The gender of a child is relevant from the beginning. If a boy is born there are celebrations: the father may 'kill a

sheep' and the attending women will announce the birth with more ululations than for a girl. Some women admitted to better feeding and caring of sons. Small boys are encouraged to hit out with sticks; the girls to be submissive and obedient. Once they reach the age of six or so children of both sexes are expected to make useful contributions to the household economy. Until they reach adolescence they are in a phase of psychological development in which they 'become industrious through learning and practising skills'. While most of the work skills they are learning are gendered, small girls may herd and small boys may fetch water. As they grow older their work and play activities are increasingly gender specific. As we have seen increasing numbers of girls are now attending primary schools, although we do not have evidence about the ways in which school cultures approach gender differences. Adolescence is a period for establishing a gendered personal identity and young adulthood for developing intimacy in close physical and emotional relations. Mature adults have a role in mentoring the young, while the psychological task for old people is 'life integration': making sense of the life that is coming to an end.

The 'normal' progress of people through these stages is threatened by illness and disabilities, cultural restrictions and demands, parental deaths, inadequate parenting, problematic family relationships and inadequate material resources. Poverty can cause problems at every stage. The under-6s are threatened with malnutrition, poor clothing, leaking roofs, lack of health services, parents with little time for childcare, and having to work. In addition children aged 6-12 may be contracted to other households as herders or servants, be over-worked at home, or be unable to attend school because of the costs. Adolescents in poor households have to face the problem of being identified as 'poor' while very young adult males will have to find employment while poor girls find it hard to get married. Poor adults live from hand to mouth while poor elderly adults may sink into destitution. Along the way uncounted numbers die.

Differences in social origin status related to different cultural habituses can also lead to differences in personal agency profiles. For example Argobba females confined to the homestead do not have the competence of the Amhara who work on the farm and go to market.

Degrees of personal power

The exercise of personal power by a person in any situation or episode depends on an interaction between his personal agency profile and the personal structures of opportunity and constraint which he faces. These are constituted by his role(s), relevant formal rules and/or informal norms, the structure of relationships with other people who also occupy roles, access to relevant material resources, and relevant ideas. The three direct measures of 'degrees of empowerment' in the empowerment framework are relevant here. Does a choice exist? Is the person capable of making the choice? Once made is the choice achieved?

The structures of opportunity and constraint (roles, institutions, relationships, material resources, ideas) may be such that a person is not offered a choice. In the field of community governance this is the case for women and poor men who have no roles in decision-making at this level. In the livelihood field this is the case for many of the landless and young people with secondary education. In the field of human production in the past this was the case for all women and it still is for some. In the field of ideas opportunities are growing while at the same time ideological leaders are trying to impose constraints.

The personal agency profile of a person may be such that, even though the opportunity is there, s/he cannot make the choice due to incompetence, habitus or preferences, or psychological inability. It is hard to think of examples in the livelihood field where opportunities are energetically seized. In the field of human production the refusal by women to take up government-provided opportunities to use contraception has some connection with habitus but also to relationships with dominating husbands.

Personal power is only exercised if the opportunity is there, the choice is made, and the ensuing inter-actions result in its achievement. This depends on the actions of other people; for example competition for the same opportunity produces losers and winners. When gangs of young men from two villages in Korodegaga both tried to seize the opportunity of loading vegetables on to the lorries there was a fight which was won by one group.

The social category with the lowest personal power in the communities is 'the poor', who are a mix of males and females and people of all ages. Structures provide more constraints than opportunities for most poor people and many approach them with problematic personal agency profiles produced through lifetime experiences which may include incompetence related to illness, disability or old age, a habitus developed in a childhood of poverty, and/or psychological liabilities which for example may be that the person has 'become defeated'. Poor people with good personal agency profiles can make choices, but may not have the opportunity to pursue them, or even if they have may not achieve the final goal. While females and young men on average have less personal power

than males and older men, those who are not poor have more personal power than poor people. Empowerment strategies which would benefit females and young men may not reach those who are poor without special design for them. The category of 'the poor' is not homogenous; different kinds of poor people need different empowerment strategies .

4.8. Community facilitative power

Gendered hierarchies within households and the community, and wealth hierarchies of households, are key mechanisms in the production and reproduction of community facilitative power which depends on the material contexts, social relationships, roles, institutions and ideas involved in each of the four fields of action, and on the ways in which the fields interact. In this section we first consider features of community facilitative power which are common to all communities, and we then consider some differences across different types of community.

Households and kin networks form the core of the livelihood, human re/production, and social protection fields which provide most of the security people achieve, apart from the donor/NGO/government food aid provision in drought-prone sites. The majority of Ethiopians are involved in such 'informal security regimes' with more or less government contribution. The main causes of insecurity in these regimes are scarce collective resources, life processes, local competition for scarce resources and structured inequality. The main solutions are kin-based social exchanges and 'opportunity-hoarding' on the basis of claims to superior social identity, and patchy government services, although the 'welfare mix' involves a potentially larger set of players and institutions some of which are international. Such regimes can be found across the rural and small-town areas of the four 'established' regions: Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and SNNP, in parts of the four 'emergent' regions of Afar, Somali, Gambella and Beneshangul Gumuz, and in the informal sectors of larger towns. They vary in ethnic and religious composition and the extent to which they are connected to government.

Farming is the key activity in all sites and there are no local signs of the 'industrialisation' which the agricultural-development strategy was designed to underpin. No outside opportunities have been provided and local habituses in which farming is the only desirable and respectable occupation apart from government employment mean that there those with entrepreneurial 'animal spirits' do not have the inclination or the competence to invest in small-enterprise production rather than services. In recent years government penetration of these communities has increased and there are signs of development achievements. However, communities resist changes that threaten the local community governance structures as these are vital to the survival and reproduction of the informal security regimes without which the inhabitants would not survive.

The communities host at least five types of competing cultural repertoire each with a logically compatible set of values, goals and beliefs (ideas). 'Traditional' community repertoires adhered to mainly by older people are being challenged by 'modern' community repertoires introduced by rich merchants, educated adults and youth, and the infiltration of global cultures. Three ideological repertoires are being actively promulgated within the communities each with the intent of changing the preferences of inhabitants. Increasingly fundamentalist religious repertoires strive to change or reinforce religious values and related practices. The government repertoire is used to try to get inhabitants to conform to practices based on hierarchical socialism while donor and NGO repertoires have introduced some liberal and egalitarian ideas. People draw on these repertoires in ways that are unsystematic and seemingly contradictory.

There are differences in the collective facilitative power of different types of community. Community facilitative power is greater in the communities which produce a crop surplus and are more integrated into markets and services. Communities with a mix of ethnic groups and religions can observe different ways of doing things but they also waste energy and time competing in a variety of ways. In the homogenous communities everyone can potentially be mobilised to work together for the whole community. However, it is more difficult to be a nonconformist especially at a time when religious leaders are more powerful than they have been. In the homogenous sites such leaders are not using their power in ways which are particularly conducive to development goals.

5. Power and Personal Agency in the Communities: a Longer View

The 'snapshot' of the communities taken between 2003 and 2005 shows the strength of structures in each field of action whose main functions are to reproduce rather than develop the community collective. In this section we take a rapid longer-term look at where these communities have come from and consider possible future trajectories. We briefly consider stability and change in structures and agency since the late Imperial era (1960s) in the four fields of action, overall stability and change in community facilitative power, and factors of significance for future community trajectories.

5.1. Stability and change in structures and agency since the late Imperial era

Livelihoods

The land reforms after 1975 and more recent distributions were said to have done away with differences in power and wealth based on class and ethnicities. However, wealth and occupational distinctions with their status connotations have persisted to some extent. In Dinki there are no longer wealthy Amhara landlords, but the Amhara continue to have somewhat higher averages of land and livestock holdings than the Argobba. Craftwork, notably weaving and trade are culturally viewed as Argobba occupations, and although there are no longer rigid distinctions, this cultural pattern persists to some extent. In Turufe the migrants from the North no longer retain control of power and land, though some have remained wealthy and are involved in trade, and some migrants from the south are involved in craftwork and continue to be looked down on. In Yetmen families of former slaves are still identified though craftworkers can sometimes do well by combining craftwork with agriculture. In Korodegaga there are no longer any of the absentee landlords who used to control large tracts of land. Another legacy of these times are diverse ethnically-based memories of superior status (Amhara and to a lesser extent Tigrayan) and inferior status (Oromo, Argobba and ethnic groups in the Southern Region) and power relations riddled with domination, exploitation and exclusion.

Farming technologies have moved on to the extent that the modern inputs of improved seeds, fertilisers and pesticides are increasingly used, while the use of small motorised irrigation pumps is spreading in appropriate places. However, soil is prepared using an oxplough technology that goes back centuries and there are few other signs of modernity in the rural fields. Few off-farm own-account activities are new or use new technologies exceptions being the electric grain mill and the Usuzu trucks used by the grain traders of Yetmen.

Creeping land reform has increased the security of tenure of landholders and relaxation in the law with regard to land leasing has commodified the share-cropping 'market' to an extent. The PASDEP (Ethiopia's second PRSP) goal of commercialisation of agriculture could produce revolutionary change in the livelihoods of the farmers of Korodegaga should the site be included in a large commercial irrigation scheme using the Awash. PASDEP also proposes the promotion of much more rapid non-farm private sector growth, though it is not clear that this will focus on small/medium enterprises and local economic development that would raise the general living standards of people in these communities.

Human re/production

There have recently been changes for some women in the fields of human production and reproduction. In Imperial times contraception was not on offer and people accepted the number of children which God provided. Government has been advocating and providing contraception for many years and now people in the integrated sites and some young people in all sites are in favour of smaller numbers of children, but there are others who still believe that God decides how many children one will have. We did not hear of objections to contraception from the Orthodox Christian religion but it was reported from Turufe Kecheme that Muslims were not meant to use it. Men are more likely to want more children than women, particularly if they are concerned about access to labour over the years of their farming life.

There has been little change in the lack of respect in local cultures for the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth and the post-partum period and this is matched by relative neglect in government provision of maternal and infant health services. Parents still train their children into gendered habituses emphasising the need for males to learn aggression and females submission. However, there are reports that the severity of the violence involved in disciplining children is much less than it was in the 1960s; in Korodegaga it was reported that towards the end of the 1990s children (probably older) started to 'refuse to be beaten'. There is a concern among parents that, if family discipline breaks down, so will the household economy. Young children are still often cared for by other children

While religious education is losing popularity among Orthodox Christians it is becoming increasingly popular for Muslims. It has been brought into the communities by teachers reportedly trained in Nazareth using resources contributed by Saudi Arabian Muslims, who also contributed funds for the building of three mosques in Korodegaga. There is growing enthusiasm for formal education in all sites, although there are also opponents, particularly in Dinki.

During Imperial times women and girls worked long hours doing domestic and other work and this is still the case. Women and girls work very long hours.

Community governance

It was argued above that local people resist external attempts to change local community kin-related governance structures which for many years have provided them with what personal and collective security they manage to achieve. This is not because they are committed to customary practices and their 'trust and interest in formal market and state institutions remains low'; they engage with the 'formal' market institutions to which they have access and would probably prefer that they were more formal in the sense of being policed to prevent cheating. The 2005 elections were a source of huge interest in all sites although subsequent events did reduce trust in state institutions. Also people are increasingly organising internally to develop new (civil society) institutions and organisations to reduce insecurity with constitutions and rules. While these are not 'formal' in the way the word is usually used in development discourses, they do have elements of formality about them.

In terms of changes in government governance structures the involvement of the younger educated generation seen as spearheading change and countering the control of resources and power by reactionaries from the ancient regime were important features of discourse and the representation of society instituted by the Derg and continued during the EPRDF with reference to those who came to power during the Derg as 'Derg Bureaucrat' and 'Feudal Remnants' in a bid to dispossess them in land redistributions and empower the landless youth. During the Derg this ageist societal analysis went along with a denigration of cultural repertoires associated with tradition and religion, and though the EPRDF has highlighted ethnic federalism as a key statal organising principle, leading to a celebration of culture and revival of traditional institutions, and given Islam more prominence, until recently the youth were seen as the vanguard of their constituency.

Pro-poor policies came in with the Derg land redistributions and in the wake of the 1985 famine in the targeting of food aid and food for work programmes, which has continued in periods of recent hardships with the food security programme and with the institution of safety nets. Labour mobilisation under the state became a feature of the Derg development approach which was boosted by the use of food aid for environmental rehabilitation. The imposition of some mandatory collective labour continues. The campaign approach to development where energies and resources are focussed on achieving targets and diverted from ongoing programmes became a feature of the Derg approach starting with the student campaigns to the rural areas, and involving villagisation, cooperativisation, resettlement and conscription. In the EPRDF period campaigns have been less drastic though organisation of resettlement, conscription, and specific policies such as water harvesting have been carried out on a campaign basis.

Current government repertoires are based on rhetorics of ethnic decentralisation, agricultural-led Development Industrialisation and in response to donor ideologies the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy followed recently by the Plan for Accelerated Sustainable Development to end Poverty, seeking to promote pro-poor sustainable development. Decentralisation based on ethnic states has allowed for a measure of autonomy to local states, though federal control of budgets continues and it remains to be seen whether the trend of donor conditionality of channelling direct budgetary support to the regions will lead to a change in the balance of power between the Federal and Regional structures. Despite decentralisation state penetration and lines of power through the EPRDF party now go down to a lower level than ever before with the establishment of sub-kebele structures, allowing for greater coordination and control. Pro-poor policies have been hampered by high population growth, drought, constraints on the agricultural sector and limited linkages with other sectors. In terms of food security the recent strategy has focussed on food-based safety nets with employment generation schemes and resettlement. The government has recently invested in promoting education which has expanded considerably in recent years with forced contributions of labour and cash from community members.

Cultural re/production and dissemination

During Imperial times the ethnic status hierarchy was strong with the Amhara at the apex. The Orthodox Church was associated with the ruling class, and other religions were looked down on. Power was associated with gender and age with elders requiring subservient behaviour from women and children. For example in Yetmen children were expected to wash the feet of adult visitors and then drink the water.

The socialist ideology promoted by the *Derg* had a strong impact in constituting a cultural repertoire of value to women, younger people and poor people, and a praxis of collective labour and campaigns under state management. Despite notable changes during the EPRDF period much of this legacy remains. The principle of girl's education is accepted though gender differences in education still persist. Women rights to property are asserted, and female-headed households are a minority feature of the societies though widows and divorcees are among the poorest and need to rely on male agricultural labour. Women's associations exist and representation of women in *kebele* committees has been instituted though women's associations remain weak and women's representation is limited and often tokenism without real power. Campaigns against cultural practices defined as harmful to women such as FGM²⁹, early marriage, and abduction continue, and are having some effect in reducing these practices.

Gendered agency and relationships

In terms of gendered 'power over' there is an ongoing process of change which began during the *Derg* era and has continued since 1991. The power of patriarchal men over women and younger men and within the community more generally has been reducing, although there are still institutionalised elements of exclusion, exploitation, domination and violation to be found in these relationships. Parents are able to exert considerable power over working/learning children (roughly 6 to adolescence), particularly the girls.

Relationships based on household wealth

In the 1960s there were wealthy landlords who no longer exist and tenants of different wealths. During the *Derg kebele* leaders and those who joined the Producer Co-operatives had opportunities for greater wealth in the community. Today there are big differences in productive and reproductive wealth in all communities with signs of increasing inequality and 'class formation' as the numbers of landless people increase. Richer households who employ servants are in a powerful position in relation to their employees as if they refuse to honour the contracts the servants often have no redress. Richer households who sharecrop land in are also powerful compared with the poor landholders who are often elderly or women heading households.

Relationships based on ethnicity

The ethnic hierarchy of imperial times has been challenged ideologically and through the ethnic federal structure. However, historic experiences of exploitation, exclusion, domination and violation are part of individual and collective memories, while it is always difficult for a group that was once superior to view others as equals and to give up aspirations for a return to the old status quo. Pressure on land and the paucity of other economic opportunities apart from those associated with office in the *kebele* has contributed to the local politicisation of ethnicity in Dinki and Turufe Kecheme.

Relationships based on religion

While there is a correlation between ethnicity and religion it is not a perfect one and in many rural Ethiopian communities Orthodox Christians and Muslims have lived together tolerantly for many years. However, just as there is a potential for feelings of injustice related to historical ethnic relations the same is true for historical relations between different religious groups. During Imperial times the status of Muslims was low compared with the Orthodox Christians.

5.2. Stability and changes in community facilitative power

Here we highlight a few key issues from each of the sites.

Dinki (Amhara, remote, mixed)

People in and around Dinki suffered hugely during the 1984/5 famine. Many people died and the loss of accumulated wealth in livestock and household assets meant that community facilitative power was very low. NGOs came to the area as a result of the famine introducing irrigation using channels and providing food aid. Most people in the community are unable to grow enough food on rainfed land and many survive by weaving and regular food aid in the form of food for work. Malaria is a constant problem. Recent increases in opportunities to market irrigated vegetables and fruit have led to growing wealth for a proportion of households. There are a few landowners who live in the local town and employ labourers to work on their land in Dinki. The community contains a mix of Amhara (mostly Orthodox Christians) and Argobba (Muslims) being at the meeting point of larger areas where these groups live. There are tensions arising from religious differences but the groups share a range of customary beliefs. Both groups are also at risk of attacks from neighbouring Afar

²⁹ Female Genital Mutilation

groups. While people in the community are becoming increasingly integrated into local markets they are behind the other communities in terms of government service provision and take-up, including education but particularly health services.

Korodegaga (Oromia, remote, homogenous)

Many people in Korodegaga also died during the 1984/5 famine and in subsequent periods of drought (1994/5, 2002) numbers of deaths related to lack of food occurred. It is not possible to produce enough food for a year on rainfed farms and people rely on livestock, firewood sales and food for work to fill the gap. Malaria causes deaths and loss of working time. The site is surrounded by two rivers offering the possibility of irrigation using water pumps. During the 1960s the landlord used irrigated land near the river to grow oranges; the irrigation was provided by tenants carrying the water in buckets. In the later 1980s the Producers' Co-operative received assistance from UNICEF in the form of a water pump; the irrigated farm provided daily labour for some of those who were not members of the PC. When this waterpump failed a larger scheme was negotiated and installed but it had been badly designed and did not work. From the early 1990s the community had no access to motorised irrigation until the arrival in 2001 of the NGO Self-Help who, in collaboration with the *kebele*, organised a co-operative of 130 members with half a hectare of irrigated land each. This worked well for five years providing farmers with good incomes, but in 2006 the NGO withdrew from the site and there were concerns that without the mechanical back-up and the credit to buy inputs the scheme would decline. However, there was hope that a government scheme with two large new pumps which were installed in 2006 would replace the old scheme and provide opportunities for more farmers. In May 2007 the scheme was still not operative although channels had been dug through food-for-work and there were worries about its sustainability.

Turufe Kecheme (Oromia, integrated, mixed)

People in Turufe Kecheme also suffered during the 1984/5 famine but since then have had no serious production problems resulting from lack of rain. The community sells cash-crops to traders to be marketed in Addis Ababa and people are increasingly taking opportunities for off-farm work in the nearby town of Shashemene. Respondents regularly said that the community was not so well off as it had been. Ethnic federalism accompanied by decentralisation has exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions. The provision of government services and utilities for some has increased facilitative power. Educated youth are pursuing opportunities in Shashemene and Addis Ababa.

Yetmen (Amhara, integrated, homogenous)

Farmers in Yetmen have also gained income from cash-crop farming and have no serious production problems resulting from the weather. Land pressure and lack of opportunities for educated youth are key issues since migration is not an established practice. Yetmen town has government-provided utilities.

5.3. Factors of significance for future community trajectories

There are a number of continuities in the stories of these four communities, chief of which is that there have been no changes in the structures of the local economies since their reconstruction after the fall of the Derg which look likely to set them off on new trajectories. The irrigation in Dinki has made a few households richer but there seem no plans to extend it. In Korodegaga no sustainable way of organising the irrigation has yet emerged. The cash-crop sites are not doing anything new but merely reproducing the economy each year. This economic reproduction parallels the reproduction of the informal security regimes described above.

However, it is possible to identify a number of 'drivers of change', chief of which are: unsolvable population pressure on land; education and the penetration of global cultures; emerging organisation from within communities; government activities; and ethnic and religious tensions:

- Existing land shortages combined with the large youth population will push many of them out of these communities into existing large towns unless new opportunities are brought into the vicinity
- An increasingly educated population with access to global cultures will not respond well to overly-authoritarian governance structures
- If these homegrown organisations are allowed and encouraged a local civil society might promote the development agenda
- Government activities supported by donors are promoting human development and providing social protection in the drought-prone sites; the longer-term consequences of this are unclear
- There are great dangers in the current politicisation of ethnicity (see Somalia) and religion (see the Sudan) which cannot be ignored by development actors.

6. Lessons for Development

We conclude the paper by drawing some conclusions for three sets of people with an interest in development. The conclusions for policy makers are particularly relevant to Ethiopia, although there are elements of which should be of interest for policy in other rural contexts, particularly in other parts of Africa. The

6.1. Conclusions for development policy makers

Local community power structures act as filters to all planned interventions which should be designed with this in mind. Interventions inject new resources, ideas, institutions and relationships with the potential to empower some and disempower others. It is very difficult to reach 'the poor' who are not a group but a category of power-weak but diverse kinds of people. While empowerment interventions are usually aimed at improving personal agency profiles, sometimes through supporting collective action, there is scope for considering interventions to empower communities by assisting them to break out of 'low-level equilibria traps'. There are potential lessons from other countries experimenting with Local Economic Development (LED).

Empowerment interventions to increase the personal power of disadvantaged categories may be designed to change structures of opportunity and constraint, to change ideas, or to improve personal agency profiles. In relation to structures ways of introducing new livelihood opportunities to people based in rural communities, especially the young and landless, need to be explored at local, regional and national levels. Land shortages have led to the rise of a class of young men who are either landless or have very small plots from their parents, and, while increasing numbers are becoming educated, there are few local off-farm opportunities and little urban migration. To improve local livelihood opportunity structures for young men and women a *Youth Enterprise /Employment Policy* should be included in *wereda* and regional 'Local Economic Development' plans for small towns.

The MDG goal of reduction of maternal mortality needs to be treated with the same seriousness as the primary education goal. Improved utilities and infrastructure empower women, as does micro-credit linked with new breeds and training for cash-producing farming activities which fit well with other time demands.

Government policy makers and donor policy advisers working with different governance models should discuss this openly. They should both recognise the value of local community governance models to rural residents and find out more about how they work with a view to encouraging bottom-up changes. Local community and government governance structures could work more efficiently together. Development policy makers should be aware of the potential for politics at country, regional and local levels to undermine or support development activities. There is a battle of ideas going on in rural communities which needs to be understood and monitored.

There is scope to improve and increase empowerment interventions aimed at improving the personal agency profiles of people who are disadvantaged as a result of their gender and/or age. Childhood is a time of great importance; this is the time when the in/competences, habituses and autonomy which underpin choices and achievements in adult life are developed. Interventions to invest in children are important both for a view of development as a long-term process and a view of development as wellbeing improvement.

Considering in/competence few children get nutritionally-balanced diets, while those in drought situations and in poor households often starve for shorter or longer periods. Most start farm or domestic work at around the age of six, as they are taught the skills important for farming and domesticity while making increasingly important contributions to the household economy. Children from poor families may be hired out as servants from very young ages. An increasing proportion of children go to school with most mixing work and schooling.

Children learn habitus norms, values and ways of doing things in family contexts. Children in rural areas grow up in households organised on the basis of gendered hierarchies in which domination and violence by 'superiors' to 'inferiors' is common, although less severe than it was in the past. Boys are encouraged to be aggressive, which is linked with the idea of family protection against enemies, while girls are taught to be quiet and submissive, linked with the idea of them becoming homemakers. During education children learn new ways of thinking, although gendered hierarchies and violence are also found in schools.

Government investment in the education of these adult 'personal agents' of the future has expanded in all sites in the last few years, and been met with enthusiasm by many parents and young people. Barriers to the attendance of poor children include costs and the household need for their labour. Attempts to abolish the shift system caused problems for children who had to travel far, and for those whose work was vital to the household.

Absenteeism was related to clashes between school calendars and seasonal or market day work demands. Poor children would benefit from 'informal education' initiatives while calendars to suit local conditions and provide more flexibility during peak agricultural periods would reduce absenteeism and dropout rates.

Policy action to improve personal agency profiles requires a *Child Policy* covering nutrition and health, child work including child 'trafficking', the timing, structure, content and quality of education, child protection from violence and abuse, and attention to gendered child-rearing practices. Poor children need special assistance which could be provided were the NGO sector to expand.

A choice of four livelihood goals was mentioned by richer young men approaching adulthood in the integrated sites: farming, larger-scale trading, government employment and international migration, with America the favoured destination. By comparison manual work is of low status, with the historic stigma attached to 'craftworkers' such as blacksmiths, potters, tanners, and to a lesser extent weavers, carried into the field of 'industry'. Many poor boys start life as agricultural servants/herders. The main livelihood goals for richer young women were marriage requiring domestic skills, government employment requiring education, and international migration for domestic work. Low status activities for which poor girls are prepared include dungcake and firewood selling and the making and selling of local alcoholic drinks. There is a need to raise the status of industrial work.

There is considerable evidence of personal autonomy, or the ability to make and pursue choices, among both males and females, particularly evident in the way in which many adolescents and young adults of both genders in three of the sites are now working for cash to enable them to go to school, many starting Grade 1 at relatively late ages. A number of adult respondents said they would appreciate a literacy programme.

The current government has been committed to empowering women since its inception and policies for women have made some impact on women's rights to land, and provided a space for discussions of 'harmful traditional practices' which are the first step in their reduction. Women in the integrated sites increasingly practice family planning and young people in the remote sites expressed support for it. Government policies in this area are gradually bearing fruit but the pressure must be maintained. Until recently there has been little development activity aimed at women in the sites; an NGO savings and credit scheme associated with access to hybrid hens in Korodegaga provided a small group of women with income from eggs and hens and improved diets for their families. In two sites towards the end of the research women's groups were beginning to access Government credit. Schemes should be designed which fit in with the other demands on women's time. There was little evidence in the sites of government or NGO activities in pursuit of the MDG to reduce maternal mortality. Government and donor action in the area of women's reproductive health in these sites was limited to contraception. Women's needs during the pregnancy-birth-infancy cycle are largely ignored inside local communities, by government, and by donors. Maternal ill/health affects the personal agency of the next generation as well as reducing the mother's personal agency. Women's policies should be three-pronged: to support mothers, to improve gender relations, to support economic development.

Customarily old people were respected and feared as a result of their ability to bless and curse. Their cultural and political power began to decline during the Derg and currently only wealthy or elite old men have retained respect. Some young people insult the old for their out-of-date ideas. In the remote communities the institutions and relationships in kin-based informal security regimes theoretically provide support for old people no longer able to work and for those without relatives material resources and care should be provided by neighbours other community members. We do not have information on how well these mechanisms work in practice. These mechanisms are also found in the more integrated communities, but they do not cover everyone. Old people with no relatives and immigrant old people are at risk of sliding into destitution and relying on begging to stay alive. The disempowerment of old people should be recognised and a *Policy for the Aged* considered; this is another area where expansion of the NGO sector could contribute.

The most extreme form of disempowerment is death but not much is known about its incidence in rural communities except that it is frequent. In mid-2004 in 12% of households across the communities someone had died in the previous year; five people from one household died. Consideration should be given to the introduction of local registers of births and deaths.

6.2. Conclusions for development policy thinkers

No development intervention is a-political and this is particularly true of empowerment interventions. Power is not an individual attribute but a quality of relationships; improving the 'power to' of individuals or categories of person impinges on the 'power to' of others. For example, the move to increase education for girls in Ethiopia in order to empower them had consequences for other members of local communities including forced demands for contributions from rich and poor of labour and cash to build extra classrooms and pay extra teachers, and increased workloads for mothers due to the loss of daughters' labour time.

There are other theoretical issues which need to be taken into account. Empowerment in the context of controlling power relations (exploitation, exclusion, domination, violation) requires the disempowerment of dominant parties which is politically complex and sensitive. The empowering of collectivities (power with) can enable them to use it in competition or conflict with other collectivities (power against).

The empowering of communities through improving techniques of production and discipline requires institutional designs which can connect efficiently with existing institutions, rather than trying to impose external and alien priorities. In this connection the discourse distinctions between 'formal' and 'informal' and 'modern' and 'traditional' or 'customary', both associated with the idea that development can only occur through the 'formal' and the 'modern', are not helpful in contexts where formal markets are 'missing' (although real markets are not), where the state is still in the process of being 'built' and local grass-root organisations are not allowed to qualify as 'civil society'.

It is not easy to change structures of opportunity and constraint since norms and ideas are embodied in social actors; the changing of rules or techno-material contexts will not be effective without matching changes in norms and ideas contradictory to the proposed change. For example, the prime obligations that people owe to others are to kin and involve social exchanges over long periods of time. When new resources are introduced to a community the moral obligation to reciprocate past assistance or to care for weaker kin members may override rules forbidding 'corruption'.

Despite these caveats the empowerment agenda is potentially very important for disadvantaged power-weak people in informal security regimes³⁰ in rural areas in poor countries such as Ethiopia, particularly children, poor other people, and other females. However, it needs to be employed with sensitivity and recognition of potential pitfalls in the way it is justified. The empowerment discourse suggests people may be empowered by improvements to embodied competence and access to resources (agency), by changes in institutions (rules and norms), or by changes in the way the two interact. The goal is ostensibly to ensure that choices are achieved. However, if institutions are changed through interventions but people's preferences or habituses have not changed, then the goal is not to ensure that choices are achieved but to change the choices. This should be acknowledged. For example, female circumcision is widely supported by males and females throughout rural Ethiopia; uncircumcised girls/women (depending on cultural context) bring shame on their families, cannot get married, and cannot be buried in churchyards. The government has banned the practice but people are making the choice, exercising their personal power, to take the risk of behaving illegally. In this situation neither government nor donors like the choice.

In considering interventions to empower through improving personal agency profiles there is a need to address together the three constituents: habitus or preferences; in/competences; and autonomy/heteronomy as a psychological resource/liability. For example, if young people are formally educated (competent) and potentially autonomous but lack an entrepreneurial habitus in the context of few job opportunities their personal power in the livelihood field will not be increased.

6.3. Conclusions for development researchers

In the academic field development-related research takes place largely within development economics, 'development studies', 'area studies', geography, social anthropology, and in small pockets in the disciplines of political science, sociology and increasingly psychology. Most empirical research that informs policy, particularly country policies, is produced by economists and dependent on survey data gathered from household

³⁰ In this paper we have not addressed the problems of trying to empower people in the insecurity regimes to be found in the pastoral peripheries of Ethiopia.

heads, enterprise owners, and service providers. Participatory research used as a form of 'market research' has also been used to inform policy.

The development economics 'paradigm', now institutionalised as best practice for data collection in poor countries, produces very valuable information for the description and analysis of livelihoods and human resources, markets and economic growth, household poverty and larger macroeconomic issues. However, it does not meet the growing demand for information, analyses, explanations and policies relating to issues which are increasingly seen as relevant to development, such as intra-country conflict, state-building and national governance, community-level governance, social protection and, at the individual level, personal wellbeing including personal security, empowerment and subjective quality of life. Its methods are also ill-adapted to addressing important sensitive issues, such as sexuality, HIV/AIDS, drug abuse, and illegal or banned activities, which require developing trust and more time with respondents. Also the survey approach has difficulties in assessing activities of mobile or migrating populations, and the poorest who may not live in households or have residences that can be sampled may fall through the net. Also people's strategies and decisions have to be inferred from the outcomes.

Development researchers in disciplines and fields other than economics have research perspectives and skills with much to contribute to improved understandings of issues which have recently made it on to the development agenda. For example, if, as Stern *et al* (2005) argue, development for poor countries by definition involves endogenous and/or engineered changes in preferences, there is a need for research into the diverse local cultures which constitute the 'nation'. And if, as they also argue, changes in the investment climate and empowerment are 'inherently political' and extreme political and economic differences can generate violent conflict, there is a need for country-level research into the dynamics of power at national and lower levels, and the linkages and networks between levels.

Research into culture and power requires knowledge about 'qualities' as well as 'quantities' and is best conducted using theoretically-sophisticated conceptual frameworks in conjunction with mixed methods; a Q-Integrated (Bevan, 2005) rather than a Q-Squared (Kanbur, 2003) approach. Advances in computer technology mean that 'qualitative data' about community, household and individual 'cases' can be easily entered, stored and organised to allow for rapid comparative multi-level qualitative and quantitative analyses of small-N and large-N cases, where the connection between the statistics and the cases is not lost as it is in variable-based research.

The 'poverty traps' which are of growing interest to economists (Bowles *et al*, 2006) are constructed and reconstructed in community-level social systems by people who pursue goals according to their culturally-learned values and beliefs and follow established practices which contribute to the survival, but often also the entrenchment, of the systems. Integrated multi-method research focused on competing cultural repertoires and power dynamics raises levels of understanding about the ways in which differential 'informal' practices impact on attempts by states and civil society organisations to introduce formal markets and new technologies which would lead to more appropriately designed interventions.

A similar research approach in government bureaucracies would lead to a greater understanding of the informal dynamics which often undermine civil service reforms, public financial management, and service delivery and could assist policy makers to design interventions which realistically start from current ways of doing things and provide a clearer understanding of obstacles to change.

The WeD Ethiopia research was undertaken in exploratory mode and has produced a considerable multi-level database of quantitative and qualitative data made in four rural communities and two urban spaces. The model could be adapted for the efficient generation of panel Q-integrated data about communities purposively selected as exemplars of different livelihood systems, local cultures and cultural mixes. Data generated through such an approach could be used by local governments, as well as national government and donors concerned to map what is happening in different parts of the country. In particular it could illuminate contrasts between different types of community, for example integrated and remote villages, surplus producing and deficit food aid dependent sites, and improve understandings of differential impacts of regional policies

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Appendix 1: The WeD Ethiopia Database

The database is still under construction and not all is in the public domain. However, people with an interest in using particular protocols should approach Philippa Bevan (pbevan@mokoro.co.uk) or Alula Pankhurst (alulapankhurst@ethionet.et)

The urban database includes parallel material for two sites; one in Kolfe, Addis Ababa and the second in Shashemene. All the rural research instruments were adapted for urban use except WIDE2 and the household migration module.

1. A Resources and Needs Survey (RANS) June/July 2004.

Survey of household resources (human, material, social, political and cultural) and the extent to which individual needs (for health and education) were met. 250 households in Korodegaga, Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen. 169 (all) households in Dinki.

The RANS database can be requested from WeD at the University of Bath (e.brangan@bath.ac.uk).

2. The development and piloting of an instrument to measure individual subjective quality of life (WeD-QoL) May/June 2005.

Pilot Quality of Life instrument (31 males and 31 females of different ages and wealths in each site)
The WeD-QoL pilot data can be requested from WeD at the University of Bath

3. Protocol-guided process research at community, household and individual levels.

WIDE1³¹ was conducted in the fifteen villages included in the panel Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (6 rounds between 1994 and 2004). Contact j.hoddinott@cgiar.org.

WIDE2 was conducted in the same villages supplemented with three agricultural sites involved in new activities plus two pastoralist sites.

DEEP³² was conducted in four of the WIDE1 villages selected as exemplars of (1) Amhara and Oromo Regions (2) food-surplus and food-deficit economies (3) sites relatively integrated in national markets and state services and sites which are relatively remote (4) sites which are homogeneous in ethnic/religious composition and sites which are mixed.

In most cases households and individuals for research were purposively selected from the RANS respondents. In all cases a sample of males and females of different wealth/poverty was chosen. Males were interviewed by a male research officer and females by a female research officer.

The psychological instrument the 'WeD-QoL pilot' was mostly administered to people for which we had other information.

Community Level

WIDE1 Village Studies I 1996 www.csa.e.ox.ac.uk/evstudies/main.html
WIDE2 2003 contact Philippa Bevan or Alula Pankhurst

DEEP

Village Studies II January 2006 www.wed-ethiopia.org
Protocol data contact Philippa Bevan or Alula Pankhurst

Community Organisations
Poverty-related Event History
Poverty Dynamics
Collective action
Elites and destitutes
Young Lives1: the Cultural Construction of Children's Lives (aged roughly 3 –18)
Old Lives1: the Cultural Construction of Old People's Lives
Disputes and Resolutions
Migration
Exploratory QoL

³¹ Wellbeing and Illbeing Dynamics in Ethiopia

³² In-Depth Exploration of Ethiopian Poverty

Community Diary: September 2004 – September 2005 inclusive

Household Level

Protocol data

contact Philippa Bevan or Alula Pankhurst

Household Poverty Dynamics: change, shocks, inter-generational mobility

Migration

Household Diary Pilot

Household Diaries (12 households): October 2004 – September 2005 inclusive

The income and expenditure data from the household diaries is available in a separate database from WeD at the University of Bath.

Individual Level

Protocol data

Adult Lives: 14 men and 14 women

Old Lives2: the Personal Experience of Old People's Lives (10 old ancient men and women)

Young Lives2: the Personal Experience of Young People's Lives (16 males and 16 females between roughly 3 and 18)

Migration for work/survival (men) for marriage (women)

Appendix 2: The Evidence Base – Structures and Agency in the Livelihood Field of Action 2003-2005

A2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this Appendix is to describe status-related opportunities and constraints in the four sites between 2003 and 2005 which resulted from differences in personal and social power associated with the livelihood field of action. The statuses which determine personal agency and opportunities and constraints are genderage, relevant local categories of (embodied) social origin³³, and wealth.

In all sites own-account farming is the dominant occupation, with very few households having no involvement in farming, although as Section 3 showed there are opportunities for off-farm own-account activity and employment, these being greater in the more integrated sites. The household is the basic organisational unit, although there are also various individual opportunities and many inter-household linkages. The division of labour is genderaged. Adult males plough, plant, weed, keep wild animals away from the farm if necessary, harvest and thresh. They also burn farm waste and prepare farm implements. Boys work at herding and on the farm with their contribution increasing as they grow older. Women in most places have tasks related to soil preparation, weeding, harvesting and threshing. Girls work at herding and the female farming tasks. In Section A2.2 we focus on farming while in Section A2.3 we compare community opportunities for off-farm work for males and females in terms of own-account production and employment in and beyond the community. Section A2.4 describes credit and insurance arrangements while A2.5 compares the problems and crises associated with making a living which are faced by households and individuals in food deficit and food surplus communities. The A2.6 describes local and ideological repertoires of ideas related to livelihoods. The Appendix concludes with a discussion of community, household and personal power in the livelihood field.

A2.2 Farm production

The main farming outputs in the four sites are grain (*tef*, wheat, maize, sorghum depending on the site) and in Turufe Kecheme potatoes. Livestock play important roles in the livelihood system. Farming depends on an ox-plough technology and own-account farming requires access to two oxen, male labour to plough, plant, harvest, and thresh, and labour for weeding, and some aspects of soil preparation and harvesting, which is often done by females, except among Argobba Muslims in Dinki. In this culture ideally females do not work outside the home, although this may not be possible for poor households.

To be successful a farmer must have access to land, oxen for ploughing, farm implements and inputs, labour for the different work activities, and markets for the sale of produce. Farming competence includes knowledge, technical, management and business skills, and judgment in the context of local ecologies, and established and recently imported technologies.

Climate, Ecology and Infrastructure

There are two key dynamic aspects of livelihoods based on farming related to (1) the changing seasons which are associated with changing work activities such as ploughing, weeding, and harvesting and changing food availability, and (2) the weather and other conditions of a particular year leading to 'good years' and 'bad years'. Runs of bad years accumulate. There are questions as to whether recent changes in weather patterns might be related to climate change.

Local topologies and ecologies and road and market access make the two integrated sites suitable for cash-crop production and the proximity of main roads gives access to markets in Addis Ababa. Rivers provide a resource for irrigation in the other two sites but also contribute to their remoteness. Increasing local demand for vegetables has led to improved incomes for those with irrigated land.

Technologies of production

Livestock play important roles in the economic activity of these communities. A cattle herd generates oxen for ploughing, cows producing milk and butter, dung for manure or fuel, meat, skins and hides, and cash. Goats and

³³ These have been described in Section 3. They are: ethnicity associated with religion in Dinki and Turufe Kecheme, clan and residence status in Korodegaga, and residence status in Yetmen

sheep can be eaten or sold. Pack animals provide transport and camels can also be eaten. Bees produce honey which can be used to make the local mead *tej*. Hybrid chickens which produce quantities of eggs for sale have been recently introduced to women in Korodegaga. There was not much difference in the average number of livestock owned between the sites in 2004, despite complaints of shortage of grazing land in the integrated sites described below. Camels can only live in the environments of Korodegaga and Dinki, where they have been introduced recently from the lowlands. In Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen cattle vaccination services were reported as provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, though these were not regularly provided in the other two sites where livestock regularly succumbed to disease. Cross-bred cattle were not popular but hybrid chickens have proved successful in Korodegaga.

In all sites the land is prepared using the ox-plough; farmers also use sickles, spades, forks, machetes, and pitchforks. Fertilisers and pesticides are used by those who can afford to buy them. Some improved seeds are planted particularly on the irrigated land in Dinki and Korodegaga.

BOX A1.1: MODERN FARMING INPUTS

From Dinki:

There is a nursery supplied with water from a spring where coffee plants and fruit plant seedlings are grown for distribution

In 2004 there was a distribution of improved onion seeds for growing on irrigated land.

Fertilisers and pesticides are used, especially by cash-crop producers, though there is a shift to use of manure instead. This is both as a result of the increase in price of fertilisers and pesticides, and due to the shortening of the rainy season, as the use of fertilisers requires sufficient rainfall. Richer people also use fertilisers and pesticides for maize and sorghum production. In the past the inputs were obtained from the MoA on credit or were bought from traders. Weed killers and pesticides are now available from private shops (though few farmers own sprayers).

In Dinki the land by the river is irrigated using channelled river water (27% of households) while in Korodegaga water is pumped up from the river using diesel pumps of various sizes (51% of households). A few households in Yetmen (2%) irrigate land near a river to grow vegetables. In Turufe Kecheme a few neighbouring households recently clubbed together to put in a pipe whose water was being used to grow vegetables on homestead plots. In Dinki the irrigation is managed by the group of farmers who use it. In Korodegaga there are four different institutional approaches: a co-operative; a government project; local individual and group initiatives; and inward investment.

BOX A1.2: IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANISATION

From Korodegaga:

There were four institutional approaches to irrigation in Korodegaga in 2006: a co-operative; a government project; local private and group initiatives; and inward investment.

Degaga Irrigation Development Co-operative:

40 hectares in 2001; 139 members. Assistance from NGO 'Self-Help' which lent inputs. Self-Help withdrew from the site in 2006.

Government pumps: Regional government installed 2 large irrigation pumps in 2006 which were still not operational in May 2007.

Local farmers: buy motorised pumps individually or in small groups; in 2005 there were more than 25 people with irrigation pumps.

Inward investors: given land by *wereda* or renting from school; bring motorised pumps

Instigators of new technologies include the government, NGOs and local merchants. All expect contributions from the local people in terms of labour and/or cash.

TABLE A1.1: INVESTMENT IN PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES		
	Amhara	Oromia
Integrated Surplus	<p>Yetmen</p> <p>'Merchants have mobilised the people to contribute money for bringing electricity, telecommunication service and the like.'</p>	<p>Turufe Kecheme</p> <p><i>Electricity:</i> partly extension of government service from town and initiative by inward investor wanting to install a mill plus community which has not come to fruition</p>
Remote Deficit	<p>Dinki</p> <p>Irrigation – introduced by an NGO</p> <p>NGO-initiated nursery for coffee plants and fruit plant seedlings, taken over and run by the Ministry of Agriculture.</p>	<p>Korodegaga</p> <p><i>Irrigation co-operative:</i> NGO covered costs of motor, expertise, initial costs of fertiliser, selected seeds, insecticides and weedkiller. Local people provided labour and an initial contribution of 70 <i>birr</i>.</p> <p><i>Government irrigation:</i> government provided motors and expertise; local people labour</p> <p><i>Private investors:</i> provided pumps</p> <p><i>Local farmers:</i> bought pumps individually and in small groups</p> <p>Rafts across the Awash: Ethiopian Red Cross; Shop-owner; irrigation investors</p>

There have been disputes around the introduction of new technologies; those related to irrigation are discussed below. In Turufe Kecheme money accumulated towards the installation of a grain mill and electricity 'disappeared' in 2006 together with T's partner.

BOX A1.3: INSTALLING ELECTRICITY

From Turufe Kecheme:

In 2005 a man called T came and agreed with the community to cover half the cost of a new electric mill (25,000 *birr*) if the community paid for the other half. As part of the project, the community would get electric light. It was estimated that each household head had to contribute 250 *birr*. The construction of the mill-house began in July. Some people contributed 125 *birr* during the month of *Nehase*, when they got good income from the sale of potatoes. The other 125 *birr* would be contributed in the forthcoming harvesting time (in *Tir/Tahsas*). The committee tried to get financial support from *iddir*, in order to speed up the process. Some members agreed but others, whose houses are found near the mosque, did not. This is because they already have permission from the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPC) to get light from Kuyera Kebele 01. They complain that the objective of *iddir* is to help each other when members face a crisis, mainly death. So the committee did not get financial support from the *iddir*.

Accessing land

Since the Land Proclamation of 1975 rural land has been state-owned and allocated for use by local government. Initial allocations were based on the size of households.

BOX A1.4: LAND ALLOCATION IN THE PAST

From Turufe Kecheme:

Every household registered in the *kebele* as a member has been allotted a plot of land by the *kebele* even though the size varies. There are members who have only one or two *timad* of land while there are also a few who have up to three *timad*. This variation arose because the land allocation was based on the number of household members. Those who had a household with many members could get more land than those households whose family size was smaller because initially the land was allotted at a rate of one *timad* for each member of a household irrespective of differences in age, sex or ethnicity.

In principle every rural dweller has the right to a piece of land but, due to population growth and increasing land shortage, this right may not be met. Over the years since 1975 informal use-rights have been solidifying and in 2004/5 land measurement took place in all the sites. This was associated with changes in land taxation to introduce a graduated system; farmers were also promised land certificates. *Wereda* or *kebele* officials can

confiscate and redistribute land, for example if tax is not paid. Other reasons for loss of land in the sites included allocation of land by *wereda* officials for 'inward investment' (see Box A1.5) and political revenge evidenced in the 1997 redistribution of land in Yetmen when most of the land of former Derg 'burocrats' was distributed to young landless households.

BOX A1.5 LAND PRIVATISATION

From Korodegaga:

Almost all people believe that all lands in the *kebele* belong only to the people of Korodegaga. They said that giving their land to an outsider without their consent is an illegal act. In this case, they blame the *wereda* administration for giving about 40 hectares of irrigated land to private investors some ten years ago. They add that these lands were given to the individuals without consulting the people. They regret that if these lands had not been given to outsiders, many landless people would have got farmland, and this would have changed their life condition for the better, enabling them to produce cash crop vegetables.

In 2004 mean hectares used per household were Turufe Kecheme 0.9, Dinki 1.2, Yetmen 1.6 and Korodegaga 2.3. In Korodegaga around a third of households have access to 3 or more hectares although unless they have irrigated land they will often produce little due to poor rainfall. Access to irrigated land varied across the sites: 50.8% in Korodegaga, 26.1% in Dinki, 2.2% in Yetmen and none in Turufe Kecheme.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Mean no of hectares	1.2	2.3	0.9	1.6
	%	%	%	%
Landless	8.9	2.0	13.5	2.0
< ¼ hectare			1.2	0.4
Between ¼ and ½ has	4.1	2.4	10.8	2.8
Between ½ and 1 has	25.4	9.0	40.2	12.8
Between 1 and 2 has	43.8	28.2	29.5	50.8
Between 2 and 3 has	15.4	24.7	4.4	23.2
Between 3 and 4 has	1.8	19.6	0.4	5.6
Between 4 and 5 has	0.6	9.0		2.0
Between 5 and 6 has		3.1		0.4
6 or more has		2.0		

14% of households in Turufe Kecheme were reported as landless, compared with 9% in Dinki and 2% in both Yetmen and Korodegaga. However, the RANS sample did not include the landless young men who have been unable to set up their own households.

BOX A1.6 LANDLESS HOUSEHOLDS

From Korodegaga:

There are more than 100 landless peasants, and the number is even greater when we include here those who get only a very small (1/2 ha.) amount of land from their parents during their marriage ceremony. There are also some migrant landless households in the community. The landless earn their livelihood by renting land and share-cropping with weak farmers. They also participate in off-farm activities like daily labour and firewood selling.

From Dinki:

After the revolution, land was allocated to every tenant and to the landless according to family size. Each individual was given not less than five *timad*. Land was distributed for married people, young adults and female-headed households who did not have land in 1987, and it was given to individuals who were introduced to the village later from land which was communally owned. Since the last redistribution, nineteen years have passed, and the young people who did not get land at that time are now grown up with families and children. They have lived either as sharecroppers, received the help of their parents or they have bought land from people who are unable to pay tax, and as a result sell their land for a specific time period under a contract.

There are gendered and male-age differences in access to land

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Mean landholding	1.2	2.3	0.9	1.6
Mean male-headed landholding	1.3	2.4	0.9	1.8
Mean female-headed landholding	0.6	2.2	0.7	1.0
Mean divorced female landholding	0.3	1.8	0.4	0.7
Mean widowed female landholding	0.8	2.4	0.8	1.1

Female-headed households were considerably less likely to use irrigated land than males in Dinki 10% compared with 30%, while there was a small difference in Korodegaga 46% compared with 52%.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Mean landholding	1.2	2.3	0.9	1.6
Mean landholding males in 20s	0.9	1.4	0.7	1.1
Mean landholding males in 30s	1.1	2.1	0.8	1.6
Mean landholding males in 40s	1.5	2.9	0.8	1.7
Mean landholding males in 50s	1.2	3.0	0.9	1.9
Mean landholding males in 60s	1.0	2.9	1.0	1.6
Mean landholding males 70+	1.4	3.4	0.9	1.2

The distribution of irrigated land by age of male head was more unequal and related to age hierarchies in Korodegaga than in Dinki.

	Dinki	Korodegaga
	%	%
Males in 20s	31.6	35.4
Males in 30s	25.0	50.0
Males in 40s and 50s	35.5	67.8
Males 50 and over	33.3	53.1

There are small differences in access to land by ethnic group in the mixed sites. In Dinki while there is little difference between the mean landholding of the Amhara (1.21) hectares and that of the Argobba (1.16 hectares) 13.5% of Argobba households are landless compared with 1.7% of Amhara households. 34% of Amhara households used irrigated land compared with 20% of Argobba. In Turufe Kecheme the ‘immigrant’ Tigrayans have the largest mean landholding while Oromo and Amhara means are almost the same. Immigrants from the Southern Region on average have access to notably less land.

	Mean landholding (hectares)	Number of households
Tigrayan	1.2	24
Oromo	0.83	140
Amhara	0.82	18
Kembata	0.53	13
Wolayta	0.53	25
Hadiya	0.27	6
Gurage	0.11	14
Silted	0.0	1
Sidama	0.0	1

In Korodegaga the households whose male heads belong to the dominant and largest clan, the Sebiro, have an average land size a little larger than that of households in other clans: 2.4 hectares compared with 2.1. Only 0.8% of Sebiro households are landless compared with 3.5% from other clans while 8.4% of Sebiro have landholdings of 5 or more hectares compared with none from other clans. There is little difference between the

clans in access to irrigated land.

While there is no substantial irrigated farming in Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme around half of respondents to the WeD-QoL pilot in each site claimed in 2005 that irrigation was 'very necessary' for happiness in the community. In Yetmen 80 people attempted to start an irrigation project, but failed due to effective opposition by (older) people with cattle.

BOX A1.7 IRRIGATION FAILURE

From Yetmen:

Agriculture is mostly currently rain-fed although there is a great potential for irrigation because Yetmen is situated on a plain. Currently there is one private farm cultivating onions, tomatoes and potatoes. However, this is opposed by many people in Yetmen, as the volume of water in the rivers is decreasing. They are worried that their livestock may die due to lack of water. Other villages have irrigation and in 2003, 80 people tried to organise themselves following a directive sent by the *wereda*. They made a dam with sacks filled with clay and ploughed the land, but many older people with more cattle resisted; then *wereda* officials came and stopped the project.

People in Korodegaga were more successful. In the later 1990s farmers began to use handpumps and then clubbed together to buy diesel pumps. Conflicts over irrigable land led to a request for help from the *wereda* and in 2001 a large pump was provided by an NGO to irrigate 40 acres of land accessed by 130 people. In 2006 two large pumps were provided by government to irrigate over 150 hectares, although these were still not functioning in May 2007 when this paper was written.

BOX A1.8 IRRIGATION SUCCESS

From Korodegaga:

In the second half of the 1990s, drought and poverty forced some farmers to cultivate lands around the Awash River and to produce vegetables and maize using hand pumps. Through time, these farmers formed groups and bought smaller private pumps, thus, irrigating the communal lands following the edge of the river. As many people began to use irrigation, competition became very stiff, and conflicts become normal. Though the *kebele* officials tried to resolve some disputes by distributing communal lands to those who already started irrigation work, the vast increase of potential land seekers, (mainly the landless) aggravated the conflicts. The *kebele* officials wrote a letter to the *wereda* administration expressing the importance of expanding irrigation and the extent of conflict over land among farmers. After assessing the issues through field visits to the area, the *wereda* officials decided that those who had pumps should continue to perform their irrigation works on land they had already occupied; and the *kebele* officials had to divide the rest of the unoccupied lands among the new seekers.

Sharecropping of land is a customary institution governed by local rules which has become more important in recent years due to pressures on land and the absence of a land market. In 2004 in Yetmen and Dinki 42% of households sharecropped some land in. Until recently renting land was illegal; it is more frequent in the Oromia sites with 11% in Turufe Kecheme and 10% in Korodegaga renting land in 2004.

BOX A1.9 SHARECROPPING AND RENTING LAND

From Turufe Kecheme:

What is common in the *kebele* is renting land on the basis of a contractual agreement. A person who cannot plough his land can rent it out for 300-400 *birr* (100 *birr* in 1994) to another person for the whole year (2 harvests) or for half a year. However, it is not usual to rent land for six months because the fertiliser used during *belg* is also used for *meher*. Also, most of the people who rent land need to produce *belg* potatoes to sell for cash and then wheat at *meher* which enables them to get a lot of money. The owner has to wait until the end of the contract for payment.

From Korodegaga:

In 2005 occupying farmland through rent or share-cropping has become very common. The increasing loss of livestock (mainly oxen) is the major factor for such kinds of contract relationship. Lack of seeds in drought years and labour are also other factors that force many poorer and destitute farmers to rent out their lands to richer farmers or outside renters. Our destitute female-headed household, for example, rents two hectares of land, and gave one hectare on a share-crop basis. In rain-fed agriculture, a hectare of farmland is rented for 50-60 *birr*, but outside investors can rent irrigated lands for 600 *birr* for a hectare.

Sharecropping rainfed land: the costs of seeds and fertilisers are equally divided between the owner and the sharecropper. A farmer who has livestock or seeds can get the land from a farmer who has not and shares the harvest equally. Even a farmer who has only has seed can give it to the landowner and share the harvest equally even if he provides no other input (like labour or oxen).

Sharecropping irrigated land: the owner provides only the land, while the share-cropper provide seeds, fertiliser, weed killer, pesticides, and labour cost. When the vegetables are sold, they divide they money equally after the renter takes the cost of production.

From Dinki:

Some traders and shopkeepers living in Aliyu Amba are said to have plots of land in Dinki as well as coffee plants. Unlike agreements between farmers living in Dinki, agreements between a person who owns a farm while living in town and a farmer who provides his labour are concluded in such a way that the landowner pays half the price of the yield in cash.

The selling of land is illegal but is occasionally practised.

BOX A1.10 SELLING LAND

From Turufe Kecheme:

One cannot tell the price of an average holding of land because land sales were legally prohibited during the *Derg* and remain so. Informants maintained that nobody wants to sell land because it is their life. It is only when an individual decides to leave the area and the *kebele* that he or she secretly sells his/her allotment to another person by bribing the leaders of the *kebele*. There is no regular price for such exchange of land. There are a very few people who want to sell their land when they face a severe shortage of money. This is done secretly and there are men who even do not tell to their wife.

Conflicts over land are common. The land registration process of 2005 produced some conflicts between official landowners and people who had been renting or sharecropping their land for some time. There have been conflicts over irrigable land in Korodegaga, Dinki and Yetmen.

BOX A1.11 CONFLICTS OVER LAND

From Yetmen:

Land disputes are one of the frequent forms of disputes and they are resolved by friends, relatives and social courts. They are taken to *wereda* courts if they are very serious.

From Korodegaga:

The major types of land dispute include conflicts over 'communal' (unoccupied) lands, over borders of farm lands, over inherited lands, and over rented lands, especially when there is no clearly defined agreement regarding when the contract will be over.

The land registration process of 2005 produced some conflicts between official landowners and people who had been renting or sharecropping their land for some time.

BOX A1.12 CONFLICTS OVER RENTED LAND

From Dinki:

Some Amhara had obtained land from others by renting and sharecropping (*megazo*). When the land registration authority came, some of those using the land claimed it, but those paying the tax on the land asserted their rights. There were a few cases disputed in courts as some people tried to reclaim the land they once abandoned and which was subsequently given to other farmers. They tried to regain the land from current owners but they lost the cases in court.

Turufe Kecheme:

In 2004 there was land measurement to identify landowners. There are some owners who sold their land secretly, but at the time of measurement both the seller (original owner) and the buyer claimed ownership of the land. The cases were taken to the *kebele* court (*fird shengo*), and the *kebele* committee testified the land to be the property of the seller since they know only the original owner. However, the *kebele* officials found it difficult to solve such conflicts. In most cases they decided on the payment of compensation to the individual who bought and cultivated the land. The compensation included the price for the plants. Most of the time the owners of the land declined to pay, considering the fact that the land was bought by a farmer who is a dweller of the community, they decided to let the land stay in the hands of the buyer.

Conflicts over irrigable land in Yetmen and Korodegaga have been described above. In Korodegaga both *wereda* and *kebele* officials have been involved in deals which gave access to irrigable land to outsiders. *Wereda* officials provided land to inward investors

BOX A1.13: WEREDA OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE INWARD INVESTORS

From Korodegaga:

Investors who came from different areas rented land from poor households, school's land and so on. Now there are five investors in the area who produce tomatoes, onion, papaya, banana, and maize in bulk for sale in towns such as Adama. From those, two investors have their own irrigated land, which was given to them by *wereda* officials. Some people complained that the *wereda* officials are subject to corruption. The other three investors rented land from private landowners and one has rented about five hectares of land from the school and has planted tomatoes.

These investments have not produced much benefit for the people of Korodegaga since most employ migrant labourers, although there are some opportunities for local people at harvest time. Disputes with migrant labourers who were not paid, and more general disputes between migrants and residents are described in below.

BOX A1.14: MIGRANT LABOUR

From Korodegaga:

Almost all of these investors employed Amhara and Oromo migrant labourers who settle around the farmsteads and care for and protect the crops. The investors provide medium-sized irrigation motors, seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, salary of the motor operator, and food costs for the labourers. The migrant labourers work in the form of share-cropping. They perform all the works (digging, weeding, watering, harvesting, protecting the produce from thieves etc.). At harvest time local daily labourers may also be employed. At the end of the harvest, the investors count all the production costs, except the cost of the purchase, which the labourers pay. Then, the remaining profit is divided between the two parties - the labourers and the investor. Irrigation activities of such kind are carried out by using two motors (one costs 12,000 birr); one brings water up some distance and pours it into a hole; the second pump transfers the water from the hole to the farm.

Kebele officials reserved a large tract of irrigable land for five years for an Ethiopian NGO which promised to provide equipment which would irrigate 35 hectares for the community and 15 hectares for the NGO.

BOX A1.15: KEBELE OFFICIALS AND AN ETHIOPIAN NGO

From Korodegaga:

In 2001, the Ethiopian Red Cross society set up a raft on the Awash River. This raft has given important service for the people up to the present day. Some five years ago the Ethiopian Red Cross society signed a contract with the local people to establish a motor pump, which would irrigate 50 hectares of land. The people agreed to give 15 hectares of land to the organisation freely so that the people would use the remaining 35 hectares for themselves. These lands are found within the UNICEF sponsored irrigation scheme, and it is even the most suitable part of the project. However, the agreement remained only on paper; the Red Cross received the land from the people and has kept it idle over the past five years. Though people showed good interest to cultivate the land by using rain-fed agriculture, the local officials prevented them from doing so. The lands grow unwanted weed called partinium every year, and people are forced to participate in the destruction of the weeds. As time passes, people have become discontented with the action of the Red Cross. By the end of April 2005, the Ethiopia Red Cross society president and regional officials visited this land, talked to the people about the issue and agreed to start the construction of the pump in the near future. But the people moved against this, saying that since the government has planned to resume the damaged pump, they no longer want to work with the Red Cross; it was not the local people but the Red Cross who reneged on the agreement. The Red Cross officials have not returned.

In Dinki there have been conflicts over water.

BOX A1.16: CONFLICTS OVER WATER FOR IRRIGATION

From Dinki:

Some farmers with plots of land near the Dinki River use irrigation for some crops. Some farmers, especially from Addis Alem, have planted crops and fruits, like papaya, bananas, green peppers, tomatoes and onions. There is an intensive use of irrigation and this has led to competition between the seedling station, water-mill owners, and cash-crop producing farmers for water. It was reported that during the previous dry season there were, for the first time, disputes between up-stream and down-stream use of river water, between mill owners and irrigation farmers. The dispute was resolved through discussion in which they agreed to use water in turn, each having access once per week.

Access to irrigation caused problems for 15 of the 130 members of the irrigation co-operative in Korodegaga. These farmers were unable to repay their loans for inputs and were banned from using the land until the loans were repaid. Since they could not earn money from their irrigated land only those who received help from others in the form of gifts or loans were able to retain their land.

On marriage parents should provide their sons with some land to work, either through a gift, a loan, or a share-cropping agreement. When a husband/father dies the widow has a legal right to the land, although among the Arssi Oromo of Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme, and the Argoba of Dinki a widow may still be expected to marry a brother of her husband³⁴. After the death of both parents in the past *kebele* officials could redistribute the land although now it seems that families are developing rights to the land. Customary practices in terms of which children inherit what vary across the sites and are more or less affected by the growing importance of *sharia* law in Korodegaga, Dinki and Turufe Kecheme, and government legislation everywhere. In the past the Amhara inheritance norm, which was not always practised, was equal shares between brothers, in contrast to Oromo Arssi norms which favoured primogeniture.

Doing and accessing farm labour

Farmwork is done using household labour, labour of relatives, labour-sharing mechanisms, servants employed for a season or more, and daily labourers. The most important source of labour is the household.

BOX A1.17: LABOUR SCARCITY

From Dinki:

In Dinki, and in most other local *kebele*, there are some indications that labour, like land, is scarce. One indication comes from the reply to the question whether agricultural activity is labour intensive. Most informants answered in the affirmative. Reasons for this relate to the nature of the land which does not give good yields unless it is ploughed more than once, and the need for manuring. Generally, activities ranging from ploughing to harvesting draw heavily on the labour power of the household and that of other households. This affects attitudes to education.

In male-headed households men organise the labour of household members and others who work on their farms. The working team engages in soil preparation, planting, weeding, harvesting, and processing. In all sites the rule is that ploughing is a task for males. Women, boys and girls are expected to assist with all other activities, except for the Argoba women of Dinki who do not perform farm work unless the household is poor. Young boys may do domestic tasks, particularly fetching wood and water, and young girls may herd livestock but as they grow older their tasks become increasingly genderised. Since ploughing is reserved for men in no site can a woman farm without a man: a husband, father, brother, son, relative/ neighbour, or servant. Women without men rent or share-crop out their land.

BOX A1.18: A GENDERAGED DIVISION OF LABOUR

From Yetmen:

The allocation of labour in the area is usually determined by the composition of the household. Gender and age are the major determinants of the division of labour. Ploughing (*kocha*) is a male activity. Men are also expected to lead the daily activities of the household. Other agricultural activities such as weeding,

³⁴ Marriage institutions are described in Section 5 on human reproduction and social protection.

harvesting, and transporting crops, and livestock activities are usually carried out communally within the household and can be done by men or women. Activities solely performed or managed by women include processing of grain, preparation of food, rearing of children and other domestic activities. Boys/girls of age 6 to 12/10 are locally called *leffo / ligoch* and are involved in herding of livestock and in helping parents with domestic work. Boys of 13 or more usually help with farm work, while girls of 10 and above assist with domestic work and the collection of dung.

From Korodegaga:

All the able-bodied adult males and grown-up young boys work at farming, weeding and harvesting crops. Small boys tend the livestock while the girls assist their mothers in domestic chores (including fetching water and wood). Threshing and ploughing are activities of males, however, both men and women work on irrigation. Farming and harvesting are conducted mainly by adults and young men; small male children can participate in weeding, digging, collecting and threshing as well as irrigation works. Women participate in all agricultural works except ploughing the farm. They work in weeding, soil preparation for sowing, harvesting (beans, maize, etc), collecting and threshing the crops.

Women prepare the soil while men sow the seed. They throw out wastes from the farm in order to clean it, which decreases the weeds. Then they help with the weeding on all the crops grown. For maize and haricot beans women mostly participate in the harvest and collect the cobs in fixed places from where the men transport them to the threshing areas. For *tef* women sweep and clean the floor where the crop is threshed. It is difficult for women to grow crops on their own, because they do not plough and they also need access to male labour during harvesting and threshing.

Girl's labour: Today, girls participate in all activities except farming and harvesting. They perform cooking, baking, fetching water and firewood, weeding, digging, collecting harvested crops in fields, irrigation works (weeding, planting, watering, collecting harvest, etc), and community works such as Food For Work (FFW), water harvesting, terracing and removal of weeds. They also herd goats and sheep. They care for babies in home. Most girls in the community are involved in daily labour; they carry bundles of firewood on their backs to sell in markets. They take grain to the millhouse for grinding by carrying the grains on their back. In short, there is no work that girls do not do, except tilling the land.

Table A1.2 shows that the main activity of farming males in a month in mid-2004 was agricultural work on the household farm (between 69% and 84%). Herding occupied around a quarter of males in Korodegaga and Yetmen, 18% in Dinki and 12% in Turufe Kecheme where group herding organisations exist.

TABLE A1.7: MAIN ACTIVITY OF FARMING MALES: MAY/JUNE 2004				
	Remote		Integrated	
	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Farming	80%	73%	84%	69%
Agricultural labouring	2%	3%	4%	3%
Herding	18%	24%	12%	27%

Richer farmers employ servants as herders or farm-labourers for a season or continuously under a number of different arrangements.

BOX A1.19: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

From Yetmen:

There are a number of arrangements:

- Farm servant works for a predetermined wage + board and lodging
- Servant takes one quarter of yield + board and lodging
- Wage labourer or married son takes one-third of harvest

Some households together hire a herdsman at the cost of 20 *birr* per household plus meals.

There were frequent complaints from agricultural labourers and employed herders of bad treatment by employers.

BOX A1.20: EXPLOITATION OF SERVANTS

From Dinki:

He revealed that his early appearances as a servant in individual household, taught him that most employers (masters) would try to cheat their workers, or even they could fire them with out any compensation. He believed his last migration experience was the best as he was able to make good bargains with his masters and obtained the fruits of his labour. And he considered all others experiences as bad in terms of obtaining a fair wage for his labour.

Richer farmers may also employ daily labourers for particular seasonal tasks. This is very common in Turufe Kecheme and on the irrigated farms in Korodegaga.

BOX A1.21: FARM SERVANTS AND DAILY LABOURERS

From Yetmen:

Rich rural people can afford to employ servants to help them in farm and herd activities; women are not employed as servants in rural households even in the rich ones. In the urban part of Yetmen young women are employed as servants in a few households. Labourers are also employed on a daily basis to carry quintals of grain and to move the grain by car; this for merchants living in Yetmen. There is a shortage of labour for harvesting in January and February, and for ploughing in July. There are migrant workers coming from neighbouring *kebele* to perform these activities (except ploughing). People in Yetmen also migrate to the neighbouring *kebele* for wage labour. Hard work, trustworthiness and responsibility are the principal criteria used in the area to identify the right person for the job. . Labour is hired for herding, ploughing, harvesting and building. There are other activities like baby-minding, well-digging and wood chopping carried out through wage labour.

From Turufe Kecheme:

For employees that come from outside the *kebele*, employers provide 180 or 200 *birr* annually if they are given shelter and food, but 5 *birr* per day if they do not demand shelter and food. For seasonal migrants harvesting one *timad* of farmland, the employers pay 35 *birr* if they do not demand shelter but 30 *birr* if they do. If it is weeding and digging during cultivation they are paid from 25 to 30 *birr* if there are few weeds and from 30 to 40 *birr* if the weeds are thick. One person can finish weeding one *timad* of farmland in two and half days and the maximum period it takes is three to four days for one person. The payment for weeding decreases if the labourer demands shelter from the employer. No one in the *kebele* wants to work ploughing at a daily rate since this will make them inferior to others. *Kebele* residents will plough for piece rates. In this case they must bring their own oxen which few can afford. There are a few poorer households in the *kebele* who work weeding, collecting potatoes and harvesting at a daily rate.

Wage labour is practised on individual farms. Most households employ weeders and harvesters. The wage labourers come from inside or outside the *kebele*. Those from inside the *kebele* are landless or peasants who only have small pieces of land. Migrant labourers usually come from Wolayta though there are also individuals from Wello, Gonder, Gojjam in Amhara and other Oromo groups from Kofele and Shewa who are working as wage labourers. However, these others did not come specifically to be wage labourers as the Wolayta did. Previously the Kembata used to come for wage labour but since many Kembata were expelled following the fall of the Derg they no longer do so.

From Korodegaga:

The majority of the daily labourers are young boys and girls followed by destitute and female-headed households. Since cash crop vegetables are grown in lines of 5m long by 15cm wide, labourers are paid from 0.10-0.15 *birr* per row. They can get from 8-10 *birr* per day. Active and strong daily labourers can get up to 120 *birr* monthly. Our poor diary respondent said that he and his wife can get 10 *birr* each per day. Most of the native daily labourers are from the nearby villages of Satara, Buko, Olati and Shelota. Distance and high temperature hinder women and children from coming to the irrigation scheme.

A number of customary institutions governing work-sharing and work-groups are still in use, although declining, particularly in Korodegaga, in the face of opportunities to earn cash doing daily labour.

BOX 4.22: WORK SHARING AND WORK GROUPS

From Turufe Kecheme:

Labour sharing systems such as *debo* (*dego* in Oromiffa) and *wenfel* are still practised in the area. For *debo* the person who needs help begs all his/her friends and relations to help for ploughing, sowing,

weeding, harvesting, or house building etc and prepares food and drinks. The amount and type depends on his/her capacity. Usually *tella* (local beer), *injera* (thinly baked circular bread), and *areke* (local distilled liquor) are offered to the participants of the *debo*. The food and drinks for the participants also depend on whether the person is satisfied with what was done or not. The work usually starts at 8am and the participants get their first refreshments (*shome*) between 10 and 11. They are allowed to eat a small quantity of *injera* with *wot* (sauce) and *tella* or bread and *tella*. Drinking *areke* is prohibited in case they get drunk and waste time eating *kollo* (roasted cereals). Eating *shome* takes not more than half an hour and then the work continues until the caller tells the participants to stop. It is usual in this area to work until 3pm when the participants are invited to go to the caller's house to eat and drink. Here *areke* and *kollo* are allowed as well as *injera*, bread and *tella*. The quality and quantity of food depends on the wealth of the caller. The person who called the work party has no obligation to go and work for those who came to work for him. In *debo* there is no obligation for the requested person to come, but labour will not be reciprocated another time by the person from whose *debo* he was absent.

In contrast to *debo*, which might not be reciprocal, *wentel* (the *Oromiffa* name is *gessa*) is an arrangement in which two or more farmers have a contractual agreement to help each other in certain kinds of tasks. The amount of time taken for work and the type of food prepared for participants are always similar for all members of the work party. For instance five people may work for three hours and be provided with bread and *tella* and this will be the same for each person. The time to be taken is decided by the participants in discussion. The quality and quantity of the food is usually less than *debo*; sometimes only coffee and *kollo* are prepared. However, the type of work can be different for each party: one can call for ploughing, another for weeding, the third for harvesting, etc. The members of this labour sharing arrangement are usually relatives or best friends. After making a *gessa* agreement it is unethical and prohibited for a person to be absent after using others' labour. Such a person will be socially ostracised with all his family and nobody will enter such labour exchange agreements in future.

Gessa and *debo* are usually practised in the *kebele* during weeding and harvesting periods, when there is a need for extra labour. The members of *gessa* or *debo* work groups come to work with their oxen and farm equipment if they have them.

In Turufe Kecheme there are also four cattle *iddir* in which each member takes turn in herding the cattle of all members.

In all sites inhabitants were mobilised by the *kebele* for community work of various types which, during the research period, included road maintenance, road widening, terracing, water harvesting, building and maintaining government buildings including schools, and terracing. Community members were also mobilised for activities unrelated to the *kebele*, for example mosque-building in Korodegaga. In Korodegaga and Dinki there was a fuzzy boundary between community activities qualifying people for 'food for work' and community activities regarded as an obligation of every member.

Accessing oxen and other farming resources

In addition to land and labour a farmer needs access to two oxen, tools, and seeds. If he does not own these there are a number of customary institutions through which he may access them.

BOX A1.23: ACCESSING OXEN

From Korodegaga:

There are various ox/plough-sharing arrangements with other farmers... these arrangements range from providing labour in return for borrowing oxen and a plough, to the symbiotic sharing of oxen between farmers who each own only one when the plough requires two.

From Turufe Kecheme:

A piece of land can be exchanged for oxen and ploughing in an arrangement according to which a man who has no land but has oxen makes an arrangement with a person who has land but no oxen. The one who has oxen not only provides the service of his oxen but his own labour as well for the whole farming period. This is known as *lafa duda gurguracha*, literally meaning offering land for compensation, and it is frequently practiced in the *kebele*. There is also an arrangement for exchanging labour for oxen in which a person who has oxen and a piece of land enters into an agreement with a person who has no oxen to give two days labour service with the oxen on his own land in exchange for one day service of the oxen for himself. The labourer has no obligation to do any other farm work apart from ploughing. Another arrangement is what is known as *qite* or *kota* in which a man who has oxen, seeds and the money necessary to buy fertiliser enters into an agreement with a person who has land but not seeds and money to provide the service of his oxen and human labour on the land in exchange for an equal share of the produce. The person who gives the service of his land in exchange for labour, oxen, seed, and money for fertiliser has no obligation to help with labour. There is also what is called *sello* in which two persons who

have only one ox each bring together their oxen to plough one day for the one and another day for the other on their respective farmland.

Currently there is exchanging oxen for crops practiced on an annual basis. The individual who uses the ox has to feed the ox and pays up to three quintal crop (one quintal maize, one quintal wheat, and one quintal sorghum). The payment depends on the strength of the ox.

From Yetmen:

Mekanajo is an institution bringing together those who only own one ox.

Labour for oxen: a man works two days for the oxen's owner for one day's use of the oxen.

Sharecropping: the landowner provides the land and the sharecropper the oxen.

If livestock are lost or stolen, friends, neighbours and relatives search for them. If they are not found they will help by providing oxen for ploughing until the household head gets his animals back. They will also contribute money so he can buy replacements. When an ox dies the neighbours and relatives divide the meat (which is called *irtiban*) and promise to give the farmer a given amount of grain in the next harvest season so that the man at least covers part of the expense needed to buy an ox.

Share-rearing is practised in Korodegaga and Dinki.

BOX A1.24: SHARE-REARING

From Korodegaga:

Rich farmers give their goats and sheep as *ribbi*, a method of keeping them for the owner but to divide the offspring's equally. For example, if a goat has four offspring in a year, they take two each but the mother continues to be the asset of the owner. The goats or sheep are kept until they have given birth 2-3 times, the offspring are shared equally and then the heads are returned to the owners.

Informal sharing, and lending and borrowing is a way of accessing tools which the household does not own.

Selling and exchanging farm products

Selling crops

Grain from Yetmen and potatoes from Turufe Kecheme are sold in the markets of Addis Ababa. There are two sets of 'middle men'; 'youth' who buy small amounts from farmers and accumulate it to sell on to the larger traders who take it to Addis Ababa; and the larger traders. A number of relatively rich grain traders live in Yetmen town. Irrigated vegetables in Korodegaga are bought by traders from Addis Ababa and Nazret who bring lorries to the site. There is suspicion that traders collude to reduce prices.

BOX A1.25: CASH-CROP TRADING

From Turufe Kecheme:

The youth involve themselves in brokering, mostly in the *kiremt* season, when potatoes from the *kebele* are ready for sale. Many youths collect up to 2000 *birr* by working as a broker between the farmers in Turufe and Wetera and the traders who transport potatoes to Addis. Many students buy clothes and educational materials from the income they generate from brokering.

There is a problem of collusion among traders to lower the price of goods sold by the farmers and to raise the prices of those goods the traders sell. The farmers know that the traders cheat them by using a wrong weighting scale. There are weights and measures laws around towns. In the Shashemene and Kuyera markets, some traders buy crops and cereals from peasants using weights. There is no one who polices the markets except in Shashemene, where the government levies taxes on livestock sales.

From Korodegaga:

Most merchants are from Addis Ababa and Nazret. They come to load the vegetables after the purchase is carried out between the brokers and the farmers. Due to lack of a proper road, merchants greatly reduce the prices of the crops. In addition, since the producers have no direct contact with the merchants, brokers may easily reduce the prices of their crops.

Small surpluses are also sold in local markets.

Selling livestock and livestock products

People sell hens, eggs, skins, honey, butter, goats and sometimes cattle in order to obtain cash for various purposes including the purchase of food and other necessities, seeds, fertiliser, pesticides, to pay government taxes, health and education expenditures, and marriage and death ceremonies.

Exchanging and sharing

There is a considerable amount of non-market exchanging, sharing and giving of agricultural and livestock products.

A2.3 Off-farm work

In this section we describe own account production and work within and beyond the community, employment opportunities within and beyond the community, opportunities for school leavers and opportunities for training and subsequent use of what was learned. Viable off-farm own-account work and employment depends on a demand for the products and services; there is a greater demand for a wider range of products and services in the integrated sites than in the remoter ones.

Own account production and work

Own account material production may be for household consumption, exchange or sale. The major services provided relate to trade. Table A1.3 shows the own account production opportunities available in each of the four sites. The main off-farm coping strategies in the two food-deficit sites are firewood selling (mostly done by women) in Korodegaga and weaving (men) and spinning (women) in Dinki. The making and selling of dungcakes by women is a coping strategy in Yetmen. *Areke* production for sale is undertaken by women in Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme. In the RANS sample 1% of households in Yetmen and 2% in Turufe Kecheme owned a still. 9% of households in Turufe Kecheme and 8% in Korodegaga owned carts while 2% of households in Korodegaga owned small fishing nets. There are opportunities for wealth in Yetmen through relatively large-scale trading in national markets and in Turufe there are a few who invest in 'anything they think will be profitable'. There are opportunities for smallscale trading in the integrated sites.

	Korodegaga	Dinki	Turufe K	Yetmen
Males	Firewood selling Dera: carried by donkeys	Weaving A few blacksmiths produce ploughs and other farming tools.	There are a few peasants who also invest money in trade in cattle, potatoes and anything else they think will be profitable Shops	Large-scale trading in national markets. Smallscale trading in local markets and for sale to larger traders.
Females	Firewood selling: carried on back. Petty trading from home: coffee, sugar, kerosene, cigarettes, bread to daily labourers Petty trading in local towns: buy onions and tomatoes and sell in town	Spinning A few Muslim women weave	Sale of areke and tella in home. Large quantities of areke made and sold in Negele town. A few women do hair-dressing on a part-time basis.	Smallscale trading in local markets Petty trade Making alcoholic drinks Selling alcoholic drinks Prostitution

As reported in Section 3 in the main text the remote site the main activity of around 70% of active males in the remote sites was farming compared with 41% in Turufe Kecheme and 48% in Yetmen. Off-farm opportunities were considerably greater in the integrated sites. Women in the Amhara sites did more off-farm work than those in the Oromia sites. 23% of females in Dinki did spinning as a main or secondary activity in the pre-RANS month while 18% of females in Yetmen and 8% in Turufe Kecheme were engaged in a range of activities.

Employment - local work for residents

There were few employment openings for females in any of the sites other than daily agricultural labour especially weeding; activities undertaken by one or two included teaching, shop work, religious work and government work. For males there was a wider selection of activities in the integrated sites including various

forms of unskilled and skilled manual work, jobs in the service industry, and government, NGO religion-related employment. A considerable number of males from Turufe Kecheme commuted for work to nearby towns. In 2004 4.3% of males in Turufe Kecheme and 5.2% in Yetmen reported a main activity in the last month that involved off-farm employment, compared with 0.9% in Dinki and 0.6% in Korodegaga.

BOX A1.26: DAILY COMMUTING FOR WORK

From Turufe Kecheme:

There are a few professionals, who work as carpenters or plumbers in Kuyera and Negele, going to work on a daily basis. About 60 youngsters also work as supporters of mini-bus drivers and brokers. In the *kiremt* season the number of brokers working at Kuyera could exceed to 10-15, because of the potato market.

Outward migration for work

Outward migration for work is rare in Dinki and Turufe Kecheme, but a little more common in the other two sites. From Yetmen young males migrated to plantations in the south for 3-6 months or for longer periods to work as daily labour or guards. Young men and women migrated to Addis Ababa and other major towns: women worked as servants in hotels or houses or in petty trade and men as daily labourers. There were also examples of a few successful people with their own businesses.

A few individuals from Korodegaga migrated to nearby rural areas for seasonal manual work, farm work and domestic work and there were a few longer-term migrants to towns who had returned. Distress migration is common at times of bad harvest though this has reduced due to opportunities for daily labour on irrigation farms. There is a tradition of military service in Korodegaga and a number fought in the war against Eritrea. By 2005 daughters from 3 richer households were working in Saudi Arabia and returning remittances and two more were planning to go.

Inward migration for work

In all sites there is inward migration for daily labour. For example, in Turufe Kecheme in November and December poor people come from a nearby area for harvesting work, and in April and June people come from Wolayita for potato hoeing. There is also some urban in-migration in Yetmen town. There are two types of migration into Korodegaga, one involving kin of residents and the other Amharas who come for seasonal work on the irrigated land of the inward investors.

BOX A1.27: INWARD MIGRATION FOR WORK

From Korodegaga:

A few people migrate from other areas of Arssi, mainly from the neighbouring *wereda* and *kebele*. They come to their kin and relatives. They live by working as daily labourers and cattle rent, they also cultivate land which is rented or kin gift. They become permanent settlers. However, there are some migrant labourers who come from other parts of Arssi, most of whom are Muslims. They are either farm labourers or cattle herders. The age of cattle herders ranges from 8 to 16 years old. The farm labourers are adolescents (over 16). Most of them are employed on a contract basis for a period of one year but there are also farm labourers who are employed only for the harvesting or farming seasons. The payment is mainly in cash (more than 500 birr per year). Sometimes, however, it may include both cash and farmland on the basis of the agreement between the labourer and the employer. Since they are migrants, they have no direct access to agricultural land. Their opportunity to establish a separate household is also less. In addition to these, there are migrant temporary labourers who work on the irrigated land of investors. Some of them also work on a share-cropping basis with local farmers. These are culturally, socially, and religiously different from the local people and contact is related to mutual economic benefits. Most of them belong to the Amhara ethnic group, and they come from the north.

Opportunities for school leavers

Unemployment of school leavers was reported as a growing problem in the integrated sites.

BOX A1.28: OPPORTUNITIES FOR SCHOOL LEAVERS

From Turufe Kecheme:

In 2005 most unemployed school leavers are dependent on families, some are married and have got land from their family but, according to the local people, they are not hard workers, they waste their money by

chewing *chat* and drinking local drinks. Some do not plough their land, instead they give it for sharecropping and they like wandering around the village and recreation in Kuyera. At the time when most farmers sell potatoes (in August) they work as brokers and get commissions.

From Yetmen:

Out of 27 high school graduates (15 females and 12 males) only 1 employed in a govt organisation while 2 were farming. 4 people graduated from universities and colleges – 3 were govt employees and the other was employed as a grain trader under his father. 4 males and 1 female graduated as teachers – 3 employed but one died. 4 in higher education in Ethiopian universities and a European institute. 'It was reported that it had become common for students of the *kebele* to become school drop-outs because many graduates were unemployed.

Opportunities for training and its subsequent use

There have not been many opportunities for training in the communities. There are most opportunities in Turufe Kecheme where there is most NGO activity; however there are a number of cases where what has been learned is not used due to lack of follow-up and incentives.

BOX A1.29: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRAINING

From Turufe Kecheme:

In 1994, a respondent reported that there were farmers who were trained at the Adult Training Centre before 1989. Among other things they learned:

- how improved seeds are important and how to use them
- modern methods of cattle breeding and preparation of fodder
- about the side effects of deforestation and the importance of afforestation
- how to use modern ploughs and how terracing is useful
- how to give first aid to women during childbirth (for women)
- how to save fuel by preparing modern cooking places (for women)

However, since 1989 they have not used their training because there has been no one responsible for organising and inciting them to use their knowledge.

Two youngsters (one male and one female) attended a training of one month, organised by Pathfinder International in May 2005. They were trained on community-based family planning at Negele town. They began teaching the community on family planning and sexually transmitted diseases.

Three NGOs (African Human Action, Catholic and Compassion) have been giving training for different *kebele*, including Turufe. About six people attended the trainings, which focused on HIV/AIDS, childcare, side effects of harmful customs such as circumcision, and importance of using contraceptives, etc. They gave condoms for anyone who needed them. Previously they taught the community using the knowledge they gained, at meetings and even from door to door. But presently they do not teach, instead writing a monthly report to get their monthly salary (70 birr) because the NGOs do not supervise them.

A2.4 Saving, lending, borrowing and insurance

Saving

Saving takes a variety of forms from in-kind saving such as livestock or grain to (rarely) bank deposits. The majority of peasants with cash savings reportedly keep the money in their homes.

BOX A1.30: SAVING

From Yetmen:

Peasants save money. They invest the largest portion in purchasing agricultural inputs and other commodities and they keep a little as a reserve. Compared to traders, who take part in wholesale activities, retail in the village and build bigger zinc-roofed houses, savings and investments among the peasants are modest. For farmers livestock is one of the means for saving. But with ever decreasing grazing land they cannot keep large number of livestock. Some farmers also purchase grain when it is cheap and sell it when prices get higher. Most people in Yetmen keep their extra cash in their own house for future use. But richer merchants in the urban site save their money in banks in Dejen or even in Addis Ababa.

Lending and borrowing

Most people borrow money from their friends and relatives. There are *iqub* (ROSCAs) in Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen and in Turufe Kecheme people may also borrow from *iddir* (burial societies).

BOX A1.31: BORROWING AND LENDING

From Turufe Kecheme:

Most of the community members borrow money from their *iddir* or from relatives. The *iddir* expects the return of money after the following harvest, but the money from a relative or friend might not be returned if the two agree and relatives and friends do not expect interest. The *iddir* lend money with interest rates lower than that of the moneylenders. People want to borrow from the *iddir* since the interest they pay supports its budget. In addition to money, the members of *iddir* can borrow grain, and they will replace it at harvesting season. This also has an interest in terms of grain.

There are credit associations (*iqub*) which people use for economic security at times of economic and social crisis. Every member pays a fixed amount of money every week. There is a judge to supervise and administer rules and regulations. The sum of money collected each week goes by chance to one member and the opportunity rotates so that once a member has won he or she cannot be selected again until all the members have won once. For example, in an *iqub* with a membership of 30 each member receives the money once in 30 weeks. The number of *iqub* is not exactly known but respondents estimated about 10. *Iqub* are differentiated among each other because most members have different levels of off-farm income (e.g. shops, grain trade, *tella* or *areke* trade, etc). One of the 4 shopkeepers contributes 30 *birr* a week while the rest contribute 10 *birr* each. The women who sell *tella* contribute 1 *birr* a week. The money paid out is usually used to buy food or clothes, but sometimes it is spent on farm inputs like seeds and implements. Women who get money from *iqub* have the right to use it for anything they need. The money is used either for the women's private purposes, such as buying clothes for themselves or as additional income for family necessities in the household. It may be invested in the farm or education if the women want. Their husbands cannot dictate how they use the money. It is their right to use it for anything they need. If the women want, they can discuss with their husbands how to use the money.

There are 'moneylenders' with high interest rates who may lend money and/or grain.

BOX A1.32: 'MONEYLENDERS'

From Yetmen:

People do not borrow from relatives and friends unless the amount is small. They usually borrow from rich people or from money-lenders. Usually borrowers return 100 kg of *tef* for 100 *birr*, or 50 kg of *tef* for 50 *birr*. The agreement is written as if the borrower took 100 kg of *tef* and not 100 *birr*, and the witnesses of the agreement also sign as if they saw the borrower receiving 100 kg of *tef* and the following harvest season the lender goes where the borrower threshes his *tef* and take the 100 kg of *tef* from the threshing field, so that he will not have any problem of getting it after the harvest is taken into the house. However, if the lender agrees to receive interest in cash rather than in kind, the interest rate is 10 *birr* per month for 100 *birr*. And the borrower has to pay the interest every month until he returns the amount he borrowed. But if he fails to pay the interest the borrower will take the initial amount from the person.

In very recent years there has been a growth in access to Government and NGO savings and credit facilities.

BOX A1.33: SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS

From Dinki:

Until 2005 there were no savings and credit facilities available. Recently, however, the Amhara Savings and Credit Association, which is affiliated to the ruling EPRDF party, has been providing credit of up to 1,000 *birr* at very high interest rates to farmers in the area.

From Korodegaga:

The SHI sponsored community irrigation cooperative lends modern inputs (fertilisers, selected seeds, pesticides and weed killer) to be repaid together with an interest of 2% after harvest.

From Yetmen:

In 1994 credit was not very important but by 2005 it had become very important – many people take credit in the form of cash, seeds and fertiliser. There were two savings and credit associations in Yetmen: one set up by government and monitored by the Amhara Region Saving and Credit Association and a second set up by the people themselves. Membership in both was increasing.

In Korodegaga two women's savings and credit association have been recently established.

BOX A1.34: SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS

From Korodegaga:

The Women's' Credit and Saving Association was formed three years ago with the assistance of SHI. The members pay 11 *birr* monthly. The money is saved in the Oromia Credit and Saving Association. They go to Dera to pay the contribution. There are 18 members. They borrowed money twice in 2004 and in May 2005. In the previous year they borrowed 700 *birr*, and then later 980 *birr*. Each member has saved about 400 *birr*. The credit has helped them to buy goats, sheep, cows and oxen, and to build houses. There is also another small women's credit and saving association which was established in 2004. It was organised by the *wereda* extension and credit and saving offices. It has about sixty women, and they pay 1 *birr* monthly. Now, they want to save in the bank, because the amount of money has increased.

Insurance

In Turufe there is one cattle *iddir* where members give support for a member on the death of cattle. Otherwise people who suffer asset losses depend on informal networks of relatives, friends and neighbours.

A2.5 Problems and crises

Major causes of serious asset or income loss are crop failures, livestock diseases and human illnesses and deaths.

Crop failures

Bad weather and crop pests and diseases regularly cause households considerable losses in terms of assets and/or income. For example, drought caused damaging losses for 84% of Dinki households and 96% of Korodegaga households between 1998 and 2004, while frost affected a quarter of households in Yetmen.

TABLE A1.9: PESTS/DISEASES AFFECTING CROPS 1998-2004				
% of households with considerable losses (RANS)				
	Amhara		Oromia	
	Yetmen		Turufe Kecheme	
Integrated	Frost and hailstorms	25%	Frost and hailstorms	10%
	Too much rain or flood	3%	Too much rain or flood	8%
	Drought	2%	Drought	26%
	Pests/diseases before harvest	25%	Pests/diseases before harvest	31%
	Pests/diseases storage	4%	Pests/diseases storage	8%
	Dinki		Korodegaga	
Remote	Frost and hailstorms	1%	Frost and hailstorms	1%
	Too much rain or flood	15%	Too much rain or flood	2%
	Drought	84%	Drought	96%
	Pests/diseases before harvest	35%	Pests/diseases before harvest	5%
	Pests/diseases storage	10%	Pests/diseases storage	1%

Livestock diseases

There is a considerable number of livestock diseases which frequently kill cattle, sheep, goats and pack animals. The major livestock diseases are rinderpest (*abagorba*, *abasenga*), leeches (*alikt*), and a disease called *kutena* which is transmitted while grazing. Sheep get *kulkult*, goats get 'leprosy', and mules get *kantir* and trypanosomiasis.

BOX A1.36: SEASONAL LIVESTOCK PROBLEMS: 2004/5

From Korodegaga:

September: spread of sheep, goat and camel disease; many died. Wereda vets came and disease reduced. Camel owners bought medicine.

October: diseases continued; many died. Vaccination given on 1 day but not all vaccinated so disease continued.

November: diseases continued and many died; *kebele* officials reported to *wereda* but no vets came.
January: diseases aggravated as treatment not given to all shoats.
February: Still some disease though most had recovered.
March: Severe fodder shortage

Serious damage to the household economy as a result of livestock diseases between 1998 and 2004 was reported by between 11% (Yetmen) and 20% (Dinki).

	Amhara	Oromia
Integrated	Yetmen 11%	Turufe Kecheme 15%
Remote	Dinki 20%	Korodegaga 14%

Human diseases

Serious illnesses and deaths of key workers often lead to serious reductions in productive and reproductive assets, income and consumption.

	Amhara		Oromia	
	Yetmen		Turufe Kecheme	
Integrated	Serious illness of family member	25%	Serious illness of family member	47%
	Death of family member	27%	Death of family member	29%
	Dinki		Korodegaga	
Remote	Serious illness of family member	23%	Serious illness of family member	16%
	Death of family member	14%	Serious accident to family member	2%
			Death of family member	31%

A2.6 Local and ideological repertoires of ideas related to livelihoods

Finally we compare five cultural repertoires or sets of ideas related to livelihoods which are available in the communities: 'traditional' and 'modern' repertoires, religious repertoires, government repertoires, and donor/NGO repertoires.

'Traditional' local repertoires

Men should farm producing traditional crops and livestock using the labour of wife/wives, children and others in customary arrangements. Sons should become farmers and daughters farmers' wives. Sons should live near to parents. Own-account farming is the basis of the livelihood system with the main products being grain/potatoes and livestock, which are highly valued. Economic relationships are based on social exchanges and contracts. Labour should be provided by the household according to genderage, work groups or exchanges, or the employment of servants, and contracts should govern land/oxen/input/labour exchanges. Credit should be sought from kin, neighbours and rich men. There is not a moral obligation to repay credit from government. Apart from government employment off-farm work is undesirable: a coping strategy for poor households or undertaken by excluded occupational 'castes'. *Kebele* leaders should help their families and kin to improve their livelihoods.

Modern local repertoires

Farmers should use modern inputs since fertilisers, pesticides, improved seeds and credit increase local grain and potato yields and are worth the investment in the cash-crop sites. Irrigation using motor pumps to pump water from rivers, channels in hilly areas channels, or tap water, should be used to grow vegetables and fruit for sale, and grain for home consumption in drought-prone sites. Daily labour should be used for weeding and

harvesting. Women should be involved in cash-producing activities, for example through rearing chickens. Credit should be sought from NGOs, government, and collective savings groups.

Farm work and life is hard; viable off-farm activities in urban settings are desirable. For children education should take priority over farm and domestic work. Young women can put education and work before marriage. Young men and women can migrate to urban areas or even internationally for work and should not be expected to live near their parents, although they should support them with remittances. Young men and women can earn money acting as brokers between farmers and larger-scale traders. Off-farm activities provide opportunities. One way to become rich is to become a large-scale trader. The goal of education is government employment or international migration. Daughters sent to the Middle East as domestic servants should send remittances home to the family.

Religious repertoires

Both Orthodox Christian and Muslim religions have rules prohibiting people from working at certain times which are related to fasting/feasting rules.

BOX A1.35: RELIGIOUS RULES AFFECTING WORK

From Yetmen:

They are strict in their respective fasting times. Christians do not work Saturdays and Sundays, St Michael's (on the twelfth of every month); St Gabriel (on the nineteenth); St Mary (on the twenty-first); St George (on the twenty-third); and Bale Wolde (on the twenty-ninth) days of each month. On average they do not work about fourteen days in each month, a total of 168 days a year. Muslims work all the year except their usual holidays.

From Dinki:

For Muslims, Friday is a feast day each week and Wednesday is kept as a feasting day related to traditional beliefs. In these days of each week they prepare a coffee ceremony at least three times. The males celebrate by chewing *chat*. Muslims in Dinki go to the river or wash in other places five times per day. For one *segdet* they spend thirty to forty minutes. So they might spend three-four hours per day and stay in their house on Wednesday and Friday.

Orthodox Christians are expected to observe Saints' days each month and the fasting and feasting, and abstinence from work related to the key events in the Christian calendar. Muslims are expected to pray five times a day and limit work on Fridays; the fasting period of Ramadan when no food can be eaten during daylight hours affects capacity to work at that time. Religious leaders have an important role in praying for rain. Obligations related to funerals and other death ceremonies also affect work as do the monthly customary celebrations of *adbar* where there are still practised.

Government modernisation repertoire

Farmers in cashcrop sites using modern inputs are contributing to the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation Agenda. Those in food-deficit sites need new technologies, especially irrigation. *Wereda* level agricultural services and *kebele* level Development Assistants should introduce new technologies motivated by targets to be met. Women should be encouraged and assisted to develop their own farming activities. Government should assist people in drought-prone sites by introducing water technologies by any means possible. For example officials have promoted irrigation in Korodegaga in four ways: through a co-operative organised by an NGO which provided a pump and credit; by urging farmers to form groups to buy shared motor-pumps; by selling non-motorised pumps related to a water harvesting project which failed due to the soil; and by providing two large pumps to irrigate a government scheme.

Left to themselves people will not pursue the activities that are necessary for development. Government must take the lead and force changes through persuasion, instruction and sanctions. People should be mobilised for community work to improve infrastructure and rehabilitate the environment through 'campaigns'; these take priority over the other activities of community members. Labour markets are not necessarily to be encouraged since they are not under government control. A full land market is not currently an option. Land certification is seen as a compromise that can promote tenure security and investment. Output markets provide an opportunity for taxation but do not need government regulation.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

The only site with current evidence of donor and NGO livelihood repertoires is Korodegaga. The NGO stayed in the site for five years (2001-2006) organised an irrigation co-operative, provided a pump, received a contribution from each of the 130 farmers and provided credit for inputs. Those who did not repay were not allowed to use the land and then taken to the Social Court; a number had their land taken away.

The NGO also set up a savings and credit scheme for women and provided hybrid hens and training in keeping them. Donor involvement in Food Aid led to the introduction of the Safety Net scheme in Korodegaga towards the end of 2006. This scheme is intended to provide long-term security to farmers in drought-prone areas so that they do not have to sell assets to survive.

Recent donor policy and practice in Ethiopia has been focused at macro level with little attention to meso-level livelihoods. However there are current moves to promote decentralisation to the *wereda* level though it is unclear if and how this will affect the community level. In the discourse there is an assumption that development is being held back by the absence of markets and the informality of activities. People will respond to the incentives offered by (competitive) markets and a programme of privatisation is supported although there is disagreement as to whether a full land market should be established.

A2.7 Community and household power in the livelihood field

Community power in the livelihood field

The integrated sites are self-sufficient in that they do not need food aid. This is a result of the positive aspects of their environments and ecologies: reliable rain, flat and fertile soil, proximity to all-weather roads and urban demand for their agricultural outputs. The remote sites are no worse off in terms of overall land availability or livestock ownership. Their main liabilities are scant and unreliable rains and problems in transporting outputs to markets. In both sites most households with land on which they can grow vegetables using irrigation from the rivers have recently grown richer. If sustainable and community-owned irrigation projects were established in both these sites then incomes could increase to raise the standards of living closer to those in the integrated sites.

However, increasing land shortages related to the growing population, mean that in all sites there is a need for livelihood diversification.

Household power in the livelihood field

Households use a mix of material, social, cultural, and political resources in pursuit of livelihoods and 'wealth' and 'poverty' in each of these areas tend to go together.

Wealth as a source of household power for the other fields of action

In the previous section we identified seven productive wealth categories: two rich, two middle, two poor and one destitute. The productive wealth of a household not only determines life style and the life quality of members in the reproductive field, it is also a status marker contributing to the quality of the collective agency of the household in other fields of community action, community management and cultural struggle.

Cultural resources: ethnicity as a source of household wealth and thus power

Ethnicity is a feature of social status in Turufe Kecheme and Dinki. In Dinki there were some differences in productive wealth holding between Amhara and Argobba: 13.5% of the latter were landless compared with 1.7% of the former, and 20% had access to irrigation compared with 35% of Amhara. 54% had no oxen compared with 34% and 15% no livestock compared with 7%. In Turufe Kecheme largest mean landholdings attached to the Tigrayans and Amhara with Oromo in third place. The ethnic groups from SNNP had the smallest average holdings. There were no landless Tigrayans compared with 6% of Oromo, 16% of Amhara and 79% of Gurage (who are famous throughout Ethiopia for their entrepreneurial activities).

TABLE A1.12: ETHNICITY BY WEALTH - DINKI AND TURUFE KEcheme								
	Ethnicity of hh head %	Mean landholding Hectares	Landless %	Mean irrigated land – estimate Hectares	Access to irrigated land %	No oxen %	No livestock %	Asset index score
DINKI								
Argoba	64%	1.16	13.5%	0.08	20	54	15	2.54
Amhara	36%	1.21	1.7%	0.12	35	34	7	2.66
TURUFE KEcheme								
Oromo	57	0.87	6	NA	NA	50	16	3.04
Tigrayan	10	1.29	0	NA	NA	21	4	3.46
Wolayitta	10	0.61	24	NA	NA	72	16	3.13
Amhara	8	0.96	16	NA	NA	50	37	3.67
Kembata	5	0.49	8	NA	NA	58	15	2.60
Hadiya	3	0.53	29	NA	NA	50	14	3.25
Gurage	6	0.42	71	NA	NA	100	64	2.00
Sidama	0.4							
Silte	0.4							
Sodo	0.4							

Cultural resources: clanship as a source of household wealth and thus power among the Oromo Arssi

We had insufficient data to explore the relation between Oromo clan membership and wealth in Turufe Kecheme. In Korodegaga the dominant clan the Sebiro were slightly better off than non-Sebiro in terms of less landlessness and ownership of oxen and other livestock.

Cultural resources: gender of household head as a source of household wealth and thus power

The differences in productive wealth in the Oromo sites between male- and female-headed households was notably less than in the Amhara sites. In Korodegaga there was no difference in mean land size and proportion with no livestock, and small differences in proportions with no land, with access to irrigated land and having no oxen. Differences in land size were small in Turufe Kecheme, though livestock ownership differences were larger. In Dinki the mean land size of male heads was more than double that of female heads and in Yetmen it was almost double. In Dinki 40% of female-headed households were landless compared with 24% in Turufe Kecheme, 3% in Korodegaga and none in Yetmen.

TABLE A1.13: SEX OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD BY WEALTH								
	Sex of hh head %	Mean landholding Hectares	Landless %	Mean irrigated land – estimate hectares	Access to irrigated land %	No oxen %	No livestock %	Asset index score
KORODEGAGA								
Male	76	2.4	1.5	0.38	52	44	9	1.64
Female	23	2.2	3	0.30	46	39	8	1.51
DINKI								
Male	78	1.33	None	0.12	31	39	8	2.56
Female	22	0.62	40	0.03	11	82	29	2.74
TURUFE KEcheme								
Male	78	0.88	0.5	NA	NA	44	8	3.12
Female	22	0.73	24	NA	NA	60	22	3.05
YETMEN								
Male	77	1.77	3	NA	NA	28	13	4.64
Female	23	0.95	None	NA	NA	94	57	4.43

Taking all assets into account female-headed households tended to be worse off on average than male-headed households in all sites, most notably in Dinki where 53% of female-headed households were in the bottom asset quintile compared with 16% of male-headed households.

	%age of households							
	Turufe K		Yetmen		Koro		Dinki	
	MH	FH	MH	FH	MH	FH	MH	FH
Top quintile	9	5	69	53				
Quintile 2	31	36	26	36	3	3	16	13.2
Quintile 3	31	31	5	10	10	8	38	47.4
Quintile 4	21	16			35	25	30	34.2
Bottom quintile	8	12			52	64	16	5.3

Cultural resources: age of male household head as a source of household wealth and thus power

In the Oromo sites men in their 60s and older have the highest average size of landholdings; mean size decreases as household heads get younger. This is not the case in the Amhara sites where largest mean land sizes are held by men in their 40s and 50s and smallest by those in their 20s. In the sites with irrigated land there is not much difference in access by age in Dinki; in Korodegaga the highest proportion with irrigation (over two-thirds) are in their 40s and 50s and the lowest in their 20s (over one-third). The integrated sites have a higher proportion of male-headed household without livestock and oxen than the remote sites. Again the age effect is clearly seen in the Oromia sites particularly with regard to ownership of oxen. Young male-headed households in Yetmen have greater access to oxen than elsewhere. This can be associated with differences in ideologies: in Amhara on marriage there are endowments from both sets of parents, while among the Oromo bridewealth is passed to the parents of the groom.

	Age of hh head %	Mean landholding Hectares	Landless %	Mean irrigated land – estimate hectares	Access to irrigated land %	No oxen %	No livestock %	Asset index score
KORODEGAGA								
20s	25	1.40	None	0.15	35	46	4	1.63
30s	28	2.06	1.9	0.34	50	46	9	1.78
4/50s	31	2.97	1.7	0.56	68	31	9	1.58
60s+	17	3.17	3.1	0.46	53	28	6	1.56
DINKI								
20s	15	1.02	None	0.12	32	53	5	2.79
30s	34	1.07	None	0.09	25	39	9	2.66
4/50s	24	1.71	None	0.14	36	26	7	2.52
60s+	28	1.48	None	0.15	33	43	5	2.35
TURUFE KEHEME								
20s	21	0.68	5.0	NA	NA	63	25	3.13
30s	28	0.84	9.4	NA	NA	50	11	3.28
4/50s	31	0.98	13.8	NA	NA	48	12	2.98
60s+	20	1.00	8.6	NA	NA	23	14	3.05
YETMEN								
20s	15	1.23	10.7	NA	NA	29	14	4.50
30s	28	1.68	3.7	NA	NA	40	15	4.69
4/50s	35	2.15	None	NA	NA	15	9	4.73
60s+	22	1.66	None	NA	NA	34	14	4.53

Due to lack of access to land it was reported that young men were unable to set up new households at the appropriate age.

BOX A1.36: CONSEQUENCES OF LAND SHORTAGE FOR YOUNG MEN

From Dinki:

There is a lag in the household development cycle because many boys have not yet married due to the problems of land.

From Korodegaga:

Land is owned by the state with peasant households being give use rights. Land has not been redistributed in Korodegaga since the first allocation in 1975 creating a class of landless young men dependent on their parents (*jirata*).

The age for marriage starts from 15 to the female and 18 to the male. In recent times, due to the scarcity of resource it exceeds to 20-25 for many in the community.

There are many landless young men in the kebele. Though they are members of the Korodegaga community, they are not considered to be members of the Korodegaga *kebele* administration. This is because they have no land, and do not pay land tax to the government. To be a member of the *kebele* administration requires a person to have land. Thus, most of these members of the community aspire to the redistribution of farmlands. They believe that getting farmland may help them not only to ensure *kebele* membership but also to play significant roles in the developmental activities of the people

Appendix 3: The Evidence Base – Structures and Agency in the Field of Human Re/Production 2003-2005

A3.1 The gendered division of labour

The second major field of action in which all members of the community are involved is human production and reproduction. 'Human production' includes pregnancy, birth, and investments in children in terms of socialisation and education for future human resources. Human reproduction involves the use of material and social resources to maintain people on a daily basis including food, housing, household assets, clothes, etc.

We saw in Section 3 of the main text that women and girls are the main household actors in the field of human production and reproduction, although young boys may also contribute reproductive labour and adult males build and maintain the houses, contribute material resources for reproduction, and participate in the raising of children. Wives manage domestic labour and are responsible for ensuring that the household has water and fuel and for grain grinding, shopping, baking, cooking, brewing, cleaning and maintaining the house, and managing domestic labour if there are daughters and/or housemaids. Those who are mothers are simultaneously responsible for becoming pregnant, carrying the pregnancy, giving birth, childcare and its management, and involved in the socialisation of their children, the training of their daughters in housework skills and management, and organising the household's domestic labour if there are daughters and/or housemaids. They also have to manage the care of the sick, and of disabled and old dependents, who may not live in the household. Daughters begin to help mothers at the age of 5 or 6 and by the time they are 12 or so they may be doing the bulk of the household's domestic work. Wives also have additional important roles in working with their husbands to cope with life's problems and providing hospitality, particular during ceremonies and feasts.

BOX A2.1: DOMESTIC WORK AND ITS MANAGEMENT

From Turufe Kecheme:

A successful farmer's wife respects what her husband says, is morally brave enough to withstand any life problems with her lovable husband, is satisfied with what they have rather than living a dreaming life, and volunteers to help out and do farm activities when she has time. She should be able to manage and handle the household and furniture, be good at receiving and accommodating guests, be able to make home made furniture such as *sifet* and *fetil*, and be good at home decorating and able to spin. She should be good at home economics and at managing and economising on consumption goods. Social skills most respected include engaging in off-farm activities to support the household economically, preparing for the ceremonies of death (including *iddir*), weddings, and the different feasts. The housewives' responsibility are evaluated by the community..

Husbands and wives also invest time in maintaining networks of relations with other men and women outside the household for mutual support and enjoyment: neighbours, friends, relatives and in Arssi other clan members.

BOX A2.2: EXTERNAL NETWORKS OF RELATIONS

From Korodegaga:

Most of the time, friendship is established at village level. Sometimes, immediate neighbours are also friends. For old people, living together for a long time is the cause for forming friendship. The community elders, in particular, move together to solve community problems like conflicts and disagreements. Young people establish friendship based on their age and gender. School children form friendship with their school mates. They walk to and from the school together; they play football and swim in the river with their friends.

Generally, friendship is age and gender oriented. It is not common to see friendly relationship between boys and girls. Even in the school boys and girls play separately; again boys and girls do not swim together. People say that this kind of distinction has been practised for many years and recently, the strengthening of the Sharia law has tightened it.

Economic and social obligations are more to father's kin than to mother's kin since descent is reckoned through the father's line. Most of the time mothers come from distant areas for marriage. Therefore children do not have close affection for the mother's kin and they give priority to father's kin for all things. Kinship in Oromia is very wide, because they consider relatives, clans and adoptions to be in kin group.

Over two-thirds of females of working age in the remote sites did domestic work as their main activity in the month before the RANS, compared with 45% in Turufe Kecheme and 58% in Yetmen (Table A2.1). The majority performed 'general housework', though a substantial minority specialised in a particular activity such as cooking, food processing, fetching wood and water and childcare.

TABLE A2.1: MAIN ACTIVITY MAY/JUNE 2004				
	Remote		Integrated	
	FEMALE			
	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
DOMESTIC WORK	67.8%	72.7%	45.2%	58.3%
Caring (children)	4.8%	2.2%	1.3%	2.3%
Fetching wood/water	6.2%	5.1%	3.7%	5.0%
Processing food for household consumption	6.6%	4.8%	10.8%	8.2%
Cooking	2.6%	1.8%	5.5%	5.0%
Sewing		0.2%	0.1%	
General housework	47.6%	58.6%	23.8%	37.8%
	MALE			
HOUSEHOLD WORK	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%
House-building				2.8%
DOMESTIC WORK	2.3%	2.4%	2.6%	4.1%
Caring (children)	2.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.5%
Fetching wood/water		0.6%	1.5%	1.5%
Processing food for household consumption		0.2%		0.8%
Cooking			0.3%	0.5%
General housework		1.4%	0.7%	0.8%

The more domestic work is done by daughters the less their mothers have to do and vice versa. If daughters spend increasing time on daily labour and/or education the work burden on their mothers increases.

BOX A2.3: DOMESTIC WORK CONFLICTS

From Korodegaga:

Sometimes, daughters refuse to perform housework because they prefer daily labour than housework, as it helps them to get income. As a result, conflicts may arise between the mother and daughter; some households solve the dispute through discussion; fathers may also be involved in the discussion. In addition to salary, daily labour helps daughters to get free time with their friends (both females and males). The involvement of daughters in daily labour creates a heavy housework burden on their mothers because they have to perform and manage all the above mentioned tasks.

A3.2 The production of human beings

In this section we describe the local institutions and relationships which affect marriage and the birth of children. Household formation begins with marriage which in most cases is followed by the birth of children. Children are seen as potential workers and carers in old age. The efficient operation of a farm and a homestead is seen as requiring a mix of male and female children and, given high infant and child mortality rates which were even higher in the past, the ideal number of children has been high.

Marriage-related institutions

Marriage

There are a number of different marriage institutions in the sites. The two major types are the Amhara Orthodox Christian contract-based institutions (Yetmen, and groups in Dinki and Turufe Kecheme) and Oromo Islam-related bridewealth-related institutions (Korodegaga and the largest group in Turufe Kecheme) which include polygyny, widow inheritance and sororate (marriage to a sister of a wife who dies). There are also polygynous marriages in the Argobba group in Dinki who are also Muslims. Turufe Kecheme contains Tigrayans with similar arrangements to those of the Amhara, some groups from the Southern Region with their own institutions, and a few Catholics and Protestants.

BOX A2.4: MAIN FORMS OF MARRIAGE

From Yetmen (Amhara):

Marriage is a contractual agreement between a man and a woman involving pooling of labour and property to establish a new household and raise children. The main forms of marriage are known as 'equal partners', communion and pay marriage; there is also living together.

From Turufe Kecheme (Oromo Arssi):

An Oromo Muslim may have up to 4 wives. Apart from bridewealth marriage there are the following forms: family exchange (man's sister marries wife's brother) - this marriage avoids bridewealth; abduction: *buta* (no longer practised); *hewata*: marriage agreed by the couple; *dalla*: inheritance of a widow; *benbeto*: marriage to dead wife's sister.

Customarily first marriages were arranged between the parents of the groom and bride; often the first inkling the bride had that she was to be married was people arriving for the wedding. This still occurs, although young people are increasingly resistant. First marriages are accompanied by exchanges of wealth between families and gifts to the couples. The Oromo system involves bridewealth payments from the groom's family to the wife's family which are associated with the customs of the replacement of a dead wife by a sister and the marriage of a widow to one of her dead husband's brothers. In the Amhara system the parents from both sides give (in theory equal) negotiated presents or endowments to the couple. The rules of both systems, particularly the Amhara system, make it likely that marriages will take place between families of similar wealth status.

BOX A2.5: FIRST MARRIAGES - EXCHANGES BETWEEN FAMILIES AND GIFTS TO THE COUPLE

From Yetmen:

For a first marriage elders chosen by the parents of the prospective groom are sent to the parents of prospective bride; the bride is expected to be a virgin. The bridegroom gives presents to the bride. Parents give (negotiated and equal) presents to the couple to give them a good start in living an independent life. In 2005 it was said that each set of parents may give ¼ hectare land; otherwise the groom works on father's land and shares a third of the produce.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Among the Amhara and Tigrayans 'bridewealth' is less than 300 *birr*. For the Oromo it can be up to 3,000 *birr*. For poor people it is 100 *birr* and *tej*. The average bridewealth payment is 1000 *birr*.

There are rules about who can marry whom. In Korodegaga and among the Turufe Kecheme Oromo marriage within a clan is forbidden. Couples who break this rule are likely to be socially excluded. The Amhara have a rule that two people who have a kinship relationship up to the seventh degree of consanguinity cannot marry, but it no longer seems to be strictly enforced beyond the third degree. There are desirable ages of marriage: in Korodegaga girls should be more than 15 and boys more than 18. In Yetmen child marriage is practised.

BOX A2.6: CHILD MARRIAGE

From Yetmen:

Child marriage: parents of children propose they be married when 8 to 12 years old and a feast is held. They stay in parents' houses until they receive resources to start their own family. Marriage often does not last long as the children do not want to live together. Then they can marry again by their own choice or their parents'.

Women heading households

Between 23% and 24% of households in each of the sites were headed by a woman in 2004. Some of these were widows, some divorced or separated, and some were 'minor' or rejected first wives of polygynous husbands. Some of these had been abandoned, while others reported themselves as the head of the household with the husband (who might be reported as the head of another household) as a household member.

	Amhara		Oromia	
Integrated	Yetmen		Turufe Kecheme	
	Male	2.6%	Male	1.0%
	Female	51.7%	Female	71.7%
Remote	Dinki		Korodegaga	
	Male	3.8%	Male	5.7%
	Female	57.9%	Female	65.6%

Most women heading households in all the sites are widows. Some will be able to get back on to the *ideal household development cycle* by remarrying while others will remain female-headed until either a son who has grown up takes over the household, or the woman dies or is taken into a younger household as a dependent. There was an interesting report from the female Research Officer in Dinki related to women's decisions to remarry. A number said that they had not remarried to avoid the situation where their children became stepchildren in the new household which might lead to exploitation and/or neglect by the new husband.

Proportions of widows in the sites with Amhara residents, among whom divorce is relatively acceptable and remarriage encouraged, are lower (Dinki 58%; Yetmen 52% compared with Korodegaga 66% and Turufe Kecheme 72%) and proportions of female-headed households headed by divorced women are notably higher in the sites with significant Amhara populations (Table A2.3).

	Amhara		Oromia	
Integrated	Yetmen		Turufe Kecheme	
	Male	2.6%	Male	0
	Female	37.9%	Female	11.7%
Remote	Dinki		Korodegaga	
	Male	5.3%	Male	1.5%
	Female	34.2%	Female	6.6%

The qualitative evidence from all the sites (Box A2.8) confirms that divorce and remarriage are common among the Amhara, but rare in the Arssi Oromo sites. It is interesting that the explanation from Turufe Kecheme is focused on the bridewealth payment, while that from Korodegaga is couched in terms of Islamic *sharia* law.

BOX A2.7: DIVORCE

From Yetmen:

If there is a dispute between husband and wife they usually get divorced. In 2005 respondents said that divorce is becoming common. People are getting divorced without any apparent reason. Either of the spouses can appeal to divorce and the elders who were involved in the marriage try to reconcile them. But if one of the spouses is resolute in getting divorced, the property is divided equally and children also go equally for both. The father is supposed to pay a fixed amount of money each month, (it might be in kind) for little children who will stay with their mother till they reach the age of six. There is no difference of opinion between government, religious leaders and elders regarding divorce. All of these do not want spouses to get divorced, but if they do not want to live together, no one can prevent it. The people who got divorced will marry again soon. A divorced woman especially is sought out because she has resources which were divided from her previous husband. The man also gets married even if his resources decline. In some rare cases a divorced man marries another divorced woman to create jealousy, leading to the marriage of the husband's former wife and his new wife's former husband.

From Dinki:

Christian women can divorce their husbands if they do not want to live with them. Bridewealth and dowry are divided in proportion to what each contributed. Christian women also have a right to a share of the land or household property. It was reported that Muslim women do not have the right to divorce; if her husband does not want a divorce she cannot get the divorce document and if she leaves home without this she cannot remarry. In the past if a Muslim couple divorced the woman would take only her clothes and 30 *birr* (about £2). In 2005 it was reported that she can get 200-500 *birr*. However, a Muslim woman does not

have the right to land on divorce, even if she counted as a household member during the distribution of land. 'This is because of the Islamic law on marriage'³⁵

From Turufe Kecheme:

The divorce in which a wife gets half the assets including land applies only to marriages among Tigrayans and Amharas. The amount of land each has depends on how many children they take with them. If a woman (Arssi Oromo) is married under *gabera*, some people believe that she has no right to share all the properties. This is because her husband paid more (as *gabera*) to her parents to marry her. But she can take her clothes, house equipment and other properties that she got from her relatives as a gift during the marriage. If there are children, especially sons, who live with the woman, he shares land for bringing up the children. Later on the land belongs to the children. Both the widows and the widowers have a right to remarry if they can.

From Korodegaga:

Divorce is rare because of the religious influence of sharia law; couples may separate. By 2005, a divorced woman had acquired the right to share land with her husband.

Polygynous marriages

These are most frequent in Korodegaga and, as Box A2.9 shows, often involve the rejection of the first wife.

BOX A2.8: POLYGYNY

From Korodegaga:

When the husband has a second and third wife, he refuses the first wife and she lives with her children in a separate house. He does not help in labour or finance. The properties (cattle and land) are shared by elders and mediators. The children live with their mother. Religious law does not allow divorce and the husband must care for all wives equally, but in reality this does not work.

However, arrangements may be more complex, as exemplified by one of our 'Household Diary Households', where an elderly elite man reported that he managed what might be called a 'livelihood complex' of 18 people, which consisted of three sub-households each occupied by one of his wives and a 'daughter' (one a real daughter, one an adopted relative, and one a grandchild) and in one case a son, who partially provided for their own needs by doing daily labour and/or selling firewood, plus two adult sons living separately with their families who had achieved partial independence but many of whose activities, at least in the eyes of the old man, were organised by the patriarch.

Widows and widowers

In the Amhara culture widows and widowers are expected to remarry. Among the Oromo there are rules about who a widow can marry. Customarily a widow is expected to marry a brother of her dead husband.

BOX A2.9: INHERITED WIVES

From Korodegaga:

Dalla (inheritance of widows) is one of the important types of marriage applicable in Korodegaga until now. If a husband's wife dies, the man can inherit his wife's sister. He does not make any payment (such as *Gabara* or clothes). Equally if the husband dies, the wife may be inherited by her husband's eldest brother. If the eldest brother is too old, he transfers the responsibility to the second eldest but takes a cloth (*bulluko*) from his younger brother as an exchange for the inherited woman. This type of marriage is done a year after the death of the head: this year allows her to forget her dead husband and is called *gufufa* (bad year). After a year the dead man's brother calls a meeting of his and her relatives and elders to fix the day on which he will be her formal husband called *kaya-oga* which means the last day of sadness and the beginning of a new life.

³⁵ This belief is counter to national legislation and lay behind the opposition of Argobba men to the land measurement in 2005 which is discussed further in Section 6.

From Turufe Kecheme:

A younger brother can inherit the wife and property of a deceased older brother and bring up the latter's children if the wife has not reached the menopause. This is to prevent the transfer of property to a non-kin group and bad treatment of the children by another husband. If the first younger brother of the dead husband is not willing to inherit the wife he goes to the *shanacha* (elders), tells his problem, and the next younger brother can inherit the wife and property of the elder brother. If the dead husband has no brothers one of the sons of the dead husband's paternal uncle can inherit.

In Korodegaga widows and widowers can remarry unless they are too old, disabled or unable to work: if so their kin have the responsibility to help them. Later marriage is applicable among those who are divorced, widowed or who want to have more than one wife. It is prohibited to marry a divorced or widowed woman unless the man is also divorced or widowed or wants to marry more than one wife.

Fertility

Infertility

In all sites but Turufe Kecheme infertility was commonly reported as seen as a woman's problem. If a couple proves to be infertile an Amhara man is likely to divorce his wife while an Oromo man is likely to marry a second wife. However, richer couples who are happily married may solve their labour problems by hosting relatives or employing servants, as is the case with one of our Household Diary Households in Dinki.

BOX A2.10: INFERTILITY

From Yetmen:

Infertile women are despised because they are considered to be cursed. Women who do not have children go to holy water and traditional healers. Women's infertility sometimes leads to divorce. There is no identified infertile man in the community.

From Turufe Kecheme:

She would go to the hospital to know if the problem is with her or her husband. If the latter is true nothing will be done. But if the former is true the husband will marry another woman.

From Korodegaga:

Women who are not getting pregnant pray and beg Allah.

Fertility and family planning

High fertility rates were explained by the need for family labour and religious beliefs.

BOX A2.11: EXPLANATIONS OF HIGH FERTILITY

From Dinki:

The division of labour within the household affects the number of children a given household may have. There is a need for more children as sources of labour. Children are a burden only until the age of five or six. The number of children a given family has is affected by traditional attitudes towards fertility. It is believed that God is the one who gives children and whether one has more depends on his will. Although there is a demand for more births, women realise the difficulty of close births. Close births affect farming activity and the wellbeing of the mothers.

From Korodegaga :

Old people believe that having more children is an asset. Children support their parents in labour especially in old age. Having more children means replicating kin / relatives; children also protect their households from outside enemies, especially during conflicts with powerful individuals. In short, children help their parents to get respect and a proper position in the community. This is particularly true if the parents have more sons because sons always live with or around their parents. Girls move to their husband's home after marriage. Even female-headed households can get proper respect if they have more children. On the other hand, young people do not support the idea of having more children. Both young boys and girls told us during the interview on 'young lives' that the increase of population through natural increase is one of the main reasons for the impoverishment of many households. They said that they would make sure they have fewer children than their parents. Poverty itself made them change their attitudes. Some informants realised that because of having many children, they could not fulfil their basic needs (food, clothing, education, sanitation, etc) and their wealth status has decreased.

However, young people are less convinced by these reasons and in recent years there has been a growing desire for smaller families related to an increased use of contraception, particularly in the two integrated sites, Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme.

BOX A2.12: CONTRACEPTION

From Dinki:

Some women in Dinki use birth control method or a tablet which is given from Aliyu Amba medical personnel. However, most women do not use birth control even though they know that having more children leads to poverty. The fruit of *Zarch'e-embway* (*Solanum marginatum*) and prolonged breast-feeding are used to prevent conception.

From Yetmen:

In 2005 respondents said that the desired number of children was 4.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Female informants mentioned that having many children leads to poverty and it also has a negative side effect on the health of mothers. They limit themselves from having many children by using contraceptives. According to *Weyzero AS* (female representative of Turufe) there are three individuals, including herself, who distribute condoms. These individuals get the condoms from NGOs (Catholic, Compassion and Adventist Development and Relief Assistance) and they also have been getting training on different issues. Muslims who follow their religion seriously are prohibited from using contraceptives. The need for male labour on the farms also makes husbands disagree with the use of contraceptives by their wives.

Pregnancy, abortion and illegitimate children

Most pregnant women work until they give birth.

BOX A2.13: PREGNANCY

From Yetmen:

Most pregnant women do not receive any care; they work till they give birth. Pregnant women are given food that they like to eat because the baby will have some kind of mark on its skin if the mother didn't eat what she desired during pregnancy regardless of their economic status.

From Korodegaga:

During pregnancy women are not cared for; they work and eat as usual.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Pregnant women receive nothing although they may change their consumption habits, especially those who are wealthy enough. Women in childbirth receive milk, butter, grain flour and sometimes sheep and goats from their parents, relatives and friends, and *Atmit* (gruel) and *Genfo* (porridge) are common foods.

Only in Korodegaga did five female respondents, who were interviewed separately, claim there was no abortion. In all the other sites it was a recognised practice.

BOX A2.14: ABORTION

From Dinki:

In 1996, abortion was said to be practised when there was an unwanted pregnancy. It was reported that women drank juice from a plant called *Mekan-endod* (*Phytolacca dodecandra*) and *qulqwal* (*Euphorbia candelabrum*) during the first month of pregnancy.

From Yetmen:

Abortion is not easily available. Women usually give birth even if it is an unwanted baby. The abortion may take place in health centres of traditional medicine, but it is risky for women.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Not all pregnancies are wanted. Traditional drugs are taken to terminate unwanted pregnancies. There are some who drink bleach. There are some who drink soup solution. Others consume large quantities of anti-malaria pills. There are some who come to hospital for help after they have started bleeding. *Woman health worker*.

From Korodegaga:

Women do not try to get rid of unwanted pregnancies intentionally. Miscarriage occurs rarely and by accident.

In all sites pregnancy outside marriage is highly disapproved of, with the blame attached to the woman who is likely to be socially excluded.

BOX A2.15: ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

From Yetmen:

In earlier times men used to have illicit children, but now the economic situation and fear of HIV/ AIDS have significantly decreased its prominence. However, there are some men who still go to the urban site and continue to have illicit sexual relationships with women who work in local drinking houses.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Pregnancy out of marriage is discouraged in the community. Youngsters who get pregnant and give birth before marriage are excluded. Many drop out of school and migrate to other areas, leaving their child behind. No one will want to marry them thus they remain dependent on their parents or migrate to other areas.

From Dinki:

It is taboo to have children without having a legal husband. Women who become pregnant outside marriage are undermined by others. They are insulted by the others who feel shame if women have become pregnant out of marriage.

From Korodegaga:

Pregnancy outside marriage is totally unacceptable and leads to stigmatisation. It is believed that every female child should marry at the proper age (15-19). Pregnancy before marriage is culturally illegal. Even widows should be inherited by the brother of their husbands or relatives. If they do not do this, they should keep themselves from having illegal children. A case in point is that one of our diary respondents gave birth to illegal children twice within the past four years. The local people always blame her for spoiling their culture. They have generally have no good attitude towards her.

Giving birth and infancy

Most births take place at home.

BOX A2.16: CHILDBIRTH

From Yetmen:

They usually give birth at their house but are taken to health centres whenever a serious problem happens. After giving birth they stop work for 40 days.

From Korodegaga:

Childbirth is carried out at home for all whether they are rich, middle, or poor. Women give birth with the help of local female experts – having some knowledge and skill about childbirth. It is not common to go to health centre for birth. But if the pregnant woman faces difficulties in childbirth, she is taken to Awash Melkasa or Nazret health centres. Due to lack of transport, people carry her on their shoulders and take her to Sodere, and from Sodere they use mini-buses. After childbirth women stay at home for 2-4 weeks. During this time they are taken care of either by daughters, mother-in-laws, co-wives, or other neighbouring women. The number of weeks a woman may stay at home depends on whether or not she has grown up daughters at home.

There is a high maternal mortality rate.

BOX A2.17: MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES

From Dinki:

Women in and around Dinki have died because of childbirth problems since there is no clinic with professionals. Even at Aliyu Amba clinic, the maternal mortality rate is high and the surrounding women give birth with the help of one traditional midwife.

The publicly expressed preference is for male babies, although women interviewed by women often express a preference for female babies, since these will assist them with domestic work.

BOX A2.18: INFANT GENDER PREFERENCES

From Turufe Kecheme:

There is a belief, particularly among the Orthodox Christians, that it is better to give birth to male than female children. They believe that males can defend themselves and their family from any danger while females are easy victims for enemies. A husband feels happiness when his wife gives birth to a son and the wife also feels proud. The husband may kill a sheep or a goat for the wife who gave birth to a son. When a son is born, women who gather in the house of the woman giving birth make a thin loud clamour called *illita* seven times, but only three times if the child is female.

From Dinki:

One respondent said that all parents say they have greater love for their son than their daughter. Parents provide better food and clothes for their son. Some women said that their husbands usually wanted male children, while they themselves preferred female children. The reason for this preference, according to the women themselves, was because they would receive more help from their children. The men, on the other hand, did not share this argument and said instead that the gender of the child was unimportant to them. The family, as we have noted, could hire a boy to help the man with duties such as taking care of the animals and ploughing. The women, however, did not have this possibility, but were very much dependent on their own children's labour and especially on a teenage daughter.

From Yetmen:

Respondent 1 : Men prefer baby boys. They will buy alcoholic drinks.

Respondent 2 : Women prefer baby boys in order to be secured in old days.

Respondent 3 : Baby girl. They will be happy. But they can't express it since they are afraid of their husband.

Respondent 4 : Mothers like both babies equally. But sometimes when they have many of one they prefer the other.

Infancy

The main problems reported in raising infants relate to feeding them and dealing with their illnesses.

BOX A2.19: INFANCY

From Turufe Kecheme:

The raising of children is much better than before. In the past children suffered from a variety of diseases like kwashiorkor, polio, etc. However, because mothers now get advice on children's health matters these diseases have become rare. But children still suffer from diseases like measles. Of course child-rearing is better among the relatively well-to-do than among the poor. *Woman health worker.*

When children are sick we have to sell our grains first before we take them to hospital. This takes time and the children will be harmed in the meantime.

Nurturing and socialising children

As argued in above 'Developing Children' move through a number of developmental phases. In two protocols we asked a number of male and female key informants in each community a series of questions about children of different genderages.

Causes of harm to babies included poor health and care of the mother during pregnancy, illnesses such as malaria and waterborne diseases, a mother unable to care for and feed the baby, starvation, lack of a balanced diet, lack of vaccination, hygiene not well kept, lack of care due to poverty, not getting medical treatment at the right time.

Causes of harm to girl children included illnesses such as smallpox meningitis, and malaria, and disability, lack of medical care, lack of parental care, inability to play with their friends, dress like her friends, or bad relations with friends, lack of adequate food, being beaten, early marriage (Yetmen), doesn't find a marriage partner,

abduction, if she is abused, lack of modern education, circumcision (Turufe Kecheme), and heavy work – ‘They are burdened with work. They are the ones who accomplish all the housework and also much of the farmwork and many of them go to collect firewood’ (Korodegaga).

Causes of harm to boy children were similar although lack of medical care was not mentioned while mother’s death was, and having no clothes replaced not being able to dress like friends. Not being able to go past Grade 4 was mentioned in Korodegaga where the primary school only covers Grades 1-4.

In Tables A2.4-A2.6 a male respondent from Yetmen describes in more detail and for infants, knee children, roaming children, working/learning children, adolescents and very young adults, the problems faced and goals and expectations of parents and other adults in the community.

TABLE A2.4: PROBLEMS FACED BY CHILDREN OF DIFFERENT AGES – REPORTED FROM YETMEN			
	Common	Male	Female
Infants	Susceptible to disease Lacking appropriate medical care Nutritional failures Mothers leave them to work without arranging appropriate babysitters		
Knee children	Drowning, fire, using harmful objects, dirt Injury from cattle, donkeys Destroying their clothes		
Roaming children	Floods, playing with mud in the rainy season		
Working Children	Not getting access to education; health problems and dropping out of education; workloads and child labour; not getting their meals at the right time. Shortage of clothes and food.		Made to fetch water beyond their capacity; expected to do heavy labour work. If they fail or break the pots they are punished physically and verbally.
Adolescents	At risk of contracting STDs including HIV/AIDS; emotional instability resulting from potential lack of opportunities. At risk of problem behaviours including gambling, drinking, stealing, fighting and getting easily upset.		Girls from poor families face the prospect of not getting married leading to low self-esteem and social ostracism. Threat of rape and unwanted pregnancy.
Very young adults	Problems for them are primarily related to shortage or lack of land, unemployment and AIDS.	Poor young men employed as labourers in other people’s households are at risk of labour abuse and exploitation.	

‘Developing children’ (0-16) face a number of problems, which are much more severe for those in poorer households. Nutritional failures, diseases, and the lack of appropriate medical care are common problems but most problematic for infants and small children. The norm is for children to start work at around the age of 6; working/learning children may expected to do work ‘beyond their capacity’ in terms of strength and may not get access to education. They may not get their meals at the right times and shortage of clothes and food may be a problem, particularly in times of drought in the remote sites.

Adolescents suffer from emotional instability, which may be related to realising they lack opportunities. They are at risk of problem behaviour; males may get into gambling, drinking, stealing, fighting and ‘getting easily upset’ while females are at risk of rape and unwanted pregnancy. Both sexes are at risk of contracting STDs, including HIV/AIDS. Girls from poor families face the prospect of not getting married leading to low self-esteem and social ostracism.

Very young adults face problems related to shortage or total lack of land, unemployment and AIDS. Poor young men employed as labourers in other people’s houses are at risk of labour abuse and exploitation.

Parental expectations and goals

Parental goals and expectations for infants are much the same for both sexes; once they have passed the age of 1 or so expectations become increasingly genderised. Male knee children should begin to engage in ‘male

activities' especially herding animals; they should defend themselves against their peers and protect their sisters. They should obey their fathers. The use of bad words and rising aggression is expected. Female knee children should start doing minor activities around the house. They should be obedient to their mother and not be seen naked. They should not talk too much or use bad words and be 'submissive'.

In Yetmen female working/learning children are increasingly confined to the household except for going to school. The labour contribution to male and female household activities increases with age. As adolescents males should behave aggressively and defend their rights behaving in masculine ways and following the father's role. Female adolescents should be non-aggressive and non-confrontational and concentrate on learning domestic skills so that they can get married. They should keep their virginity. Very young adult males and females are expected to help their fathers and mothers and also to work for themselves.

TABLE A2.5: PARENTAL EXPECTATIONS AND GOALS REPORTED FROM YETMEM			
	Common	Male	Female
Infants	Not to be screamers or make tantrum Distinguish members of the household Must check hearing ability Make them play; play with them Teach them to talk Stimulating environment Affection and warmth		
Knee children	To be cool and tolerant; conscious of some dangers. To have good relations with all household members	Engage in male activities: herding animals; defend himself against peers; protect sisters from other's violence; obedient to fathers; the use of bad words and rising aggression are expected	Minor activities in the house; collecting firewood; not being seen naked; obedient to mother; not talking too much or using bad words; should be submissive.
Roaming children	Good relations with neighbouring children Obedient, accepting orders Keep their sanitation.		
Working children	Good sex-appropriate behaviour; good inter-personal relations; follow lessons and get good grades; accept good teaching from teachers or anyone else; do homework; attend school regularly; help parents with work when free from school; keep their personal hygiene; have a positive outlook; no stealing or sabotage. Younger children should work 2 hours a day, middle children 4 hours, and older children 6 hours.	Boys should do men's works such as harvesting, tilling the land, visit the crop in the field and the cattle; play with peers and other friends.	Girls are expected to do household chores including making dungcakes and should be humble and submissive, should not talk too much, should not use bad and cruel words and not be aggressive and rude. She should be obedient to boys at home. She should not go to the field for playing with others.
Adolescents	They should be good at inter-personal relations, obedient, good citizens, and knowledgeable and educated.	Males should behave aggressively and be confronters and defend his rights. He should behave in masculine ways and follow father's roles; be obedient to father. He should do men's work such as farming, making fences, and caring for cattle.	Females should be cool, tolerant, non-aggressive and non-confrontational. They should cook, fetch water, and do female farming activities – weeding and carrying the cut <i>tef</i> . Girls have to learn everything such as cooking, cotton spinning, brewing, how to take care of children. An adolescent girl who fails to fulfil these duties may not get married; and she will be given the nickname <i>geltu</i> . They should keep their pride, integrity and virginity.
Very young adults	They should have good behaviour and personality, they should be skilful in line with their sex roles, and have good inter-personal relations.	Boys of this age work for their families such as harvesting, threshing, tilling, and weeding. They are also expected to work for themselves.	Girls should do women's work such as baking <i>injera</i> , cooking <i>wat</i> and fetching water; they should also work for themselves.

Parental activities in relation to children of different ages

Small children, working children and adolescents may be beaten if they behave badly. Other socialisation incentives include meeting their needs, teaching them directly, keeping them from bad peers, rewarding, encouraging and praising and offering incentives for doing particular things. Fathers help young male adults to save for their future independent lives and discuss their futures with them. Parents may have relationship problems with working children but report that the main issues start with adolescence.

TABLE A2.6: PARENTAL ACTIVITIES IN RELATION TO CHILDREN REPORTED FROM YETMEN			
	Common	Male	Female
Infants	Must check hearing ability Make them play; play with them Teach them to talk Stimulating environment Affection and warmth Take them to clinics when sick and get them vaccinated. Dress them in good clean clothes.		
Knee children	Teach them about dangers Teach them to be clean; toilet training. Teach them languages Socialisation: discouraging bad behaviour; scolding; praising; giving incentives; explaining	To teach and encourage boys we also have some sex-typed language; for example 'please beat him/her'. A stick is given to the boy and he will be taught how to use it.	
Roaming children	Teach them to do what is necessary; e.g. washing their clothes, eating, avoiding bad peers Punishing wrong behaviour by showing anger and mild corporal punishment Praising good behaviour	Trained, advised and encouraged to practice sex-role typed activities.	Trained, advised and encouraged to practice sex-role typed activities.
Working children	Meet the needs of the children; teach them and order them to do good things; keep them from bad peers; punish and reward as appropriate; encourage, praise and advise. They are punished by frightening, being angry and corporal punishment. They may also be offered incentives for doing particular things.		
Adolescents	Advice, teaching, explaining, and punishing including beatings, rewards including sheep or calf, praise and blessing. Issues of sexuality, childbearing, STDs and AIDS are raised through educative discussions by parents and teachers.	Some adolescents are difficult to beat; the options are to advise them and if they do not respond to drive them out of the home.	Female child is told to be womanly; she should be obedient to her mother and follow her mother's skills and roles.
Very young adults	Similar to adolescents. Parents and community members also discuss with them matters relating to staying in the community and migration. Help them to save grain, money or assets for their future independent lives.	Helping the males not to use the savings for drinking and other extravagances.	

Inter-generational relations

Parents may have relationships problems with children of working/learning age but the main issues start with adolescence.

BOX A2.20: PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS

From Yetmen:

Parents get happiness and pleasure when they see the working/learning children around them and if their education is going well, their work is going well, their health is maintained and they are good at inter-personal relations. Mothers may face problems from sons of this age if their needs are not met, including insults and stone-throwing. Fathers get angry with their sons when they say such things as 'I don't want to

eat this' or 'I won't wear these clothes'.

In their relationship with adolescents fathers and mothers face problems of disobedience and from the demands they make, though they generally find something good in the relationships such as being helped with their work.

These young adults do not accept advice and their needs and interests are always strange and difficult to meet.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Older people regard the behaviour of some young men as undesirable. These includes, chewing *chat*, drinking local drinks, and smoking, which waste their time and affect their economy. These in turn may have a major impact on their work. An undesirable trait for a young man is to have interest in sexual intercourse. It is because of such interest that they get married and begin to lead a new life before becoming self-sufficient economically.

Educating children

Parents send children to school partly in the hope that they will do well and secure off-farm employment, and partly because they recognise the value of literacy and numeracy and modern knowledge.

Religious education

Religious schools are found in all sites. There has been a flourishing of Islamic education in Korodegaga related to the recent building of three mosques with finance from Saudi Arabia. In Dinki there is a woman who teaches the Koran to children and a few young men who are being educated in *madrasas* in Saudi Arabia. In Yetmen attendance at the local priest school had declined

BOX A2.21: RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING

From Yetmen:

In 2005 respondents said that, unlike earlier times, it is only a few children who attend local priest school before they start attending primary schools. Mostly these children are the ones who help their parents by looking after cattle and by performing other duties, and who attend the priest schools simultaneously. But when their parents decide to send them to school they start learning formal education. However most children at ages of six or seven are sent to school after their family members teach them the Amharic alphabet.

Formal education

Korodegaga has a primary school Grades 1-4. There is a junior school within walking distance at Sodere. Junior and high schools can be attended in Dera by renting a house. The nearest primary school to Dinki is a walk of around 30 minutes and provides Grades 1-3. They can pursue education up to Grade 8 in the town of Aliyu Amba (around 9 km) but must go Debre Birhan for high school (60 km). There is easy access to primary and secondary schools from Turufe Kecheme. Yetmen has a junior school (Grades 1-8). For secondary education they must go to town (Dejen or Bichena) which involves hiring accommodation.

Given that many people of non-official school age are keen for an education the ages of those attending schools are widely dispersed. The average ages of the RANS sample of males in Grade 4 in mid-2004 were 17 in Dinki, 16 in Turufe Kecheme, and 15 in Korodegaga and Yetmen.

BOX A2.22: EDUCATION

From Korodegaga:

There is no fixed age at which pupils start their education. As generally they start formal education from the age of seven to forty / fifty years old. So they have different age groups in different classes. At grade one they started to read and at two/three they write effectively. The community people would like to see changes in their standard of living and they want to educate their all children. At the present time they learn Oromiffa, mathematics, civics, English, sport, music, drawing, environment, science and social science. Under civics, they learn about democracy, human rights, citizenship, harmful culture, etc. In addition to the Korodegaga elementary school, some students attend Sodere elementary school (1-6 grade). Still others (boys) learn in Itaya primary school by staying in their relatives' home. After completing elementary education, Dera is the most favourable location to continue secondary education because the nearest high school is located there. Only some male students continue their secondary education in Nazret high

school. It is difficult to determine the average ages of students in each grade, but it is possible to give the range. In grade one, the age of female students extends from 7 to 19, and boys from 8 to 22; in grade four the range for girls is from 13 to 18 and for boys 13 to 21.

From Yetmen: Students go to Dejen or Bichena for secondary education; they usually rent rooms in groups while their parents send them food.

Table A2.7 shows that in the integrated sites in 2004 there was no gender difference in studying; in Korodegaga there was a small difference, while in Dinki more than twice as many males were in education.

	Amhara	Oromia
Integrated	Yetmen	Turufe Kecheme
	Male: 52.8% Female: 52.2%	Male: 67.8% Female: 66.9%
Integrated	Dinki	Korodegaga
	Male: 41.2% Female: 19.1%	Male: 44.4% Female: 36.1%

Table A2.8 shows the numbers of male and female students in Yetmen school in 2005

Grade	Students who were registered			Students who completed			Number of Teachers in each grade
	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	
1	126	142	268	113	126	239	4
2	78	103	181	87	90	167	3
3	80	90	170	72	90	162	3
4	79	69	148	78	70	148	2
5	97	72	169	90	69	157	5
6	75	70	145	74	69	143	5
7	184	137	321	179	143	322	7
8	170	151	321	155	154	309	7
Total	889	834	1723	848	809	1657	29*

* The total number of teachers was 29 out of whom 10 were females. But the sum in that column is greater than 29 because some teachers teach in more than one grade starting from grade five to grade eight.

There were more girls than boys in Grades 1-3.

BOX A2.23: THE CURRICULUM IN YETMEN

From Yetmen:

Most households with one son will not send him to school as he will be required for cattle herding; daughters can help before and after school. The drop-outs were reported as being mostly boys. Students from Grades 1 to 4 learn Amharic, environmental science, English, mathematics and physical education, music and drawing- as one subject. They attend two classes a day which are two hours each, and it is mostly student-centred with active student participation. Students from Grades 5 to 8 take Amharic and physical education in common. But basic science, music and drawing which are taken by students in grade 5 and 6 are substituted by chemistry, physics and biology for students in Grades 7 and 8. An average student reads and writes effectively at Grade 2. But if a student attended priest school before coming to school s/he might read and write well even in Grade 1. However, some students may not read and write effectively up to Grade 3. Students who complete their Grade 8 and pass the national examinations are sent to Bichena to attend secondary school. But for some students who have relatives in Dejen and want to learn there, a letter is written for the school to enrol them, because Dejen is not in our *wereda* and the school has no obligation to enrol students from Yetmen.

Only 1 person from Dinki (a female) and 11 from Korodegaga (10 males and 1 female) were reported as being in secondary education. There were 124 from Turufe Kecheme 60% of which were male and 62 from Yetmen, 31 of each sex.

BOX A2.24: SECONDARY EDUCATION AND BEYOND

From Yetmen:

All boys should go to secondary school but they face problems which are lack of money for house rent or shortage of affordable rental houses, food shortage, food spoiling and the risk of STDs. Girls should also go to secondary schools and face the same problems plus the risk of unwanted pregnancy.

Korodegaga:

After completing primary school in the kebele, some parents do not volunteer to send their daughters to towns to continue their education. They believe they may establish special relationship with boys and give birth to illegal children which is not acceptable..

Turufe Kecheme:

A few rich households send their children to Addis to attend school. Some community members of Turufe send a child to Awassa to attend college education, covering the expense for college education, house rent and consumptions.

Children growing up

Gender differences become accentuated among adolescents and with potential sexual activity the differences become most salient with greatly increased risks for girls and young women of abduction, rape, forced marriage, and not finding a husband. Adolescent boys in Dinki were said to be 'beyond the age of beating' as they may rebel, whereas girls could still be beaten for misconduct. Young men were said to risk engaging in premature sexual behaviour exposing them to HIV/AIDS. Very young men may be promised or given land as well as animals as rewards, whereas young women may be given animals, clothes and jewelry. Young men face challenges of gaining access to land and livestock, finding a wife, whereas young women face challenges of marriage, pregnancy and childbearing.

Young men and women of this age are frequently contributing to the household economy while trying to establish themselves as adults in an environment with insufficient farming opportunities for all and, in the remote sites, few off-farm opportunities, and in the integrated sites great competition for the opportunities that exist leading to unemployment and underemployment particularly for males. Parents worry about these young people, and at the same time are prone to get into conflicts with them. Uneducated parents may have particular problems in understanding the mindsets and ambitions of educated children.

Other sources of domestic labour

Households with insufficient domestic labour may bring in relatives or adopt, or if richer employ maidservants.

Incorporating relatives

In Oromo culture adoption may be used to build up a household's labour supply. Adoption is not common among the Amhara but they may host relatives for longer or shorter periods for the same purpose.

BOX A2.25 : INCORPORATION OF RELATIVES

From Korodegaga:

There do not appear to be women without children; if there are, they raised children of their husband's second wife or relative's children in the principle of adoption. Therefore, except a few people who have close contact, other people outside the community would not know about a woman's infertility.

Domestic servants

Richer households may employ servants to fill labour gaps and in domestic labour.

A3.3 Human reproduction

In this section we consider household consumption of basic goods and services, illnesses, treatments and deaths, and reproductive assets.

Household consumption

Women and girls are mainly responsible for providing household members with food and other basic goods such as coffee, sugar, oil, salt, spices, soap, matches etc, and water and fuel. This means that time has to be found for grinding the grain into flour, which may be done at home or by taking the grain to a mill, going to the market, travelling to and from the water source, and collecting fuelwood or making dungcakes. In the integrated sites the distances that have to be travelled are a lot shorter than in the remote sites.

Food and other consumption goods

The staple diet in all sites is grain, made into *injera* or porridge, with a stew made of vegetable protein. However diet varies with wealth and rich households may eat meat, eggs, vegetables and dairy products fairly regularly while poor households may regularly replace the *wot* with *berbere* made from local spices.

BOX A2.26: STAPLES

From Dinki:

In times when there is no drought or famine the staple food for most households is *injera* prepared from sorghum and *wot* prepared from beans and chickpeas. Sometimes people also use banana, pepper, or sugar mixed with *berbere* as a substitute for *wot*. In times of war, drought or famine, wild foods are eaten. People buy salt, sugar, spices and oil at the market.

From Korodegaga:

The most commonly consumed food includes *injera* (from *tef*), porridge (*genfo*)- made from barley and mixture of maize and wheat, *nifro* - made from *boloke* (haricot beans) and maize, and roasted maize mainly during the harvest season. The rich and medium households can get eggs, chickens (sometimes), and meat of goats and sheep as well as dairy products. The very poor and destitute households do not get such kinds of special food. Milk is obtained mainly from cows but also from goats and camels (if they have camels). Some individuals catch fish from the Awash, which they use for home consumption. Everybody can get vegetables, mainly onions, tomatoes, green peppers and cabbages because these crops can be obtained at any time from the irrigation farms. Though there are some fruits like papaya, and sugar cane, they are sold at market. The consumption of vegetables started with the expansion of irrigation farms in the community. The consumption of eggs is also a recent development. The introduction of the hybrid chickens by SHI in coordination with the *wereda* agricultural and extension office greatly contributed to the presence of eggs in large quantities. On special occasions such as fasting, people drink *shorba*, a drink made from barley. On holidays they may consume milk, butter and eggs; as well as *chat* in some households.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Injera, bread, potatoes and *shiro* (beans) are common foods. The rich make *injera* with *tef*, and others use a mixture of *tef*, wheat, maize and barley. Many middle and poor households eat *enset* when they face food scarcity (May-June). Meat is consumed mostly on holidays. Some rich and middle households get milk from their cows.

From Yetmen:

The people usually eat *injera* and *wot* which is often made from beans or vetch. Rich people can get varieties of food such as vegetables, meat and dairy products, while most middle-wealth and poor people eat the same item of food most of the time. There is no considerable change of food items except in fasting seasons, when the supply of grains dwindles in some households. Starting from the rainy season they are forced to decrease the number of meals they take in a day. And during this time they plant vegetables in their backyards which can be eaten soon. On special occasions such as holidays, rich and middle-wealth people slaughter sheep by themselves, while the rest may contribute money to buy and slaughter a sheep in groups. This is when the holidays are seen by the people as very important. But on other holidays, poor and middle-wealth people may not do anything new to celebrate the holiday.

Grain availability varies through the year, being highest following the main harvesting season which is roughly between September and January depending on the site. In Yetmen in the year 2003/4 74% of households produced enough staple to see them through the year while this only applied to 11% of households in Korodegaga where 46% of households bought a half or more of the staple eaten.

TABLE A2.9: PROPORTION OF STAPLES BOUGHT JULY 2003 – JUNE 2004				
	Amhara		Oromia	
Integrated	Yetmen		Turufe Kecheme	
	None	74%	None	32%
	A small proportion	12%	A small proportion	37%
	Around half	4%	Around half	9%
	A large proportion	4%	A large proportion	8%
	All	6%	All	15%
Remote	Dinki		Korodegaga	
	None	25%	None	11%
	A small proportion	45%	A small proportion	43%
	Around half	22%	Around half	28%
	A large proportion	2%	A large proportion	18%
	All	5%	All	0%

Other consumption goods

Yetmen and Turufe are close to regular markets and to shops.

BOX A2.27: TURUFE KEcheme'S SHOPS

From Turufe Kecheme:

There are six shops in the *kebele*. These shops normally stock items such as coffee, sugar, oil, kerosene, soap, salt, matches, blades, pens, pencils, exercise books, soft drinks, biscuits, white bread, *sambusa* (samosas) and cigarettes. The nearest drug shop is found in Kuyera town, 4 km from Turufe and 8 km from Wetera and is privately owned. The government drug shop is at Shashemene town; there is also a shop at the hospital (2km)

The journey to the market in Aliyu Amba from Dinki takes one hour and a half on foot and from Korodegaga to Dera takes three hours. Some go to Sodere which takes around 30 minutes and from there may pay to get to Awash Melkasa using mechanised transport.

Drinking water

Yetmen residents have easy access to piped or well water. Residents of Dinki use river or spring water. People in Korodegaga get their water from the nearest river; the distances travelled from the 7 villages vary. There are problems with river pollution in both sites, which are reported to cause illnesses in Korodegaga.

BOX A2.28: DRINKING WATER

From Yetmen:

Piped water was introduced in Yetmen town 1996. Rural people use water wells for many household chores. Others buy water from the urban site or from a common tap in some rural places.

From Dinki:

77% of households got water from the rivers and 23% from springs. To get pure water from the rivers in Dinki is impossible; one fetches water downstream when someone has washed his body or clothes upstream.

From Korodegaga:

All RANS households obtained water from one of the rivers. The Awash, flows through year, but is regularly polluted from factories and hotels. The Kelata declines during the dry season. RANS respondents were unclear as to ownership of the rivers: owned by no-one – 37%; community owned – 5%; government owned – 5%; don't know – 11%; other – 42%.

There have been problems and conflicts related to drinking water access in Turufe Kecheme.

BOX A2.29: CONFLICTS OVER DRINKING WATER

From Turufe Kecheme :

In 2004 access to water was: communal piped water 44%; spring water 26%; river water 13%; purchased private pipe 8%; private pipe 5%; well 4%. Shortly after the survey the communal pipe broke down and most of the dwellers were forced to use river and spring water. There was a pipeline near the mosque which was far for most people and for which non-Muslims had to pay. However, there was construction of a water pipeline for the local hospital, through the co-operation of people from Turufe under the *iddir*. Though the pipeline is for the hospital, the administrators promised to leave the water pipe which the hospital had been using and which comes through Turufe for the use of the village. In September 2005 the hospital started to use water from the new pipeline and left the old pipe for Turufe. However, the former pipeline of the hospital was broken at Turufe by those whose land it passed through but who could not benefit from it. Two rich households, a former *kebele* leader and an agricultural office employee have constructed a pipeline for their small local area. Other households are on the way to an agreement with the neighbourhood to contribute money in order to construct a pipeline.

Sanitation

Despite sporadic government campaigns which began during the Derg period people in all sites but Turufe Kecheme have proved reluctant to build and use latrines. A major part of Turufe Kecheme has remained villagised, while Dinki was never villagised and the people of Korodegaga abandoned the village following the end of the Derg regime.

BOX A2.30: SANITATION

From Turufe Kecheme:

Flush toilet	2%
Improved pit latrine	2%
Other pit latrine	47%
Bucket toilet	4%
None (outdoors)	45%

From Yetmen:

RANS 2004: 98% None (outdoors); 1% improved pit latrine; 1% bucket toilet. In 2005 officials of the current government (EPRDF) were teaching about the importance of latrines and instructed people to dig holes. They were told they would be punished if they did not and those convinced that this would be the case did dig holes, though they have not been used.

From Dinki:

RANS 2004: 100% None (outdoors). There were government attempts to force residents to build toilets at household level. The Kebele announced that anyone without a toilet would be fined and someone would come to check. As a result, some people dug a hole just to show but have now filled it up again.

From Korodegaga:

The school had a male toilet before 2004; in 2004 a female toilet was built. The Development Assistants' office had a damaged toilet. So they excrete their waste around their farm (small children excrete around their home but adults go far from the home). I observed that faeces do not last long (not more than one day), and rapidly become decomposed

Fuel for cooking and warmth

Fuel for cooking is needed throughout the year: in Korodegaga and Dinki wood is used and in Yetmen animal dung and small amounts of firewood. In Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme a few rich households are reported as using kerosene. More fuel is needed in Korodegaga and Yetmen which are cold between June and October.

TABLE A2.10: MAIN SOURCE OF COOKING FUEL OVER THE LAST 12 MONTHS – MID 2004

	%age of households			
	Turufe K	Yetmen	Korodegaga	Dinki
Firewood	92	20	97	97
Electricity	4	1		
Charcoal	2			1
Agricultural residue	2	3	1	1
Animal waste	1	74	2	1
Petroleum products		1		

Light

In Yetmen town and environs people have access to electricity for lighting; some households without get it from those with for 5 *birr* a month. In 2004 in Yetmen 43% of households said they had access to electricity and 22% in Turufe Kecheme. The other households, like all households in the remote sites used oil lamps or firewood.

Clothes

Clothes are an extremely important aspect of life; first, having some at all and second, the quality. Young family members are often rewarded with clothes. Buying new clothes for children for annual festivals is considered an important household priority.

Illnesses and treatment

Illnesses cause suffering to those who are ill, prevent them from performing their usual duties, and sometimes kill them. Households spend large proportions of income and sell assets to get treatment for some illnesses. For example, between 1998 and 2004 47% of households in Turufe Kecheme reported at least one illness which led to serious reductions in assets and/or consumption.

Illnesses

The following illnesses were reported from the sites, although the fact that an illness was not reported does not necessarily mean that it does not exist:

Malaria: Malaria is endemic in Korodegaga, Dinki and Turufe Kecheme and was reported in Yetmen for the first time in late 2004.

BOX A2.34: MALARIA

From Dinki:

Malaria can force people to stay in bed for two to three months and has a negative impact on farmers' work.

Meningitis: occasional epidemics

Elephantiasis and leprosy: both reported from Yetmen; elephantiasis in Dinki and leprosy in Turufe Kecheme.

Typhoid, hepatitis and waterborne diseases: typhoid was reported from all sites except Yetmen.

Yellow fever: reported from Turufe Kecheme

Cholera: reported from Turufe Kecheme

Tuberculosis: reported from Yetmen, Turufe Kecheme

Respiratory problems: People with respiratory problems get sick during the rainy season.

Measles, rubella, mumps: common

Eye problems: common

Rabies: reported from Yetmen.

Sunstroke: common

Haemorrhoids: common

STDs and HIV/AIDS: HIV/AIDS was reported from all sites but Korodegaga.

Skin diseases: common

Gynaecological problems: common

Children's illnesses: measles, sore throats, coughs, diarrhoea, persistent itching, meningitis

BOX A2.35: HIV/AIDS

From Yetmen:

Most people are convinced of the need to use condoms due to the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Yetmen. Many people have died of HIV/AIDS. This is recent and now people are becoming afraid of it. There is a change in knowledge and attitude towards HIV but there is no significant change in the people's practice.

From Turufe Kecheme:

The hospital reported that there were about 50 HIV positive people in Turufe and Wetera Sake in 2005.

From Dinki:

By 2005 a few people have lost their lives as a result of HIV/AIDS. For example, 'AT' told the female research officer that her 27-year-old son had died of HIV/AIDS. There are also people who are suspected of being HIV/AIDS patients.

Table A2.13 shows that in the middle of 2004 Yetmen was by far the healthiest site, which may reflect the fact that the site was malaria-free at that time. Dinki was the site with the greatest health risks.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kech.	Yetmen
Illness in last year preventing daily activity	9.6%	7.1%	7.0%	2.8%
Chronic illhealth	8.0%	3.5%	6.5%	3.7%
Illness in last 2 weeks	11.2%	9.0%	9.3%	3.7%

Treatment

When a household member is sick or suffers an accident decisions are made as to whether or not to seek treatment, and if so where to go. There are traditional medical options: practitioners specialising in herbal medicines and bonesetting, and other traditional treatments including bleeding and hot metal, and/or visiting a site with holy water. Potential modern options may include a health post, government, NGO or private health centre or clinic, pharmacy, or government hospital. The quality of service and availability of drugs varies.

BOX A2.36: HEALTH SERVICES**From Yetmen:**

There is a private clinic but it is expensive. Most have to go to a nearby *got* to a public health centre; it costs less but there is a meagre supply of medical necessities. The construction of health post was under way in 2005. People go to Dejen and Bichena for serious illnesses. There are a number of traditional medical practitioners using herbal medicines.

From Turufe Kecheme:

The site is 2.5km from Shashemene General Hospital (Kuyera); there is also a private clinic. Within Abiyu Elemo there is a specific area called Gigessa, where the Catholic mission established their centre. There is a health centre which gives food and shelter for handicapped children who suffer from polio and other bone-related problems. The centre delivers treatment for eye infections either annually or twice a year. At this time the *kebele* makes an announcement for the people to attend the service. The payment is small but people prefer to go to Kuyera hospital except for bone-related problems and eye infections.

In 2005, some rich or medium people prefer to go private clinics at Shashemene and Awassa (if the disease is serious) because the Kuyera hospital is poor in facilities and there is also a shortage of medicine. To get to Shashemene costs two *birr* whereas to Awassa it costs six *birr* for a single trip. Some rich people go to Wondo Genet to get customary treatment holy/spring water to prevent cough. To get there costs five *birr*.

People try to treat their illnesses themselves. They bleed the joints of their arm by slightly pricking the blood vessel with a blade and burn swellings with heated iron. The bleeding temporarily cures the disease. But repeated practice of this method can cause the loss of a great deal of blood from their body and can bring about more serious diseases. People also try to prevent illnesses by cleaning their bodies, compounds, clothes, food and the water they drink.

There is no *Kaleecha* (ritual healer) or equivalent in the *kebele*; but informants mentioned that the closest *Kaleecha* around Turufe Kecheme is in Hamulo *kebele* which is about two hours' walk away. There are three traditional doctors for bone-setting and herbs in the *kebele*.

HM, AF (female representative of the village), TB (health representative of the village), and another three people have been taking training given by NGOs (Catholic, Compassion, and Africa Human Action). Anyone can get condoms from them. GH is a health representative of the *kebele*. He was trained by the MoH, and he vaccinates children when there is a polio vaccination.

From Dinki:

The people of Dinki treat their health problems mostly by practising ritual celebrations or visiting a spirit possession specialist. There are individuals known as *wogesha* who treat bone fractures, joint dislocation, and the dislocation and swelling of muscles. There are also people who know how to treat headaches, eye and ear problems, and have snake medicine (*Yeebab medhanit*). Spirit healers (especially for Muslims) are important providers of traditional treatments against illness locally categorised as bad spirit-related diseases. The same people or others also serve as herbalists curing illnesses related to wounds and skin diseases.

From Korodegaga:

It is possible to get medical treatment in Awash Melkasa and Dera. In addition to the presence of health centres in these towns, there are many private clinics. Both in terms of distance and service, Awash Melkasa is the best for the local people. The transport cost is 2 *birr* per trip to Awash Melkasa while it is 4 *birr* per trip to Dera. Awash Melkasa is also the closest town to the *kebele*. The services given are also better, according to the beneficiaries. People go to Nazret hospital only for serious illnesses. The major problem with regard to health service is that the medical cost is too high for the poor and destitute people. Many rich and medium people prefer the private clinics to government health centres because the private ones are efficient both in time and quality of service.

People use different kinds of traditional medicine for various kinds of diseases. The medicines are obtained from plant leaves and roots. They are used for problems such as toothache, headaches and snake bites. One person gives traditional treatment in Bofa in Eastern Shewa by making cuts on a patient's tongue. It is believed many people have been cured from stomach, kidney, liver and lung diseases. A large number of women and a few men visited this person's house in 2005. People also bathe in hot springs to get treatment from some diseases. The presence of Sodere hot spring creates a favourable opportunity for the people. Since they cannot afford the entry fee of 8-15 *birr*, people bathe in the hot waters which are found outside the recreation centre. There is also another hot spring in Korodegaga just parallel to the Sodere recreation centre. They use traditional medicine available in Itaya for cancer.

In mid-2004 over half of those ill in the previous two weeks had sought treatment in all sites but Dinki, where the figure was only 14%.

	%age of people			
	Turufe K	Yetmen	Koro	Dinki
% ill	9.3%	3.7%	9.0%	11.2%
Treatment sought	56%	50%	65%	14%
	Number of people			
Sought treatment: first place	87	22	71	11
Hospital (nearest)	51		1	
Hospital (not the nearest)	6			1
Health centre/clinic (nearest)	8	17	31	4
Health centre (not nearest)	2		22	1
Pharmacy (nearest)	10	2	4	
Pharmacy (not nearest)	3		3	
Health worker (clinic based)	4	1	8	2
Health worker (mobile)			1	
Religious site	1	1		
Traditional healer		1	1	1
Not specified	2			2
	Type of facility: Number of people			
Government	64	13	31	7
Private	26	11	43	1
NGO	2	1	2	
No institutional affiliation	1	1		
Traditional site	1	1		1

	Main reason for not seeking treatment			
Expected cost reasonable, but no money	19	3	6	6
Expected cost of treatment high	17	5	7	7
Absence of caregivers	8		8	8
Traditional beliefs	5	1		
No means of transporting patient	3		5	5
Illness unlikely to be treatable	3	3	2	2
Could not spare time from work	2			
Self-diagnosis and treatment	2	3	1	1
Concern about extortion	1			
No facility in village	1	2	4	4
Illness mild	1		2	2
Lack of information	1			
No-one available to escort patient	1			
Fear of poor quality treatment			1	1
Low quality of facility (e.g. no drugs)			1	1

Deaths

A total of 108 households in the RANS sample reported in mid-2004 that someone in the household had died in the last twelve months. Five households in Korodegaga suffered multiple deaths: 2 households had 2 deaths and 1 each had 3, 4 and 5 deaths.

	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kech.	Yetmen
One or more deaths in the last year	6%	9%	5%	7%

House, furniture, and household equipment

Houses

Houses in Yetmen, Dinki and Turufe Kecheme are larger and better constructed than those in Korodegaga, although in 2005 people made richer as a result of irrigated farming were using a new technology and building houses with corrugated iron roofs made of 'blockets'. In 2004 85% of houses in Yetmen had tin roofs compared with only 2% in Korodegaga and 9% in Dinki.

	%age of households			
	Turufe K	Yetmen	Koro	Dinki
Houses	50%	86%	20%	95%
Huts	50%	14%	80%	4%
Corrugated iron roof	41%	85%	2%	9%
Thatch roof	59%	15%	98%	91%
Separate kitchen	45%	76%	5%	25%
Separate foodstore	25%	19%	23%	63%
Livestock house/yard	30%	31%	69%	73%


In Yetmen, Turufe Kecheme and Korodegaga livestock are often kept in the house at night due to theft in the integrated sites and hyenas in Korodegaga.

BOX A2.31: HOUSING

From Yetmen:

The most fascinating brick-built house in the community has 5 modern rooms with a tiled floor, ceiling, shower room, bedrooms and other facilities. This house cost about 30,000 *birr*.

People keep their livestock in their houses, otherwise they will be stolen.



From Turufe Kecheme:

Cows are mostly kept in people's houses. If kept in enclosures they may be stolen, so someone has to sleep there to guard them.

From Korodegaga:

Sheep and calves are kept in the house because of hyenas.

From Dinki:

Tin-roofed houses are regarded as being of no value due to the hot weather, but since it is a status symbol to have a tin-roofed house, people still want them, even if they are not suited to the lowland area.

Rich households in Korodegaga and Dinki have bought houses in the nearby towns of Dera and Aliyu Amba respectively; children attending schools can live in them and/or they bring in rent. In Dinki there are a few landholders who live and work in the town and rent or sharecrop out their farmland. Many community members prefer to live in the villagised part of Turufe, which is nearer to the town of Kuyera, especially those who have children attending school. There are some middle and rich persons from Wetera who rent rooms or buy a residence in Turufe. Young people have a problem getting access to land for housing, frequently building in the compound of their parents.

BOX A2.32: SHORTAGE OF LAND FOR HOUSING FOR YOUNG HOUSEHOLDS

From Yetmen:

People get access to land for housing during land distributions; however since land distribution has not taken place since 1997 there is no access to land for housing for young people. They build houses in either of their parents' compound, usually that of the parents of the bridegroom. Because there is a shortage of land in the community there is no scheme for allotting land for housing. Young people with new households may live with the husband's parents for a long time.

Household assets

In terms of household assets, including productive and reproductive assets on average Yetmen households have the most, followed by Turufe Kecheme, Dinki and Korodegaga.

TABLE A2.12: RURAL ASSET QUINTILE – MID 2004

	%age of households				
	Turufe K	Yetmen	Koro	Dinki	Total
Top quintile	8.0	65.6			20
Quintile 2	32.4	28.0	3.1	15.4	
Quintile 3	30.8	6.4	9.4	40.2	
Quintile 4	20.0		32.5	30.8	
Bottom quintile	8.8		54.9	13.6	

Within communities household assets are unequally distributed; there are greater differences in Turufe Kecheme.

BOX A2.33: WEALTH DIFFERENCES IN HOUSEHOLD ASSETS

From Yetmen:

A few rich people have refrigerators, TVs and video players. In rich households there are big barrels and up to four big pots in which to make *tella* (local beer). The availability of *tella* throughout the year is one indicator of status in the rural part. Rich and some middle households have beds, chairs and a table.

Poor households may not have pots and other household furniture. A destitute household may lack even the basic assets and be forced to borrow from neighbours.

From Turufe Kecheme:

Assets in a wealthy home might include wooden beds, a clock, a cupboard, table, chairs, bench, mattresses, sheets, carpets, glasses, plates, cups, a tray, all types of kitchen equipment, a tape recorder with radio cassette, bicycle and a lantern. The middle wealth households have a radio, wooden beds, cart (pulled by donkey), and different agricultural and kitchen equipment, and a bicycle. In a poor home the assets you can find are prepared skins used as a mattress, home-made stools, cooking materials like a coffee pot and cups, and *wot* and *injera* preparing materials and maybe a *kuraz* (kerosene lamp). The destitute have only few kitchen implements which are not enough for them.

From Dinki:

Very rich people have a tape recorder, a modern bed and gold earrings or necklaces. Rich people are expected to have a tin-roofed house and a tape recorder. Middle-wealth people are expected to have a good house though it may not have a tin roof. A poor person is expected to have a house.

From Korodegaga:

Very rich households have a radio, tape player and quality watches, beds of cattle skin, chairs, farm implements like a plough, *jamba* (machete), sickle, spade, hammer, private irrigation pumps, hand pumps, and sprays. Rich households have a bed and mattress made from animal leather and a plastic sheet for the floor. One farmer has a *gari*, a horse-drawn cart; another rich person has a bicycle.

Medium-wealth households have a radio, bed, plough, sickle, spade, *jamba*, hand-pump, a few have a private irrigation pump in a group, and house furniture like pots made of plastic. The beds are made from animal skin or mud (*medeb*) and the mattress of straw.

Poor households may have a plough, sickle, spade, *jamba*, jerry-can and a bed *medeb*. The destitute have a sickle, spade and *jamba*. One destitute female-headed women reported that she has only a sickle and *jamba*.

A3.4 Local and ideological repertoires of ideas related to human production and reproduction

Finally we compare five cultural repertoires or sets of ideas related to human production and reproduction which are available in the communities: 'traditional' and 'modern' repertoires, religious repertoires, government repertoires, and donor/NGO repertoires.

'Traditional' local repertoires

Customary forms of marriage are good (though there are variations in what is considered important): child marriage, arranged marriages, abduction, polygyny, marriage with a dead wife's sister; marriage to a dead husband's brother. Divorce is acceptable among the Amhara but not among the Arssi Oromo. The gendered division of labour in the household is good. Men should lead the household and control the behaviour of members using persuasion, incentives and sanctions including violence. Wives should obey husbands; sisters should serve brothers; younger of both sexes should obey elders. A couple should have as many children as possible to provide household labour and because it is God's will. Boys should be raised to be aggressive and girls to be submissive; each should be taught gendered role activities. Girls should not be sent to school. They should be circumcised as children (Amhara) or just before marriage (Arssi Oromo). Domestic activities must be done by females, and boys help with firewood and water collection only if there are not girls/women to do so..

Modern local repertoires

Child marriage should be abolished. Couples should have choice in who they marry. Too many children lead to household poverty. Couple should limit the number (a suggestion of 4 in 1 site) by using contraception. Both boys and girls should be sent to school. Domestic activities must be done by females.

Religious repertoires

Church marriages forbidding divorce are desirable, though rare. A Muslim may have up to four wives, though few have more than one. Women should be modest and restrict their public activities. The number of children a woman has is in the hands of God. In some religious repertoires contraception is forbidden. Islamic education is important for both boys and girls.

Government modernisation repertoire

Customary forms of marriage are not good. Government rules ban marriage under 18, abduction and forced marriages. No-one should marry below the age of 18. Couples should choose their marriage partners. Couples should limit the number of children they have through contraception. Female circumcision should not take place. No interest in who does domestic activities. All children should be sent to primary school.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

Little interest in marriage rules. Wife-beating should be abolished. Couples should limit the number of children they have through contraception. No interest in who does domestic activities. All children should be sent to primary school.

Appendix 4: Evidence Base – Structures and Agency in the Field of Community Governance 2003-5

A4.1 Community governance: goals and structures

The goals of community governance are the maintenance of social order by controlling deviant behaviour, resolving disputes and handling dissent and conflict, economic development activities, social protection, gender and family ‘policy’, the management of collective resources, community survival and solidarity.

Governance structures consist of the roles, rules, values and beliefs involved in decision-making on behalf of the community. In rural Ethiopia there are two inter-penetrating sets of governance structures, one with its roots in the community and the other brought into the community by the government. In the next two sections we consider these two sets of structures separately and in the fourth section we provide some examples of issues which have arisen in the communities across the government-community interface.

A4.2 Local community governance

Community governance structures

We consider elites, power in the *kebele*, religious leaders, and modernisers.

Elites

Eliteness involves not just greater wealth but also influence, notably through local informal and formal organisational positions. Ability to influence external agents is also important and for that literacy and education can be useful, though limited opportunities in rural areas for high school graduates push them to look for work in urban areas.

BOX A3.1: LOCAL ELITES

From Yetmen:

In 2005 the local elites were identified as those people who have political power, wealth and education. Priests are also considered to be elites. And their eliteness is based on their wealth and their capacity to influence other people. Those people who are wealthy and who have political position may get status in the community. But a wealthy person cannot get political power just because of his wealth, and equally, those with political power cannot obtain wealth just because of their political position. In addition people who have education are accorded good status: teachers, development agents, health workers and priests. And since most of the people in the community are not educated the formal education of these people gives them authority in their respective areas.

Greater wealth can enable elites not just to purchase productive assets, such as pumps and vehicles in the richer sites, but also to mobilize more labour through festive work groups, to employ wage labourers, to invest in more livestock in the poorer sites including prestige animals such as camels, horses and mules, to improve their housing, notably with tin roofs becoming a symbol of eliteness in the poorer sites, to build urban houses and to purchase some luxury items, including better household goods such as metal beds and mattresses, radios and TVs, bicycles and even trucks in Yetmen. Elites are also able to access better services in towns, and may send their children for education to live with town relatives.

In Dinki the main elites are those who have been able to gain access to additional land and particularly irrigated land and have become more wealthy by producing cash crops, notably onions and fruits. In Korodegaga elites have traditionally had large livestock and land holdings. However, control of irrigation through investment in pumps and sale of cash crops is now the most important access to wealth and elite status. In Turufe elites are those who have gained more land and are involved in trade. The most prominent case is a migrant who has offered to pay half the cost of electricity for the village alongside a mill he planned to establish. In Yetmen the elites are mainly the grain traders in town who have bought trucks and have consumer goods such as satellite dishes, TVs and videos. Priests are highly respected and educated youngsters can gain access to some positions.

We may distinguish between “traditional” and “modern” elites. The traditional elites gained power mainly based on control of land and labour and had greater livestock holdings. This was achieved in part through the management of social relations and was often gradually built up by elderly men. The extent to which elite statuses were inherited may be debatable. To some extent the land reforms reduced the transferability of elite

status, with former landlords losing land in both Derg and EPRDF reforms and Derg “Bureaucrats” in the EPRDF redistributions in Yetmen. However, despite those redistributions some formerly wealthy families may well have been able to retain a higher status position.

The more powerful recently emerging elites, have gained their position much more through wealth and control of trade and external links. The traders in Yetmen, the pump owners in Korodegaga, the mill owner in Turufe, and those building town houses in Dinki are examples of these newer elites, who may also be differentiated from the rest of the population not just in terms of the quantity of their resources but also in the type of resources, productive assets and consumer goods they own.

Power in the kebele

Factional politics are often difficult to discern as they are based on informal networks and may change rapidly. Sometimes they seem to be follow ethnic or clan lines and may be important in the election or replacing of *kebele* representatives. However, these elections are also subject to influences from the *wereda* authorities, and occasions when directives instruct leadership changes offer opportunities for changing unpopular leaders and can alter the power balance and lead to shifting alliances and allegiances.

BOX A3.2: LOCAL POLITICAL POWER AND CLANS IN TURUFE KEcheme

From Turufe Kecheme:

In order to wield power in the kebele one has to be liked and respected within the clan lineage. Being a member of a respected lineage, for example Amannu which is the dominant belbela (lineage) within the Weyrera clan is an important factor in gaining power in the kebele. The Oromo community in the kebele is firmly knitted as a corporate group through the lineage structure. Within the lineage it is advantageous to gain the support or friendship of important individuals in order to win the support of others. With the support of a strong lineage one can accomplish any objective in the kebele.

Religious leaders

Religious leaders have had a strong following in all the communities, and play key roles at times of crisis notably in leading collective prayers in times of drought.

BOX A3.3: THE POWER OF ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN PRIESTS

From Yetmen:

Priests are very powerful and people listen to what they say, which is not the case with government officials. They can order people not to work for a week (*gizit*) for undeclared reasons. Priests are educated and people trust them.

Modernisers

Merchants in Turufe Kecheme and Yetmen have contributed and mobilised the people to contribute money for bringing electricity, telecommunication service and the like. In the Turufe Kecheme case the fund was stolen. Irrigation investors in Korodegaga contributed towards the repair of the raft to Sodere.

Conflict, disputes and customary institutions to restore order

In this section we consider times of crisis, violent conflicts, religious tensions, blood feuds, conflict resolution, and disputes within and between households.

Times of crisis

Social order is maintained with reference to traditional and religious values. Times of crisis such as political turmoil notably at the downfall of the Derg can lead to breakdown of peaceful coexistence as happened in Turufe where most of the Kembata were expelled. During periods of drought and famine such as in 2002 contributions to funeral or religious associations may be reduced or suspended. The 2005 elections were a period of tensions and in Turufe the minorities expressed fears of reprisals against them should the EPRDF be defeated.

The Dinki and Korodegaga communities have historic conflicts with pastoralist neighbours which occasionally flare up (Box A3.4).

BOX A3.4: CONFLICTS WITH NEIGHBOURS

From Korodegaga:

There were fights between organised gangs of youngsters from Buko and Sefera villages between 2002 and 2005. The community leaders of both villages tried to solve the problem through reconciliation but the disputants chose to take their cases to court. The disputants from Buko were imprisoned in Dera prison and in 2004 three of them were imprisoned in Asella (the zone capital) for six months. After they were released, they continued to commit crimes. In June 2004, they seriously beat Jille camel herders they asked the herders to give them money. When the news of the conflict was heard in Jille, 40 people with guns came to Korodegaga and asked the people to hand over the offenders. The local elders tried to solve the problem through discussion. Finally, they agreed that the case had to be taken to the police in Dera, and the locals showed their consent to cooperate with the police in the attempt to present the three youngsters to court. Three policemen tried to catch them in coordination with *kebele* officials. Two of them were imprisoned but one escaped.

From Dinki:

Both Christians and Muslims consider the Afar, who are Muslims, to be traditional enemies. Although the Afar are Muslims, the Argoba have never sided with them. The alliance between Argoba and Amhara against the neighbouring Afar has been repeatedly witnessed in many armed conflicts. Most of these conflicts have taken place in market places such as Dulecha, Zuti, and Senbete. It is reported that the Afar stole cattle, usually at nights, from the many Argoba and Amhara people living near the border of the Afar villages. Many Argoba and Amhara people who evacuated their houses due to repeated harassment and killings committed by Afar. The murders were committed at the market or in the street. Although there have not been attacks on Dinki itself, ten camels were stolen from one household in a neighbouring community in 2005. Since governmental action was reduced after the May 2005 elections, the problem has now become serious.

Dinki residents also consider the Oromo as historical enemies for committing genocide against their people during the Italian occupation. According to the story, the area was overrun with an Oromo militia force led by a Muslim leader who was supported by the Italians. First, the leader called the local population to a 'peaceful' public meeting at Haramba, and then ordered his militia to start massacring those who gathered. They killed most of them using axes, swords, knives and spears. Then militia moved into the villages and continued killing people found in their houses or as they were fleeing. Both Muslims and Christians agree that the militia killed people indiscriminately, irrespective of age, sex, religion or ethnicity. However, Christians believe that some Muslims collaborated with the invading *Galla* militia by killing Christians. In the list of historical events, this incident is maintained as an important reference in calculating time and reminding of the prejudice against the other ethnic groups. During interviews, informants commonly used to tell their current ages in reference to this event, saying they were born a certain number of years before or after the time of the *Galla* (*yegalla gize*).

Conflicts

Serious conflicts are referred to the *Kebele* administration and social court, though prior to this and afterwards local elders are involved in dispute settlement and restoring harmony among people who live close to one another. Conflicts over land have led to violence, for example in Yetmen in 1997 during the redistribution.

BOX A3.5: FIGHTING OVER LAND DISTRIBUTION IN YETMEN

From Yetmen:

In Yetmen in 2005 it was reported that in 1997 when land was redistributed many people were involved in disagreement and fighting, especially those whose land was taken, (who were officials during the previous government) and those who were given this land. Some of the people whose land was taken, together with people from other areas with a similar problem, tried to go to Bahir Dar and appeal to different regional offices, but they were unable to effect any change. Those whose land was taken complained that they were not allowed to participate in public meetings. In recent times they have come to participate in public meetings called by the *kebele*, but their ideas or comments are not welcomed by *kebele* administrators. It was reported that most people who served the Derg regime are now supporters of the main opposition party the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD). It was also reported from Yetmen that there are local *shifta* or bandits living outside the law.

In Turufe Kecheme there are concerns on the part of non-Oromo residents about the security of their land rights.

BOX A3.6: INTER-ETHNIC TENSIONS IN TURUFE KEHEME

From Turufe Kecheme:

Some Tigrayan informants pointed out that they survived the crisis of 1991, because they were armed. The Oromos from as far as Kofele came to overrun and rob all the non-Oromos. But the Tigrayans claimed that they live together at a certain area which enabled them to unite. But all are in a great fear that one day the Oromos will force them out of the area. The Tigrayans and Amharas seem to identify themselves together, as both fear the Oromos. Tigrayan informants fear that now they cannot defend themselves from the Oromos, as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government disarmed them. They said they gave up their arms because then they trusted the government. But now they consider the government betrayed them and they are at the mercy of the local people. The Oromos consider the Amharas and Tigrayans as groups who come to rob their resources. The tension was high when the time for the election of May 2005 was approaching. The non-Oromos were in great fear that the Oromos will forcefully expel them on the day after the election. However, the tension has decreased after they heard the result of election.

This is associated with cultural differences.

BOX A3.7: LAND SHORTAGES AND ETHNIC TENSIONS

From Turufe Kecheme:

It is not only religion that leads different ethnic groups not to celebrate festivals together, but also the present political conditions have an impact. Tigrayans feel superior to other ethnic groups, while the Oromos want the other groups to leave the area so they can own all the farmland. Wolayitas and Amharas consider themselves to be hardworking people and feel that it is only since they came to the area that the Oromos learned how to plough land and make themselves wealthy. Such conflicts cause the groups to dislike each other and not celebrate festivals together. The other ethnic groups do not like the local people. All the administrative personnel are from the local ethnic group and they give priority to natives. The other groups know that the local people call them *Anasa* (minorities). They consider them as alien to the community. There is some kind of discrimination even though it is not official/open.

Even though the people in the *kebele* have many interactions with migrants through local institutions (*Iddir*) and labour-sharing mechanisms (*Debo/Wenfel*), the local people do not like the migrants. This is because they believe the shortage of land arises due to population growth, and they would like the migrants to leave the area in order to occupy their land.

Religious tensions

In relation to religion there have recently been increasing divergences over growing fundamentalist influences, among Muslim, Orthodox and Protestant Christian groups. This has led to tensions within and between religious groups. Within groups the fundamentalist tendencies have tended to be promoted by younger educated men often with external contacts preaching against lax religious practice and customs that were seen as traditional and not part of the main religion. Muslim fundamentalist ideas and expansion of mosques was promoted by Wahabi influences from Arabia. In Korodegaga there was conflict over rituals by the river that were condemned by Muslim leaders. In Dinki Muslim leaders condemned those who drink alcohol. Christian leaders in Yetmen exerted pressure on people to observe more religious holidays. Protestant leaders in Turufe tried to persuade people to abandon traditional festivals. The fundamentalist tendencies have also led to a hardening of lines of religious divides between religious groups. This has led to increasing separation of institutions such as funeral associations and pressure not to celebrate festivals such as the first of the month *abdar* ceremonies together.

BOX A3.8: DECLINING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN TURUFE KEHEME

From Turufe Kecheme:

Previously there was a *bale-wold Iddir* whose members were Orthodox as well as Muslim. At one time there was a mourning at a Muslim house. Utensils from the *Iddir* were used for the mourning feast. Later on the Orthodox said that the utensils are stained/contaminated and need to be blessed to be used at an Orthodox home. Because of this reason the Orthodox Christians discussed and agreed to organise the *Iddir* in a new way (to form a new Christian group), and they made that *Iddir* to serve the purpose of both *Iddir* and *mahiber*. Thus any person who wants to join this *iddir / mahiber* has to be an Orthodox Christian.

The families of those who convert to Protestant religions may be socially excluded.

BOX A3.9: SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS CONVERTS AND THEIR FAMILIES

From Turufe Kecheme:

Almost all of the Oromos are Muslims, Wolayitas and Kambatases are Protestants, Tigrayans and Amharas are Orthodox Christians. There is a religious freedom in the area. Everybody can follow whatever religion s/he wants. Even within one household, different members follow different religions. But older people are not happy when their children/grandchildren change their original religion, and their relationship begins to deteriorate. There was a problem in Senbete when one informant was thrown out of the *iddir* because her grandsons converted to Protestantism and the other members refused to attend the feast in her house

Blood feuds

These are a potential feature in the Amhara sites.

BOX A3.10: BLOOD FEUDS

From Dinki:

Blood feuds are mostly handled by elders. Most feuds would be considered for settlement at a time when the number of victims from the feuding parties are considered to be proportional. The usual way of resolving such a conflict is banning the movement of members of the contending families from participating in public occasions like weddings, funeral ceremonies, and market places. The saying 'an eye hates blood' (*dem ayn yitelal*) reflects that a temporary sanction prevents the feud from relapsing. The other traditional method of resolving blood feuds is paying *kasa* (compensation) to the family of the deceased. However, this method is rarely used since people believe it to be cowardly. An individual who has accepted compensation would be ridiculed as 'a person who has benefited by selling his brother's blood'.

Conflict resolution

In the south the Oromo *gada* political institution based on age-grades still plays a small role in conflict resolution and the leaders are recognised by NGOs as influential.

BOX A3.11: THE OROMO GADA INSTITUTION

From Turufe Kecheme: In the period after the overthrow of the *Derg* regime, the *gada* political institution began to develop in importance. However, it seems that their importance is limited to conflict resolution of problems related to murder. They are respected and NGOs invite them to meetings related to harmful traditions, believing that their presence has importance in implementing their plans. Sometimes cases are even returned to these elders from the *kebele* court or even from the *wereda* court for contribution. They have good acceptance among the community

In the Amhara sites 'bewitching' or spirit possession is also used for solving conflicts.

BOX A3.12: SPIRIT POSSESSION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

From Yetmen: First one of the disputants, usually the victim, will report the dispute to the sorcerer/ess,. The other party will be sent a summons to appear before the sorcerer/ess for mediation. When both appear they will be put under oath to tell the truth and will come to terms on conditions the sorcerer/ess decides, having sworn not to break up the mediation and to keep their allegiance to him/her. If the offender then does not follow instructions, the witch, using magic powers, inflicts a death penalty on him or her and the families. Usually the family is inflicted with diseases which are said to be insoluble and incurable by any means and die one by one after unbearable suffering.

From Dinki: The role of spirit possession cults in conflict resolution is not something to be underestimated in this area. If one of the disputants wants the spirit possession cult to be involved in dispute resolution, the other one will become worried because they believe that the one who made a mistake or began the dispute will be punished by this spirit, and, if he is not willing to ask forgiveness, he or his children will die.

Local security personnel may not act impartially. For example in Korodegaga they dealt violently with immigrant labourers.

BOX A3.13: VIOLENCE BY LOCAL SECURITY PERSONNEL

From Korodegaga:

In March 2005, one individual accused four labourers from Wello in Northern Ethiopia, who were working on his land as sharecroppers, of repeatedly raping girls and stealing goats. There was no evidence for this and some people believe that the above reasons are not the real ones and that the main cause of conflict was that one of the labourers was having an affair with the wife of the accuser. Finally, some security personnel and some irrigation farmers caught the migrant labourers, beat them severely and imprisoned them in the *kebele* office for three days. The labourers said that they were abused because they are alien to the community, and the aim was to confiscate their cash crops. The security personnel reported the problem to the *wereda* police office. The office instructed them to bring them to the *wereda*, however, since the individuals were seriously wounded, they feared taking them to *wereda*. The local elders tried to resolve the problem through reconciliation but after a few days, the victims left the area. Some local people strongly blamed the security personnel for carrying out illegal actions, they add that if the labourers were strong enough to accuse the crime makers, they should volunteer to be witnesses.

Other aspects of local organisation

Community life is organised through social networks and some formal organisations including *iddir* (burial associations) in all sites, *mehaber* (gendered monthly feasting groups) among the (richer) Amhara, and *iqub* (rotating savings clubs) in the two richer sites. Community life involves considerable internally initiated community work.

BOX A3.14: CUSTOMARY COMMUNITY WORK

From Dinki:

Self-initiated community work organised by local organisations includes: participation in general ceremonies through *iddir*, for which women prepare and serve food for feasts; men fetching wood and water; digging of graves; carrying and burying the dead; participation in wedding parties for which women prepare food, and sing and dance; co-operation in house building and roof-making; and dung-spreading; women also come together and prepare ritual foods during neighbourhood level ceremonies (*adbar*), for the people who work as *giso*, for *mahiber* of one household or for *kristana* (baptism).

Local people also deliberately organise to pursue particular projects or goals.

BOX A3.15: WOMEN ORGANISING FOR DEVELOPMENT

From Turufe Kecheme:

The woman's association is under the women's *Iddir*. They contribute 1-25 *birr* per month for the association other than for the *Iddir*. The association was formed in late 2004 and some members gave a photograph and got an identification card. There are around 57 members. The association has a plan to open a bank account and to use the account to get financial support from governmental/non-governmental organisations and to begin developmental activities. The leader of the association (Alemitu Safa'o) who is also the female representative of the village, has attended a meeting about their association at *wereda* level

A few farmers united to ask the government for the things they need like fertiliser and selected seeds. Sometimes these farmers are able to get agricultural inputs from the service cooperative, which is found at Hamus Gebeya for cash at a lesser price than from the traders.

Locally-based 'policies'

A number of 'policies' are implicit in community practices and initiatives which relate to economic development, human development, social protection, gender and family policies, and community solidarity. Economic and human development and aspects of gender and family policies have been considered above. Here we focus mainly on social protection, the key element in the community informal security regimes discussed in Section 3.

Social protection and education

In these rural communities the 'welfare mix' is dominated by self-help, households, families and wider kin, neighbours, friendship and patron-client networks. Local community organisations, particularly *iddir*, make

some contribution, as do some actions at community level, networks with other communities particularly through marriage links, religion-based programmes and charity, NGOs, and international links through kin and diaspora organisations. Government food aid programmes in the remote sites are considered in the section on local government.

Families/households and self-help: There are strong internal and external moral pressures on children to help their parents while young members of the household and, after they have set up independent households, when the parents are too old to work. There are strong intra-family relations across households.

BOX A3.16: THE IMPORTANCE OF FAMILIES IN THE WELFARE MIX

From Turufe Kecheme:

Children are expected to help their parents in all the necessities of life such as housing, food, clothing etc.

From Korodegaga:

Families are often spread across households. Families play the most important role in childhood socialisation and education.

Children who migrate, especially overseas, are expected to send remittances to assist their parents and relatives.

BOX A3.17: INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES

From Dinki:

Some children went to Jedda and greatly changed the lives of poor parents and relatives.

Self-help is an important element in the welfare mix. For example in a rich household in Dinki school attendees use their own incomes to cover costs.

BOX A3.18: CHILDREN FINANCING THEIR OWN EDUCATION

From Dinki:

Thus, good income, food security /balanced food in take and good health have been part of this household diary. It is important to note that the household never made any expenditure for grown children as they have been covering their expenses on clothes and schooling from their own incomes. Household Diary.

The first resort when illness strikes is self-treatment.

BOX A3.19: SELF-TREATMENT OF ILLNESSES

From Turufe Kecheme:

People try to treat their illnesses themselves. They bleed the joints of their arm by slightly pricking the blood vessel with a blade. People also try to prevent illness by cleaning their bodies, compounds, clothes, food and the water they drink.

From Dinki:

March 2005: There were many people who were sick seriously with malaria. As they talked it is common that the person who is caught by malaria is sick in this month. Nobody tried to treat or give medical service for this problem. But the people themselves tried to get medical service; however some of them were waiting their recovery by sleeping only.

In very bad times people, particularly males, migrate to look for food. Other coping strategies include borrowing, selling assets, stealing, daily labour, begging, send children to work as servants, and cutting trees for sale as firewood or charcoal.

TABLE A3.1: COPING STRATEGIES IN TIMES OF FAMINE OR OTHER FOOD SHORTAGE

Site	Coping Strategies
Yetmen	Migration for work in town and rural, Borrow grain, money with high interest Credit but difficult to get in time of famine No begging Theft is widely practised in time of famine
Dinki	Sell cows, oxen, various household implements like agalgie, seiecha People sell goat, cow, ox and various household implements like bed, gan kurbet, cups made of clay etc Daily labourer in the community to better off households Daily labour outside the community/migration to town/seasonal daily labour Many physically weak people beg in Menze, Tregulet, Rasa and Bereket Poor households send their children to neighbouring highland and middle-land areas - they are paid annually Borrow food from better-off households Credit is owned by traders who come from Aliyu Amba It has been observed that people used to steal cattle, grain, goats and sheep Very poor people are involved in begging around Ankober Muslims ask alms going to Nazareth and Christians Nazareth and Addis Ababa
Turufe Kecheme	Turufe only faced famine in 1984. Then many people faced problems Sale of livestock and house utensils with very less price. The livestock became thin and bony. Just at the beginning of the famine they were sold with less price. However in the middle of the famine, who would buy them? No credit It became common to see many people begging, especially old people. Theft, especially food. Although people used to steal in the night before the famine, during the famine people used to steal in the day-times.
Korodegaga	Almost everybody started to cut trees for charcoal and fire wood. Especially the women were involved in carrying the firewood to the nearest cities for sell. They became the backbone of their families. Sell livestock and other assets The price of livestock became so low. They also died because of drought. Some have gone to the nearest state farms for seasonal wage labour. Borrow food No credit Begging – yes Theft – yes

In Turufe Kecheme farmers who do not live adjacent to their plots have stopped planting some crops since they are regularly stolen. Local begging and migration for begging is a fallback strategy. It is reported from our urban site in Addis Ababa that begging is seen as an occupation.

Kin, neighbours, friends and patrons in the community: Informal learning from relatives, neighbours and friends is recognised as important.

BOX A3.20: COMMUNITY EDUCATION

From Korodegaga:

The majority of the people don't have a good attitude towards child learning'. Young Lives1.

Out of school children and adolescents learn about local history and the local culture - norms, beliefs, and social ethics; from neighbours, friends, elders and family members.

Kin are very important for social protection.

BOX A3.21: THE IMPORTANCE OF KIN IN THE WELFARE MIX

From Turufe Kecheme:

In our community, if a person has a big kin, he/she is respected. There is blood relationship with your kinsmen. Therefore the problem of a kinsman is your problem. We help each other in everything. Everyone

of us have the responsibility to help if one of our relatives is in any kind of problem, in his farm work, in money, in kind, etc.

Weak and poor members of the kinship benefit from their rich relatives. Kinship ties involve economic and social obligations to both mother's and father's kin. Kin groups have to help each other and cooperate for example during marriage, quarrels with other ethnic or kin groups, mourning, and have to practice the same religious beliefs (Islam). Kin members are expected to contribute when members are fined by a court or unable to repay borrowed money.

From Dinki:

Destitute man, 65: His sister has played an important role in helping him establish his life in Dinki. She hosted and provided him land for house construction when he moved from Awash to Dinki.

From Korodegaga:

My relatives have always helped me in times of problems. They provided me money or food crops during the years of drought and hunger.

From Yetmen:

The networks among kin groups exists all the time. But, it has become significant and reciprocal, after he has formed his own household. It links both men and women. Of course, it has no leader, but a notable person in kin group can manage and support the intimacy of kin relationship. The main purposes are to exchange labour, and resources; to have a common security; to protect their wellbeing; to help each other in time of crises and happiness.

Affinal kin: This network started when he married – it links wife's parents, sisters, brothers, uncles and aunts. The network has been developed since the time immemorial by forefathers. The wife and husband's close relatives are the most important people in the story. The membership stability depends on the stability of marriage and their relationship. If there is divorce, the network will all disintegrate.

Gulma is labour to help elderly and disabled people – usually relatives – no payment.

Neighbours, friends and patrons are also important for social protection. A wealthy man from Korodegaga described a range of helpers.

BOX A3.22: PATRONS, NEIGHBOURS AND FRIENDS IN THE WELFARE MIX

From Korodegaga:

The other important person in my life was a man called Ayalew Asfaw, my teacher while I was at Wonji. Once up on a time, my mother went to her parents in Guraghe leaving me alone. My teacher took me and helped me for seven months.

After the death of my wife, one of my neighbours (female) gave me a lot of support (childcare, financial, material, moral, etc).

I had also good friends, while I was at the war front. We helped each other in all aspects of our life including during the time of serious problem (like death, wounded, etc). Adult Lives Male wealthy 52

From Turufe Kecheme:

Neighbours are very important. A number of interactions and relations take place between neighbours. If any problem happens to a neighbour, it is the nearest neighbours that first help him/her. He told me one proverb (amharic proverb, written out in script) translated as: "A neighbour is better than a relative who lives far", which means it is the neighbour that always support each other in every matter. Everybody benefits but poor neighbours benefit more from their rich neighbours.

We take care of each other during maternity. We exchange labour services for agricultural work. We help each other at times of illness. We stand together both in sorrow and in happiness,

We have been neighbours for the last 17 years. The relationships involves all members of our two families, not just me and her. I am on a relatively better standing in terms of resources; it is therefore often me who provides the material support to her; however, there is a relationship of mutual support among the various members of our families (my husband has such a relationship with her husband; our children also have a similar kind of relationship).

From Dinki:

Old man, 78: His neighbours are so important to him as they were helping him in preparing his food since he became old.

From Yetmen:

Friendship – In this network friends help each other at the time of need. The transactions take place in the form of labour sharing, resource exchange and borrowing. His network on the basis of friendship has been started 16 years ago with the implementation of the villagisation programme. It links men who are poor and rich. They have been an important person since the friendship has been started. They discuss problems and issues together both personal and communal and they arrange loans and marriages. There are 3 people important in the story of the network. The network structure depends on the selection of kingroups and non-kin groups who have common interests regardless of age and wealth. As a matter of chance, this network structure assume residential pattern who are neighbours.

If a house burns down people will help rebuild and give crops if stores destroyed as gift or loan to be repaid next harvest. If livestock are lost friends, neighbour and relatives will search; if not found will lend oxen for ploughing and contribute money to buy replacements.

When a family member dies all community members should assist.

BOX A3.23: COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS AT TIMES OF DEATH

From Korodegaga:

During the time of death, every woman has to pool some contribution, which may be grain, flour, milk, porridge, or money to the deceased family (household). Normally ½ kg to 1kg of flour is given which helps the household to prepare porridge to serve guests who came from the farthest areas of deceased kins, relatives, etc. This contribution is in kind and it also cultural norms to help the deceased household. Men also contribute some money. In the case of *iddir* (also called *shengo*) members have to participate in the burial, send messages to relatives of the deceased, fetch water and fire-wood, erect tents, a fence or build a house, and look after guests who come for the funeral. In some *iddir* members have also to cultivate the lands of the deceased

Local community organisations: Iddir began as burial associations but in many places are extending their social protection activities.

BOX A3.24: IDDIR – BURIAL ASSOCIATIONS

From Turufe Kecheme:

Iddir money is paid when someone dies; in 1995 a widower was paid 300 *birr*, a member whose child died 150 *birr*, and a close relative living far away 50 *birr*. Utensils are provided by the *iddir*. *Turufe Kecheme*

Iddir organise people to help each other during crucial periods such as death and weddings. If a house burns down all *iddir* members have an obligation to build a new one; if cattle get sick or have accidents members slaughter and divide the meat and then pay money to the owner at a fixed time.

Among the Oromo clans are important for compensation for murder, bridewealth and debt.

BOX A3.25: CLAN OBLIGATIONS

From Turufe Kecheme:

The Oromo groups in Turufe Kecheme are members of *Weyrera*, *Se'emana* and *Gomora* clans which are patrilineal. The land belongs to the *Weyrera* group; members of the other clans live in the PA mixed with the *Weyrera* without having territorial claims. The members of the clans are divided into different lineages or *balbala*; each has its respective leaders; the senior *balbal* is *Bariso* and the leader of this *balbala* is also the respected head of the *Weyrera* clan. Economic obligations associated with lineages include contributing money or cattle during blood compensation for murder, payment of bridewealth and debt. The obligations are to the corporate group.

Mehaber are Orthodox Christian organisations for a group to share a monthly feast associated with a particular saint. These organisations have some social protection functions.

BOX A3.26: MEHABER OR MONTHLY FEASTING GROUPS

From Turufe Kecheme:

People (orthodox Christians) prepare feasts in rotation (members also help each during serious problems such as crop failure or housefire).

Community leaders: Community leaders are often active in seeking aid for the whole community in times of crisis.

BOX A3.27: INITIATIVES BY COMMUNITY LEADERS

From Korodegaga:

The food aid had started in 1984. It was provided by the state for exchange of work. Hajis Kabeto, Hode Gebe and Sheikh Kedu Sateno are those who had struggled for the community to get the food aid. The food aid has saved lots of life.

Community care: From Dinki and Yetmen come examples of community care.

BOX A3.28: COMMUNITY CARE FOR THE DISABLED AND DESTITUTE YOUTH

From Dinki:

The poor/ destitute may try to support their lives by begging house to house for food or grains from threshing floors as far as they can move. But if they become disabled and have not any one to take care of them, they were said to be looked after by the community on a rotating basis; villagers could take and nurse them turn by turn until they die.

From Yetmen:

There is no form of organisation but people personally and sometimes in groups will help sick, disabled and youth. It may be in labour or financial. Yetmen

Other communities, migrants and diasporas: Our research communities are linked to other communities, particularly through marriage. For example:

BOX A3.29: LINKS WITH OTHER COMMUNITIES

From Turufe Kecheme:

Gonde takes 3 hour walk from Turufe; there is a marriage link with Turufe. Thus in-laws from Turufe take their cattle to Gonde when there is a security of grazing or straw. There is a serious problem in feeding their cattle especially from *Tir – Ginbot*³⁶. In Turufe there is a shortage of grazing land. There is also an arrangement that individuals (rich or middle) will put their sheep in the house of their relatives or some on whom they trust. Then they share the offspring to the sheep with the host who cared for the sheep. Cattle, sheep, and chicken, skin and hides are brought from Gonde. In other months firewood, lumber and vegetables are also brought to Turufe. In the time when there is shortage of maize and potatoes at Turufe, they also bring it from Gonde. Individuals from Turufe visit their relatives as far as Gonder, especially when they face crises, such as a death of a family member.

Some people migrate to beg.

³⁶ Roughly January to May.

BOX A3.30: MIGRATION FOR BEGGING

From Dinki:

He first went to Nazaret 9 years ago in order to receive alms during Ramadan. He decided to go after a relative in Aliyu Amba told him that his son, who owns a flour factory, used to give money for the poor every year during Ramadan. He has travelled 8 times; he didn't go this year but the alms-giver sent him 300 *birr*.

Some families have urban-based members who send remittances or gifts and help in times of need (Feleke: 2005). Some have relatives abroad.

BOX A3.31: INTERNATIONAL LINKS

From Korodegaga:

From late 1970s to 1999, my brother, who lived in Saudi Arabia, had helped me financially. But he died in 1999. Adult Lives large landowner 76

I wish to send him to America after he will complete his education. I have a relative in America who has the interest to help my children so that I hope that he will go out from the country and then help his family. Young Lives2 Father of 14 year old

Contributions have been received from diaspora organisations.

BOX A3.32: DIASPORA ORGANISATIONS

From Dinki:

People are worried about the government officials plan to collect monthly money that was disbursed free by Ethiopians from abroad. The donors representatives announced that the money was freely given to help people buy seeds and distributed 117 *birr* to each household. But it was said that the government started to warn people that they should pay it back, but delayed it until the election is over.

NGOs, religion-based programmes and charity: In 2003/4 Yetmen had no NGOs active in the community. Turufe Kecheme had the most active NGOs, many of them with religious affiliations, followed by Korodegaga where Self-Help International was active between 2001 and 2006, and then Dinki (Table A3.2).

	Amhara		Oromia	
Integrated	Yetmen		Turufe Kecheme	
	homogenous NGO	None	ethnic mix NGO	1.33
Remote	Dinki		Korodegaga	
	ethnic mix NGO	0.22	homogenous NGO	1.07

BOX A3.33: NGOS IN TURUFE KEHEME

From Turufe Kecheme:

Catholic Relief Services, Kalehiwot church, Kuyera Adventist College provide modern hospital services but often only to adherents of the faith. Three NGO's (Ekalo, Compassion, and Catholic Relief Services) help poor parents by constructing a house, and by providing clothes, exercise books and shoes (annually), pens and soap monthly, and money and grain at some annual holidays for their children. They also give religious education at weekends.

Kale Hiwot church, in collaboration with the Wereda Bureau of agriculture, distributes coffee and tea seedlings (about 10,000). Catholic Children's Fund (CCF) funded the expansion of the school at Wetera in 2005, and during the month of November Arssi Development Organisation gave 10,000 *birr* as a gift for the construction of Wetera primary school. Pathfinder trained two youngsters in family planning in May 2005.

African Human Action (AHA) and Adventist Relief gave training for different *kebele* about female circumcision, HIV/AIDs, and contraceptive methods, and individuals who attend these training sessions teach their communities. AHA gives 70 *birr* to these individuals monthly to encourage them, whereas Adventist Relief gives 35,000 *birr* per month. However, the dedication of these teachers to teach the community has been declining because there is no supervisor to control them.

Islamic education, some financed from Saudi Arabia, is growing in popularity in both Korodegaga and Dinki. Two boys from Dinki are attending a madrasa in Saudi Arabia.

BOX A3.34: ISLAMIC EDUCATION

From Korodegaga:

Children attend religious schools from an early age; they are important in socialisation as well as teaching the Koran. Small children should be sent to religious school to learn about moral education which has a positive impact in regulating the behaviour of the children.

Religious schools teach Arabic, Islamic law and rules; they learn moral ethics, values and norms and discipline. (Primary school director)

'Quran education carried out in the primary school (in the afternoon from Monday to Friday) and the whole day Saturday and Sunday.' Parent of 4 year old boy who attends.

All the religions provide some form of social protection for those in need.

BOX A3.35: RELIGION-BASED SOCIAL PROTECTION

From Turufe Kecheme:

Followers of one division of this religion called 'Kali-hiwot' help those children who didn't have a father. They help one of my children starting from 1995: they were paying any expenses related to her education, health clothes etc. And they gave me some money for her food until 1999. They also construct a house for me in 1996 when my house fell apart/collapsed.

On the occasion of Ramadan, we attend prayer at the field located at Wetera. There were almost 2000 Muslims who attend the prayer in the morning. After the prayer we went to our house and celebrate if. On the eve, every Muslim contributes a crop to be delivered to the destitute and weak. The Mosque organized the distribution of the crop.

Reciprocity, redistribution and collective action through *sadaqa* – a feast that can be prepared at any time by a wealthy person for the poor, *mowlid* (the birthday of the prophet Mohammed) and *id al fatir*.

From Dinki:

Aid Alefer: The rich Muslim calls all the Muslim found surrounding. The main purpose for the caller is to get heaven in the name of Allah. A people who is a member of 'Degge' should prepare large ceremony (party) like tella, injera with wat, and he should invite all people. Participants should accept all rules state[d] in the Quran.

Orthodox Church followers donate to beggars on saints days and provide food during *senbete* which are feasts held on Sundays in churches. They also allow the destitute and poor to eat at *teskar* which are feasts to honour people who have died.

Private services - formal and informal: A few rich families send children to private schools in Shashemene and Addis Ababa. Private cosmopolitan health facilities and are available in towns for those who can afford them. Yetmen has a private health clinic/pharmacy. Traditional treatments are also available; some of them are free or in return for a cup of coffee, while others are expensive and paid in cash.

BOX A3.36: TRADITIONAL MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

From Turufe Kecheme:

In 1995 there were 3 traditional doctors in the PA for bone-setting and herbs, 2 trained traditional birth attendants and three untrained, traditional birth attendants for livestock, and a *kaleecha* (ritual agent) about 2 hours walk away.

Land which can be sharecropped or rented out is sometimes used by old people and others who cannot work to provide a 'pension'.

BOX A3.37: LAND AS A FORM OF SOCIAL PROTECTION

From Dinki:

Old men can use their assets/ property, especially land as their guarantee to find caretakers in time of disability and retirement from work.

Gender and family 'policies'

Marriage and divorce were covered in Appendix 3. Here we consider female circumcision and inter-personal violence within the family.

Female Circumcision

This is ubiquitous and valued by most men and women.

BOX A3.38: FEMALE CIRCUMCISION

From Dinki:

Circumcision of children is made for both ethnic groups, the Amhara and the Argoba. The Amhara circumcise their male child at the 7 days after birth and a woman child at the 11 days from birth. The Argoba circumcise when the child becomes mature for fear of death.

From Yetmen:

Children are circumcised at the age of 7 days. ... People do not accept the harmfulness of such practices as female circumcision.

From Korodegaga:

For all first marriages there is the ceremony of circumcision. On the 15th day before the wedding the bride's parents call for an expert to cut part of her vagina. If the marriages are the result of kidnapping or choice of the woman circumcision is done at the in-laws house.

From Turufe Kecheme:

According to the culture of the Amhara, a female infant is circumcised on the seventh day of her birth. According to the culture of the Arsi, the circumcision takes place in advance of her wedding. The occasion is marked by a variety of activities which, of course, differs according to the tradition of the various groups. Among the Kembata, for instance, the men would carry the circumcised girl and dance. Among the Oromo, the circumcision of girls is an occasion for big feasts to which kin and neighbours are invited. The Amhara, who have lately began to circumcise children at ages 5 and 6, also prepare food and drink. The woman who would cover the eyes of the girl who gets circumcised would be known as her "Ayin-Enta" (literally, the mother of the eye).

Girls are circumcised for cultural reasons. Girls who are not circumcised and who are christened cannot be buried in churchyards when they die. It is regarded as a shame not to have been circumcised. Among the Oromo, in fact, a woman would not be wedded if she is not circumcised. People believe that uncircumcised daughters would only bring shame and dishonour to them. The good thing about circumcision is that it brings about liberation (or freedom). Freedom from being mocked and insulted, freedom from being an object of criticism. It is also good to respect and continue with a cultural practice that has come down to us from our ancestors.

Inter-personal violence in the family

Customarily violence has been a widespread sanction used by superiors to punish and control inferiors particularly in gender and age hierarchies. The following examples show that not all women accept regular beating; a standard response is to return to the parents' house. Reconciliation often depends on the provision of compensation gifts, such as a new dress, by the husband.

BOX A3.39: WIFE-BEATING

From Turufe Kecheme::

In 1988 I quarrelled with my husband, the reason was that he had a bad behaviour he drank alcohol and always he insult and beat, immediately I fled to my parent and I lived there for two years. Later on he sent elders and he promised to improve his behaviour and they reconciled us.

From Korodegaga:

The highest point of living during the current time (now), because in the past, there was enough wealth, but my husband beating me. He was always beating, so I lived in indecent condition. But now I am living peacefully.

Violence is common among children and young people, with boys beating girls, and elders beating youngsters.

BOX A3.40: VIOLENCE AGAINST AND AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE

From Dinki:

FGD of working/learning children Umer (middle wealth) started by listing the problems children could face at this age - they may receive beatings when animals enter and damage crops, they may not get enough food to eat or get ill. The other agreed with him and Endiris added that the students may be punished by teachers when they disturb in class or if they don't do homework. Addis believed that keeping animals in the cold / rain during the rainy season was a bad problem. Concerning their relationships with adult men. Endiris argued that they used to give them much orders and beat them. Others agreed with him and Umer added that older children also beat them or force them to work more. Addis believed that older children also used to snatch away their playing objects and tear their clothes as they keep animals far away from home.

FGD adolescents The rich boy considered parents / adults interruption / orders work assignments while children are playing games as a disappointing /problem children at his age face. Others agreed with him and he added that illness, death of parents and thus dropping out of school are the risks. The poor revealed and others agreed that poor children have the risk of critical food shortage, clothes, inability to go to the school or buy exercise books. School children may face problems during rainy seasons as they could not cross the full rivers and their parents may hold them out of school seasonally or per money for work and teachers could beat them for each absence from school or if they don't do homework. The middle wealth adolescent raised the problem of work burdens imposed upon children by this parents and others supplemented him that a lot of work assignments / orders in outside they are given, especially to carry heavy bundles of firewood or big jericans of water from the river.

As to relationships with younger children, other adolescents and adults, they argued that they used to beat younger ones for any disagreement. But they may later complain to parents and the adolescents also could receive punishment. In their relationships with other adolescents (male or female) it was agreed that they used to quarrel and beat / insult each other, even they could inflict injuries by throwing stone against each other. In their relationship with the young adults (male / female) they believed themselves as victims. They argued that adolescents are always harassed, beaten, loaded with work burdens in their relations with adults. On the other hand, the young could involve in disputes with parents if the victimized adolescents report the case.

FGD Young Adults In discussing problems related to food shelter and clothing, the middle said that these are not common problems to all young adults. He argued that the type and quantity of food, the type / quality of clothes each could have differs from house to house depending on parent's behaviour. Others agreed with him and added that some used to eat *ful* and get meat and milk. Others may depend on beans and couldn't get enough *injera*. Some may have good jackets, shorts, or shoes, and get new clothes to wear and others wear *Abujedy* clothes and never change / replace worn / torn out clothes in four years.

Community solidarity

Community celebrations have been a customary way to build solidarity and a community feeling. These are important in Yetmen and very important in Dinki. In Korodegaga the penetration of stricter approaches to Islam have led to the almost total abandonment of customary community rituals, while in Turufe Kecheme the ethnic mix means that people tend to conduct celebrations within their own group.

BOX A3.41: COMMUNITY CELEBRATIONS

From Yetmen:

Since the people of Yetmen are Orthodox Christians, there are festivals on all major Christian holidays of the country like *Meskel* (the day for the commemoration of the founding of the True Cross), *Timket* (Epiphany), *Genna* (Christmas), *Fasika* (Easter), etc. There are feasts involving sacrifices during major Orthodox Christian holidays. These major holidays are: *Kidus Yohannes* (new year commemoration), *Meskel* (the day for the commemoration of the finding of the True Cross), *Timket* (Epiphany), *Genna* (Christmas), and *Fasika* (Easter). People slaughter animals for feasts in the belief that it will create happiness and joy. Everybody is invited to all holiday feasts. A few people slaughter animals in the months of January and June which are referred to as *Yetir-dem* and *Yesene-dem*. This is linked with animistic beliefs which the overwhelming majority look down upon. They call it *Amliko-baad*. People who practice *Amliko-baad* rub the blood around their faces. The flesh of the slaughtered animal is only eaten by kin. Non-kin are not invited. In 1994 it was reported that during the major Christian holidays, the rich invite the poor to celebrate with them. In addition, food was redistributed to beggars at the Abo Church found in the *kebele*. However in 2005 during the major Christian holidays, and in other similar occasions, it was reported that it is only relatives who celebrate together. The previous culture of celebration with poor and redistributing food to beggars is now only history. In *Sene* there is a holiday when people take *injera* to the church to give to beggars.

A4.3 Local government governance structures

Kebele structures

Peasant Associations, now known as *kebele* were established in the mid-1970s. Recently reorganisation has involved the merging of old *kebele* to create larger units roughly around three times the size of the older ones. These are now referred to as *Kebele Administrations*, since they are the lowest tier of government with paid officials, accountable to and reporting to *wereda* levels.

BOX A3.42: KEBELE STRUCTURES

From Turufe Kecheme:

Kebele officials are intermediaries between the state and society through which government directives, policies and other information are disseminated and implemented. They are also responsible for taxation. They mobilise farmers for group work such as terracing and afforestation. *Turufe Kecheme RO*

From Dinki: The following *Kebele* committees were found in Dinki in 2003: service cooperative, committee of associations; community participation; committee of artifacts; security of justice sector; family planning programme; health committee; local militia; land tax; resettlement programme; food for work; education committee; water committee; women's participation; road construction committee; voluntary service; AIDS committee.

From Yetmen:

At the top of *Kebele* administration is the chairperson with his 6 cabinet members. These people are chosen among 100 people who were chosen by the people in the three respective *got*. ... And they again select one *got* chairperson for each of the three *got*. Then under the chairperson there is one secretary and the local militia.

From Korodegaga: The *kebele* administration and *kebele* social court are the two major formal organisations. The *kebele* administration is accountable to the Dodota-Sire *Wereda* administration. It is run by a special body known as the cabinet which has five members: chairman; vice-chairman; chief secretary; security leader; and DA worker. Apart from the DA worker, who is the formal employee of the government, the cabinet members are elected by the people. The DA worker is the only female. The responsibilities of the cabinet are administering the public, mobilising the people for community development works, controlling the security of the people, tax collection, distribution of extension services and food aid to the people. Since 2002/3 officials have been paid: chairman = 150 *birr*; vice chairman = 90 *birr*; secretary = 50 *birr*; security leader = 40 *birr*; the other officials continued to work free of charge.

Kebele Administration leaders are influential, particularly when they control resources such as food aid, or can affect outcomes in disputes, land measurement and distribution including to themselves and their relatives, participation in collective labour or conscription. However, their power may be limited to their period of office, and they may be disfavoured once no longer in power. The power resources of *Kebele* officials include the threat of removing land entitlements, approval of illegal land sales, taxation, the ability to fine and imprison, the power to mobilise people for community work, the signing of permits for people to leave the site, get medical

treatment etc, and the registration of organisations such as *iddir*. One way in which *kebele* and *wereda* officials relate to local people is through meetings.

BOX A3.43: LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR GOVERNMENT MEETINGS

From Turufe Kecheme:

On Tir 7, a meeting was called, but few dwellers appeared and it was postponed to another day. At this day way announced that they will be fined and many appeared. Some complained that they meeting place (Watera) is too far. But the meeting was held. And we discussed about the construction of school and the tax. *Turufe Kecheme, Community Diary*

From Korodegaga: There have been a number of meetings in October. Officials from the woreda organised people at least twice a week. They discussed about poverty, agricultural development programmes, expansion of irrigation projects, family planning and HIV/AIDS.³⁷ People really doubt about the benefits obtained from these meetings. ..they faded out not only by the number of meetings also by its length which takes the whole day without any rest. One informant told me that 'these people come here to create another problem to us rather than to solve our problems.'

In recent years new structures for mobilising and controlling local people at a lower level have been introduced. This had happened earlier in Tigray and then Amhara Region, where they are known as *Mengistawi budin* which are units of about 50 households and within these *hiwas* or *cells* with 10 households or less. In the Oromia sites they are known as *gere*, *got* and *cell*.

BOX A3.44: ENCADREMENT STRUCTURES

From Yetmen:

There are nine *mengastawi budin*, each consisting of about 50 households. Each *mengastawi budin* has 3 representatives chosen by the people.

From Korodegaga:

The kebele administration is restructured into three got. Each got is administered by five got leaders who are 'elected'³⁸ by the public in a meeting. .. Their accountability is to the kebele administration (cabinet). Below the gotl there are 8 gare. Each is headed by a committee of five members. ..At the grass root level of the hierarchy we get the ordinary people; the farmers and family labourers. Since the gare is closer to this group it has the responsibility to follow up security problems; it mobilises (orders) people to participate in meetings as well as development activities. ... Officials said that the reorganisation of the kebele in this way is to facilitate developmental activities in the community and to facilitate the administration system. However, some knowledgeable people stated that the aim is also to control and suppress opposition and resistance to government.

The *mengastawi buden* are used for the organisation of community work:

BOX A3.45: GOVERNMENT-ORGANISED COMMUNITY WORK

From Yetmen:

There have been four recent community works: maintaining the road to Zebch; emptying ponds where malaria mosquitoes might breed; building terraces on the slopey area near the church; and building the compound of the police station. The work is organised using the *mengastawi budin* system; it is controlled work at given times and if people do not go they are fined.

From Dinki: The former *kebele* is now a *got* within the new larger *kebele* created in the last reorganisation. The current *kebele* was reorganised as Hegerselam by combining 5 formerly independent PAs.... There is also a structure known as *nus-kebele* (sub-PA) in which 2 or more *got* form a common leadership that deals with common problems. Each *got* is further divided into *mengastawi budin* and then into *hiwas* (cells). A *mengastawi budin* is run by 7 elected people (1 head, 1 secretary, 5 members) whereas a *hiwas* may be formed by 6-10 neighbours depending on spatial proximity.

³⁷ For information on HIV/AIDS from the 20 WIDE sites see Pankhurst 2004.

³⁸ Research officers reported the manipulation of meetings so that people 'elected' those who *wereda* officials had chosen before the meeting.

From Korodegaga: It also helps to control the community at a meeting and under some community works. For example last year the widening of the roads was based on these groups.

From Turufe Kecheme: Structures known as *gere*, *got* and *cell* are used to organise farmers for work.

Communities may have some power to replace unpopular *kebele* officials.

BOX A3.46:

From Korodegaga: In September 2004 almost all the *kebele* officials, including the chair who was accused of giving land to the Red Cross were replaced. However, the new administration did not last long. In July 2005 the *kebele* officials were accused by the public for different mistakes: no leadership quality; unequal participation in community work; unfair distribution of food aid; could not keep the peace. Lower officials did not accept instructions from their bosses. People accused them at the *wereda* administration who sent officials to change the *kebele* officials. New leaders were elected; all the officials of the *gere*, *got*, and security group were replaced. Only the secretary of the *kebele* and the head of the *kebele* social court stayed.

There are government-formed women's associations and roles for women in the *kebele*, although they are not generally powerful in the community.

BOX A3.47:

From Korodegaga:

Women's associations are working in the area. The *kebele* women are organised as '*Dubberti Walada gamfa*'. They have their own representatives in the *kebele* leadership, social courts, *kutitir* committee members, and different *kebele* officials.

Government institutions and social order

Top-down social order is maintained through instructions coming from the Region and *wereda* to the *Kebele* Administration, often explained at meetings at which directives, campaigns and quotas are laid out. Community labour and contributions are organised through the sub-*Kebele* administrative structure of *mengistawi budin/hiwas* or *gere/cell*. Lack of 'participation' may be punished through fines. If conflicts cannot be resolved by neighbourhood elders or are serious they are brought to the *Kebele* social court, and if the verdict is imprisonment the offender may be taken to the *wereda*.

BOX A3.48: THE KEBELE SOCIAL COURT

From Korodegaga:

The *kebele* social court or *Kore Hawasa* plays an important role in conflict resolution. It has five members: the judge, vice-judge, secretary, and two members, one of whom is a woman. It meets twice a week and is responsible for major disputes such as conflicts over land, cattle entering farmland, group fighting, minor theft, serious conflicts between husband and wife and serious quarrelling between individuals. It has a right to decide a penalty up to 500 *birr* but no right to decide on imprisonment. More serious crimes are reported to the police, and the cases are seen by the *wereda* court.

Interactions between customary dispute resolution practices and government courts are discussed below.

Government services

In this section we first compare general government service provision to the sites and then focus on education, health services and food aid.

Government service provision to the communities

Table A3.3 shows that people in the four sites received a wide range of services from government between mid-2003 and mid-2004. A big contrast between the remote and integrated sites is the provision of food aid to the former and modern utilities and hospitals to the latter. Korodegaga received considerably more services than Dinki reflecting differences at *wereda* level. Security was important in the Oromo sites but not the Amhara sites

and more use was made of the courts. The most frequently taken-up services were agricultural advisory and inputs, education, and health services of various kinds.

TABLE A3.3: REPORTED USE OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES 2003-4 (RANS)				
	% of households receiving service			
	Remote		Integrated	
Type of government service:	Korodegaga	Dinki	Yetmen	Turufe K
Food aid	22.0	78.7		
Agricultural advisory	51.4	24	42.4	40.2
Irrigation	2.0		0.4	
Agricultural inputs	48.6	14	24.0	15.9
Animal health	7.1	21	36.4	1.2
Development advice/packages	14.9		0.4	5.6
Other development (non-agricultural) advisory	6.7	1		4.8
Other development (non-agricultural) inputs	1.6	1	0.4	1.2
Microcredit	2.7		6.4	6.8
Employment generation scheme	0.8		0.4	0.8
Immunization (free)	36.1	11	16.8	34.7
Health centre/post	25.9	4	43.2	15.5
Hospital			1.2	51.4
Treatment/medicine (free)	18.0	5	0.4	6.0
Treatment/medicine (subsidised)	4.3	1		1.6
Family planning (free)	13.7	2	10.0	17.9
Family planning (subsidised)	2.7	1	0.4	6
Education	17.6	21	3.6	41.8
Textbooks (free)	23.9	10	17.2	13.5
Schooling subsidised				11.6
Primary school	23.1	7	44.4	41.4
Schooling (free)	10.6		4.8	4.8
Secondary school	2.7	1	3.2	8.4
Subsidised boarding (hostel)			0.4	0.4
Vocational training		1		1.2
University			0.4	
Security	52.9	2	4.0	34.3
Court/justice	9.8	1	4.8	6.8
Electricity			47.6	17.1
Telephone			4.4	16.3
Communal piped water			33.2	6.8

Education

Table A3.4 shows that a significant proportion (between 20% and 56%) of males of 7 and over have no experience of education. 72% of females in the remote sites have had no experience of education. However, a female in Turufe Kecheme is more likely to have experienced education than a male in any of the other three sites, while in Yetmen a very slightly higher proportion of females than males are currently attending school.

TABLE A3.4: EDUCATION EXPERIENCE				
	Dinki	Korodegaga	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
% of males 7+ with experience of education now or in the past	44%	60%	80%	61%
% boys (6-19) attending school now	42%	43%	72%	51%
Average age of males in Grade 4	17	15	16	15
% of females 7+ with experience of education now or in the past	28%	28%	63%	50%
% girls (6-19) attending school now	19%	20%	68%	52%
Average age of females in Grade 4	12	15	13	14

In the last few years the government has adopted a policy of the rapid expansion of education and abolition of the shift system. Parents have been mobilised to send their children to school, sometimes under threat of fines if children do not attend. In Dinki some parents compromised by sending one child. Children also resisted in their

own way.

BOX A3.49: YOUNG SCHOOL REFUSERS

From Dinki:

Some sent from us but they didn't go to school; they passed the day in the shadow of a tree for play.

Increased demand caused problems at the beginning of the school year.

BOX A3.50: TEACHER SHORTAGES

From Korodegaga:

The primary school started the academic year around September 5. Many students registered and started education, but since there is a serious shortage of teachers students couldn't learn properly. The teacher and director couldn't give all the subjects for all the classes (grade 1-4) between 9.00 and 12.30

As a result in Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme contributions have been demanded towards the upgrading or building of schools.

BOX A3.51: COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO FOLLOW GOVERNMENT POLICIES

From Yetmen:

2004 This year the number of students enrolled and attendance had increased and as a result there were no classes /rooms to accommodate this, and the option was to let them learn out there in the open air, and under the tree shades. However, later on the school, community together with the public and other relevant people have decide to arrange shifts, and hence to alleviate this problem. However, this was said to be against the educational policy that is functional these days, that is no shift arrangements are supported. In response to this problem and to bring a sustainable/ lasting solution the community is contributing money, and running the construction of rooms / classes in the school compound.

In Dinki a new school was opened in a nearby village (20 to 30 minutes walking). In 2005 there was a shortage of facilities.

BOX A3.52: POOR SCHOOL FACILITIES

From Dinki:

The school only has two classrooms, forcing grade one and two to learn in one room sitting back to back. There are no chairs and tables for the students, although the students do not complain because they do not know that students could have tables and chairs

In Korodegaga people were mobilised every Sunday to construct toilets and build fences for the school. There are costs related to school attendance for stationery, clothes and school fees. There may be other costs, for example in a school in Turufe Kecheme teachers were employed by the community with funds raised from every household.

BOX A3.53: SCHOOL FEES AND COSTS

From Turufe Kecheme:

There is a primary school teaching grades 1 to 6 and a junior school within two km. Any farmer who can buy stationery, clothes and pay school fees sends all his children. There is a shift system so some can go in the morning and some in the afternoon. Some community members are worried about the proposed move to full day schooling but this may not be implemented until the construction of further classrooms is completed. The school fee for Kuyera Junior School is 20 *birr*. This fee is irrespective of the number of students from one household (i.e. whether one or two or many children learn at Kuyera School the payment is only 20*birr*). The same rule also works for Kuyera Secondary School, its fee is 30 *birr*. In both schools there are additional payments of two *birr* per student for sport.

The community pays 20 *birr* per year per household for Wetera primary school whether they have a child who attends school or not. The money is used to pay the salary for the teachers employed by the community. If their children attend Wetera primary school there is no fee paid. But almost all of the

community prefer to send their children to Kuyera School. The community pays both this school payment and land tax together. This is the rule of the *kebele*. Someone cannot pay only tax without paying the school payment. There is also a *kebele* school at the *kebele* office. Small children learn the *fidet* (alphabet). The payment is 0.50 *birr* per child. In addition the teacher gets his salary from a Catholic NGO. A few children from rich households learn at 'Lucy' kindergarten at Kuyera. The monthly fee is 100 *birr*

Health

Government provision of preventive services has been increasing although, as Table A3.5 shows, delivery of vaccination varied considerably by site. In three sites more than two-thirds of residents have received some vaccination.

	% respondents vaccinated in 2004
Korodegaga	80.3%
Dinki	37.3%
Turufe Kecheme	66.1%
Yetmen	72.0%

It was recently reported from Turufe Kecheme that men were not allowing their wives and daughters to have a meningitis injection as they were suspicious because it was for females only. They believed the injection contained a contraceptive. Dinki has the lowest proportion of people who have received vaccination, which may be the result of resistance.

BOX A3.54: LACK OF INTEREST IN VACCINATION

From Dinki:

As some women told me there was vaccination for small children of one and half years old and for pregnant women. Women were not interested that much to get it. Some said because of the fear of the needle. The others didn't know why they are not interested

RANS respondents were asked if anyone in the household had ever been given a number of health resources. Of the three sites where malaria is endemic the highest provision of chloroquine was in Korodegaga, while the low figure for Dinki reflects their general low use of modern medicine.

Has anyone in the household ever received?	% of households receiving health resource in 2004			
	Remote		Integrated	
	Korodegaga	Dinki	Turufe Kecheme	Yetmen
Vitamin A	15%	21%	69%	47%
Oral Rehydration Salts	12%	18%	55%	11%
Chloroquine	89%	3%	20%	14%
Bednet	0	1%	1%	0
Contraceptives	5%	1%	32%	33%
Condoms	0	1%	6%	0

There are anti-AIDS clubs and activities in Korodegaga, Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme. Just as the research was coming to an end there were reports of government activity against malaria in Korodegaga: provision of free bednets and prophylactics and DDT spraying. It was frequently reported from the sites that poor people usually do not seek cosmopolitan health treatment due to the expense.

Food aid

The main form of social protection provided by government is food aid which has been regularly if not always sufficiently provided, mostly as food for work in Korodegaga and Dinki. There has been no food aid or food for work in Yetmen and Turufe Kecheme, which are generally surplus producing. The changes in the food aid system associated with the introduction of the Productive Safety Net Programme caused some problems in Korodegaga in the first part of the research year (September 2004 – October 2005) which were sorted out in May 2005.

BOX A3.55: FOOD AID IN KORODEGAGA 2004-5

From Korodegaga:

In January 2005 people were not paid any money for the FFW they had done so they stopped and did daily labour instead. Officials said the people were lazy and had little interest in work. They also announced there would be no food aid in the current year. ... People began to purchase food from the market in November 2004. Since many people had no cattle to sell in order to purchase food crops, they suffered a lot from hunger. They got income only by selling firewood or by doing daily labour in the SHI sponsored irrigation scheme. The government was very reluctant to give them food aid. At the beginning of November, the *wereda* officials organised a meeting in the *kebele* and warned the people that since there was no food aid from the government, the people should help themselves by expanding private irrigation farms. But since most farms have little power to purchase private pumps, the suggestion from the government was not put into practice. The local people were angry with the government for not giving due attention to their problems which were caused by natural problems. They reported repeatedly to the government, through the DA and *kebele* official, that they had become unable to support themselves and so proper aid should be given to them. In March 2005 wheat was distributed to the people but it was discontinued in April. It was restarted in May and continued up to September. The food aid was given as part of the FFW programme. It was given for those who could participate in community works such as terracing and road construction. An individual could get 15 kg of wheat, 3 kg of fafa (supplementary food for children), and 1.5 litres of food oil per month. The maximum amount of wheat that households with a large household size got is 75 kg. Interestingly enough, the food aid was given twice per month in August and September 2005. Though the distribution was carried out by the *wereda* office, the aid was sponsored by donors and relief institutions. It was given in the form of the safety net programme

Taking a longer view the importance of food aid is clear.

BOX A3.56: INSITUATIONALISED FOOD AID IN KORODEGAGA

From Korodegaga:

Food aid started in 1984 and has often been provided since then; regularly since 1997 although there seems to have been a move to stop it in 2004/5.

'The *Kebele's* association of organization is helping in finance in different amounts at different times.' *Adult Lives Female Poor widow with children*

In both the drought-prone sites food aid is appreciated when it saves lives and helps poor and vulnerable people. But it is seen as making people lazy and it is not always timely. In 2003 there were complaints about unfairness.

TABLE A3.7: FOOD AID IN THE DROUGHT-PRONE SITES BEFORE 2003

Site	Positive aspects	Negative aspects	Was distribution fair?
Dinki	Food for the landless and physically weak (older people)	It makes a person develop aid mentality. It makes a person lazy. It was so late.	No: committee screens eligible - unfair selection and numbers of household members not considered.
Korodegaga	People are saved from death that results from famine.	For those lazy fellow who depend on the food aid it has a negative aspect. Hard working farmers want a permanent aid to pull them from this type of life for ever.	Some people say some men are registered in more than one <i>Kebele</i> . Some complain that households with equal numbers of families don't get equal food aid. Some don't get because they were not registered when the list of affected people was sent to the <i>Wereda</i> .

Food aid was generally reported as being linked to 'food for work' programmes. Benefits mentioned were that people could work locally rather than having to migrate, that some of the work is useful (soil conservation, ponds, forest development) and encourages a work spirit, and that people participate in their own development. The major constraints were conflict with labour needs and people's own priorities at peak times, low payment rates, and late arrival of the food. Other points mentioned were that not everyone is involved, and that the work is often compulsory and results in disincentives for individual and community initiative.³⁹

³⁹ For more details on differential responses to famine see Pankhurst and Bevan 2004 'Hunger, Poverty and Famine in Ethiopia: some Evidence from Twenty Rural Sites in Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya and the SNNP' and Bevan 2004 'Hunger, Poverty and Famine in Ethiopia: Mothers and Babies under Stress' www.wed-ethiopia.org/working.htm.

TABLE A3.8: FOOD FOR WORK IN THE DROUGHT-PRONE SITES BEFORE 2003

	FFW Programme?	Benefits	Negative aspects	Fair?
Dinki	Every week two times, in the morning, from 7.00 to 10.00. People involve in terrace, road, ditch construction to protect the soil or the crop from erosion Road construction .	People involve in the community's development activities. For every person who has involved in the programme. The distribution is not free of charge therefore it gives a sort of confidence because people render their labour services.	People work 8 times in every month but they get only 12 kilos if they have no other household members. Besides, they give up their work to cover the times so as to get food aid. People forced to give up to participate on their tasks whenever there is community development work.	No, I have mentioned the reasons above. Yes, because the work is for the community.
Korodegaga	In 1977 when UNICEF organised the people to engage in 'food for work' programme. They used to get 35 -60 birr according to the number of family members. From UNICEF to the regional RRC in 1981 - in building the irrigation canal up to 1984 E.C. Starting from 1991 up to now we are working on eradicating the partinium weed. The coordinator is the DA. Mostly we pull out the weeds which have covered the community. We make terracing, we maintain roads.	The people will develop the attitude of working for a better life. Work before food type attitude will develop. he positive aspect of this is that the people think that whatever they get as food is the outcome of their labour. This positive aspect is for the whole community.	Some people hate the work. They want to collect the food without any labour. These lazy peasants don't come to work with different excuses. They simply seek that their quota of food comes every month There is no negative aspect of 'food for work'	No, some people don't appear for work. The duration for the work is very small. Those absents should not have their food aid. But they get their quota every month. No, those who are absent from work with lame excuses get the food aid because the <i>Kebele</i> are not firm on this.

Gender and family policies

Marriage and divorce

The government policy on marriage is based on the voluntary consent of the couple. Abduction is illegal. From 2005 a divorced woman had formal rights to share land with her husband.

BOX A3.57: GOVERNMENT MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE POLICY

From Korodegaga:

The government policy on marriage is based on the voluntary consent of couples. By this principle, two youngsters (female and male) may get married without the parent's agreement. This marriage may happen between the same clan or different wealth status so this breaks the cultural norms of the society. As a result elderly and middle age people oppose this policy.

In 2005, divorced women have rights to share land with her husband. This is supported culturally and legally.

Inheritance

Civil law supports inheritance to all children; so now a married daughter who has inherited nothing can in theory take the case to the social court.

Circumcision

The government has banned female circumcision, which we have shown above to be culturally entrenched in all the sites. What is happening at the interface between the two stances is discussed below.

Family planning

This has been government policy for a long time; the evidence that behaviour is shifting, at least in the integrated sites has been presented elsewhere.

Governance style: campaigns, meetings, quotas

The government's style of mobilisation may be assumed to enhance efficiency of communication and implementation of government policies and service delivery. However, it may also be perceived as intrusive, competing with existing informal institutions and undermining community autonomy. Attempts to make use of community institutions to promote overtly political agendas may also be perceived as running counter to community interests.

Controlling working practices

In Turufe the authorities sought to use the official structure rather than traditional work parties to collect harvests and banned migrant workers resulting in increases in the rate peasants had to pay to employ wage labourers.

BOX A3.58: GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN THE AGRICULTURAL LABOUR MARKET

From Turufe Kecheme:

The other thing which is the result of government intervention is the banning of daily labourers from other regional states who used to come to the area annually for work. Combine-harvesting machines were also restricted from working in the area. Some people say that this is done in order to save the farmers from extra expenses and to guide the peasants to work intensively. Others say that it is just to keep away the outsiders from the Woreda. This had been practised in Arsi Negele Woreda in 2003/2004 harvest time. The other problem in the harvest is the fact that we faced difficulties to get workers. In the previous years many labourers used to come to our site. But this year there are fewer labourers, partly because the government prohibits them to come to our site. I heard that the government wants the local community to avoid employing others and collect by themselves. Thus we are condemned to pay up to 50 birr per *timad*. But last year we used to pay 25-30 birr.

Roadblocks were set up and migrant labourers were not allowed to pass them. Directives to use the new formal structure to collect crops instead of traditional labour groups were resisted by local people.

BOX A3.59: GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE WITH CUSTOMARY WORKING PRACTICES

From Turufe Kecheme:

November 2004: The government attempted to make the people use the *Gere* and *Got* hierarchy to collect the crop. But none of the community members use the hierarchy. Most of them used *Debo* and *Wonfel* systems⁴⁰, and some employed labourers

Long meetings

A main government instrument aimed at promoting change is the [long] meeting during which officials lecture local people. There was a sense expressed in all sites that people were fed up with the frequency of the meetings which they often considered a waste of valuable time. In some cases people only attended out the fear of fines or of being considered uncooperative.

BOX A3.60: EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENT MEETINGS

From Dinki:

The cadres called the people for a one day meeting and discussed about development.

From Korodegaga:

Wereda officials organised meeting in September after rain failure and urged people to organise themselves in groups of 8-10 and buy small irrigation pumps to extract water from the river.

⁴⁰ They argued that the incentive structures of the cell/*gere/got* system were perverse. People work hard using customary systems since they are based on long-term social exchange relationships.

Involving local associations as partners in development

Funeral associations during the Derg period were involved in conscription, and currently are expected to contribute to costs of development initiatives. Although the collaboration may be seen as effective, such co-opting of local informal institutions may tarnish their legitimacy.

Government has an ongoing history of exploiting local grassroots organisations:

BOX A3.61: GOVERNMENT EXPLOITATION OF GRASSROOT ORGANISATIONS

From Turufe Kecheme:

Government intervention is inevitable around institutions. During the Derg period people were afraid to go to religious institutions. Derg used burial institutions as a source for recruiting militias who were later sent to the fronts. During EPRDF period the government used the iddirs as a means of cost sharing in development strategy.

The standardised campaign approach with quotas in which the officials of each *wereda* seek to impress the regional authorities by achieving or going beyond targets or quotas, has negative implications including doing things in too great haste, mobilising energies on single tracks detracting from applying human, material and other resources to ongoing activities, a tendency to go for increasing numbers and quotas set from above to the detriment of quality, experimentation, and adoption of what works, assuming that the same solution is valid everywhere without taking due consideration of regional, altitudinal, climatic, and socio-cultural variations. This is a particular problem for 'Development Agents'; young educated and trained people whose position between the *wereda* and the community can be very difficult. An anecdotal example from elsewhere in Amhara region describes the anxieties and frustrations of a young DA with a quota of free beehives to distribute which no-one wanted as most of the local bees were dead or dying.

Community work

Government organised community work involves road construction and maintenance, environmental rehabilitation and conservation, such as terracing and water harvesting and construction of buildings for schools, clinics etc. Such public works may or may not involve food-for-work in the food-deficit sites.

BOX A3.62: COMMUNITY WORK

From Dinki:

There are some activities in the construction of village to village road, stream development activities, ditch preparation for storing rain water. There is food for work involving road construction, making terrace, fencing the Muslim graveyard etc.

November 2004 : *Kebele* leaders ordered people to participate in road maintenance campaign. December 2004. People participated in road maintaining work campaign terracing and contributed wood for school construction. *Dinki Community Diary*

From Korodegaga: There were campaigns every Sunday against the partinium weed in September and October. Community work was also used for digging and clearing canals, improving the road, fencing, building the school toilet and mending the boat.

Elders are involved not only in mobilisation but also participate personally in community development programmes. The most notable community works in the past three years include: water harvesting which was part of the FFW, environmental rehabilitation such as terracing and reforestation, campaign against unwanted weeds like partinium weed, roads works and digging irrigation canals. During most of the year, people participated in these works once a week on Sunday. All individuals over the age of 18 should take part in the programme. In the case of FFW/safety net programme, however, any individual who can work may participate in the programme. Thus, even children as young as 12 are involved in it. But very old people as well as physically handicapped are exempted from community works; they are also not forced to participate in meetings.

From Yetmen:

As far as campaign work was concerned, the road to Zebch was maintained, terraces were built near the church where flood eroded the soil very much, and the compound of the police station was maintained. These things were done by coordinating each *Mengistawi Budin* whose representatives have the obligation to check who was present and who was not.

Although the community work is called voluntary or participatory labour, in fact it is mandatory, with threatened fines for non-attendance. Attitudes towards such work vary depending on the assessment by communities, groups and individuals of their usefulness. Whereas roads, schools and clinics are often appreciated, scepticism was expressed about environmental rehabilitation and water harvesting.

Taxes and other contributions

In 2005 people went to all the sites to measure the land with a rope. Household heads were given or promised certificates and tax schedules related to size of landholding were developed.

BOX A3.63: LAND TAX		
From Yetmen:		
Land holdings in rope		Tax payment in birr
1,2		20
3,4		25
5,6		30
7,8		35
9,10		40
11,12	=	45
From Dinki:		
Land tax and all other types of government imposed taxes and contributions are collected by the <i>kebele</i> leadership using the social courts and the militia to force people who do not co-operate. All household heads who have land, acquired through distribution or inheritance, pay taxes. The minimum tax rate is 20 <i>birr</i> paid on <i>Dikuman</i> land (garden plots), and up to 70 <i>birr</i> being paid on the largest landholdings of thirteen <i>timad</i> or three to four hectares.		
From Korodegaga:		
The amount of land tax is determined by the amount of land occupied by the household, and by the economic status of the household. It ranges from 30 to 100 <i>birr</i> . It is collected immediately after the harvest season. Landless peasants do not pay land taxes.		
From Turufe Kecheme:		
In the years before June 2005, every farmer was expected got pay 20 <i>birr</i> regardless of the size of their land, but after the end of the recent measurement of land, a new taxation system was imposed, which considers both the size of their land holdings and the quality of their land. At the time of land measurement (2004) the land was classified in to three categories A, B and C, corresponding to lands which yield good, average and low harvests respectively.		

Contributions in cash, labour or wood have been expected for the construction of schools in all four sites in 2005. Contributions of labour and/or cash for the building of health posts were required in Dinki and Yetmen.

A4.4 Community – government interfaces

In this section we describe a number of interactions between local government and communities including satisfaction with government services, voice and accountability, and dispute resolution and justice. We also provide some examples of community resistance to government policies.

Satisfaction with services

Expressed levels of satisfaction with the government services received by households was high with only 15% in Dinki, 13% in Korodegaga, 12% in Turufe Kecheme, and 11% in Yetmen not being 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied'. Satisfaction with NGO services in the three sites where they are activity was even higher with the equivalent figures being 2%, 9% and 9%.

	Dinki	%	Koro	%	Turufe	%	Yetmen	%	Total	%
Very satisfied	74	24	257	20	389	16	613	34	1333	23
Satisfied	187	61	872	67	1725	72	1034	58	3818	66
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	17	6	54	4	225	9	54	3	350	6
Dissatisfied	27	9	110	8	62	3	90	5	289	5
Very dissatisfied	1	0	8	1	6	0	4	0	19	0
NK	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	306	100	1302	100	2407	100	1795	100	5810	100
Services per hh	1.81		5.11		9.59		7.18			

	Dinki	%	Koro	%	Turufe	%	Yetmen
Very satisfied	9	24	94	34	67	20	
Satisfied	26	70	156	57	238	72	
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	0	0	12	4	7	2	
Dissatisfied	2	5	10	4	15	5	
Very dissatisfied	0	0	2	1	6	2	
Total	37	100	274	100	333	100	None
Services per hh	0.22		1.07		1.33		None

The qualitative data shows that the veterinary service (or its absence) was a major cause of dissatisfaction for farmers in the remote sites. During the community and household diary year (October 2004 – September 2005) there were frequent complaints of recurring livestock diseases and deaths from Dinki and Korodegaga and of failures by the government veterinary service to act effectively to eradicate the diseases. These services were accessible in the more integrated sites.

BOX A3.64: LIVESTOCK VACCINATION IN TURUFE KEHEME

From Turufe Kecheme:

There was a vaccination programme in the *kebele* during the *Derg* period. The programme was carried out once a year and the service was provided by the MoA coming to the *kebele*. In 1994, the MoA was not obliged to provide vaccination by visiting the *kebele*. Peasants had to take their livestock to the MoA office. However in 2005, agricultural officers did visit the *kebele* and vaccinated all the cattle at the cost of 0.60 birr per animal

Dispute resolution and justice

There is prevalent assumption of a disconnect between formal and informal institutions⁴¹. The State is seen as increasingly penetrating, and within communities people are portrayed as dependent on informal institutions and lacking confidence in formal institutions. There is certainly some truth to these stereotypes. State structures have become more pervasive with ever lower levels of control⁴², a narrative that is common regarding dispute resolutions. Some elders spoke of their mandate being reduced compared to the past, with *Kebele* social courts monopolising serious and sensitive issues such as murder and land disputes, relegating elders to cope with minor family and inter-household matters⁴³. Moreover, local people trust and rely on informal institutions. Informal dispute resolution based on cultural logics differs from universal values of the formal legal system: it relies on compromise, is restorative, seeking reconciliation among people who live together, it is accessible, localised, in a familiar language, less costly, timely, does not involve imprisonment; relying on the moral authority of social ostracism or cursing and achieving reconciliation through blessing and commensality; it is thus considered legitimate and predictable based on widely held beliefs and norms.

However, when we look closely at how disputes are handled and resolution processes a more complex and dynamic picture emerges, and there is much greater interaction and interdependence of the two systems than

⁴¹ See for instance: “The formal and informal opportunity structures under which Ethiopians live their lives are not complementary” Empowerment in Ethiopia: A status review. *WB Draft Working Paper*, p.33

⁴² See the earlier discussion on levels of local government.

⁴³ However, customary institutions are said to have a greater role than under the *Derg*.

might at first appear. In practice the formal justice relies heavily on informal institutions throughout the process. First, when litigants bring a case, they are sent back to elders to mediate and seek a compromise and only if this fails are they allowed to return to the *Kebele* courts. In Yetmen the social court assigns elders with a written request to investigate not just in family and marital affairs but also for land and money matters. Elders are expected to communicate their decisions in writing to the courts. Second, courts often seek the advice of mediating elders as witnesses. Third, once a verdict is reached elders are often expected to ensure that the parties implement and respect decisions. Courts may also be involved in enforcing verdicts suggested by the elders.⁴⁴

There has also been a tendency for the formal system to involve or co-opt the elders into semi-formal roles. For instance in Dinki the *Kebele* formed a marriage and divorce committee,⁴⁵ composed of elders. This is related to State interests in defending women's rights and monitoring male-dominated customary institutions but also due to the high prevalence of marital disputes and the view that elders are needed. Moreover, local level *Kebele* officials are from the communities and understand and often share the cultural premises of the elders, and seek to translate external values in local terms and minimise external impositions. There has also been a process of informal institutions becoming more formalised, notably in the use of written contractual agreements of decisions, with chairmen being designating and keeping copies of agreements. To conclude the picture that emerges is less of separation and more of negotiation and collaboration, with compromise as well as resistance.

Major crimes like serious theft, murder, rape, abduction, ethnic or clan-based disputes are passed to the *wereda* court. The *kebele* social court's accountability is not to the *kebele* administration but to the *wereda* court. It seems that the presence of this court helps the people to get solutions to their security problems. People go to the court even for minor cases. Some informants said that the court is giving fair justice to the people. The social court works in coordination with the *kebele* administration (*kore bulchisa*) and the *kebele* security (*Abba nagga*). Sometimes, it also coordinates with community elders. Elders complain that the increasing role of the social court in dispute resolution greatly contributes to the decline of the role of traditional conflict resettlement institution.

Relations between community members, customary structures and government structures

Local elites interact regularly with officials at *wereda* level.

BOX A3.65: LOCAL ELITES AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES

From Korodegaga:

The local elites are well-related to economic and political structures through the Ministry of Agriculture at *wereda* level. Should they require more force to catch thieves and other outlaws the *wereda* police and administration cooperate with them. The elders' council provides support through the *kebele* structure. The elders motivate people to participate in development activities, and to get involved in meetings and support government programmes. Since they have developed good experience in mediation, and local politics, the elders represent the people in all matters affecting the community. Most of the members of the council are also social elites. They develop such status through personal effort as well as due to their exposure to participation in meetings (both government and public) and involvement in conflict resettlement process. Elders are involved not only in mobilisation but also participate personally in community development programmes.

Perspectives on elites and their relations with broader structures vary among different groups in the community.

BOX A3.66: VARYING PERSPECTIVES ON A LOCAL ELITE

From Turufe Kecheme:

Here are some different views on the relationship of local elites to broader economic and political structures. The local elites do not have any relation to broader economic and political structures. Another view is that they try to arrange for the farmers to get fertilisers, improved seeds, herbicide etc. In addition they also respond to some requests from above. Some leaders are self-centred. When there is a need they get backup from above. They relate to the broader structures through the regulations. They collect

⁴⁴ For instance in Dinki the owner of a donkey that ate crops in a field was made to pay compensation.

⁴⁵ Such a committee was already described in a resettlement setting in the late 1980s (Pankhurst 2002:242-62).

money for fertiliser and land tax and pass it up. They have meetings and exchange letters with higher up. Their concern is how they can stay longer in power by reporting people who object to the government and detaining people. They do not do anything for the community and are supported from above when they need to oppress the people

Voice and accountability

There have been continuities in state-peasantry relations from the Derg to the EPRDF period most notably in what Clapham (2002) describes as 'the project of *encadrement*' which involves economic, social and cultural modernisation conceived in socialist terms as well as the control of political opposition. This involves incorporation into structures of control based on a single party system directed from above, to be achieved through control of land and state resource allocation, the organisation of farmers into peasant associations and a hierarchy of lower-level structures, and peasant mobilisation through meetings, campaigns, quotas, direct orders and collective labour.

However, there are differences under the EPRDF. Some of the more extreme forms of mobilisation in villagisation, cooperativisation, resettlement, conscription have been avoided or much reduced. In the sites there has been a moving away from the villagised settlements established under the Derg, except in so far as services are available such as in Turufe where water, health, education and even electricity are more available in the compact settlement, and where the migrant minorities feel more secure, and in Korodegaga where irrigation potential and projects led to more people living at *Sefera* the settlement near the river. People within the sites have also increased their linkages with nearby urban areas with some elites even building houses and sending their children to towns.

However, in terms of the extent and depth of state penetration and potential control the encadrement project can be said to have gone much further than under the Derg. Not only are *Kebele* Administration officials now the lowest official tier of government paid by and accountable primarily to the state rather than to the communities they represent, but also the sub-*Kebele* level structure creates a system of potential mobilisation structure of three tiers below the *Kebele* with the *gots*, representing geographical divisions, the *mengistawi budin* whose very names 'government teams' hint at their role and allegiances in Amhara and the *gere* in Oromia with five leaders for around 50 households and the term *hiwas* in Amhara or cell in Oromia, a grouping of ten households or less, reminiscent of a military structure. The structure is used for mobilisation for meetings, collective labour, provision of food aid, ensuring taxation is paid etc. It can be a very efficient means for local mobilisation down to small groupings but is primarily a top down structure with considerable power for the leaders and potential for abuse given the lack of checks and balances.

There have been some cases of resistance and confrontation some of which are described below. They relate to resettlement, conscription, land measurement, water harvesting, the digging of household latrines, new education policies, abduction, female circumcision, commemorative ceremonies for the dead, the abolition of blood feuds, and the 2005 elections.

Resettlement

In Dinki the community was able to oppose plans to move households off hillsides which government experts wanted to have reforested moving people into settlements nearer the river. Community members were relieved that government energies in mid 2005 were concentrated on the elections so that this plan was shelved.

BOX A3.67: LOCAL RESETTLEMENT PLAN ABANDONED DUE TO LOCAL UNPOPULARITY

From Dinki:

Also, in 2005, the agricultural development centre had planned to resettle the people from the upper part of Dinki to the lower areas to make way for an afforestation programme. People strongly opposed the idea of forest reserves, arguing that it would aggravate the already existing shortage of grazing land. There is also a great problem with deforestation in the area. The intention was conservation of the area from degradation, and to avoid excessive cultivation of slopes. However, the plan was not accepted by the residents. The people were ready to resist as some had built houses on top of the hills fifty years before and, as a result, the proposal was dropped before the May 2005 elections since it was seen to be unpopular.

However, some people were resettled from Dinki to other areas. Although only a few households were affected most of those resettled seem to have returned when they found conditions in the resettlement areas to be harsh

and very different from the idyllic scenarios they were told about.

Conscription

During the Derg wars against Eritrea several rounds of forced conscription were carried out in all the sites, and there were cases of men who tried to resist. In Dinki one man considers that he and his relatives were discriminated against for having successfully resisted conscriptions by hiding. In 2005 there was conscription in Dinki and even reports of some cases of conscripts being taken from marketplaces and rumours of them trying to escape.

Land measurement

The government has firmly continued the policy of land remaining state property. However, at a local level in many of the sites there were 'illegal' land sales. In 2005 a new policy of land measurement was carried out in all the sites with a view to providing ownership certificates, with the intention of promoting tenure security and investment. However, this resulted in some conflict notably in Turufe between land owners and those who had rented land and in Dinki due to fears that this would be a measure to increase taxation, and in particular by the Muslim Argobba men who did not want their wives to be registered as co-owners.

BOX A3.68: LAND MEASUREMENT

From Korodegaga:

There was land measurement in the area in 2005, carried out from February to May. The survey assessors were elected by the people, and comprised five local individuals. The group members moved together and measured the lands of each farmer. The farmers had to show their plots and the borders. The aim of the measurement is to ensure ownership. Before the measurement was completed the rainy season began, so the ownership certificate had not yet been given to the farmers.

From Turufe Kecheme:

In 2005 there was land measurement to identify landowners. There are some owners who sold their land secretly, but at the time of measurement both the seller (original owner) and the buyer claimed ownership of the land. The cases were taken to the *kebele* court (*fird shengo*), and the *kebele* committee testified the land to be the property of the seller since they know only the original owner. However, the *kebele* officials found it difficult to solve such conflicts. In most cases they decided on the payment of compensation to the individual who bought and cultivated the land. The compensation included the price for the plants. Most of the time the owners of the land declined to pay, considering the fact that the land was bought by a farmer who is a dweller of the community, they decided to let the land be kept in the hands of the one who bought the land.

Water harvesting

This nationwide water harvesting campaign was carried out in 2003-04 in the two drought-prone sites, Korodegaga where it failed as it was inappropriate given the soil type, and around Dinki where the plan was rejected due to fears it would spread malaria but where people from Dinki were required to provide labour for surrounding areas.

BOX A3.69: WATER HARVESTING FAILURE IN KORODEGAGA

From Korodegaga:

In 2003-04, people were involved in the water harvesting programme, which was also part of the FFW programme. A number of ponds were dug during that year in different areas of the *kebele*. However, the water-harvesting programme was a total failure in Korodegaga, as it had not taken into account the condition of the soil, which is mainly sandy, and cannot hold water. At the end of the year, it was discovered that all the ponds failed to hold the water. The other problem is the high temperatures in Korodegaga can easily evaporate water so it is difficult to use this water for growing crops.

Household latrines

As described above in Yetmen and Dinki people were instructed to dig latrines and threatened with fines; a number dug holes but just for show.

Government education policies

The abolition of the shift system was successfully resisted in Korodegaga on the ground that children travelling

a long distance missed the mid-day meal and did not have time to complete their household work. There were discussions in Turufe Kecheme.

BOX A3.70: PROBLEMS WITH THE ABOLITION OF THE EDUCATION SHIFT SYSTEM

From Turufe Kecheme:

There were attempts made to convince the people accept the end of shifting system. Meaning, it was believed that one major obstacle of achieving quality education was the fact that students spent less time in the school. Therefore, it was recommended that shifting system should be ended and students should spend much of the day time in the school. As a result, the school arranged meeting for this cause.

The attempt by the government to extend the school calendar to July failed in Dinki as this is the month when the rainy season starts; many children had to stop school because they could not cross the rivers which were too full. Respondents from Dinki explained some of the reasons for absenteeism and the problems caused for teachers.

BOX A3.71: A PROPOSAL FOR AN EDUCATIONAL CALENDAR SENSITIVE TO CHILD WORK NEEDS

From Dinki:

Even if there is the opportunity to go to school, children have duties outside school, which conflict with their educational attendance. Those who have already started to go to school may be forced to quit due to the pressure exerted by farming activities. Furthermore it is also observed that teachers find themselves in a very difficult situation because most students temporarily withdraw during harvest time. When these students return they can be a burden on the teachers since they have to catch up with the others who have been attending regularly. This problem is shared by many schools in rural Ethiopia and the Ministry of Education could respond by designing different calendars for schools in rural areas. In addition, students are forced to stay away from their school on the market days to look after the house and smaller children when their parents are at market. Previously, the market was on Sunday, however, now the market day has changed to Thursday and Monday, which are school days, so the number of students has decreased on these days.

Abduction

A reason frequently proffered explaining why parents are not keen to send their daughters to school is the fear of rape or abduction. However, while abduction is now a criminal offence it is difficult to prosecute, partly because the parents of the victim are not keen.

BOX A3.72: ABDUCTED GIRL'S PARENTS AGAINST PROSECUTING THE ABDUCTER

From Dinki:

There was a case in Chibite when a fifth-grade student was kidnapped by her classmate. The school administrator tried to bring the case to court in order to stop such cases in the future, but, paradoxically, the father of the girl counteracted, pleading that there is no need to take the boy to court since the case had been resolved by elders.

Female circumcision

Since circumcision is now illegal unless the interviewer is well-trusted respondents are likely to claim that it is not practised.

BOX A3.73: FEMALE CIRCUMCISION DENIED

From Turufe Kecheme:

Male and female babies are circumcised seven days after the birth. A man is forbidden to circumcise a female baby but a woman can circumcise both male and female babies. Through time the community has understood the side effects of female circumcision. The role of NGOs has been important in teaching the people regarding issues like HIV/AIDS, circumcision and family planning. In addition the people hear about circumcision and other gender issues from the media, mainly the radio. Female circumcision is no longer practised in the area.

A later interview with a nurse was more accurate.

BOX A3.74: FEMALE CIRCUMCISION GOES UNDERGROUND

From Turufe Kecheme:

Third respondent: *(Note from researcher: It is difficult to find women who would say that they have been harmed by circumcision as it is difficult to find women who have not been circumcised. This respondent is a woman who opposes circumcision, a nurse.)*

They believe that a woman would not be able to get a husband if she is not circumcised; they believe that she would have a bad reputation. From the vantage point of health, however, it is clear that circumcision causes a number of problems. For instance, it makes labour during birth very painful and protracted. The risk of contracting deadly diseases including HIV/AIDS is also great due to the unsanitary condition of the instruments that are used for the job. There is no benefit at all in circumcision. In fact, it is a very harmful practice in terms of health.

Note from researcher: It is difficult to find women who would say that they have been harmed by circumcision; even women who might have been harmed by it would find it difficult to state that openly; they would, instead, find some other explanation for their difficulties. Even though circumcision has been outlawed recently, the public still looks upon it positively as a good cultural practice. Nobody benefits from the circumcision of girls, except may be the expert woman who gets paid for the job.

Q: Are you circumcised yourself?

A: Yes, I am. My parents had me circumcised in my infancy. Since we are Amhara it happened on the seventh day of my birth.

Q: Have you had your daughter circumcised?

A: Yes, I have. The reason is, as I said to you, both my parents and relatives would not give me peace if I had not done it. As I said to you, despite the legal prohibitions, the public has not as yet understood the benefits of abandoning the practice. It is still practised secretly.

There are signs that it is becoming increasingly possible to discuss the physical problems related to circumcision.

BOX A3.75: FEMALE CIRCUMCISION – THE CHOICE BETWEEN ‘IMPURITY’ AND PHYSICAL PROBLEMS

From Korodegaga:

In the past, the ceremony of circumcision was a part of all first marriages. On the fifteenth day before the wedding the bride's parents called for an expert to cut part of her vagina. From then on she was not allowed to work outside her house (compound), for example to bring water and collect firewood. People believe that, if the female is not circumcised, she will be referred to as *Nejas* or impure. Now, circumcision of female children is regarded officially as a harmful practice. Some female officials took training on this issue at the *wereda* level. Health experts also came from the *wereda* health office and taught the people about harmful practices including circumcision. Though the practice of circumcision is still conducted in the *kebele*, many people have developed awareness about its disadvantages. The attempt to raise awareness among the whole community continues.

Teskar – commemorative ceremonies for the dead

In Yetmen *kebele* officials tried to abolish the local commemorative ceremonies for the dead on the grounds of their expense.

BOX A3.76: ATTEMPT TO ABOLISH COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONIES FOR THE DEAD

From Yetmen:

Government activities trying to abolish commemorative ceremonies are very unpopular among most members of the community. And community elders argued with government officials at different meetings held to convince the people. But when some *Kebele* officials tried to impose this idea and to enforce it, the people defended their right through open protest. And now this endeavour by the government is no longer strongly pursued.

The officials abandoned the attempt after one of their number was exposed for secretly fixing a *teskar* for one of

his relatives in another *kebele*.

The abolition of blood feuds

Blood feuds may still occur in both Oromo and Amhara regions. Government attempts to abolish such conflicts in Dinki met with failure.

BOX A3.77: THE FAILURE OF A BLOOD DRYING COMMITTEE

From Dinki:

As is the case in many parts of Northern Ethiopia, blood feuds (*dem meqabat*) are still a reality between individual families. Kin groups co-operate much more significantly in this respect than in economic matters. A person who has not been able to avenge the death of a kinsman is subjected to much ridicule during funeral occasions and is even labelled *dem techi* (blood drinker). Realising the proliferation and severity of the problem, there was once an attempt by the government to stop such conflicts once and for all. A committee known as the Blood Drying Committee (*yedem adraki komite*) was organised from *wereda* down to *kebele* level. However, this campaign was not successful and did not last for long.

The 2005 elections

In all four sites the government party lost the 2005 elections. Up to the run up of the elections the EPRDF was confident of winning massive support in rural areas, a view which was reinforced at meetings and by *kebele* officials. Frequent meetings and radio programmes meant that people in the communities were very much aware of the upcoming elections. However, campaigning was limited and opposition presence within the sites almost non-existent. In Turufe it was reported that the EPRDF officials did a survey dividing people into those who were going to vote for them, those who were undecided and those who were in opposition. There were also anxieties expressed by migrants that they might be evicted if the EPRDF lost and if there was ensuing disorder, as the memories of the evictions of the Kambata in 1991 and of Eritreans in 1999s were still fresh in people's minds. When the Kebele officials held meetings those who attended expressed support for the government. In Korodegaga in one instance when an official asked if anyone would vote for the opposition one man put up his hand and when he was asked about it he said he had only put up his hand to ask a question. In Dinki an opposition supporter had stones thrown at night on his roof a few days before the elections.

In Dinki campaigning issues included the question of money that had apparently been sent by diaspora Ethiopians the help farmers in their area. The government officials collected the money that had been distributed and were challenged by opposition CUD supporters arguing that proof should be provided as to whether the fund was given as a loan or a gift. Unemployed youths in Aliyu Amba were allegedly recruited to campaign in favour of the EPRDF and given per diems from government offices. There was also some attempts by EPRDF cadres to campaign among the Argobba Muslims on the grounds that the CUD was Amhara and Christian.

On the election day in Dinki the Argobba had a separate ballot box for the house of representatives to chose an Argobba party. Almost all Argoba voted at the Federal level for the recently formed Argoba People's Democratic Movement (APDM) rather than the earlier EPRDF-sponsored Argoba National Democratic Organisation (ANDO); the CUD obtained 25 of the Argobba votes which were supposed to be for the ethnic-based parties. The majority of the Amhara voted for the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) for the parliament at both Federal and Regional levels. Only 12 Amhara voted for the EPRDF at the Federal Level. For the regional council the EPRDF won in Dinki due mainly to Argoba support, although it lost to the CUD at a *wereda* level.

In Dinki after the election people listened to both national and Voice of America and German Amharic radio services, so they were aware of the post-election crisis and feared unrest after the violence in Addis Ababa. After the elections there was very little government development activities which on the whole the community seemed pleased about as it meant that they did not have to come to meetings, participate in community labour campaigns etc and were left to their own devices. However, there were meetings to discuss the elections at which EPRDF cadres were said to have admitted mistakes and promised to redress them. Fairly soon after some 200 people were sent for a couple of weeks to discuss how government could improve its policies.

In all sites local people told *wereda* officials that they would be voting for the EPRDF, partly out of fear of reprisals. In Korodegaga most people were planning to do this in February/March 2005, with women being particularly supportive on the grounds that the government had improved their rights to land and other property. However, there was a change of mind as national and local political discussions developed. One element in Korodegaga was a view that most of the high ranking politicians 'belong to one ethnic group (the Tigrayans)'

and as a result the role of other ethnic groups in national politics is small. There was also a belief that the distribution of government resources and income to different regions of the country was unfair. 'As one farmer said in the last fifteen years the government built three airports and more than fifty factories in the Tigray Region, which is one of the smallest regional states both in size and population.' Korodegaga Village Studies.

People in Yetmen, which is in an area where clashes with government can be traced back to the 1960s, were so worried about the potential for disorder that there was a considerable amount of 'panic buying'. In the event the election was held peacefully.

BOX A3.78: ELECTION TENSIONS IN YETMEN

From Yetmen:

In 2005 there were no manifest political conflicts, but there was tension between administrative officials who are supporters of the ruling government and other people who support other political parties. According to people in administrative positions the election was very democratic and fair starting from the agitation period. They cite the CUD victory in Yetmen by a significant margin as proof of this. However, many people and those who were active supporters of CUD do not accept this. According to this group of people the election was not fair starting from its agitation and the CUD victory was in spite of its unfairness. The people were told to vote for candidates of the ruling party on many occasions, and were asked who they were going to vote for. The people had no choice but to conform to their expectations in meetings. However, it turned out to be the opposite on the Election Day. In addition, candidates of other parties were interrogated and harassed. And according to them what was amazing was that after the election people from the *wereda* came and asked the people at a meeting why they did not vote for their candidates and if there were any reforms they wanted to be made. But these things must be done regularly and not after they have lost the trust of the people.

A4.5 Local and ideological repertoires related to community governance

'Traditional' local repertoires

Wise and experienced elders should guide the community as to the values they should follow, the knowledge that they need, and the beliefs which are correct in each of the fields of action. Elites (male elders, influential wealthy, educated, religious leaders) should make the important community decisions. Social order should be maintained with reference to traditional and religious values. Communities must protect themselves against neighbouring enemies. Disputes should be resolved by elders and other traditional institutions such as *gada* and spirit possession wherever possible. The aim is the restoration of harmony among people who have to live in regular face-to-face interactions. Community relations should be organised through social networks and local 'formal'⁴⁶ organisations such as burial associations and savings clubs and regular community and neighbourhood festivals. Customary ceremonies are important, especially those related to burial of the dead. All members should contribute work for ceremonies and other co-operative community work. People or groups should assist poor and destitute old, sick and young people with resources and care.

Household and personal security should be sought and provided through self-help, intra-household sharing, family obligations, particularly of children to parents, long-term social exchanges with families and wider kin, neighbours and friends, and seeking patrons. Land should not be marketable as it provides security for those who can no longer work. People should seek health treatment appropriate to their illness; which may involve self-treatment, traditional health practitioners, visiting holy water sites, going to pharmacies, or using government or private for-profit health services. The customary gender and family policies described in Appendix 3, including female circumcision, should remain in place. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with corporal punishment; it is necessary to maintain discipline within the household.

It is not surprising that *kebele* officials are prone to favour their relatives and kin networks since, as members of kin networks, they have long-term moral obligations. The government's governance style is problematic since it interferes with farming calendars, collective land use, and often takes little account of local preferences.

Modern local repertoires

Those who are successful in business and people with education, and model farmers who apply modern inputs are the ones who should be listened to. People should be open to new ideas from outside the community and

⁴⁶ In that they have rules.

even outside the country. Local groups of men and women should organise to pursue development assistance from government and NGOs. People should use modern institutions for saving and borrowing. Household and personal security can be sought through local formal organisations such as *iddir*, NGOs and through government food aid, although long-term development aid would be preferable. People should use cosmopolitan health services. Government should not exploit grass-root organisations. Government gender policies should be implemented. People should not sell their oxen and go into debt to finance customary celebrations such as child marriages and expensive and repeated burial ceremonies.

Religious repertoires

The values, knowledge, advice and instructions of religious leaders whose role is validated nationally and/or internationally should be strictly followed since they know what God's will is. Failure to conform is or will be punished. Orthodox Christians should observe religious holidays called by priests. The official representatives within all religions are against the practice of traditional festivals. Religious followers should practice the rules of charity endorsed by the religion they follow. Poor people can seek personal security via religious charity.

Government modernisation repertoire

Government has regarded the free movement of ideas as a threat to its political control and used various means to prevent it. *Kebele* officials should disseminate and implement government directives, policies and other information. They should gather taxes and mobilise community members for group development work. The best way to mobilise peasants is through long meetings where they are lectured and local government *encadrement* structures with cells of 10 households or less for which one household head has responsibility. Lack of participation should be punished with fines. Officials are theoretically held accountable through the system of *gimgema*; meetings during which community members can raise criticisms and request removal of the official although in practice it is more likely to be used to get rid of officials not towing the line. Social order should be maintained through instructions coming from the Region and *wereda* to the *kebele* administration; local security is maintained by local *kebele* militia who are armed.

Government should provide economic and human development services, and food aid to drought-affected communities, although this should be used as payment for community development work. Local communities should contribute cash and labour on demand to improve local services, such as education, health services sanitation, piped water, roads, and should pay a small fee for the use of these services. Customary gender and family policies should be replaced with modern policies. Local grass-root organisations should be at the service of government. In elections local people should support the government party which is mobilising them for development.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

Donors think that 'information' has the potential to increase market and political efficiency. Local government officials should be accountable to community members through participatory state structures rather than to higher government levels, to ensure a voice for 'the poor' in development activities and to reduce corruption. Local officials should be regularly elected in secret ballots. Opposition parties should be allowed to freely contest regional and national elections. Customary institutions should be increasingly replaced by formal ones.

Appendix 5: Structures and Agency in the Ideas Field of Action 2003-2005

A5.1 Introduction

In this Appendix we investigate the structures of opportunity and constraint and personal agency in the field where ideas are produced and disseminated. In the previous three sections we have compared the *content* of five cultural or ideological repertoires (local traditional, local modern, religious, government, and donor/NGO) in relation to the livelihood, human and governance fields of action. Here we are interested in the structures and agents involved in the *re/production and dissemination* of the five different cultural repertoires, and consider other more diffuse routes by which ideas reach the communities. Finally we compare the content of the five repertoires about how the communities ought to be structured in the ideas field of action

A5.2 The re/production and dissemination of local cultural and ideological repertoires

There is a considerable variety of opinion in these communities and people are willing to express themselves and argue about ideas, argument and persuasion being an element in the Ethiopian habitus. Inhabitants of the mixed sites are aware of different ways of doing things and learn from each other. Inhabitants of the integrated sites have more frequent interactions with urban dwellers, again picking up different ideas. However, as shown below there are a number of conduits for ideas to enter even the remoter communities.

Customary structures and agents transmitting traditional ideas

Older and middle-aged people are the main promoters of traditional ideas, particularly important being the influential elders with important roles in local community governance structures, including notable women with influence over how women think. Some younger people in Korodegaga regret the disappearance of 'beautiful' traditional festivals. Informal interactions and gossip play an important role in the reproduction of the local traditional ideas about how livelihoods, human re/production and community governance should be organised which have been described above.

Local structures and agents transmitting modern ideas

Rich merchants in the integrated sites promote modern utilities, material and organisational technologies and business-based ideas, including market research. Groups of young people in all sites have 'modern' goals involving education and escaping from peasant farming. Young people generally are critical of the old generation with its old-fashioned approach to life. Some women talking in safe contexts are supportive of government gender policies in relation, for example, to land ownership, contraception and abduction, and a few are critical of widely-supported customary practices such as female circumcision. Teachers and community members with higher levels of education, which include males and females in all sites, draw on and disseminate modern repertoires.

Structures and agents producing and disseminating new religious ideologies

All our communities have been affected by religious mobilisations of one kind or another, all with the aim of trying to control or change the behaviour and beliefs of local people. Orthodox Christianity depends on local 'taxes'; Islamic, protestant and catholic mobilisations tend to be externally financed. The increasing influence of religious fundamentalists, notably Islamic, but also Protestant and to some extent Orthodox has led to a greater concern for stricter observance of religious beliefs, and tensions with the predominant more lax and tolerant tendencies. This has had effects both within religious groups and between them. Two of our sites are characterised by differing religious homogeneity: Islam in Korodegaga and Orthodox Christianity in Yetmen. The other two sites are religiously heterogeneous, with Islam and Orthodox Christianity competing in Dinki and Islam, Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic Christianities in Turufe. In the religiously homogenous sites there is competition between more lax practice accommodative of traditional beliefs and stricter and fundamentalist dispositions often spread by external influences. Thus in Korodegaga wahabi influences backed by funding from the Gulf promoted stricter Islamic practices and militated against traditional beliefs.

BOX A4.3: STRICTER ISLAM IN KORODEGAGA

From Korodegaga:

Recently, the strengthening of the sheria has led to the diversion of most people from the traditional religion (which was practised side by side with islam). Modern mosques haven been expanded; quran education has been strengthened; sheiks (coming from other areas) strongly propagate the people to

accept sharia, and to convert all the principles of sharia into practice; most of the sheiks and quran teachers are members of the wahabiya religion (Islamic fundamentalism). Agitators of traditional beliefs and practices strongly complain about these strict religious followers for destroying their forefathers' religion and for their attempt to change their true Islamic religion. The sheiks get support from wahabiya religion followers in other areas of Ethiopia; the money for the construction of mosques comes from Saudi Arabia; strict local followers of Islam state that the Mosques have been constructed with the money which is contributed by private individuals in Saudi Arabia.

In Yetmen priests sought to encourage stricter observance of holy days and they were reported as being more powerful in influencing community behaviour than government officials.

BOX A4.3: ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY IN YETMEN

From Yetmen:

Every Amhara household has obligations to the local church. The focal point of parish life is the Ark of the Covenant (*tabot*). Each household is obliged to contribute a certain amount of grain each year and provide labour and materials for the construction and repair of church buildings. Parishioners baptise their children and bury their dead at the local church. Villagers are devout Christians; although a few practice remnants of animist belief as well. Each person has a religious father (priest) and obeys what he orders. If s/he believes s/he has committed a sin s/he reports to the religious father to be redeemed. It is believed that a peasant who cultivates crops on holidays will have his crops destroyed. Each villager has a name associated with a saint who will protect him/her from troubles.

In times of crisis the Orthodox church organises and leads the community in solving problems.; they teach the commands of God and ask people to obey the law and make and enforce rules for the proper regulation of the community.

Religion is important for everyone. Everyone should have something to fear. A religious person will be protected from evil things and he/she will be preserved from doing bad things. Everyone should follow the orders of God. The base for religion is the fear of God. The important rules are strict observance of religious practices e.g. fasting, praying, baptising and christening, abstain from work at the time of holidays (annual or monthly), attending mass service in Sunday as well as holidays.

In the two heterogeneous sites there were also competing repertoires between stricter and more accommodative tendencies within religious but the main tensions and competitions were between religions and their representatives.

BOX A4.4: THE RELIGIOUS MIX IN DINKI

From Dinki:

An Orthodox Christian expressed dissatisfaction with the church. 'The beliefs and values I was taught have been contradicted by the church's actions. The church tries to collect as much money as possible from the poor believer by threatening to deny christening and burial services, or grave sites. Due to the church's pressure, Orthodox people have been changing, and many more are planning to change their religion to Islam

Muslims in Dinki are sensitive towards what is going on in the rest of the Islamic world. They are greatly concerned about the Iraqi and Afghan peoples. They respect Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, and believe that western people are the enemies of Muslims. They are also well informed about the situation in Palestine.

There are various forms of interaction between Christian and Muslim. Both Muslims and Christians are known to visit annually a pilgrimage site in Herr-Amba, about seven hours walk from Dinki. There are certain commonly celebrated holidays including the Ethiopian New Year though the different religions celebrate the festivals separately.

Increasing hostility between Amhara Orthodox Christians and Muslim Argobba is reportedly linked to political competition.

BOX A4.4: RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY IN DINKI

From Dinki:

Five/six years ago, individuals used to come from Nazret and tried to convince Moslems to sever all relations with Christians even participation in *iddir*. *Iddir* has been affected by Moslem fundamentalists.

The Argoba has begun to strictly bind to Islam religion. Religious leaders have condemned those who drink tella and areqa. Prayers would not be made if they do so. The Argoba and the Amhara has developed hatred each other. This has not been openly expressed. This hatred is due to competition for political power.

There has been resistance to Muslim fundamentalists in Turufe Kecheme.

BOX A4.4: MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM IN TURUFE KEHEME

From Turufe Kecheme:

Religious institutions of Muslims have responded to the economic support from outside. In our neighbouring peasant Associations many Mosques (10-15) are built in one Association, which is highly attached with the religion that in certain areas they have been extremists. If we see the reaction of the Muslim in Turufe in the early 90s they were delighted by the flow of money from Arab countries. Fundamentalism was taking root. But now it is a different story. Fundamentalist Muslims are disturbing people saying that a book from Yemen replaces the former Koran. So they order the Sheiks not to use the former book. They are teaching us not to tolerate the Christians.

In Turufe Kecheme there is also an association between poverty and Protestantism.

BOX A4.4: POVERTY AND PROTESTANTISM

From Turufe Kecheme:

Kalehiwot and Protestants have almost similar rules. They have no fixed fasting dates but Sunday is the main day on which followers pray more than they do on other days. The Kalehiwot and Protestant followers are, by and large, young and middle-aged people. Most of the youths are students, jobless, and ex-soldiers. The rest have health problems or are poor. Compared to other religious people most of the followers are hopeful that God will give them all they need. Such hope, however, makes them lazy and does not encourage them to be hardworking.

One Muslim Oromo widow had allowed her daughter to join the Protestant church, on advice from a neighbour that her daughter will improve her bad behaviour for the blessings of God. Many young believe that joining the Protestant church will end all their worries, including illness.

Protestant churches are also involved in trying to eradicate customary festivals.

BOX A4.5: PROTESTANTS AGAINST CUSTOMARY FESTIVALS

From Turufe Kecheme:

Adbar is a ceremony that takes places on the 1st of Ginbot [in May] as part of the celebration of the day of St. Mary. In the morning everybody makes coffee in the house. In the afternoon close neighbours come together at the *Iqule-Meda*, which refers to a common ground that is equidistant from their houses, and carry out the ceremony. The neighbours who come together for the ceremony could be members of two or three families or more. The ceremony involves the making of coffee and the preparation and consumption of *nifro* (boiled pulses or grains) and *qita* (dry bread) or just bread. There will also be the drinking of *tella* (beer) and *araq*i (spirit). Everybody of both sexes, including children and old people, participate in the ceremony. Moslems as well as Christians take part in the ceremony as neighbours. It is a celebration of Saint Mary; but it also enhances and celebrates good neighbourliness. (NB The elderly play a dominant role in the *Adbar* ceremony.) Moslems as well as Christians take part in the *adbar* ceremony. Lately, however, the pente [protestants] have been condemning it as idolatry and have been preaching against it. In the past people assembled in large numbers for the ceremony; that is, a large number of families used to come together for the *adbar*. Lately, however, only very close neighbours whose households adjoin each other are coming together for it. Question: Does the Orthodox Church sanction *adbar*? Answer: No, the priests actually condemn the *adbar* ceremony. But is a long-standing tradition, a custom that has come down from early times.

As in the other sites religious fasting is important.

BOX A4.5: RELIGIOUS FASTING

From Turufe Kecheme:

Muslims have 1 month fasting in a year (*Ramadan*). It is forbidden to work on Fridays. Muslims are very weak during *Ramadan* and cannot perform any work because they eat nothing all day. They change their consumption habits and eat special food like biscuits, soup, meat, tea, and milk, and they chew *chat*. In consequence they need more money and sometimes they are forced to sell their cattle or stored grain or to borrow money from others. Most other religious people and Muslims themselves believe that during *Ramadan* there is no rainfall and people always expect rain when the fasting is over. Muslims in the *kebele* go on pilgrimages. They prefer going to Mecca if they have money. Some also make pilgrimages to *Sheik Hussein* in Bale Zone of Oromia. They say that it requires at least 500 *birr* to go to *Sheik Hussein* and more than 3000 *birr* to go to Mecca.

Orthodox Christians have the following fasting days: Dehnit, every Wednesday and Friday except the 50 days after Easter. 1. Nenewe (3 days) - on the 15th day before Hudade; 2. Hudade (55 days) - in February, March or April; 3. Hawaria (35 days) - starting in June; 4. Filseta (16 days) - in August; 5. Tsize (40 days) - from 26 September to 5 November in Ethiopian calendar; 6. Ganna (Christmas) (45 days) - from the end of November to December 29 EC. Almost all Orthodox Christians except very small children, about 15% of the community, fast for Nenewe, Hudade Filseta, and Dehnit. During the fasting days meat and dairy products are not eaten but only vegetables and pulses. This may allow the rich farmers who can afford to eat dairy products and meat to reduce their expenses.

In the *kebele* rather than Saturday and Sunday the 5th, 7th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 27th, 28th and 29th days of a month are holy days (like St George, St Mary etc), though not everybody stops working on these days. A household may stop working for 3 or 4 days (in addition to Sundays), out of the above mentioned days. Different households give importance to different saints or angels and stop working on the dates commemorated to these saints or angels. Many households place importance on 12th, 19th, 21st, 29th and others select some dates to stop working. I saw many Tigrayans stop working on the 14th and 29th days, which is not common to others.

The production and dissemination of government ideologies

Government was particularly active in the communities in the lead-up to the May election. They organised community work and called many meetings. There were attempts to change working practices through education and the issuing of directives, which were successfully resisted in Turufe Kecheme. Many meetings were devoted to telling the community to vote for the EPRDF. Women in Korodegaga and Turufe Kecheme were more supportive of the EPRDF than the men, citing their championing of women's economic rights.

The production and dissemination of donor/NGO ideologies

Donor and NGO repertoires have focused on promoting pro-poor policies and governance, recently being more active with central government in Addis Ababa than in local communities, though there are plans for this to change. Consequently such donor and NGO ideologies which have reached the communities have mostly done so through intermediaries. For example, ideas of what democracy entails owe a debt to donor formulations.

Donors have been promoting the poverty reduction policy process, and linkages to MDG issues, putting pressure for achieving quotas which sometimes seem unrealistic, and can reinforce the campaign approach in sectoral initiatives in health, education, water and sanitation, environmental rehabilitation. Governance issues have related to questions of transparency, accountability and empowerment. Though a concern about civil society is expressed donors have tended to view support to government as the legitimate and only practical approach to development and NGO ideologies have moved away from the project approach and are concerned with scaling up, replication and integration with regional government structures. NGO presence in even the drought prone sites seems to have been reduced, with less involvement in Dinki and only limited and dwindling support to a small irrigation cooperative in Korodegaga.

A5.3 Other current influences on local ideas

As revealed above Government, donors, NGOs and religious leaders act intentionally to affect the preferences of community inhabitants. At the same time people have access to a more diffuse set of influences, including membership in wider 'imagined communities', networks of relations and interactions beyond the community in

other rural areas and towns, local political parties, diasporas and the media, particularly radio.

'Imagined' communities

'Imagined' communities with their related beliefs play an important role in social identity.

BOX A4.1: THE ARSSI OROMO

From Turufe Kecheme:

The Arssi Oromo in Turufe Kecheme, as in all other Arssi Oromo groups in the country, have the concept of citizenship known as *Arssuma* literally meaning "being Arssi Oromo." *Arssuma* means having a character of independence, purity, and identity. It carries citizenship rights which include the right to marry an Arssi girl, the right to have a piece of land and become prosperous, and a feeling of being a recognised member of the community sharing all the values, customs, and traditions existing within Arssi Oromo. He has a right and capacity, for example, to be chosen as a member of *shanacha* whose role is to arbitrate and resolve disputes. *Arssuma*, in its strict sense prohibits members from marrying slaves, craftsmen (potters, tanners and smiths), and anybody with leprosy even though these rules are not strictly followed today in the area. The Arssi Oromo try to make themselves superior to other ethnic groups and even to other branches of Oromo like the Shewa. They consider the Shewa Oromo as Amhara, and some uneducated people call them *Shewa Galla*, which is a discriminatory term. Today the term *Galla* is being condemned officially by Oromo educators and political leaders. They said that it is a discriminatory word given to the Oromo by others.

Networks of relations and interactions beyond the communities

These are also very important. For example, people in Dinki are linked in many ways with people in other rural and urban communities.

BOX A4.2: NETWORKING FROM DINKI

From Dinki:

People in the site, as members of the community and sub-groups, maintain multifarious relations with other communities, both rural and urban. The Amhara have strong links to family, church and gravesites in the neighbouring communities on the higher ground, notably Lallo to the north and Aygebir to the east. The Argoba have links with the neighbouring lowland areas, notably their religious sites and religious school in Addis Alem, and Gachene where the Argoba special *wereda* is located within the Afar Region. Some people migrate to Afar, especially the young Muslims, who migrate for Islamic religious study, normally spending more than a year. A few other Muslims migrate to Nazret and Arssi to visit their relatives or to visit their religious friends.

Local political parties

The EPRDF party system has become more extensive in parallel with and sometimes merged with the government structure. Opposition parties at a local level are almost non-existent, although in the 2005 elections they campaigned in some towns and had local supporters. However, the ideologies they espoused were known at least by those with access to radios, showing that there is considerable rural awareness of national issues. In all our sites despite limited opposition presence support for opposition parties was overwhelming.

Diasporas

Diasporas have had little organised impact on development in Ethiopia though they have been active politically as was seen in the 2005 election period, and migrants remittances have provided family assistance and stimulated some investment, particularly in urban construction. The direct influence of organised diasporas in our sites was only witnessed in Dinki where a diaspora group from Northern Shewa sent some money that was distributed to peasants and as we saw earlier became an election issue. However, migrants sending remittances from abroad to their families particularly from the Gulf is beginning to have an impact, providing some assistance for a few families, and fuelling aspirations of some of the younger generation to migrate. The spread of fundamentalist tendencies is also spread through returning migrants.

Media

The influence of the media in rural areas largely limited to radio, though wireless telephones reached our sites during the research period and could begin to have a profound impact.

BOX A4.6: LISTENING TO RADIOS

From Turufe Kecheme:

Youngsters listen to a radio when they are working (threshing, harvesting etc) and most people listen radio in the evening, and at night time when they have rest time. They use the radio to find out about the general condition of the country, and in 2005 mainly to know what was going on in relation to the elections.

Only in Yetmen town is TV and satellite TV available to very small elite, though migrants to towns are exposed to global influences through video screenings. The impact of radio on changing values is difficult to gauge, though in terms of children's education and regarding issues surrounding gender relations, notably in the context of the anti-HIV/AIDS campaigns, radio programmes seem to be influential and in the run up to the 2005 elections and its aftermath not just local radio but Amharic services of VOA and Deutsche Welle provided contending perspectives.

Getting information

The main source of information about external happenings in all sites are other people who have been travelling outside the community. Listening to a radio was quite common in 2004 and we believe that this has become more widespread as a result of the 2005 election.

If you wanted to know about events in the capital or elsewhere in the country, what would you do?	%age of respondents			
	Korodegaga	Dinki	Yetmen	Turufe K.
Ask someone who has been travelling outside the community	78	80	70	84
Listen to the radio	58	22	48	65
Attend a local meeting	16	2	45	51
Write a letter	1		1	23
Read a newspaper	2	2	4	19
Talk on the telephone	2	1	1	16
Watch TV	1			14
Ask someone more knowledgeable				10
Discuss with neighbours or friends				9

A5.4 Local and ideological repertoires related to the ideas field of action

'Traditional' local repertoires

Wise and experienced elders should guide the community as to the values they should follow, the knowledge that they need, and the beliefs which are correct in each of the fields of action.

Modern local repertoires

Those who are successful in business and people with education, and model farmers who apply modern inputs are the ones who should be listened to. People should be open to new ideas from outside the community and even outside the country.

Religious repertoires

The values, knowledge, advice and instructions of religious leaders whose role is validated nationally and/or internationally should be strictly followed since they know what God's will is. Failure to conform is or will be punished.

Government modernisation repertoire

Government has regarded the free movement of ideas as a threat to its political control and used various means to prevent it.

Donor/NGO modernisation repertoire

Donors think that 'information' has the potential to increase market and political efficiency.